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INTRODUCTION
It is almost a commonplace to say that sound information 
is essential for successful and active diplomacy. It is 
scarcely less so to point out that confidence in its accuracy 
and completeness is equally essential. The present thesis 
will therefore make an attempt to indicate,within the limits 
of its title ,first the information actually received by the 
British Foreign Office, and secondly the degree of their 
confidence in its accuracy and completeness. With the first 
purpose in view, the ground will be cleared by distinguishing 
between certain classes of information and indicating the 
part played by each in the period under discussion. Under 
the second head attention will be drawn, as the information
IS
on the most important developments dealt with, to the 
sources from which that information was derived and to their 
relative value.
The first class of information concerns the interests 
of the different Powers. It indicates the action likely to 
be imposed upon them by economic factors, by the demands of 
trade or of geographical position, or by the championship of 
traditional ambitions: in short all that determines in which 
direction a power is likely to make a move in the diplomatic 
field.
The second class concerns their Internal affairs.
It shows the character of the Government of each Power: 
whether it is likely to lay emphasis on one Interest rather 
than on another; the situation of the Government within the 
country: its power to enforce its will, or the possibilities 
of restrictions being imposed upon its course by internal 
factors and if so, the strength and scope of these factors; 
and the military, naval and financial position of each country. 
This class includes, in fact, all information which goes to 
show the degree of strength with which any particular diplo­
matic move is likely to be carried through*
The third concerns the degree to which either the 
direction of the move or the strength behind it is likely to 
be modified by the relations and commitments of one power to 
another.
■fKx Hxirci
In the period under discussion it is tMa class of 
information that is of vital importance. Various factors 
brought it about that at the opening of the period information 
under the first two heads was exceptionally full, and that 
this information proved with few modifications equally 
applicable at its close.
The simplification which had occurred in the diplomatic 
field as the result of the constitution of a united Germany 
and Italy, and the Ausgleich of Austria-Hungary, left the 
five Powers pitted against each other as never before. This
closer contact between them, emphasised by the development 
of communications, brought about a definition and clarity 
as regards the interests of the different Powers which had 
also not previously existed. The demands of a growing 
public opinion in general, and the influence of the incisive 
nature of German diplomacy in particular, were factors in 
accelerating this process. The crises of the last few 
years beginning with the War Scare of 1875, furnished the 
opportunity. The Congress of Berlin and the negotiations 
immediately preceding it, were instrumental in filling in 
the gaps, recapitulating and formulating what had already 
been learnt. Not until the emergence of the colonial question 
was diplomacy influenced by an interest that had not been 
formulated in this period.
Information on internal affairs was also less important 
in the period under consideration than in earlier or later 
periods. For many of those who determined the character and 
position of the Governments from 1879-85 had done the same 
for those of the preceding period, during which, moreover, 
they had become personally acquainted. One thinks particu­
larly in this connection of Bismarck and the Emperor William, 
Francis Joseph and Ahdrassy, Alexander II, Gorehakoff,
Giers and the Panslavists in Russia, and the men of the
in Italy and in France. With the exception perhaps^ 
of the advent of Jules Ferry in France, changes in personnel
did not effect important changes in policy. Andrassy, 
as a member of the Austrian Delegations, continued to 
influence the position of the Government, and Haymerle 
and Kalhoky carried on his policy. Alexander III maintained 
the policy of his father. At Berlin,Salisbury and Beacons- 
field had made personal contacts with the Emperor and 
Bismarck, Andrassy and Haymerle, Gorehakoff and Waddington. 
Salisbury in addition, had made the acquaintance of Francis 
Joseph, of King Humbert, Depretis and Maffei in Rome and 
established contact throu^ Ignatieff with the panslavist
fo
influences on Russian policy. The advantage ef the British
Foreign Office of these personal contacts was lost when
Gladstone and Granville came into power in April 1880.
Some slight compensation was afforded, however, by Dilke*s
by
friendship with Gambetta,,^a personal friendship dating
from 1872 between the British Ambassador in Paris and
Barthélémy St. Hilaire and by Granville*s personal knowledge
of Russia, although the latter was acquired as far back as
1856. Internal factors apart from changes in personnel,
of importance for the policy of the different countries
dated in origin to the period preceding that with which we
are concerned. By 1878 the Foreign Office was sufficiently
well-informed as to what these factors were in the different
countries and their relative significance, to watch their
To
development and accurately ^estimate the part they were likely
to play under given circumstances. The Importance of such 
factors as the military party and Hungarian politics in 
Austria-Hungary, the irredentist agitation and the papal 
question^ in Italy, the religious question in Germany, 
Panslavism and Nihilism in Russia, was fully appreciated.
Lastly, by 1878 relations and commitments of one 
Power to another had come to play the predominant part in 
diplomacy. This was partly the result of the fullness of 
the information possessed by each Power as to the interests 
and internal affairs of the others. For it was this 
information which made possible the development under 
Bismarck*s leadership of a series of secret and interlocking 
agreements that made it impossible for one Power to negotiate 
singly with any other for the settlement of any individual 
issue. Moreover under his leadership commitments between 
the Powers assumed a systematised, definite and formal 
character that had hitherto only existed in isolated instances. 
Bismarck*s policy, based upon the realisation that behind 
all diplomacy lies only the ultima ratio of war, produced a 
series of commitments on the part of Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Russia, Italy, Rumania and Servia, as to thé attitude they 
would maintain should war break out in stated contingencies.
The secret character of these agreements, and the fact 
that neither the British Foreign Office nor the British 
representatives abroad ever anxiously 'accepted the principle 
on which the system inaugurated by Bismarck was based, added
considerably to the difficulties ordinarily experienced in 
procuring sound information and to the efforts that were 
devoted to securing it. The period under discussion, 
therefore, throws more light than usual on the sources from 
which diplomatic information was derived and on the factors 
which influenced its accuracy.
CHAPTER I .
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN RELATIONS
AUGUST 1878 - AUGUST 1879.
1.
During the year that immediately followed the Congress 
information on the movement of Powers towards or apart from 
each other was conveyed^less by reports specifically dealing 
with the subject, than by telegrams or despatches communicating 
the acceptance or disapproval of proposals already made, or 
the suggestion of fresh combinations, in regard to questions 
under diplomatic negotiation. These reports collated and 
interpreted in the light of the knowledge which we have 
shown the Foreign Office to possess in regard to the interests 
of the different Powers, testified at once to the existence 
of a desire to co-operate between any two of them, or to the 
weakening of former friendships.
The degree to which a Power is informed by such means 
necessarily depends upon its position as a negotiator. If 
it is itself involved in close negotiations with all the 
Great Powers on a number of questions, and more particularly 
if these questions do not touch the vital interests of all 
of them - so that the decision of some is determined largely 
by its effect on European relations - then the information
a Power derives from this source will be at its fullest and 
most reliable. These conditions were exactly fulfilled by 
England in 1878-9, Associated closely with Austria-Hungary 
and less closely with France, she negotiated on a series of 
questions in connection with the Ottoman Enpire. Decisions 
were demanded from all the Signatories of/^ Berlin^ , but it was 
evident that those of Germany, France and Italy, were deter­
mined primarily by their alliance policy. Later, associated 
more closely with France and less closely with Austria- 
Hungary, she negotiated on questions connected with Egypt.
Due** to financial obligations^&d its position as part of 
the Ottoman Empire, decisions were again demanded from all 
the Powers. In this case those given by Russia and Germany 
were determined by their alliance policy.
Ho-tnci frf iûVm cD
During the first period, whose-end may be dated roughly 
in May 1879, the tendencies revealed by these negotiations 
are: the separation of Germany from her former allies; the 
increasing isolation of Russia; the rapprochement of Germany 
and France ; a tendency of Italy to seek the friendship of 
England.
li
The impression that Schuvaloff gave^,Andrassy in a
conversation with him in November 1878, that the Russian
evacuation of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia might not take
(1)
place within the period stipulated by the Treaty, combined
(1) RO.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 814 16 November 1878.
Confidential
with the failure of Austria-Hungary to negotiate successfully
the Convention with Turkey for the occupation of Bosnia and
(1)
Herzegovina, tended to strengthen Anglo-Austrian relations.
A prolonged period of negotiation with Russia was then 
initiated. It was preceded by an exchange of views between 
England and Austria-Hungary which established the two questions 
to be settled with Russia. They were first her prompt evacua­
tion of Balkan territory, and second a peaceful transition 
from her occupation to the regular rotimo, such as would 
prevent the return of her troops on the pretext of Turkish 
outrages. Immediately after the Congress, Andrassy in 
conversation with Elliot, the British Ambassador in Vienna 
had revived the proposal he made there for a mixed European
occupation of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia when the term of
(2)
the Russian occupation expired. Salisbury expressed his
(3)
readiness to come to an understanding on the question.
At the end of November Andrassy*s suggestion was embodied in
(4)
a formal proposal. Salisbury immediately stated that
(5)
England would take part proportionately to her military strength.
(1) P.O. 7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 709 1 October
Confidential
(2) KO.7/932 Elliot to Salisbury 500 20 July 1878.
(3) EO. 7/925 Salisbury to Elliot 24 and 29 July 1878.
(4) KO.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 819 23 November 1878.
4Alternative proposals were also discussed for the event of
the rejection of the mixed occupation by the other powers.
During the course of these negotiations Germany was not
consulted by England, nor, as was evident to the Foreign
Office by Austria-Hungary. Yet, very soon after Andrassy*s
formal proposal, Salisbury invited a confidential expression
(1)
of opinion on the matter from Waddington. It was by France
that the matter was raised unofficially at Berlin and through
St. Vallier the French Ambassador in Berlin that the Foreign
(2)
Office learnt Bismarck^s views on the subject. Bismarck,
it appeared, would not advise the Kaiser to accept the proposal
if it were made to Germany. Yet the proposal for a mixed
occupation was, and had been from the start, an essentially
Austrian combination. During February and March the
exchange of views between England and the Dual Monarchy
(3)
continued. A division of opinion occurred on the point- 
as to whether the Russian evacuation was to oommonoe or to be 
completed by the date named in the Treaty. The matter was,
(1) EG.27/2317 Lyons to Salisbury 1069 14 December 1878
Very Confidential 
EO. 27/2318 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram 65 17 December 1878
Strictly Confidential 
D[ocuments] D[iplomatiques] F[rançais] Series I Vol.II 
No.371 footnote.
(2) EO. 64/910 Russell to Salisbury 691 28 December 1878.
Most Confidential
(3) Especially EO 7/956 Salisbury to Elliot Telegram
6 February 1879.
EO. 7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 81 8 February 1879.
Confidential
therefore, put before the powers. Germany again refused 
to give an opinion in Austria*s favour.
It v/as soon made clear that her attitude was not the 
result of a desire to co-operate with Russia. In view of 
the doubtful reception that seemed to await the proposal 
of mixed occupation when it should be put before the Powers, 
it was temporarily given up in favour of an English combina­
tion. Salisbury proposed, and Andrassy agreed, that a 
project whereby Turkish troops should enter Eastern Rumelia 
immediately after the Russian departure under the surveillance 
of European officers, should be put before the Government at 
St. Petersburg. Lord Dufferin, newly appointed British
Ambassador there, was instructed to do so at the earliest 
(2)
opportunity. At this juncture the proposal originally 
made by Andrassy was taken up by Russia. On the 27th of 
February Schuvaloff in a conversation with Salisbury pointed 
out the dangers of insurrection breaking out in Eastern 
Rumelia on the departure of the Russian troops. He also 
stated emphatically that the immediate entry of Turkish troops 
into the province was to be avoided at all costs. In this 
difficulty he thought the idea of a mixed European occupation, 
put forward by Andrassy during the Congress,offered the only
(1) FA 7/956 Salisbury to Elliot Telegrams 4 and 8 March 1879
(2) EO. 65/1057 Salisbury to Dufferin 3 26 February 1879.
solution. He was prepared to urge his Government not only
to consent to it but to propose it. Schuvaloff shortly
afterwards left for St. Petersburg. As a result of his
efforts the proposal for mixed occupation, when it was
formally made to the Powers by a circular of March 19th.
(2)
came from Russia. The German reply was given immediately.
It stated that she must decline all participation though she
(3)
did not object to mixed occupation in principle. Her
reply, however, as was probably intended, wrecked the
proposition. Austria-Hungary accepted the Russian proposal
(4)
without reserves of any kind. It was thus made clear to
the British Foreign Office that Bismarck*s prescription for 
dealing with Eastern difficulties - that when Austria and 
Russia had agreed upon any proposal Germany should give it 
her support - no longer held good.
The significance of the incident in this respect appeared 
all the more clear from the fact that Odo Russell, basing his 
views upon the belief that German policy was still guided by 
that precept, and knowing that Schuvaloff on his way to St.
(1) P.0.65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin 12 27 February 1879.
(2) P.O. 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin Telegram 21 March 1879,
(3) FG.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 174 22 March 1879.
(4) EO.7/956 Salisbury to Elliot 29 March 1879.
Petersburg had seen Bismarck and discussed the topic with him,
had informed the Foreign Office that the latter, true to
his policy of supporting Austria and Russia when they were
(1)
agreed, would assent to the proposal. Moreover the Foreign
Office was informed that Germany’s unfavourable reply was
made in spite of repeated efforts on the part of Andrassy to
induce Bismarck to accept. He had even taken steps to assure
the Chancellor that the commander of the German contingent
(2)
should act as Commander-in-Chief.
The Foreign Office would perhaps have appreciated the 
German attitude somewhat differently had St. Vallier commu­
nicated to Odo Russell tie whole of his conversation with 
Bismarck when he had raised the question with the Chancellor 
in the previous January. The Chancellor had told St. Vallier 
that he would support an Austro-Russian occupation if it 
were suggested, and would make it clear to the two participants 
that if necessary he would support whichever was attacked by 
the other. He repeated this plan to St. Vallier in April,
but it never appears to have been suggested to Russell, or
(3 )
through the German Ambassador in London, to Salisbury.
(1) F.a 64/932. Russell to Salisbury 138 2 March 1879.
Secret 
and 166 12 March 1879.
Most Confidential
(2) F.O. 64/932 Russell to Salisbury 197 6 April 1879.
Confidential
FG. 7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 225 11 April 1879.
(3) D.DR Series I Vol.II No.371.
F.0.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 18 8 January 1879.
Most Confidential 
D.DF. Series I Vol.II No.409.
8As far, then, as British information was concerned the German
attitude represented a distinct separation of Germany from
her former allies*
Meanwhile with the arrival of Dufferin in St. Petersburg
on the 4th March, the emphasis shifted from the exchange of
views between London and Vienna to that between London and
St. Petersburg. Austria-Hungary was kept informed but she
ceased to take a direct part. German influence on the Anglo-
Russian negotiations was as conspicuously absent as it had
been from the Anglo-Austrian. The opening of the negotiations
was facilitated by the withdrawal of the British fleet below
(1)
the Straits, and an exchange of assurances as to the 
determination of the two Powers to secure the maintenance of 
the Treaty as far as Eastern Rumelia was concerned. The 
Russian declaration stated that neither the Emperor nor his 
armies would countenance or protect the inhabitants of Eastern 
Rumelia in resistance to the introduction of the regime 
provided for by the Treaty, but would exercise their influence 
to secure peaceful acquiescence. Dufferin declared on behalf 
of the British Government that they would at all times urge 
upon the Porte to respect the ri^ts of the Eastern Rumelian
(1) P.O. 7/956 Salisbury to Elliot 12 March 1879.
F.O, 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin Telegram 10 March 1879
9
, . (1)population as guaranteed to them by the new constitution.
Gorehakoff then reduced the points upon which an understanding
was to be reached to three. They were the recording of the
assurances recently exchanged in diplomatic notes to be
addressed to the Porte; the conditions under which a mixed
occupation v/as to take place; or in the event of that project
falling through, the conditions to be imposed upon the entry
of Turkish troops in order to secure that it took phce with-
(2)
out disturbances. When prance gave a similar reply to
that given by Germany and Italy made her acceptance of a mixed
(3)
occupation conditional on German participation, discussion
( 4)
on the third point already initiated, was taken up seriously.
On the 2nd of April the British Government formally submitted 
a proposal to Russia. On the 9th Andrassy was put in touch 
with the negotiations and it was intimated that he should
(5)
cease to urge the acceptance of mixed occupation upon Bismarck.
(1) EO. 65/1042 Dufferin to Salisbury 22 15 March 1879.
Recording Telegram 
EO, 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin 7 16 March
Telegram
(2) EO. 65/1042 Dufferin to Salisbury 30 19 March 1879
Recording Telegram 11.
(3) D.DE Series I Vol.II No.401.
EO.27/2366 Lyons to Salisbury 323 20 March 1879
and Telegram 58 26 March 1879
EO.45/378 Paget to Salisbury 117 25 March 1879.
(4) EO. 65/1042 Dufferin to Salisbury Telegram 14
21 March 1879
EC,65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin 150 2 April 1879
(5) EO. 7/950 Salisbury to Elliot Telegrams 9 April 1879
and 12 April 1879
10
Meanwhile the alternative proposal had reached its final 
shape. It took the form of five points of which only one 
touched a question of principle and was likely to produce a 
division of opinion among the Powers, when formally proposed 
to them, Aleko Pasha was to he immediately nominated Governor 
General of Eastern Rumelia. Turkey had already assured 
herself that none of the Powers, apart from Russia objected 
to his nomination. Secondly the European Commission appointed 
under the Treaty for the organisation and temporary adminis­
tration of Eastern Rumelia was to be prolonged for a year.
The consent of the Powers was expected on this point as no 
difficulty had been made when an extension of its original 
six months’ term had been secured in December. Thirdly 
Turkish troops were not to be summoned by the Governor General 
into the interior of the province until after the evacuation 
of the Russian troops had been completed and then only with 
the consent of the majority of the Commission. The same 
condition applied to the occupation of Bourgas and Ichtman, 
but the previous consent of the Commission was not required. 
These last two points involved an infringement of Turkish 
ri^ts under the Treaty. They were therefore, to be secured 
by English and Russian influence as spontaneous concessions 
from Turkey and no expression of opinion on the subject on 
the part of the other Powers was necessary. Lastly Turkish 
troops were to fefrain from occupying the Balkan frontier of 
Eastern Rumelia for a year or until the delimitation of the
11
frontier was complete, whichever occurred first, provided all
further disputes on the delimitation Commissions, which in
accordance with the Berlin Treaty were then at work in the
Balkans, were decided by a majority vote. The non-occupation
of the Balkan line was again to be secured by Anglo-Russian,
influence on Turkey. To secure the acceptance of the
majority principle for the work of the Commissions it was
necessary to make a foimal proposition to the Powers signatory
(1)
to the Berlin Treaty and to secure their consent. This^  as
well as the other points of the agreement was finally secured,
ng 
(2)
iv»c>
and the combination was successful in the peaceful
and prompt evacuation of the Russian troops.
The negotiations to secure its acceptance, however,
furnished a further illustration to the British Foreign Office
of the separation of Germany from her former allies. Germany
stated her readiness to agree to whatever was accepted
(3)
unanimously by the other Powers. The Foreign Office knew
(1) P.0.65/1043 Dufferin to Salisbury 86 7 April 1879
Personal and Secret ,
F.O.65/1038 Salisbury to Dufferin 170 8 April 1879
(2) F.O.65/1038 Salisbury to Dufferin Telegram 40 12 April 1879
F.O.65/1038 Salisbury to Dufferin Telegrams 25 15 April 18TO
39 21 April 1879 
41 22 April 1879 
F.O.65/1043 Dufferin to Salisbury Telegram 52 25 April isi*) 
F.O.65/1038 Salisbury to Dufferin Telegrams 52 27 April
53 28 April
F.O.65/1044 Dufferin to Salisbury Telegram 14 2 May »g;?
(3) F.O.64/932 Russell to Salisbury Telegram 27 March 1879
12
nothing of the explanation which Bismarck had given to
Andrassy when he took up this attitude. The Chancellor had
stated that he could not accept a proposal which would place
Russia, whose representatives were in a permanent minority on
(1)
the Commissions, in a position of complete isolation.
British information only offered further evidence of Austria-
Hungary’s inability to secure German support for a proposal
to which she attached considerable importance, and of Germany’s
desertion of Russia. It was seen that on account of Germany’s
failure to reject the proposal outright, the latter Power was
eventually compelled to accept a principle for the settlement
of further disputes on the Commission^ which^however limited
was inimical to her interests.
Evidence of the isolation of Russia was afforded by a
number of other negotiations that were going on at the same
time as the negotiations in regard to the evacuation of
Eastern Rumelia. The first of these, in point of date, was
caused by Russia’s refusal to accept the decision of the
Bulgarian Frontier Commission in regard to the exact position
of the frontier to the east of the fortress of Silistria on
(2)
the Bulgarian-Rumanian section. Austria-Hungary and England
(1) M.Müller! Die Bedetttung des Berliner Kongresses für die
deutschi-russischen Beziehungen.
Radowitz to Réussi 17 and 26 March 1879.
(2) Accounts and Papers 1878-9 LXXX Correspondence Respecting
the European Commissions for the Demarcation of Frontiers
p.81.
13
at once consulted together as to the attitude they should
adopt. They agreed to abide by the decision of the
(2)
Commission and Italy supported them. When Rumania, in
spite of the Russian attitude occupied the frontier as
delimited by the Commission, the three Powers instructed their
(3)
representatives at Bucharest to offer her their moral support.
Germany and Prance adopted a separate line, but failed to give
Russia their support. For the^ refused to offer any opinion
as to whether Rumania or Russia were entitled to the territory
(4)
3h dispute.
When the Sultan in December 1878 in accordance with the
Treaty, asked for the consent of the Powers to the nomination
of Rustem Pasha as Governor General of Eastern Rumelia, German
action was not separate from that of the other Powers. She
"would concert with England," Russell reported, "in signifying
(5)
her approval." France, Italy and Austria also accepted
(1) F.O.7/926 Salisbury to Elliot Telegram 12 November 1878
642 26 December 1878
Confidential
(2) F.O.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 44 18 January 1879 |
F.O.45/377 Paget to Salisbury Telegram 4 February 1879 |
(3) F.O.27/2362 Salisbury to Lyons, Paget, Elliot and Russell
Telegram 3 February 1879
F.O.45/377 Paget to Salisbury Telegram ’ 7 February 1879
(4) F.O.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 30 17 January 1879 and
Confidential 7 February 1879. 
F.0.27/2362 Lyons to Salisbury 140 5 February 1879
(5) F.0.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 13 6 January 1879
Confidential
14
(1 )
during the first week of 1879. Russia however maintained 
that the nomination could not be made until the Commission 
for the organisation of Eastern Rumelia had completed its
(2)
work and fully defined the powers of the Governor General.
She adhered to this view unsupported, and in face of Austrian
and English pressure until a solution was found in the
nomination of Aleko Pasha concurrently with the issue of
(3)
the Eastern Rumelian constitution.
Germany’s separation from her former allies was made still 
clearer by the continual revelation of German co-operation 
with France. Such co-operation, moreover, was often com- ; 
bined with action upon questions in which the interest of 
Austria-Hungary and Russia were concerned only remotely or 
not at all.
On August 22nd a Circular despatch from Waddington to the
representatives of France at the different capitals Informed
them of the supreme importance which he attached to the prompt
(4)
execution of the Treaty of Berlin in all its provisions.
(1) F.O.45/377 Paget to Salisbury 3 5 January 1879
F.0.27/2361 Lyons to Salisbury 7 3 January 1879
(2) F.O.65/1041 Loftus to Salisbury 3 1 January 1879
Confidential
11 14 January
85 8 February
F. 0.65/1042 Dufferin to Salisbury 8 8 March f's??
10 9 March
22 15 March iv)f
(3) F.0.78/2949 Malet to Salisbury 341 23 April 1879
and 362 30 April 1879
(4) D.D.F.Series I Vol.II No.341 footnote
F.O.27/2312 Adams to Salisbury 698 6 September
Confidential
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A week later De ring, who was temporarily in charge of the
Uho WetS m  cKkfQ-t &(:
Berlin Embassy, telegraphed that Radowitz, thel-German—MinisWr
OH-'tt
fo-r Porei^ Affaire, had been instructed by Bismarck to draw
up a Circular inviting the Signatory Powers to unite in
summoning the Porte in identic language to carry out the
(1)
provisions of the Treaty without delay. The invitation
was duly made by a note dated 2nd of September. Salisbury
was at first inclined to suspect that the German Note was the
(2)
result of Russian influence. Beaconsfield, however, drew
his attention to the possibility that Waddington "had been
(3)
stimulating Bismarck." Later Andrassy pressed Salisbury
(4)
to give a favourable reply to the German note. The British
Minister then thought that the proposal, which he had already
(5)
rejected, had arisen with Austria-Hungary. But his fears
(1) P.0.64/907 Dering to Salisbury Telegram 51 August 1878
Afterwards Waddington wrote as if 47
Bismarck had taken the initiative 
in a matter in which France was 
primarily concerned.
D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.346.
Müller op.cit. p.77 .
( Bismarck to Radowitz Telegram 26 August 1879)
(2) Buclde op.cit. Vol.II p.1244.
(3) Buckle op.clt. V61.II p.1245.
(4) F.O. 7/925 Salisbury to Elliot Telegram 17 September 1878
(5) Cecll/p.336-337.
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for Anglo-Austrian relations as a result of Schuvaloff*s
presence in Vienna, led him to look for opportunities of
inadvertently giving offence where none existed. Elliot’s
(1)
reports, moreover, did not support his suspicions. Again, 
the eagerness of France in accepting the German proposal was 
very marked. Waddington it is true informed the French 
Ambassadors at London, Vienna, and Rome that he wished to 
know the opinions of the Governments to which they were
(  2  )  ho\«c\3ew
accredited, before he replied. Dering, morcover, reported
from Berlin, that when the note was communicated to him,
(3)
Waddington had immediately promised French support. This
( 4)
information was soon confirmed from Paris. In any case,
(5)
the readiness with which Germany gave up her proposal, in 
spite of the fact that Austria-Hungary, Russia and France had
(1) F.O. 7/934 Elliot to Salisbury Telegram 7 September 1878
and
671 19 September 1878
(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.341.
(3) P.0.64/908 Dering to Salisbury Telegrams 5 September 1878
8 September 1878
(4) P.0.27/2312 Adams to Salisbury 698 6 September 1878
Confidential
The note was communicated to Waddington by Hohenlohe 
on the 4th.
(5) F.O.64/908 Dering to Salisbury Telegram 12 September 1878
541 21 September 1878
The British reply was only given to von Brincken, 
the. German charge d ’affaires in London on the 11th.
D.D.F. Ser.I Vol.II No.343. B u c k l e 1247.
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accepted it, and Italy promised support if it were accepted 
unanimously, made it appear as if the note had been issued 
rather as a demonstration of friendship towards some other 
Power, than in the hope of advancing any German object in the 
East.
The negotiations on the Silistrian question ,as we have
seen,afforded evidence of Franco-German co-operation. During
the course of the negotiations for the Russian evacuation of
the Balkans, the French and German replies to the Russian
proposal for mixed occupation were the same* The identity
of their attitude was not accidental. St. Vailler had been
invited by Bismarck to Friedrichspi^he early in January.
During the conversations that took place between them, the
Chancellor had expressed the hope that Waddington would share
(2)
his views on the subject. Russell, though he did not
know exactly what had been said, was able to inform the 
Foreign Office that a discussion on the question had taken
(3)
place. Later, Bismarck in speaking to the British Ambassador
deliberately associated his attitude in the matter with that
(4.)
adopted by Waddington*
(1) F.0*64/908 Bering to Salisbury Telegram 5 September <3)2 
F.0.45/340 Macdonnell to Salisbury i
Telegram
56 10 September
(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No*371.
(3) P.O.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 18 8 January 1879 i
Most Confidential i
(4) F.0*64/932 Russell to Salisbury 138 2 March 1879
Secret
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Negotiations were also going on concerning the
recognition of Rumanian independence and the rectification of
the Greek frontier. In the first of these questions Germany
appeared to take up an attitude in direct contravention of
Austria^s interests. These demanded the extension of
Austrian influence in Rumania, and therefore the immediate
appointment of a Minister at Bucharest. In the second question
Germany was seen to play an active part in a matter which did
not touch Austrian and Russian interests.
In the autumn of 1878 Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey
accorded diplomatic recognition to Rumania and accredited
Ministers of her Court. Germany and France co-operated in
withholding recognition. They demanded that Rumania, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of the Berlin
Treaty, should first arrange for complete religious equality
(1)
within her territories. That involved the abrogation of
the 7th Article of her constitution which provided that only
Christians could enjoy civil rights in Rumania. The Powers,
except for Germany and France, were prepared to be satisfied
with a declaration from the Prince and Parliament of Rumania,
that they intended to convoke a Constituent Assembly for the
(2)
purpose. Bigland, however, having no interest at stake in
(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.361.
(2) F.0.45/377 Paget to Salisbury 12 13 January
Confidential
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the matter was guided by a desire to show her friendship
towards France and Germany and did not, for the time being,
accredit a Minister. Italy, who had already sent to her
Consul General at Bucharest letters accrediting him Minister
Plenipotentiary, thereupon instructed him to defer their
(2)
presentation.
The British Foreign Office had clear evidence as to the 
identity of the attitude adopted by France and Germany, and 
they possessed no information such as would enable them to 
explain the French action on the basis of French interests in 
Rumania.
During the early months of 1879 further information 
showed that the identity of the French and German attitude 
was maintained. The two Powers insisted on the fullest 
possible concessions from the Rumanian Government, in the 
face of a hostile public opinion in Rumania, and continual 
efforts on the part of England and Italy to find a compromise 
that would enable recognition to take place.
On the 1st of February England with Italy's support made
(3)
proposals for a compromise simultaneously to France and Germany.
(1) P.0.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 46 27 January:-
"Britain had taken rather a more unyielding tone than she
otherwise would have done out of deference to Germany 
and France."
(2) P.0.45/341 Paget to Salisbury 493 18 November 1878
(3) P.O.27/2355 Salisbury to Lyons 108 29 January 1879
No answer could be got from Waddington for some days.
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(1 )
When it eventually came it took the shape of a counter-oroposal
(2)
supported by Bismarck. No decision, however, was taken.
For a Bill had meanwhile been introduced into the Rumanian
Parliament providing for the convocation of a Constituent
Assembly. Italy immediately expressed the view that the Powers
should accept this as sufficient guarantee of the good inten­
t s)
tions of Rumania. England made representations to both
France and Germany in the same sense. Again, no satisfaction
(4)
could be got from either Power.
Russell's reports made it clear that Germany had a definite 
object in adopting such an uncompromising attitude on the
(3) tkajL"
question. For, he reported, negotiations were going on
between the German banking houses of Haus^mannand BleichrSder
(1) F.0.27/2362 Lyons to Salisbury 119 1 February 1879
139 5 February 1879
(2) F.0.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 130 28 February 1879
(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.403 footnote.
(4) F.0.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 139 2 March 1879
Secret
149 8 March 1879
Most Confidential 
F.0.27/2364 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram 57 13 March 1879
(5) P.O.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 139 2 March 1879
Secret
152 8 March 1879
Secret
170 19 March i»)f
Confidential
198 6 April
Secret
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backed, by the German Government, and Rumania for the purchase 
by the Principality of her railways which, on the bankruptcy 
of the original Rumanian Company, had fallen into the hands of 
German creditors. Besides demanding a price which the 
Rumanian Government declared was,beyond its means, the German 
negotiators insisted that the working of the railways should 
continue for some time longer in German hands. At one stage 
they had gone so far as to offer the railways to both Austria- 
Hungary and Russia in order to secure Rumanian pliancy. The 
withholding of recognition was only another means of coercion. 
Wo information came from Paris to indicate that France had 
any similar object to attain, or that she had any interest 
in Rumania that would suffer by her failure to recognise its 
independence. The question appeared to have offered to 
France a reasonable opportunity for a demonstration of friend­
ship to Germany.
On the Greek question there was at the outset a certain 
rivalry between England and France. Salisbury aimed at 
securing the peacefiil cession of territory to Greece by means 
of British influence over the Porte. His original idea was 
that it should form part of an Anglo-Turkish arrangement of 
which the rest should provide for a British loan to Turkey, and 
for a guarantee by England and France against further demands 
from Greece. Parliamentary opposition prevented the first of 
these compensations from being offered to Turkey; but Salis-
22
bury*s policy did not change.
Waddington had championed the claims of Greece at the 
Congress. When, therefore, she-appealed, in the face of a 
Turkish refusal to grant her the rectification of frontier
_ . . , 5Hji
for which the Treaty had stipulated,.to the Powers in accord-
(2)
ance with Article 24, the German charge d'affaires in Paris
was instructed to enquire what action Waddington proposed to
take. Bismarck promised his support whatever he decided to 
(3 )
do. The British Foreign Office had no information on
this exchange of views. It resulted in the issue on the 21st
of October of a French Circular proposing an identic and
simultaneous communication to the Porte, expressing the hope
that she would accept the principle of a rectification of
(4)
frontier for Greece. ' The "immediate and complete"
adhesion of the German Government, then indicated the latter's
(5)
position. It became still clearer when Russell reported
that Billow, the German Foreign Minister, had made a point of
expressing to him the pleasure of the Imperial Government,
_
(1) Cecil:App.309, 314.
F.0.27/2361 Lyons to Salisbury 64 19 January 1879
(2) F.0.27/2313 Adams to Salisbury 730 18 September 1878
(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.346.
(4) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.357.
(5) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.358.
F.0.64/910 Russell to Salisbury Telegram 3 November 1878
56
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(1 )
that England had not entirely rejected the French proposal.
In the Interval that preceded the next stage in European
negotiations, the Porte assented to a conference at Preversa
between Its own and Greek Commissioners. A new ground, however,
for division of opinion between England and France was soon
furnished. Layard, British Ambassador at Constantinople, on
the 21st January advised the Foreign Office that Turkey should
(2)
not be allowed to surrender Janina to Greece at any price.
His views were accepted. France, however, was prepared to
sustain the Greek pretension.that discussions at Preversa
should be based on the line suggested at the Congress and
recorded in its 13th Protocol. This they asserted passed
north of the strategic point of Janina. When negotiations at
Preversa broke down, and Greece once more appealed to the
Powers for mediation, France again took the initiative. Her
plan ?/as now to secure a preliminary understanding with 
(3)
England. She was prepared to accept Salisbury's proposal 
for a joint guarantee to Turkey against further Greek aggression,
(1) F.0.64/910 Russell to Salisbury 628 15 November 1878
(2) F.0.78/2943 Layard to Salisbury 73 21 January 1879
Confidential
(3) F.0.27/2363 Lyons to Salisbury 210 22 February 1879
Very Confidential
232 27 February 1879
Confidential
F. 0.27/2355 Salisbury to Lyons 275 5 March 1879
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but in return he expected that Britain should support his 
views in regard to the future frontier line.
At this point Waddington told Lyons in strict confidence 
that he had rejected offers from Germany "to send ships of 
war into the Mediterranean to act with the French fleet to 
secure the execution of the Berlin decisions." The impression 
of the German attitude conveyed by this report was confirmed 
when Russell reported a conversation with Bismarck of the 
2nd of March. The German Chancellor, it appeared, agreed 
with Waddington that the line offered by Turkey was "simply 
ridiculous." Germany, he said,had no particular interests 
in Greece but she desired to give France what "national satis­
faction" she could, and would support any proposal that M. I
(1) !
Wadding ton might make. i
Meanwhile at Constantinople the German and French !
I
Ambassadors, on the instruction of their Governments, co-operated
in pressing upon the Porte the complete cession of the Berlin I
(2)
line. Bismarck, the Foreign Office was also informed, was 
making efforts to persuade Andrassy to give similar Instructions 
to Count Zlchy. Szechenyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, 
Russell reported, was surprised to perceive how earnestly 
Prince Bismarck pressed the Greek question upon Austria-Hungary i
' i
(1) p.0.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 140 2 March 1879
(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.399.
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and urged^the necessity of her co-operation with Prance and 
Germany* The Chancellor's efforts failed as the attitude
of complete reserve maintained by Zichy showed. The Russian, 
Labanoff, and the Italian, Corti, also maintained an attitude 
of reserve, while Britain pursued a line of her own. Malet 
had been instructed to advise Turkey to place herself com­
pletely in England's hands. She would then see that the
(2)
towns of Janina and Larissa were preserved to her. Thus
the co-operation of Hatzfeldt and Fournier was all the more
marked in that they acted alone.
In spite of his failure to reach an understanding with
England, Waddington's efforts continued. Bismarck again
expressed the hope that Britain would support them. On the
21st of April fresh proposals were formulated in a Circular
to the French Ambassadors at the capitals of the five Great 
(3)
Powers. Austria-Hungary, Italy and Britain accepted in
principle but made distinct reserves. Russia, whose attitude 
Schuvaloff stated was one of comparative indifference, refused 
to express an opinion until the fate of the proposition had
(1) F.0.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 201 8 April 1879
Secret
D.D.F. Series I Vol.II Nos.399 and 403.
(2) F.0.78/2948 Malet to Salisbury 309 11 April 1879
and 324 18 April 1879
(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II 413.
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been decided by the replies of the other Powers, Germany
(1)
immediately signified her complete acceptance.
Russell's despatches impressed upon the Foreign Office 
the existence of a close co-operation between Germany and 
France. On the 15th May he described the "feeling of dis­
appointment" in Germany at the lack of British support for
(2)
the combined wishes of France and Germany. At the same
time, reports from Constantinople indicate that Germany was
using her influence with Italy to bring about a change in
(3)
her attitude favourable to France.
By the 50th of May all the Powers had accepted 
Waddington's proposal in the form it finally assumed, and 
they united in urging upon Turkey and Greece the nomination 
of plenipotentiaries to take part in renewed negotiations gt 
Constantinople, to be conducted under the auspices of the 
Representatives of the Great Powers. The question now 
ceased for the time being to be the subject of negotiations 
between the Powers. At the same time it loses its importance 
as an index for the relationships existing between the three 
Empires and between Germany and France. The French initiative
(1) F.0.27/2367 Lyons to Salisbury 515 8 May 1879
F.0.45/380 Paget to Salisbury 198 6 May 1879
F.0.65/1038 Salisbury to Duffer in 288 9 May 1879
D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.416.
(2) F.0.64/933 Russell to Salisbury 244 15 May 1879.
(3) P.0.45/376 Salisbury to Paget
Telegram 24 24 May 1879.
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In subsequent negotiations did not receive German support.
An exchange of views later took place between France and
England on the one hand, and France and Italy on the other,
but not between France and Germany. At Constantinople the
situation developed into what Fournier described as a painful
tête à tête between France and England.
All the negotiations dealt with above furnished evidence
of Italy's desire to co-operate with England. Thus British
information showed that the Italian reply to the German note
of September 2nd was the direct result of the attitude taken 
(2)
up by Britain.
A little later when Austria-Hungary proposed to the
Powers that the assembly of the Commission for the delimitation
of the Montenegrin frontier should be postponed for the time
being, Russia endeavoured to secure Italian support for a
counter-proposition that it should assemble immediately.
Italy was at first inclined to agree. When, however, it was
learnt that England accepted the Austrian point of view, the
Italian attitude immediately changed and the Russian proposition
(3)
was rejected.
(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II. 433.
(2) F.0.45/334 Salisbury to Macdonnell 316A 7 September3679
F.0.45/340 Macdonnell to Salisbury
Telegrams 49 8 September 1819
56 10 September 3879
(3) F.0.45/340 Macdonnell to Salisbury
Telegram . 11 September 1879
413 14 September3879
Confidential
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The Identical attitude adopted by Italy in regard to 
the Silistrian question has already been mentioned. The 
Foreign Office possessed evidence which showed that Italy's 
adoption of this attitude was the result of a deliberate
(1)
intention on her part to associate herself with England. At 
each successive stage in the negotiations, Menabrea the Italian
(2)
Ambassador in London enquired the British view from Salisbury
and the Italian attitude was regulated accordingly. When
England and Austria-Hungary both made proposals for the
settlement of the difficulty, Italy immediately accepted the
(5 )
British proposals.
When the idea of mixed occupation in the Balkans was 
first mooted, Menabrea infoimed Salisbury that it was abso­
lutely contrary to the Treaty. It was likely to lead to a 
permanent Austrian occupation of Salonica, if not actually
designed for the purpose, and Italy must offer an uncompro-
(4)
mi8ing resistance. When, however, the Russian circular, 
formally making the proposal was communicated in Rome, although
(1) F.0.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 45 18 January 1879
F.0.45/377 Paget to Salisbury Telegram 4 February 1879
(2) F.0.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 15 February 1879
(3) F.0.45/377 Paget to Salisbury 61 16 February 1879
(4) F. 0.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 40 18 January 1879
P. 0.45/377 Paget to Salisbury 22 27 January 1879
Confidential
59 10 February 1879
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Depretis still considered it the first step towards tearing
up the Treaty, Paget reported that he would modify his
attitude in order to act with England, If Britain accepted
the proposal Italy would do so too, and in that case wished to
come to a formal understanding with Her Majesty's Government
as to the means to he employed to give effect to their reso- 
( 1 )
lution. Three days later, Italy drew up her reply which
was communicated to Paget before being sent to St. Petersburg
as Depretis wished to know whether it met with British 
(2)
approval. Salisbury acknowledged the demonstration that
Italy had given during these negotiations of her desire to
act with England, by keeping Depretis closely informed of the
course of the separate negotiations that ensued between
(3)
England and Russia.
Italian co-operation with England in the Rumanian question
has already been seen. Again, immediately after the Greek
appeal to the Powers for mediation, Italy enquired the attitude
of the British Government, with a view to guiding her own by
(4)
it. As a result of the information she thus acquired, the
(1) P.0.45/378 Paget to Salisbury 109 22 March 1879
P.0.45/378 Paget to Salisbury 110 22 March 1879
(2) P.O.45/378 Paget to Salisbury 117 25 March 1879
(3) P.0.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 201 12 April 1879
and 217 19 April 1879
(4) P.O.45/340 Macdonnell to
Salisbury 431 3 October 1878
Confidential
50
abandoned the championship of Greek claims that she had main-
(1)
tained at Berlin. She concerted with England her reply
(2)
to the French Circular of 21st October. Then in the course
of the following Spring she stated that she had entirely
(3)
adopted the English point of view in regard to janina.
In April she again concerted with England, her reply to the
(4)
French Circular. In the following month she proposed that
their "common understanding" CLn the Greek question should be
reduced to a precise form and suggested that the two Powers
should agree upon a line of frontier which they might oppose
to any line proposed by prance for recommendation to Turkey
(5)
and Greece.
The diplomatic negotiations between the Powers after the
summer of 1879, as distinct from those of the earlier part of
cun
the year, reveal t W  evolution from Germany's separation from
lo
Austria-Hungary and Russia, «of an exclusive Austro -German 
friendship.
These negotiations were primarily concerned with two 
questions: the recognition of Rumanian independence and the
(1) P.0.45/540 Macdonnell to Salisbury 439 16 October 1878
(2) P.0.45/34L Paget to Salisbury 464 1 November 1878
(3) P.0.45/378 Paget to Salisbury 161 16 April 1879
164 19 April 1879
170 22 April 1879
Most Confidential
(4) P.0.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 232 30 April 1879
(5) P.0.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 304 28 May
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Egyptian question.
In regard to the first of these the most noticeable 
point was the sudden inclusion of Austria-Hungary in the 
negotiations towards the end of June, The fact that she had 
already accredited a Minister mi^t well have been expected 
to lead her to continue to hold aloof. However, when Germany 
revived the negotiations by proposing that a Collective Note 
should be presented to Rumania summoning her to execute Ar­
ticle 44, the proposal was addressed to Austria-Hungary as
(1)
well as to England, France and Italy. Walsham, who was
now in charge of the Berlin Embassy, then reported that
"Austria notwithstanding the fact of her having an accredited
agent at Bucharest would now be prepared to support the
representations of England and France and, if necessary, to
take part in the negotiations, which in the event of Rumania
declining to listen to these representations. His Highness
.(2)
suggested should be undertaken at Constantinople." A few 
days later he was assured by Radowitz that Andrassy would
withdraw his diplomatic agent if the present negotiations
(3)
failed. Later this information was corroborated from
(4)
Vienna. Austria-Hungary did 3n fact agree that the
(1) P.0.7/963 Elliot to Salisbury 422 8 July 1879.
Confidential
(2) P.0.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 1 July 1879
(3) P.0.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 356 16 July 1879
Most Confidential
(4) P.0.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 359 18 July 1879
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representations of the Powers should be made through her
Minister at Bucharest. This was a British proposal designed
to avoid the offensive character that collective remonstrances
to Rumania would necessarily bear. In the course of the summer
the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Boeresco came to Europe with
proposals for a compromise. Andrassy declared that he was
acting in complete accord with the other Powers and he
(1)
joined with them in rejecting the proposals.
During 1878 and the beginning of 1879, Germany had made 
use of the existence of a handful of German creditors to 
Egypt, of the rights she possessed there as a result of 
the institution of the Mixed Tribunals, and o-f the pre­
dominant position e-f-Germany in European diplomacy during and 
after the Berlin Congress, to pursue a policy and to make her
viewe felt along a line distinct from, though not necessarily
(2)
in opposition to, the policy followed by England and France. 
Germany in pursuing this policy had no marked co-operation 
from any Power. Italy and Austria-Hungary were,in fact, 
separated from Germany by their association with the Anglo- 
French entente. For they were both represented on an equal 
footing with England and France in the Commission of the 
Public Debt which had been constituted as a result of the
(1) F.0.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 9 August 1879.
F.O. 7/963 Elliot to Salisbury 9 August 1879.
(2) Lord Cromer: Modern Egypt. Vol.l. p.33 et sequ.
Mi Kloino: Deu-tsohland-und- die ftgyptische F rage-.
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Goschen mission. They were thus automatically represented
on the Commission of Enquiry into the Finances that was
^in April 1878, from whose recommendations the appointment
of the European Ministers and other arrangements of political
importance arose. They were th&% Jointly responsible with
England and France for the state of affairs that existed
until the coup d'êtat of April 1879. In the Autumn of 1878
Italy had demanded representation in the Ministry and Austria-
Hungary had stated that ^ if Italy were represented, she would
also demand representation. Neither Power however, had had
outside support and they made their communications separately
(1)
to England and France.
The dissolution of the Commission of Enquiry cut the
connection of Italy and Austria-Hungary with Anglo-French
co-operation. The exchange of views that followed between
England and France concerned proposals made to these Powers
by the Grand Vizier for the deposition of the Khedive. Austiîa-
(2)
Hungary and Italy were not consulted.
(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II Nos. 346, 347, 348.
F.O.45/334 Macdonnell to Salisbury 436 5 October 1878
P.O.27/2314 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram 4 October 1878
(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No;407.
F.0.27/2365 Lyons to Salisbury Telegrams 64 9 April 1879
66 10 April 1879
68 12 April 1879
P.0.27/2355 Salisbury to Lyons Telegram 9 April 1879
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The nature of the negotiations that now took place
served to bring out the fundamental distinction between the
Austrian attitude and the attitude of England, France and
Italy. They showed that while these three Powers were
primarily concerned with the political aspect of the question,
she was concerned only with the financial, Germany in
accordance with her previous policy which tended always to
favour the claims of the European creditors, issued a protest
against the Khedive's assumption of the sole responsibility
for the liquidation of Egypt's debts. It was almost
immediately followed up by a similar communication from
(1)
Austria-Hungary. The Foreign Office for the first time 
had clear evidence of Austro-German co-operation on the 
question.
It was the more noticeable in that the policy they
pursued was entirely distinct from that pursued by any
other Power. The reactions of the different Powers to the
German and Austrian protests made this clear. Waddington
replied in general terms to Germany's invitation to support
her protest, deprecated the German demajphe, and did not think
( 2 )
that England and France should give their support. Italy
(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.430.
Cromer: op.cit/%p.l35.
F.O.27/2367 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram 89 21 May 1879
F.O.64/933 Russell to Salisbury 258 25 May 1879
Confidential
276 2 June 1879
Confidential
(2) F.O.27/2368 Lyons to Salisbury Telegrams 92 26 May 1879
95 1 June 1879
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regarded the protest as "inexpedient." Russian support 
was only secured after a good deal of difficulty, as she 
wished to remain aloof. It was clear in fact that only the 
lead given by England was responsible for the ultimate support 
to the protest given by all the Powers.
A little later Austria-Hungary and Germany were seen to 
co-operate in lûn^ fie i a 11^ advising the Ehedi/^^ to abdicate.
In thus concerting their support of the Anglo-French efforts, 
they again acted apart from the other Powers. This was 
recognised when Waddington in proposing to England that the 
advice so far given unofficially, should be repeated 
officially, suggested that the English and French representa­
tives at Berlin should be instructed to ask the German and 
Austrian Governments to give the same instructions to their
(2) Anshfitn
agents at Cairo.* Only when the German re^ly had been
(3)
received was a similar proposal made to Russia and Italy. 
British information showed clearly that Italy did not
(4)
sympathise with the proposal although she ultimately accepted 
it. Russia rejected the proposal "Nous avons tellement 
écorché ces pauvres Turcs au nord" said Jomini who was
(1) F.0.45/381 Paget to Salisbury 270 12 June 1879
(2) F.0.27/2369 Lyons to Salisbury 634 16 June
(3) F.0.27/2369 Lyons to Salisbury 643 20 June 1879
(4) P. 0.45/381 Paget to Salisbury 280 22 June 1879
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temporarily in charge of the Russian Foreign Office "que
(1)
c'est bien le moins que nous les protégeons un peu au sud."
It appeared, and significantly, mainly from German sources,
that she was intriguing at Constantinople against
(2)
England and France.
British infoimation during the next months confirmed the
as
evidence of Austro-German co-operation. St. Vallier,^Walsham 
now chargé d'affaires at Berlin reported, had asked at Berlin 
whether if France and England protested against the Sultan's 
revocation of the Firman of 1873, Germany would support their 
action. Bismarck had replied that "before giving a 
definitive answer he must know the views of the Austrian 
Government with whom he desired to act in complete harmony 
respecting Egyptian affairs." Again, in regard to the 
Anglo-French proposals for the establishment of the Control 
in accordance with Tewfik's offer, Bismarck was ready to 
support them but waited for the Austrian reply before saying 
so officially. Radowitz, Walsham reported, "laid great 
stress upon the necessity of Germany acting in concert with
(3)
Austria on this occasion.”
(1) F.0.65/1044 Plunkett to Salisbury 286 23 June 1879
Confidential
(2) P.O.64/933 Walsham to Salisbury 320 28 June 1879
Secret
(3) F.O.27/2369 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram
101 20 June 1879
P.0.64/933 Walsham to Salisbury 501 21 June 1879
303 21 June 1879
309 21 June 1879
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Finally when negotiations were initiated as to the powers
ancA oL
of membership and the international commission of Liquidation
that was to be instituted, Germany and Austria-Hungary
(1)
united in taking the initiative. On the 5th August the 
Foreign Office were informed,Hohenlohe, the German Ambassador 
at Paris, had brought Waddington "on behalf of the Austro - 
Hungarian as well as the German Government" a memorandum 
embodying detailed proposals on these points. Next day a 
similar communication was made by the Austrian Ambassador.
A little later the same proposals were made in London.
II.
In the same way that the relations between the Powers 
were reflected by the course of general diplomatic negotia­
tions, they were shown by the more intense negotiations on 
the European Commissions which met in the Balkans to settle 
in detail the frontiers of the newly formed states and the 
constitution of Eastern Rumelia, and by the proceedings of 
the Commission of investigation into the state of the popula­
tion of the Rhodope district.
Thus, the reports of the British members of the Commission 
for the organisation of Eastern Rumelia reflected the whole 
development of European relations from the Berlin Congress 
to the late summer of 1879 when its sessions were adjourned.
(1) F.O.27/2372 Lyons to Salisbury 832 5 August i"61H
845 8 August 1879
Confidential
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They showed clearly the German association with Russia that
characterised the first two months after the Congress. On
arriving at Constantinople, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the
British Commissioner, found the German Ambassador and the
German Commissioner supporting a number of claims made by
Russia in respect of the competency and procedure of the
Commission. One of these at least, touched upon a
question of vital importance from the British point of view.
It was the Russian contention that in spite of Article XXIII
of the Treaty, the Commission should not take over the
(2)
administration of the Eastern Rumellan finances. In any
case the combined effect of Russia's pretensions would be
to prevent the establishment of any organisation in Eastern
Rumelia, and to ensure that when her troops left the Peninsula
the population of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia would be in
such a state as to make a rising inevitable and so armed and
organised in bodies of militia under Russian officers, that
the success of the rising was assured, and so the work of
(3)
the Berlin Congress undone. The support therefore which
(1) F.0.78/2914 Wolff to Salisbury 19 9 September 1878
25 13 September 1878 
Confidential
28 14 September 1878 
Confidential.
Millier : op.cit. p. 78.
(2) P.0.78/2914 Donoughmore to Wolff 13 21 September 1878
[assistant Commissioner]
(3) F.O.78/2916 Wolff to Salisbury 58 11 October 1878
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they received from Germany was observed closely by the
British representatives. The proceedings of the Commission
of Enquiry into the condition of the refugees gathered in
the Rhodope district, that was constituted on the 17th July
in accordance with the 18th Protocol of the Congress of
(1)
Berlin, showed that this support was not limited to the
particular issues with which the Rumelian Commission had to
deal. The demands of Germany's Eastern policy could always
be alleged as justification for the German attitude in
respect of these, but only the demands of her alliance policy
could explain the action of her representative on the
Rhodope Commission. In the course of its investigations the
question of the cause of the present plight of the population
could not be kept out of the discussions, for witnesses
before it continually accused the Russian soldiers of having
perpetrated all sorts of outrages in the district during the
Balkan war. The result was that Russia protested. The
German Commissioner supported her protests. Finally when
its report was drawn up and the accusations against the Russians
were not omitted the Russian and German Commissioners refused
(2)
their signature.
It was made clear to the Foreign Office that Germany in .
(1) British and Foreign State Papers. Vol.69 p.1107.
(2) Müller: op.cit. pp.75-77.
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supporting Russia was isolating herself from all the other
powers. None of the other members of the Rhodope Commission
refused their signature to its report. The Austrian, it was
true, was saved by illness from the necessity of giving a
decision, but when the joint report was abandoned, he sent
home a separate report as strong against Russia as those
(1)
of his colleagues. Then Wolff, on arriving at Constantin
nople, reported that he found both the Austrian Ambassador
(2)
and Commissioner eager to work with him. An exchange of
views had in fact taken place between Wolff and Andrassy
in Vienna, and Kallay had been instructed to act entirely
(3)
with his English colleague. The French Commissionerq
Baron Ring and M. Contoully, evinced the same eagerness to
(4)
co-operate with Wolff. So that by the end of September
the English, Austrian, and French Commissioners had held
several private meetings and established certain points in
regard to procedure and certain resolutions in regard to
(5)
policy, which they would co-operate to carry out. The
(1) A.&.P.1878-79 LXXIX p.l. Father Correspondence respecting 
the proceedings of the International Commission sent to 
Mount Rhodope District.
(2) F.O.78/2914 Wolff to Salisbury 30 15 September 1878
(3) F.O.78/2914 Wolff to Salisbury 9 24 August 1878
14 27 August 1878
(4) F*0.78/2914 Wolff to Salisbury 21 10 September 1878
(5) F.O.78/2914 Wolff to Salisbury 38 24 September 1878
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Italian Commissioner associated himself with them, as far 
as the professed disinterestedness of his country would allow.
When the Commission set seriously to work at the
beginning of November the German support of Russia was seen
to weaken. The first discussions concerned the programme
for its work that had been drawn up by the French, Austrian
and English Commissioners and was now put before the
Commission by Kaliay. It was considered paragraph by
paragraph, all those touching questions of principle being
put to the vote.^ Russia voted unfavourably every time, but
the different paragraphs were accepted "sometimes by a vote
of six, sometimes by a vote of five, the German Commissioner
almost alternating his vote between the Russian and the
other Commissioners." When, as the next step, different
Commissioners were told off to deal with the different chapters
of the projected Constitution, Germany was effectually
separated from Russia. For while the Russian Commissioners
refused to take any part at all in this work, Braunschweig,
the German Commissioner, undertook to prepare a number of
(1)
chapters. When these chapters later came up for discussion 
in full commission he naturally defended his work against 
Russian opposition. At the same time the sub-commit tee that
(1) F.0*78/2916 Wolff to Salisbury 100 7 November 1878
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liad been appointed to deal with the administration of the
B . (1)province appointed a German as Director of Finances, A
Olxnfcl
struggle 6omman@-ed between him and the Russian civil Governor
in Eastern Rumelia, Prince Doudoukoff that continued with
increasing bitterness until the departure of the Russian
troops. The German Commissioner as was to be expected,
supported his countryman throu^out. In fact, Wolff reported
that he had reason to believe that the German Government was
"shocked at the proceedings of Prince Doudoukoff, both
(2)
political and financial." The only subsequent occasion 
on which German support of Russia was at all marked was in 
connection with the dispute as to the discussion of petitions 
presented by the inhabitants to the Commission. No important 
question of principle however was concerned and the German
(3)
attitude was of no advantage to the general policy of Russia. 
British information on the proceedings of the other 
Commissions confirmed this evidence. The Commission for 
the delimitation of the frontier of Bulgaria had assembled 
at Constantinople on the 11th of October and proceeded to 
Sillstria on the 2nd of November. In the divisions of
(1) F.0.78/2917 Wolff to Salisbury 143 1 December 1878.
(2) F.0.78/2918 Wolff to Salisbury 168 15 December 1878
Confidential
(3) P.O.78/2917 Wolff to Salisbury 155 8 December 2878
Müller: op.cit.(büIow to Bismarck 2 December J
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opinion that occurred at Constantinople the Russian 
Commissioner had been warmly supported by the German. "In 
carrying out the work at Silistria" however, Horne the British 
member reported,"the greatest cordiality prevailing between 
the Representatives of Germany, Austria, Italy, Russia,
(1)
Turkey and myself, in every case the vote was six against one."
In the serious division of opinion that occurred in the
ÇrowWcr
section of this Commission dealing with the future between
Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia Germany also sided with the
other representatives against Russia. The Commission in
carrying out their work had been met at one village by a
hostile crowd of Bulgarians. The Russian member although
he was seen to be well able to control the crowd, refused to
do anything, asserting that his mission was a technical and
not a diplomatic one. The German Commissioner was as strong
as his colleagues in condemning the attitude of the Russian
authorities in Bulgaria and of the Russian Commissioner.
The British proposition that the Commission should return to
Constantinople to enable its members to consult their
respective Ambassadors was accepted by a majority of six
(2)
to one.
(1) A.&.P.1878-9 LXXX. Correspondence respecting European 
commissions Appointed for the Delimitation of Frontiers 
p.79. ^^  Horne to Salisbury 26 November 1878
Mülleiu fP.O. to Hatzfeldt 24 November and 7 Decem-
\ berV
(2) A.& P. 1878-9 LXXX. p.143 et sequ. particularly
Gordon to Salisbury 2 December 1878
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The abandonment of Russia by Germany was emphasised by
the change in the attitude of the former Power that occurred
soon afterwards. The Russian Commissioners on the Eastern
Rumelian Commission suddenly showed a disposition to exchange
views confidentially with Wolff. They stated indeed that
if it was the intention of the Commission to establish a real
autonomy in the Province, that it should have the assistance
of Russia, although long discussions would necessarily occur
(1)
on questions of detail. By the middle of December Wolff
reported that the desire of the Russians to act amicably
(2)
with the Commission was growing daily more and more evident.
It soon became possible for disputed points to be settled in
private discussions between Wolff, Ring and the Russian
(3)
Commi s slone rs.
In the beginning of the following year another develop­
ment became apparent. Russia began slowly to find a measure 
of support in France and Italy. The earliest indication 
that such a development was possible was given when it 
appeared that Russia was canvassing the appointment of Vemoni, 
the Italian Commissioner, as Governor General of Eastern
(1) F.0.78/2917 Wolff to Salisbury 142 1 December 1878
(2) F.0.78/2917 Wolff to Salisbury 163 13 December 1878
(3) F.0*78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury 60 8 February 1879
Confidential
68 9 February 1879
81 18 February 1879
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(1 )
Rumelia. The appointment of a European to that position
soon appeared as a ground of rapprochement also between
(2 )
France and Russia. There was however a more fundamental
cause for this development. At the beginning of February it
appeared that Ring and Contoully,with the support of Fournier
the French Ambassador at Constantinople, were pursuing a
policy which aimed at advancing French influence in Bulgaria
and Eastern Rumelia. As a result, although France was
fundamentally opposed to the policy of Russia in the Balkans,
her representatives now avoided taking an attitude against
Russian proposals that might harm their influence with the
(3)
Bulgarian population. They therefore energetically put
forward the Russian proposal for a European Governor General. 
Wolff endeavoured to check the French attitude. He saw 
Ring and Contoully privately and appealed to them to lay 
their cards on the table and state openly what they wanted, 
when England would endeavour to assist them to secure it.
He expressed his anxious desire that in return, they, Kallay 
and himself should continue to act together cordially as the
(1) F.0.78/3034 Wolff to Salisbury 31 19 January 1879
P.0.45/377 Paget to Salisbury 44 8 February 1879
Confidential
(2) F.0.78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury 60 8 February 1879
Confidential
(3) P.O.78/2942 Layard to Salisbury 26 7 January
Very Confidential 
P.0.78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury 72 13 February 1879
Confidential
46
only means of bringing moral pressure to bear on Russia.
Ring eventually gave him his word to that effect and Wolff
then undertook to lay before Salisbury objectively and without
comment the French wishes:- the appointment of a European
Governor General, and some form of mixed occupation after
(1)
the departure of the Russian troops.
During the course of 1879 the tendency of the French
Commissioner, and eventually also of the Italian Commissioner,
to associate themselves with Russia appears more and more
marked, while from the tendency of Germany to draw near to
Austria-Hungary and England there evolved a close Austro-
German co-operation.
On the 6th March Wolff reported that the conduct of the
French was daily becoming "more and more astonishing".
He could only explain their attitude by a determination
"to create a French influence in the Balkans sufficient to
enlist the support of Russia in a future war between France
(2)
and Germany." This influence they were seen to cultivate
(3)
with increasing energy. At the same time their attitude
(1) F.0.78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury Separate 15 February 1879
and Most Confidential.
(2) F.0.78/3036 Wolff to Salisbury 98 6 March '*77
Confidential
f3) F.0.78/3036 Wolff to Salisbury 117 16 March
124 21 March
Confidential
137 25 March /"Cl
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to Austria-Hungary became more and more hostile. Kallay,
I*
said Contoully, was a very dangerous man whose only desire 
was to secure Salonica for Austria. The result of the work 
of the Commission as it was^being carried on, would only be 
to place Eastern Rumelia at her mercy. The co-operation,
(1)
however, between England and Austria-Hungary did not weaken.
Thus the French separation from Austria was also a separation
from England. In fact the French now began to speak of their
former co-operation with as having merely resulted in
(2)
their pulling her chestnuts out of the fire. The continued
French insistence on the two points which Wolff had put before
Salisbury on February the 15th, and the failure of England to
make any attempt to secure them, increased the ill-feeling
that Ring and Contouly now began to show to Wolff. At the
same time the degree of friendship between the French and
Russian Commissioners had become such that the former, who
were responsible for drawing up the Protocols^attempted to
suppress sections of the Protocol of the 24th March, the tone
(3)
of which was strongly anti-Russian, The differences between
England and France were seen to come to a head after the
(1) F.0.78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury 85 22 February 1879
B.M.Add.MSS.39024 Wolff to Layard 19 January 1879
(2) F.0.78/3036 Wolff to Salisbury 124 21 March 1879
Confidential
(3) F.0.78/3038 Wolff to Salisbury 187 28 April
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Constitution had been signed and the original work of the
Commission completed. Its task was now to return to
Philippopolis with Aleko Pasha and to act as his advisory
Council during the first months of his governorship. The
French view which the Government supported was that a real
control should be exercised by the Commission. Wolff,on the
one hand, was of opinion that the Commissioners were no
longer necessary and that any further advice should be given
(2 )
by the consuls. The extreme views maintained by the French 
Commissioner had the full support of Russia, and brought 
about a deadlock during which all corporate action on the 
part of the Commission was suspended. France and Russia
(3)
acted in close concert but apart from a ü  the other Powers.
Since "the manifestation of intimacy between Russia and 
France",Wolff reported^the German Commissioner*s consulta­
tions with him had become more and more frequent. In March 
Braunschweig had gone so far as to inform the English 
Commissioner that "he was terror-struck at the conduct of 
the Russian authorities both in financial matters and in the 
execution of the Treaty engagements, which Germany was
(1) F.0.78/3038 Wolff to Salisbury 27 April reports the 
signature on the previous day.
(2) F.0.78/3038 Wolff to Salisbury 219 17 May
Most Confidential
(3) F.0.78/3039 Wolff to Salisbury 251 1 June '<’7^
253 3 June
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determined to carry out." While he could not undertake to
support England, the Russian would equally not he supported
by him. Germany thereby, would achieve the complete
(1)
isolation of Russia. During the deadlock w hich occurred 
as the result of the French attitude in May and June 1879,
(2)
the German association with Austria began to be noticeable.
They co-operated for instance in investigating an alleged
(3)
outrage against Jews at Carlowa. On the main question in
dispute, the competency of the Commission and the binding
character of its "advice", the instructions of the German
Commissioner were seen to be brought deliberately into line
(4)
with those of the Austrian. Finally on the 1st of August, 
Mitchell who since June had taken Wolff ^s place on the 
Commission, wrote: "a great change is noticeable in the
attitude of the German Commissioner. He now openly supports
(5)
the Austrian and has abandoned his old position of reserve."
The Italian Commissioner had for some time been "very 
independent" but had kept as much as possible in the back-
(1) F .0.78/3036 Wolff to Salisbury 98 6 March 1879
Confidential
(2) F.0.78/3043 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 8 June 1879
(3) B.M.Add.MSS.39027 Mitchell to Layard 12 July 1879
(4) F.0.78/3043 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 26 June
(5) F.P.78/3044 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 1 August 1879
131
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(1 )
ground. A suspicion that he mi^t play into the hands
of Russia had however existed. It seemed to he proved well-
founded when the question of the right to ^point the
officials for the working of the Rumelian telegraph lines
was put before the Commission by Aleko Pasha. At first
Germany and Italy had joined Russia in the view that the
right belonged to the Governor General. Germany, however,
finally gave her vote against Russia and left Italy alone
on the latter*s side, prance wavered but finally also joined
(2)
the majority.
III.
By comparison with the information derived from 
diplomatic negoations, whether between the Cabinets or between 
the members of the European Commissions, information derived 
from reports specifically concerned with the subject of 
European relations is small in amount. Its chief value is 
in confirming the evidence already secured from the first 
source. For unless the infoimation of this type given to 
the Foreign Office by an Ambassador concerns some incident 
in the development of the relationships of the country where 
he is stationed, or is based upon a spontaneous declaration
(1) B.M.Add.MSS.39027 Mitchell to Layard 28 June 1879
(2) F.0.78/3043 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 30 June i<)<f
F.0.78/3044 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 28 July,«^ <)C|
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of its Foreign Minister, it is largely the result of his 
observing the tendencies revealed by diplomatic negotiation 
and interpreting them in the light of any special knowledge 
or experience he may possess# There were few such incidents 
during 1878-9 and few authoritative communications on the 
subject of alliances or relationships were received by the 
British Foreign Office* The few reports however which 
were received dealing specifically with the subject of 
relations were not unimportant.
During the autumn of 1878 they concerned almost ex­
clusively the problem as to whether Bismarck would attempt 
to bring about a revival of the Dreikaiserbund, and the 
degree of success with which such an attempt might meet.
At the end of July the newspapers were full of reports of a 
projected meeting between the three Emperors designed for 
this purpose. Elliot,however, assured the Foreign Office that 
althou^ Francis Joseph intended to visit the Emperor William 
at Tfiplitz towards the middle of August, the Austrian
Government had received no intimation of the intention of
(1)
the Czar to be present. The meeting shortly afterwards
(2)
took place without the Czar. The late autumn was, however.
(1) F.0.7/933 Elliot to Salisbury 540 3 August 1878
(2) F.0.7/933 Elliot to Salisbury 548 6 August 1878
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an important turning point in Germany*s alliance policy and it 
was inevitable that something of the crisis that existed in 
respect of Germany*s European relations, should be reflected in 
the information which reached the British Foreign Office,
It was realised that an understanding between Austria- 
Hungary and Russia on the Eastern Question would necessarily 
form the basis of a renewed Dreikaiserbund. Lord Tenterden, 
permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in a memor­
andum dealing with the subject, drawn up on the 29th of 
December, called attention to the possibility that Austria- 
Hungary and Russia mi^t effect an arrangement whereby the
(1)
former would receive Salonica and the latter Constantinople.
Elliot in writing to Layard a little earlier, spoke of the
Austrian annexation of Bosnia as "the necessary groundwork of
(2)
any new understanding between the three Emperors."
For this reason^ the information furnished by Elliot 
did not indicate that such an understanding was a development 
likely to take place in the near future. For he repeatedly 
urged upon the Government that Austria-Hungary did not aim 
at annexing Balkan territory. "The object of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government" he wrote on one occasion "will not be 
the annexation of extensive Slav territory but the exercise
(1) p.0.365/5 Tenterden Papers Memorandum 29 December 1878
(2) B.M.Add.MSS.39022 Elliot to Layard 27 October 1878
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of a preponderating influence and authority over the small 
independent territories on their frontier." He pointed
to the fall of Count Taafe and the Ministerial crisis which 
occurred in the autumn of 1878^ as a clear indication of what 
mi^t be expebted if a policy of acquiring Slav territory 
were adopted, and as the strongest discouragement to an 
Austrian Minister to do so.
di^'ïvsL"
Moreover, from Elliot*s reports the Austrian distrie-t 
of Russia appeared at the moment as an impediment to an under­
standing between the two countries. Andrassy, he reported, 
continually dwelt on his dissatisfaction with the Government
of St. Petersburg, on the ministerial anarchy prevailing
(2)
there, and,the unreliability of Russian policy. A few
weeks later he reported his annoyance and embarrassment when
the Czar interpreted a courteous refusal of permission for
Russian officers to go to the headquarters of the Austrian '
army in Bosnia,as an implied consent. He despatched two
officers with a view as he said of establishing "a line"
between his army in Bulgaria and the Austrian in Bosnia
and Herzegovina - "the very last thing," Elliot reported,
(3)
"Andrassy wishes to establish." The British Ambassador
(1) P.0.7/933 Elliot to Salisbury 545 6 August 1878
(2) P.0.7/933 Elliot to Salisbury 548 6 August 1878
(3) P.O.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 697 1 October 1878
Secret
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had in fact never seen Andrassy show more distrust of
Russia and less inclination to follow her lead. ^ ^
Meanwhile, under Bismarck*s auspices an effort seems
actually to have been made to revive the alliance between the
three Empires. In mid-October he asked Hatzfeldt to observe
at Constantinople whether there were any tendencies apparent
(2)
of an Austro-Russian rapprochement on oriental questions.
By the 4th of November Giers was writing to Cubril to express
his pleasure at "the initiative recently taken by Prince
Bismarck in the way of reviving the confidential relations
and co-operated action within the Dreikaiserbund." He now
stated that Russia desired to follow up this initiative.
He was convinced Austria and Russia would no longer collide
in their respective development. They would gain far more
through co-operated action^and the best guarantee for the
execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin was
to be found in the unity of the three Emperors. Could not
Princ?^^uss, the German Ambassador in Vienna be instructed 
" (3) '
to speak to Andrassy in this sense? Bismarck, however, in
the memorandum on Germany*s relations with Russia which he
drew up at this time for the Crown Prince who was acting as
(1) P.0.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 701 2 October 1378
Confidential
(2) Müller: op.cit. p.79.
(3) Müller: op.cit. p.86.
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regent for his father, did not mention either the renewal 
of the Dreikaiserbund or the promotion of an Austro-Russian 
understanding on the Eastern Question. On the contrary^he 
wrote "Es würde ein Triumph unserer Staatskunst sein wenn 
es uns gôlânge das orient ali s cheX Geschwür off en zu halten. " 
Whether Bismarck*s alleged initiative was seriously intended or 
not,^ iôw'''^ Q appears to have been followed up - and not with­
out his encouragement, Schuvaloff was summoned from London 
to consult with the Emperor at Livadia, Salisbury was 
immediately on tenter-hooks when it was known that he Intended 
to go via Vienna. It was not until his return jo u m ey that 
he broke his journey and stopped in Vienna and Pesth. At 
Vienna,he saw Reuss and requested him to inform Bismarck that 
*' the Czar had a lively desire for the restoration of the. under­
standing between the three Emperors." Reuss who had already 
received his instructions from Bismarck urged upon Schuvaloff 
to seek a preliminary understanding with Austria, and he
enumerated certain points connected with the Balkans which
(2)
might serve as the bases of such an agreement. The same 
evening Schuvaloff saw Andrassy at Pesth. He informed him 
that he came on an official visit as the envoy of the Czar.
He spoke of the determination of the latter to carry out the 
treaty but impressed upon Andrassy that Russia could not
(1) Müller: op.cit. p.84.
(2) Müller: op.cit. p.88.
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abandon the populations to their fate if troubles occurred
on the evacuation of Russian troops. So much appears
from Andrassy*s description to Elliot of what had passed.
We can unfortunately only suspect without being able to
prove that what Andrassy reported Schuvaloff to have said
was
was part of, or at least preliminary to^  a deliberate overture
for an Austro-Russian understanding. If so, Andrassy*s
attitude could have left Schuvaloff no hope that he would
respond. He immediately initiated serious discussions with
England on the subject of securing the prompt evacuation
of Russian troops. Nothing more was heard of any fresh
e
attempt to revive the Dijikaiserbund or to establish an 
Austro-Russian Balkan agreement.
This incident was variously reflected in British informa­
tion. The reports that came from Vienna showed clearly
enou^ that Andrassy was not disposed to relinquish the
ho
policy of friendship W  England for one of alliance with
Russia. "Andrassy" Elliot wrote, "would seem to have expressed
himself to the Russian Ambassador with a frankness that left
nothing to be desired.—  I believe therefore that we may
have the satisfaction of feeling assured of the complete
failure of the renewed attempt to induce the Austro-Hungarian
Government to adopt a different lihe of policy from that of
.(2)
Her Majesty*8 Government."
(1) P.0.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 814 16 November
: C^ru|- j). 1^ 9 Confidential
(2) P.0.7/955 Elliot to Salisbury 814 16 November 1878
Confidential
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Information which Wadding ton communicated to Lyons
tended to confirm the impression given by this report that
a renewal of the Dreikaiserbund was an unlikely development.
He had learnt from a very good source that Bismarck had
expressed great dissatisfaction with the uncertain and
undecided policy of the Russian Government. Salisbury appears
to have been impressed by the importance of Waddington*s
information. He sent the despatch immediately to Russell
(1)
and invited his comments.
Russell*s information was of a somewhat different 
character. He acknowledged the hostility of Prince Bismarck 
to Gorehakoff but pointed out that^ in spite of that, the 
German Chancellor had so far always found it necessary to 
give his moral support to Russia*s Eastern policy. He had 
further learnt the substance of the secret Memorandum 
furnished to the Crown Prince by Bismarck at the beginning 
of November. He reported accurately the section of the 
Memorandum^which referred to the freedomJf?r"Germany) from 
fear of coalitions that would result ^ fi^ the Powers, being 
occupied in the East^but he gave a much developed version of 
the rest of the document,which referred to the necessity of 
maintaining good relations with Russia. "Bismarck,"he wrote, 
"had stated his conviction that the safety of Germany with 
her defenceless frontiers and the peace of Europe on which
(1) P.0.27/2316 Lyons to Salisbury 924 19 November 1878
Most confidential
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her safety rests, depend principally on the maintenance of
(1)
the Dreikaiserbund."
The combined effect of these reports was then to leave 
the matter something of an open question,but to bias opinion 
in favour of the view that the combination would not at present 
be revived. • Subsequent reports which indicated Russo-German 
estrangement and the tightening of Austria*s hold on Servia, 
confirming thereby the view of her Balkan policy put forward 
by Elliot at the beginning of August, served to strengthen 
this bias.
Reports dealing with Germany*s internal affairs served
to prepare the way for the reports concerning her separation
from Russia. They gave the detail of the new German tariff
imposed in 1879 and showed that it struck a strong blow at
Russians trade with Germany, and they gave an account of
the stringent quarantine regulations introduced on the
(2)
Russian frontier by the latter.
Nq reports were received which indicated the gradual 
development of the Russo-German estrangement, but in April
U' bcco^ rvu, tItowJ
they showed Æha£>from Bismarck's language and from the tone
of the Press'a minor war scare directed against Russia was
(3)
developing. The Chancellor had expressed his apprehensions
(1) P.0.64/^10 Russell to Salisbury 643 9 November 1878
Secret
(2) P.0.64/933 Russell to Salisbury 240 9 May 1879
Recapitulates information already given on these subjects.
(3) P.0.71/961 Elliot to Salisbury 6 May 1879
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to a friend of Russell who repeated his views to the British 
Ambassador. In Russia the war party was exercising greater 
influence over the Czar than his Chancellor and the peace 
party. They were preparing for war with Austria-Hungary. 
Nothing could be concluded from Russia's present Balkan 
policy^ for she was playing a waiting game, iet only ^ o take 
a longer leap in the future. Her opportunity would come 
when she had detached England from Austria-Hungary. The 
evidence that was significant was the organization in Russia 
of twenty-four new battalions and the ordering of military 
stores. Ten days later Bismarck's apprehensions had con­
siderably increased. He regarded the addition of 250,000 men 
to -her army as confirmation of his worst suspicions. Soon 
afterwards Münster the German Ambassador in London, spoke
to Salisbury of Bismarck's extreme dissatisfaction with
(3)
Russia.
The effect of this body of information was somewhat
diminished when a report arrived from Russell on the 12th of 
(4) ,
May, He stated that it had come to his certain knowledge
that Bismarck had secretly instructed Hatzfeldt to use his
(1) P.0.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 210 16 April
Secret
(2) P.0.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 222 26 April
Secret
(3) P.O.64/930 Salisbury to Russell 44 1 May 1879
(4) P.0.64/933 Russell to Salisbury 240 9 May 1879
60
best efforts at Constantinople to bring about a better under­
standing between Russia and the Porte, and to support his 
Russian colleague. Further, during another visit of
Schuvaloff to Vienna from the 23fd of April to the 1st of
(1)
May, Reuss had been instructed to direct his efforts to 
bringing about better relations between Austria and Russia.
It is doubtful, however, whether this information had 
any more important effect than to remind the Foreign Office 
that such a turn in events, as a revival of the triple 
friendship was still possible. For the course of diplomatic 
negotiations still pointed to the isolation of Russia and 
the weakening of her friendship with Germany.
Evidence of the energy with which Austria-Hungary was 
pursuing a policy of economic and political penetration in 
the Balkans was furnished very soon after the Congress.
The foundations for this policy were laid during the dis­
cussions in Vienna at the end of February 1878,when Austria- 
Hungary first insisted on the interpretation of the Sanjak 
of Mori Bazar in Bosnia. When this was secured by the Berlin 
Treaty, it was seen that she had reserved to herself as long 
as the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued, the 
control as far as Mitrovica of the line of railway that 
eventually was to connect Constantinople with Europe by 
Viennai^^ Mitrovica was already Important because a line
(1) F.0.7/961 Elliot to Salisbury Telegrams 22 April 1879
and 29
P.O.66/1043 Dufferin to Salisbury
Telegram 48 20 April 1879
(3l) up •
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connected it with Salonika on the Aegean. Hitherto only
important for trade with Powers - mainly England - who
approached the Peninsula by sea, the line now offered
opportunities for the development of Austrian trade and
influence towards the Aegean. Servia, her connection with
the Ottoman Empire broken, separated from Bulgaria by racial
antagonism and from Montenegro by the Austrian control of
the Sanjak, deprived since 1876 of Russian friendship, her
c
railway connections with Mitrovica, Salonika and Constantinople 
not yet constructed, was seen to be politically and 
commercially dependent upon Austria-Hungary.
Information soon reached the Foreign Office which showed 
clearly the determination of Austria-Hungary to exploit the 
situation which she had created. Crowe, British Consul- 
General at Düsseldorf, reported on the 18th of July that 
Austria-Hungary was negotiating to secure political and 
commercial advantages from the position she hast acquired in 
the Turkish states. Loans ^ it appeared,were being floated in 
Berlin for the construction of railways to link Mitrovica 
with the lines running to the South Austrian border, and the 
Austrian Government had already given orders for the further 
extension of the Mitrovica-Salonika line into Bosnia.
Finally it was positively affirmed that "before leaving Berlin 
Andrassy had signed a convention with servia for the extension 
of railways and the furtherance of commerce, by which the
(l)LLanger: European Alliances and Alignments p.325.
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whole net of lines intended to unite Mitrovica with the
Servian towns of Misch and Bagiasch would become the monopoly
(1)
of Austrian companies." Considerable importance was
attached to this report by the British Foreign Office. It 
was seen by the Queen, and Beaconsfield, circulated in the 
Cabinet, and sent off immediately to Vienna, Belgrade and 
Constantinople instead of being sent in the usual course 
as part of a Confidential ,
In July Britain was temporarily represented at Belgrade 
by Mr. Jerningham who was normally a secretary in the Embassy 
at Vienna, He was thus probably better qualified to judge 
accurately of Austria's policy in Servia than a representa­
tive who was permanently stationed at Belgrade. On July 27th
he telegraphed that a separate railway convention with
(2)
Austria had been approved by the Sku^tschina. On the 5th of
the following month he was able to forward a complete and 
accurate text of the Convention, which had been communicated 
to him confidentially. It appeared that Crowe's information 
had not been quite correct or complete. The Convention as 
the Foreign Office was now informed, provided for the 
connection of the Austrian and Servian railway systems within 
three years, stipulated for the conclusion of a Treaty to
(1) F# 0.64/917 Crowe to Salisbury 24 18 July 1878
Confidential
(2) F.0.105/2 Jerningham to Salisbury
Telegram 27 July 1878
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facilitate trade between the two countries, and the considera­
tion of an eventual customs union. It placed Servia to 
some extent under an obligation to Austria by the latter's 
promise not to demand from her any financial assistance in 
the work for the regulation of the cataracts at the Iron Gate, 
and it envisaged the "uninterrupted development of intimate
.  n (1)and lasting relations between the two countries." This
despatch was again circulated to the Cabinet. A further
report drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the
significance of the conclusion of the Convention. Its
provisions, Jerningham wrote, would place in the hands of
Austria "the greatest source of Wealth, of development and
of strategical strength in servia." If a commercial treaty
were eventually concluded, Servia already the market for all
unsaleable Austrian goods, would be placed entirely at the
(2)
mercy of its powerful neighbour.
Very few reports dealt with the relations of France
and Germany during 1878-9. Russell reported on the 12th of
August 1878, that for the first time since the termination
of the Franco-German war, officers of each country had been
(3)
selected to attend to military manoeuvres of the other.
(1) F.0.105/2 Jerningham to Salisbury 120 5 August
Confidential 
B. Singer: Die vertrâge mit Serbien. pj, lo-ii
(2) F.0.105/2 Jerningham to Salisbury 111 50 July 1878
(3) F.0.64/907 Russell to Salisbury 12 August 1878
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In January he reported that the French Ambassador had been 
invited to visit Bismarck at Friedrichjrufjc where he had 
consulted him on the Tunis question. These reports, 
however, although they concerned what might be interpreted 
as manifestations of the improved relations between the two 
countries, did not specifically concern the question of 
their relations. In regard to Italy's desire for a rapproche­
ment with England at the end of 1878 and beginning of 1879, 
there were three important reports from the British represen­
tative in Rome, directed specifically to draw"^the attention
(2)
of the Foreign Office to this development. As for the
drawing together of Russia and France two important reports 
came from Plunkett, the British charge d'affaires. He wrote 
on the 29 th of May that he had been told by one of the French
Zoniihi
Representatives that Jan&ni who was temporarily in charge of 
the Russian Foreign Office had "let out to him in conversation 
that Russia built considerable hopes for the future on the 
growing coolness between Great Britain and France," The 
Russian Government were encouraging and flattering the French 
at Constantinople and Chanzy the French Ambassador at St.
(1) F.0.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 3 2 January 1879
57 31 J anuary
Secret
(2) F.0.45/340 Macdohnell to Salisbury 416 16 September 187E
Confidential
F. 0.45/377 Paget to Salisbury 44 8 February 1879,
Confidential
F.0.45/379 Paget to Salisbury 177 25 April 1879
Confidential
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Petersburg was condoling with Russia on the blow to her
prestige inflicted by British activity in central Asia,
A few days later he reported that he had been told of Russian
advances to France, and of Russia's disappointment at
(2)
Waddington's coolness in meeting them.
Otherwise^ on these points only,the trend of diplomatic
negotiations afforded any information.
An incident occurred, however, in the development of ^
Austro-German relations which afforded valuable subject
matter for reports on the development of an exclusive
Austro-German friendship. On the 4th February a Convention ;
between Austria-Hungary and Germany abrogating the fifth
(3)
article of the Treaty of Prague, was published.
In actual fact the conclusion of the Convention was 
quite independent of Austro-German relations as they existed 
in the Spring of 1879. For it had been negotiated secretly 
in the Spring of the previous year and was signed on the 15th 
of April 1878. Nor had its publication at this date any 
direct connection with the development of Austro-German 
relations. Already, in the summer of 1878 Bismarck^desiring 
to quiet the agitation in Denmark, had expressed a wish that
(1) F.0.65/1044 Plunkett to Salisbury 222 29 May 1879
(2) P.0.65/1044 Plunkett to Salisbury 232 2 June 1879
Secret
(3) P.O.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 62 4 February 1879
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the agreement should he made public» Andrassy agreed on 
condition that it should be post dated to the 11th of 
October 1879, and a further interval of three months be 
allowed to^pass before it was formally ratified and 
published.
Neither Andrassy nor Bismarck, however, did anything to
discourage the interpretation placed upon the incident by
foreign diplomats. It was regarded as evidence of the
tightening up of Austro-German relations, and of ^  anti-
Russian trend that was beginning to characterise them.
This Article of the Treaty of Prague provided that the
Northern districts of Schleswig should be given up to Denmark
if on a plebiscite being taken,the wishes of the population
were shown to be in that sense. Its abrogation then, which
would settle the Northern frontier of Germany aasd at the
expense of Denmark, was obviously only of value to Germany.
Russell in fact referred to it as "this important concession
to Germany." Diplomatic speculation immediately centred on
the question as to why such a concession had been made.
Andrassy's explanations on that point obviously concealed
(2)
his real motive. Elliot was inclinced to attribute it to 
Bismarck's personal influence at Berlin , and information
(1) Priis: Die Aufhebung des ArtikeIs v des Prager Friedens
(Historische Zeitschrift, CXXV, pp.45-62),
(2) P.0.7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 63 4 February 1879
(3) P.O.7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 74 6 February 1879
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received from Russell that the secret negotiations had
' (1)
begun during the Congress of Berlin confirmed this view.
(2)
Meanwhile the newspapers had begun to hall the 
Incident as a demonstration of Austro-German friendship. A 
typical article was forwarded by Loftus from the St. Peters-» 
burg Go 103 at the end of February. ”L©utriple alliance”. It 
stated, ”a fait place à 1 ^ alliance des deux empereurs 
d* Allemagne et Autriche-Hongrie. --- elle ne s ^ Inspirera
pas de sentiments bien cordiaux à l'égard de la Russie. 
L'arrangement qui a trait à l'article du traité de Prague 
est venu^ affirmer aux yeux de tous l'alliance secrète en
.(3)
question." A second conversation with Andrassy had already
led Elliot t o m e w h a t  similar views. For the Austrian
Minister spoke of the fear of Germany that on the death of
Alexander II his successor ml^t use Danish claims to create
(4)
difficulties for Austria and Germany.
After August 1879 the vhole character of British Informa­
tion changes. Consequent upon the meeting of the Rumanian 
Constituent Assembly, the assembly of a Greco-Turkish
(1) F. 0.64/931. Eus sell to Salisbury 62 4 February 1879
(2) F.0.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 13 February 1879
(3) P.0.65/1042 Loftus to Salisbury 137 26 February 1879
(4) P. 0.7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 10 February 1879
cf. D.D.F. Ser. I. Vol.II Nos. 378, 383.
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Commission at Constantinople, the predominance of the 
financial and technical questions in the Egyptian negotia­
tions, and the adjournment or dissolution of the different 
European Commissions for the execution of the Treaty of 
Berlin, there was a lull in general diplomatic negotiations. 
It furnished the opportunity for the different trends In 
European relations to come to a head. At the same time the 
activity generated by the Intense negotiation of 1878-9 
was diverted to the business of forming or consolidating 
friendships. The result was that a series of Incidents 
occurred in the development of European relatlons^^^Reports
€VJtk
specifically concerning "fee questionsbecame the predominant 
source of British Information on European relations.
In treating these reports, it is proposed to make those 
concerning the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance our 
main concern,and to deal with reports on other Incidents 
only In so far as they determined the British interpretation 
of the Information they received on that subject.
CHAPTER I I .
THE AUSTRO-GERI^AN ALLIANCE 
OCTOBER 7TH 1879.
The fact that the conclusion of the Austro-Geimian 
Alliance crystallsed a particular development In European 
relationships justifies us In treating It as the focal point 
for the whole of British Information on European relations 
In the late summer and early autumn of 1879. Relations 
during the last year had been of a somewhat fluid character. 
As long as this was so, the state of British Information 
respecting the relations between any two Powers, might 
affect some single diplomatic decision, but would not affect 
the whole character of British policy respecting questions 
In which they were concerned. The relations themselves 
might weaken or be dissolved. Action taken by the British 
Foreign Office,or some temporary turn given to British 
policy might check an unwelcome development, as soon as It 
was observed. For the period, however, during which it 
endured,the Austro-German Alliance Introduced a factor of 
permanent Importance In European diplomacy, which no action 
taken by the British Foreign Office could alter. The nature 
of British Information in regard to it, therefore was a 
matter of real importance for future policy.
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The individual decisions which make up policy cannot 
wait for full Information to be secured, and the continual 
succession of diplomatic problems makes a deliberate revision 
of judgment unlikely. At some date then the views of the 
British Foreign Office in regard to such an event as the 
conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance cease to develop 
further. At this point It may be acknowledged that the 
exact significance to be attributed to It Is an open 
question that must be determined by subsequent events. In 
that case, a restraint will be Imposed on British diplomacy 
and the doubts of the Foreign Office reflected In an In­
decisive policy In regard to questions In which the Powers 
concerned are Interested. On the other hand, the Information 
received by the Foreign Office may be accepted as an accurate 
and complete account of the development under consideration. 
In that case. It will henceforward determine British policy 
on those questions until seme fresh incident throws a com­
pletely new ll^t on the subject. Policy will be decided 
and definite, but its success conditional on the accuracy 
of the information.
British information on the Austro-German Alliance,
Two
except in smm respect^ was of the latter type. Reports 
received by the Foreign Office on the incidents which took 
place In the autumn of 1879, Information derived from the 
declarations of the Powers party to the Alliance, and
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reports of statements In the continental Press, were
sufficient to lead to a feeling of confidence In the accuracy
and completeness of the Information received. For they
were supplemented by Information that was authoritative and
yet not open to the suspicion that It represented what
Austria-Hungary and Germany desired the British Foreign
Office to know, and their substance was In conformity with
the information received during the last year respecting
the tendencies to association that prevailed among the Powers,
The date of the official Austrian communication of the
Alliance - the 27th of October - seems to mark the point
at which Information reached Its fullest limit, and British
(1)
views on the subject of the Alliance ceased to develop.
The assembling of Information began at the end of 
September.
The announcement on the 1st of August that a meeting
between the Austrian and German Emperors was to take place
(2)
at Gastein aroused no particular Interest. It was known
that a similar meeting had taken place at TBplltz In the
(3)
previous summer without political consequences. The
relations of Austria-Hungary and Germany with other Powers
(1) I.e. during the period covered by this thesis. The
text of the A u s t r o -German Alliance was communicated 
privately to Salisbury In 1887.
Cecil, op.cit., IV, p.72.
(2) F.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 478 1 August 1879
(3) See page 51.
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were not so strained, and their own, though improved, not
so close that a special political motive should he considered
to be behind the meeting, After It had taken place, Elliot
saw no cause to change his views, "The meeting,” he wrote,
"appeared to have very little of a political character ---
It would not appear that there passed anything connected
with the future policy to be followed,” If politics were
touched upon. It was only to enabOe Francis Joseph to assure
the Kaiser that the resignation of Count Andrassy would not
(1)
make any change In his relations with Germany. A little 
later, British Information Indicated that this prospect of 
a change In the direction of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Office, which was announced In the press on the 12th and 
confirmed by Elliot on the 16th, was the sole cause of the 
meeting which ensued between Andrassy and Bismarck on the 
26tlu^ The German Chancellor, Elliot reported, had Insisted 
on seeing Andrassy while he was still at the head of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government. It appeared, therefore, that 
he desired to Influence "the advice the Austrian Minister 
might give to the Emperor In reference to the choice of
(1) F.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 620 15 August 1879
(2) F.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury Telegram 12 August 1879 
'  ^ 521 15 August 1879
F. 0.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 16 August 1879
(3) P.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 536 26 August 1879
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J l )
successor* A conversation with Andrassy concerning
what had passed at Gastein did not cause the Ambassador to
(2 )
attribute any more Important motive to the meeting. The
announcement directly after It had taken place, of Haymerle's
nomination, which Andrassy told Elliot had "pleased” Bismarck,
seemed to justify the Ambassador's estimate of its slgnlfi- 
( 5 )
cance. The number of reports as to the cause of
Andrassy'3 resignation and Its possible results which reached
the Foreign Office from French and German, as well as Austro-
(4)
Hungarian sources, as against a single report from Elliot 
on the Gastein meeting, show clearly which event was con­
sidered the more significant. Yet the value of these former 
reports was purely negative. They showed that the resigna­
tion was dot due to any political cause, that Andrassy retained
the confidence of the Emperor, and that no change In Austrian
(4)
foreign policy need therefore be anticipated. Elliot In
(1) P.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 536 26 August 1879
(2) F.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 548 30 August 1879
Confidential
(3) P.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 547 30 August 1879
(4) P.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 521 15 August 1879
P.O.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 16 August 1879
P.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 531 23 August 1879
Confidential
P.0.7/957 Salisbury to Egerton 606 23 September
Secret
This despatch concerns a conversation on the 19th with 
Waddlngton at Dieppe on the subject.
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his weekly letters to Layard at Constantinople did not 
even mention the Gastein meeting. In fact having waited 
until the uncertainty as to Andrassy*s successor had cleared, 
he left Vienna on the 6th September for London, confident that 
no important^political development was likely to occur before 
his return. Again, when Eger ton and Walsham, who were
respectively in charge at Vienna and Berlin, reported Bis­
marck's Intention to return Andrassy's visit at Vienna, they
(2)
attached no special significance to the prospect. Egerton
was chiefly concerned with Haymerle's assumption of office,
and only mentioned Bismarck's Intended visit as offering
the new Minister an opportunity "to become fully acquainted
with the Chancellor's views." The political significance
of this meeting, however, was appreciated, although not until
It had taken place. ,
Prince Bismarck was In Vienna from the 22nd-24th of
September. On the evening of the 24th a telegram reached
the Foreign Office from Egerton. He regretted that he could
give no Information as to the understanding between Austrla-
(3)
Hungary and Germany. It was taken for granted then, from
(1) B.M. Add. MSS.39027 Elliot to Layard 1 September 1879
F.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 6 September 1879
(2) F.0.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury 17 September 1879
p.0.64/935 walsham to Salisbury 447 12 September 1879
(3) P.0.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury Telegram 24 September 1879
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the start, that the meeting in Vienna had resulted In some 
sort of agreement. On the evening of the 27th a further 
report came from the same representative. Egerton wrote 
with the personal conviction that whatever had t aken place 
at Vienna, no new phase In the relations between Austria- 
Hungary and Germany need be expected. He reported, however, 
facts In connection with the visit and theories current In 
Vienna as to Its results which Indicated that a greater 
significance than this was to be attached to the "arrange­
ments" or to the "Vienna agreement" to which the report 
referred.
The German Chancellor,he wrote, had taken part In long 
sittings at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In addition he 
had had an hour's conversation with the Emperor and a con­
versation with Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister. As a 
result. It was believed In Vienna that Bismarck had "pledged 
the sword of Germany to Austria in the event of certain 
somewhat unlikely contingencies." Egerton himself thought 
it possible "that a modified and strictly defined support 
had been promised" by Bismarck in return for an assurance
(1) P.0.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury 603 25 September 3S’?9
The report was probably not seen by Beaconsfield who 
was at Hughenden until the 29th, (the 28th was a 
Sunday), and was not seen until the following day by 
Salisbury who was at Puys from 15th August until the 
first week In October.
Buckle: op.clt. Vol.II p.1348. Cecil: op.clt. Vol.II
p.366.
76
that Austria would not swell the ranks of Germany's enemies." 
In view of this last statement It Is unlikely that much 
attention was paid in the Foreign Office to his personal 
conviction.
The rest of the despatch which concerns the visits paid 
by Bismarck to the French and Turkish Ambassadors may, for 
the present, be neglected. For It gave only the official 
Austrian and Geman explanation of the journey to Vienna - 
already well worn - that it was simply the result of Count 
Andrassy's Impending resignation, and of the German desire 
to ensure that his policy would be maintained by his successor.
Two days after the arrival of Egerton's report, further
(1)
Information came from Walsham at Berlin. His two des­
patches were seen by Beaconsfield and Salisbury at about the 
same time as the Vienna report. They were mainly concerned 
with the official explanation of the visit. In regard to 
which they showed some scepticism. They tended consequently 
to draw attention to the theories which Egerton had con­
sidered Ill-founded.
This tendency was strengthened when a telegram arrived 
on the 1st of October from Crowe, British Consul-General 
àt Düsseldorf. It read:- "German Emperor refuses to
(1) F .  0.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 468
I '  ^  ^ 469 26 September 1879
Confi dent la 1
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ratify the Vienna Treaty, says he will rather abdicate.
In last Cabinet Council It was determined to send Stolberg 
to Baden to tell the Emperor that the Ministry stands or 
falls on the question. It Is thought the Emperor will yield."
The outcome of this conflict In Germany between the 
Emperor and his Ministers remained to be seen. Until it was 
known, the Foreign Office could of course form no definite 
conclusions. It must, however, have been clear that whether 
the alleged Treaty was ultimately signed or rejected by the 
Emperor, Austro-German relations could not afterwards be the 
same as during the last months. The interest of the Foreign 
Office In securing Information on the results of the Vienna 
meeting was consequently considerably quickened.
The following week, however, was one of suspended 
judgment. Both the Press and the British representatives 
maintained a strict silence In regard to the subject. The 
only possible material for the development of British views 
was afforded by a series of reports which primarily concerned 
Russo-German relations. Before dealing with these, however.
It seems a suitable opportunity to review the Information
UAv cLa/^ cL » Â q
indicating the probable character of the understand if the 
Treaty were signed, received by the Foreign Office from
other sources._____ ;__________ _______________________________
(1) F. 0.64/944 Crowe to Salisbury Consular 1 October 1879
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On one point, British, information was clear: that the 
understanding in whatever it eventually consisted would 
not be directed against England. Reports concerned with 
the diplomatic negotiations of 1878-9 had given evidence of 
the close association of Austria-Hungary and England. VVhen 
Germany was seen to be cultivating her relations with Austria- 
Hungary , these reports had given no evidence of a weakening 
of Anglo-Austrian co-ôperatlon. The closing of negotiations 
on minor Balkan questions, and the Increasing concern of 
diplomacy with the Rumanian, Greek, and Egyptian questions 
meant that less opportunity was afforded for the demonstra­
tion of Anglo-Austrlan friendship, but did not necessarily 
Imply that It had weakened.
On the contrary, reports dealing specifically with 
Anglo-Austrlan relations Indicated that this friendship was 
so far from weakening that the tightening of Austrian rela­
tions with Germany would involve an Anglo-German rapprochement. 
The source of this information was in the first place the 
statements of Count Andrassy. The British Ambassador had 
reported on the 30th of August that the Austrian Minister 
had assured him that "the maintenance of the most confidential 
relations" with the British as well as with the German 
Cabinet would be the guiding principle of Haymerle's policy 
as It had been of his am. Further, at Gastein Bismarck 
had professed "a wish to cultivate the closest understanding
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with Austria and England," and Andrassy^had no reason to
doubt the sincerity of his professions. On the 4th of
September when Elliot formally took leave of Andrassy, the
Austro-Hungarian Minister again dwelt on the "satisfaction
It gave him that there was no prospect of anything occurring
to disturb the perfect understanding between England and
(2 )
Aus trla-Hungary."
In the second place Information was derived from the 
British Interpretation of an Important Incident In Anglo-
(tow?
German relations. A private letter of Beaconsfield to 
Salisbury reported the Incident to him.
On the 26th of September, that is before Egerton's report 
on the Vienna Interview had been received. Count Münster, 
German Ambassador in London, came down to Hughenden on the 
Instructions of Bismarck,^with a proposal of the "gravest 
character." According to Beaconsfield' report to Salisbury 
of the gist of their conversations, Münster stated: "Peace Is 
necessary to Germany, no country desires or requires peace 
more. To secure It she proposes an alliance between Germany,
(3)
Austria and Great Britain." Beaconsfield was convinced
(1) P. 0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 548 30 August 1879
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 560 4 September 1879
(3) Buckle: op.clt. pp.1358-1361.
According to Münster*s version of the conversation Bea- 
cpnsfleld had taken the Initiative, described the necessity 
to England of allies, and expressed his readiness to 
enter Into an alliance with gqtïïl&iïj»
Die G[rosse] P[olitlk] Vol.IV No.712 (Münster to Bismarck 
27 September 1879).
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that such was the essence of Münster's proposal. On the 1st
he wrote again to Salisbury pointing out the advantages of
alliance betv/een the three powers in question and putting
forward the suggestion of "some treaty between the three 
( 1 ) !
allies." in these circumstances, It Is hardly likely that 
an anti-English character was attributed to the Treaty that 
Crowe had reported to be under negotiation between Austria- 
Hungary and Germany.
British Information also showed that It was equally 
unlikely that It would be directed against prance. The 
close association between France and Germany revealed by the 
course of diplomatic negotiations during 1878-9, was still 
fresh In the memory of the Foreign Office. A recent report 
from Walsham showed that as soon as opportunity occurred it 
would again be In evidence. He had asked Radowltz on the 
13th of September whether he had heard anything from Con­
stantinople recently on the subject of the Greek question, 
and whether Germany was still In favour of Janlna being 
ceded to Greece. Radowltz had replied that Germany would
unquestionably consider herself bound to follow whatever
(2 )
course was taken by France.
(1) Buckle: o p . c l tïfpp.1361-1362
(2) F . 0.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 449 13 September
Confidential 1879
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The Foreign Office had also received reports specifically 
dealing with the subject of Franco-German relations which 
equally precluded the possibility of an Austro-German agree­
ment directed against France. Information as In the case 
of the effect of the arrangement on relations with Great 
Britain was derived from statements of the Foreign Minister 
concerned.
On the 19th of September Waddlngton paid a visit to
Salisbury at Dieppe. It appeared that he had given such
assurances to Bismarck as to remove every justification for
an anti-French move In German policy. "He came on his own
proposition," wrote Salisbury to Beaconsfield, apparently
to convince me that If Russia and Italy were making plans
to attack Germany and Austria, France would take no part In
such Ideas." He had assured Bismarck in the most positive
(1)
terms of his neutrality.
This information was confirmed by Beaconsfield*s report
of Münster *s language. He had spoken of the cordiality of
Franco-German relations and stated that prince Bismarck had
reason to believe that neither the present French Ministry
nor Gambetta and his friends, would ^Qgsaence a war of
(2)
aggression against Geimany.
(1) Cecil: op.clt. Vol.II. p.364.
F.0.27/2359 Salisbury to Adams 1169 24 September 1879
Secret
(2) Buckle: op.cit.aP*1560. _ ,  ^ ^
These assurances are not mentioned in Münster*s report of 
the conversation to Bismarck. He stated, however, that 
Beaconsfield had said that It was self-evident that Germany 
would not proceed aggressively against France. G.P. Vol.IV
No.712.
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Ât about the same time as Egerton's despatch on the 
Vienna meeting was seen by Beaconsfield and Salisbury, an 
Important despatch arrived concerning Franco-German relations 
from the British chargé d*affaires at Paris# Adams's 
Information was again derived from a Communication from 
Waddlngton# His report. In the first place. Informed the 
Foreign Office that when Bismarck had visited the French 
Ambassador In Vienna, as reported by Egerton, he had given 
him formal assurances that "any arrangement which might 
have been made with the Austrian Government did not touch 
France In the least." In the second place the despatch 
disclosed the existence of an Informal arrangement between 
France and Germany that had been concluded at Berlin and was 
still valid. The existence of this arrangement precluded 
any possibility of an Austro-German understanding directed 
against France. "The agreement which we came to at Berlin" 
said Waddlngton, "was that we should do all in our power to 
make the relations between our countries those of good 
neighbours; that while I on my side would discourage any Idea 
of a war of retaliation with reference to Alsace Lorraine, 
and would never stir up that question, the Prince on his side 
would not attempt to create any trouble for France In other 
questions." Bismarck, he concluded, had assured T£isserenc>e 
de Bort at Vienna that he would remain true to his word.
(1) F. 0.27/2373 Adams to Salisbury 983 26 September 1879
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A little later Adams reported what he considered
to he a distinct proof of the complete understanding between
France and Germany. It was the fact that a speech made by
M. Lepère, a member of the French Cabinet, obviously
directed against Geimany, should have passed completely
unnoticed by the latter Power.
British Information ^ Indeed,pointed without question
to the projected understanding being directed against Russia.
One source of Information In this connection was
again the statements of the Foreign Minister concerned.
Andrassy on the 30th of August stated to Elliot that the
purpose of the close understanding with Ehgland which It
was Bismarck's desire to establish, was to "withstand the
alms of Russia," and he described the Ingenious designs
of Russia which It would be the task of the three Powers to
defeat. The Gastein meeting, it appeared, had left him
confident that Austria-Hungary and England could rely on
(2)
Germany's support In that task,
Andrassy's language to Elliot on the 4th of September 
showed that relations between Austria-Hungary, Germany and 
Russia were of such a character as to make an understanding 
between the two former directed against the latter, seem a 
reasonable development. He had spoken of "the excessive
(1) P.0.27/2373 Adams to Salisbury 996 3 October 1879
' ’ ' Secret
(9) w 0 7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 548 30 August 1879
' ' • • / Confidential
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bitterness against Austria at present exhibited by the Russian 
Government," and Informed the Ambassador that German relations 
with Russia were being undermined by unjustified Russian 
complaints "that the German Cabinet had uniformly joined 
Austria at Berlin In threatening Russia."
Beaconsfield*s report of his conversations with 
Münster confirmed Andrassy's statements. The German 
'Ambassador had spoken of "Russia's complaints that Germany 
had thrown her over," described Panslavism as "entirely para­
mount" In Russia,and stated that she was preparing to attack 
Austria. The purpose of the triple alliance betv/een Austria,
(2 f
Germany and Britain would be to guard against this attack.
The alliance envisaged by Beaconsfield In his letter to
Salisbury of the 1st was therefore an alliance that by Its
anti-Russian character would place the whole previous policy
(3)
of the Government In perspective. When once such an Interpre­
tation had been placed upon Münster 's overture, It Is
(1) P.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 560 4 September 1879
(2) Buckle: op.citpp.1359-60 cf. G.P. Vol.IV No.712
Münster attributes to Beaconsfield the Statute* as 
to Russia being In the hands of the Panahvlsts. In 
his report the basis of the proposed Alliance 
appears not so much assistance against Russia Wt- as 
rather against a Franco-Russian combination.
(3) Buckle: o p . c l t^ '^pp.1361-62.
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reasonable to suppose that It was concluded that even if 
the understanding was being negotiated on][dual instead of a
n
triple basis, it was designed for the same purpose.
The greater part of the Information In this connection^
however^was derived from the British Interpretation of a
number of Incidents In connection with Russia's European
relations. Reports dealing with the generation In Germany
of an alarm against Russia's military preparations have
already been mentioned. They were matched by reports
from St. Petersburg of a violent press campaign directed
(2)
against Germany. Then there was the appointment of
Haymerle. This was Interpreted In England as an anti-Russ Ian
move. Egerton reported the unconcealed dissatisfaction of
(3)
the Russians at his nomination. Plunkett reported that
Jomini, who was then In charge of the Russian Foreign Office,
was "very little pleased" with the appointment. "Most of
the annoyances" he had stated "to which Russia had been
exposed In the various delimitation Commissions, have arisen
from expressions Insidiously inserted Into the Protocols
(4)
and Treaty by Baron Haymerle." "This", wrote Beaconsfield
(1) See page 58.
(2) F.0.65/1046 Plunkett to Salisbury 415 30 August
(3) F. 0.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury 547 30 August 1879
(4) F. 0.65/1046 Plunlcett to Salisbury 434 9 September
'  ^  ^ Very Confidential
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to Lady Bradford "is an ^ti-Russian appointment."
There were in the next place Russian attempts to secure 
the alliance of Prance and Italy. British Information 
Indicated that these attempts were on the whole, unsuccessful. 
The fact, however, that they were made strengthened the 
Impression that the projected Austro-German understanding 
would be directed against Russia, In so far as they suggested 
a justification for such an agreement. Apart from the state­
ments of Jomlnl to Plunkett In the early summer, the matter 
of a Franco-RussIan understanding had so far only been mooted 
In the Press. Without asserting that soundings had actually 
been made In Paris, the newspapers gave the Impression that 
the conclusion of^Franco-Russian understanding In the near 
future might be expected. Thus the Soleil of Paris on the 
9th of September published an Interview with Prince Gor^hakoff^
In which the latter proclaimed his sympathies for France
(2)
and expressed a desire for her "relèvement." At Dieppe 
Waddlngton denied emphatically the "rumours set about by
(3)
Russia" that France was likely to join an alliance with her.
The first Information that an actual overture had been made
(1) Buckle : op.cit. Vol.II p.1349.
(2 ) D.D.F. Ser.I. Vol.II No.473 footnote.
P.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 463 24 September 1879
( 3 )  F.0 .2 7 /2 3 5 9  .^Salisbury to Adams 1169 24 September 1879
Cecil: o p .c lL % )# 3 6 4 .  Secret
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was derived from a German source. On the 7th October 
Macdonnell, the British chargé d'affaires In Rome reported 
that Eendell the Geiroan Ambassador who had recently 
returned from Berlin "had Infoimed him In strict confidence 
that his Government had ascertained that Immedhtely after 
prince Bismarck's visit to Vienna an overture was made by 
the Russian Government In Paris, but declined by the French 
Government# " Some measure of 6onfIrmatlon was obtained 
from Plunlce tt at St. Petersburg. He referred to the advances 
of Russia made to France In a despatch on October 8 th, and 
mentioned "language held Incautiously In certain quarters 
to some of my colleagues" which showed that they had been I
rejected. He also forwarded an article from the Golos
(2)
which he considered a confirmation of the rest of his report. j
Russian advanced to Italy seemed to have been of a
more serious character. British Information at the end of 
August seemed to Indicate that the rapprochement between the 
Russian and Italian members of the European Commissions had 
not been the accidental result of similarity of views, but 
the result of a deliberate policy. If not of an understanding, 
on the part of the two Governments. Early in August Maffei
(1) F.0.45/382 Macdonnell to Salisbury 465 7 October 1879
Secret 
Recording .telegram
(2) F.0.65/1047 Plunlce tt to Salisbury 508 8 October 1879
88
had complained to the British charge d'affaires of the
"persecutionJ' he suffered at the hands of the Russian
chargé d'affaires In Rome, M. Sche%ltch "who was continually
coming to urge the Italian Government, In very persistent
terms to support the views of the Russian Government" In
regard to the points that were still to he settled on the
European Commissions* Maffei denied that Italy had responded
hut when Paget faced him with the Italian vote on the
Telegraph question In Eastern Rumella, he could only give an
evasive reply. A report from St. Petersburg Indeed
seemed to offer indisputable evidence that the efforts of
Schevltch had met with success. Plunkett described the
Czar's language in his recent conversation with the German
0
Emperor at Alexandrovka. It seemed that he had referred to
the support which the Italian Commissioners gave to their
Russian colleagues, as if it were the result of a deliberate
policy on the part of the Italian Government which he could
(2)
rely upon to be maintained. A week after this report had 
been received Macdonnell furnished further evidence of the 
existence of an Italo-Russlan rapprochement. He described 
the "marked exchange of civilities" that had recently taken
(1) P.O.45/382 Macdonnell to Salisbury 360 20 August 1879
Confidential |
(2) P . O . 65/1046 Plunkett to ,Salisbury 440 10 September 38791
Confidential
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place between Italy and Russia, the decoration conferred 
on the Russian General and his staff at the late manoeuvres, 
the flattering and friendly speeches exchanged on that 
occasion, and the valuable portrait presented by the King 
to the Russian generals. In spite of Maffei*s repeated 
denials to the contrary he believed that an "uncompromising 
entente" was taking shape between the two Powers.
Finally British Information indicated that the alleged 
refusal of the German finperor\ to sign the Vienna Treaty 
might be Interpreted as further evidence of the anti-Russian 
character of the projected understanding. For It seemed to 
be a development of the division of opinion between Emperor 
and Chancellor that had first been publicly manifested when
o
the Kaiser visited the Czar at Alexandrevka and his Chan­
cellor returned Andras sy's visit to Gastein by journeying 
to Vienna. The statements of the latter to Elliot had 
Indeed already given grounds for^suspicions that this division 
of opinion created. Bismarck, he had told Elliot, was having
difficulties with the Emperor on account of his sensitiveness
(2)
respecting German relations with Russia. British reports 
indicated that the Kaiser's visit was the result of his
(1) P.O.45/382 Macdonnell to Sallsbu^ 389 26 September ISTO
P.0.45/582 Paget to Salisbury 3 9 7 2 8 September 1879
Confidential
(2) P.O. 7/904 Elliot to Salisbury 548 30 August 1879
' ' ' Confidential
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personal Initiative. Walsham made It clear that Manteuffel's
mission to Warsaw on the 29th of August which preceded It,
had been ^ undertaken as the result of the Emperor's orders
alone. Plunkett referred to an article In the Nord
deutsche Allgemelne Zeltung as indicating that the mission
(2)
was not approved by Bismarck. On the authority of the
German Ambassador In St. Petersburg, Plunkett reported that
Manteuffel alone had been responsible for arranging the
Interview, and that the Invitation had only been made by the
(3)
Czar on the 31st, two days before the meeting took place.
It was clear,then ^ that it could not have been preceded by any 
extensive consultation between Bismarck and the Emperor, 
even If Bismarck who was at Gastein, had eventually ^proved 
of the meeting. Beaconsfield»s report of Münster's language 
to him seemed to Indicate that this had scarcely been the 
case. "The meeting of the two Emperors," Beaconsfield 
reported him to have said, "was an entire failure. The 
Emperor of Germany said and did many things on that occasion 
which his friends regretted, but the Emperor himself Is now 
convinced, that these sacrifices were In vain, and that his
(1) P.0.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 439 6 September
(2) P.0.65/1045 Plunkett to Salisbury 420 3 September
Confidential
(3) P.0.65/1045 Plunkett to Salisbury 420 3 September 1879
'  ^ Confidential
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influence with his nephew has vanished."^  ^ Plunkett's and
Walsham's reports confirmed the fact that the meeting had
failed and that no significance need he attached to it by
the Foreign Office except as a demonstration of the Kaiser's
(2 )
continued desire for friendship with Russia,
During the first week of October, however, British 
Information was exclusively concerned with an Incident upon 
which the Interpretation to be placed was at first a matter 
of doubt. It was an attempt on the part of Russia to bring 
about a rapprochement with Germany. It seemed an open 
question at first whether the Incident should be Interpreted 
as a serious effort to bring about an understanding, or 
merely as an effort to check the anti-Russian direction which 
German relationships appeared to be taking. A telegram 
arrived from Walsham on the 50th reporting the arrival In 
Berlin on the 28th of Orloff, Russian Ambassador at Paris,
(3)
and Saburoff^prospective Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.
A despatch which arrived three days later Indicated that this
Incident had a special significance. For It stated that the
(4)
diplomats In question had come direct from Llvadia. Plunkett
(1) Buckle: op.clt.,^ 'p. 1359.
(2) F.0.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 439 6 September 1879
p. 0.65/1045 Plunkett to Salisbury 440 10 September 1879
Confidential
(3) P.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury Telegram 50 September 1879
(4) P 0 64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 475 30 September 1879
' ' • • / Confidential
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had reported some days before to the effect that decisive 
discussions on policy were then taking place at the Emperor's 
summer residence there, and that all the leading Russian 
diplomats, generals and officials had been summoned to take 
part. #alsham*8 despatch further stated that together 
with Oubril, the Ambassador in Berlin, the Russians had had 
several conversations with Bismarck and had dined with the 
Chancellor before they left.
The British representative could secure no information 
as to the substance of these conversations. He stated, 
however, that the general impression in Berlin was that some 
effort had been made by Russia to improve her relations with 
Germany.
Two further rumours were current; that the object of 
the visit of the Russians had been to arrange an interview 
between the two Chancellors, and that as Gorehakoff was about 
to resign, the Czar had consulted Bismarck as to what fresh 
Ministerial appointments would be agreeable to him. Finally 
the fact that the Ambassadors in question were concerned 
respectively with French and Turkish affairs suggested that 
an exchange of views might have taken place. For British 
information,as has been shown, indicated that the causes of 
Russo-German estrangement lay partly in Russia's Eastern 
policy and partly in her advances to France and Italy,
(1) F 0.65/1046 Plunkett to Salisbury 447 17 September 1879
' * ' Confidential
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Should either of these rumours or conjectures prove founded
then the Foreign Office would have reason to consider that
Russia had serious intentions of effecting an understanding
with Germany* At first the information received encouraged
the Foreign Office to expect such a development. For,
Plunkett telegraphed that "private and unofficial negotiations
(1)
were going on for a meeting" between the two Chancellors,
and on the 3rd of October a despatch was received fron him.
It reported that the discussions at Livadia had dealt with
the question whether it was possible or advisable for Russia
to maintain her present diplomatic position - a position
where her "relations with Germany appeared to be settling down
into a serious feeling of mutual ill-will;" where her advances
to Italy were received half-heartedly and her advances to
France rejected entirely; and where "more or less open
hostility or suspicion" characterised her reOations with 
(2)
England.
A despatch received from Walsham on the 6th of October 
contributed nothing further to British information. It did 
however impress upon the Foreign Office that the incident 
had a political significance. For the representative refused
(1) P.O.65/1047 Plurf.ett to g October 1879
secret
(2) F 0.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 472 25 September 187S
' ' * ' Confidential
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entirely to accept Radowitz's explanations that it was the
result of the Chancellor's personal friendship for the
(1)
Ambassadors in question. The main question, however,
as to what this significance was remained open.
British information, lastly, indicated that the
rapprochement between Austria and Germany was based upon a
support of the Eastern policy which England and Austria-
Hungary had pursued in concert during the previous year.
Again information was largely derived from the statements
of Andrassy. In speaking to Elliot on the 4th of September
he described the object of the continued co-operation of
Austria and England, as the execution of the rest of the
Berlin Treaty and the combatting of the "persistent and far
(2)
from creditable attempts of Russia to overthrow it."
acccrrJtTi^ h l i i t  Siui'<.rni/*d’
Presumably these were the "aims of Russia" which on the 
50th,^de&e-ribed a triple understanding with England and 
Germanywu8 designed to counteract. Both on the 30th and the 
4th he described the rift between Germany and Russia en the 
result of an estrangement on the Eastern Question and Münster 
in speaking to Beaconsfield confirmed this. Moreover, 
according to Mühster also,the triple understanding, if it
(1) P.0.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 482 5 October 1879
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 560 4 September 1879
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came into existence was to be based upon the support in 
the Levant aM^the East generally,of the policy and interests 
of England." It appeared in fact as if the conclusion
of an understanding between Austria and Germany would be 
nothing more than the crowning point of a process in th$s 
respect that had already been initiated. Andrassy told 
Elliot that when Francis Joseph visited t^e^Emperor o£
Germany at Gastein,his object had in part been to express 
himself 'in the terms of the most lively recognition for the
(2)
support he had received from Germany in his Eastern policy."
As far as the interpretation of incidents in this 
direction was concerned, there is again the appointment of 
Haymerle. For, British information on this point showed 
that it might be interpreted as indicating the continued 
predominance of the Eastern Question in Austro-Hungarian 
foreign policy. Elliot reported that the principal considera­
tion in bringing about his appointment had been the fact 
that as charge d'affaires at Constantinople, Minister at 
Athens, and a representative of Austria-Hungary at JBerlin^ , 
he had a personal knowledge of Eastern politics and Austrian
(1) Buckle; op.cit. Vol.II p.1361, G.P.Vol.IV Ho.712.
Münster does not mention that he had given this assurance 
He only states that Beaconsfield had said if Germany 
would help England in the East she would be ready to 
restrain France from joining Russia in the event of a 
Russo-German dispute.
(2) F.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 520 15 August 1879
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(1)
po cy n regard to them. Plunkett reported that Russia's
dissatisfaction on the subject was founded on "their fears
that his intimate knowledge of Turkish affairs may seriously
(2 )
retard the success of their designs on that country."
To Layard, Elliot described the appointment as "public
evidence of the intention of Austria to hold strictly by
(3)
the famous Treaty."
The Foreign Office had recently received more important 
information of Austria-Hungary's intention to adhere to^  and 
develop further ,the policy of friendship to Turkey,^ and /o 
increase of Austrian influence over the western part of the 
peninsula^which she had concerted with England. Layard and 
Malet had been largely responsible for the successful nego­
tiation of the Austro-Turkish convention for the occupation
I'h
of Bosnia and Herzegovina^the previous Spring. Since the 
negotiation of the Treaty they had in fact spared no pains to 
bring about an improvement in Austro-Turkish relations. 
British information indicated that just before the Vienna 
meeting, their efforts at last had met with success and
the first step towards an Austro-Turkish rapprochement had kttn
(1) F.0.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 547 50 August 1879
(2) F.0.65/1046 Elliot to Salisbury 434 9 September 1879
Very Confidential
(3) B .M .A d d .M S S .39027 Elliot to Layard 1 September 1879
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(1)
taken.
At about the same time the British Foreign Office 
received information of a fresh manifestation of Austria- 
Hungary's determination to secure a hold on Servia. Nego­
tiations had been going on during the summer at Vienna for ' 
the conclusion of a Convention regulating the construction of 
the railways envisaged by the agreement of July 1878. The 
conferences between Servian and Austrian Ministers had proved
Oii/t tvniWl'o-tv'rtA
abortive, but an Austrian demand that Servia should -engage*
btqili
to eommenee the construction of her railways at Belgrade
towards f(isch, but not to push a line beyond that town,
before Austria-Hungary had established her own railway
connection with the Mitrovica-Salonica line, had served
(2)
to show what the latter's aims were.
Returning now to the main line of development of British 
information on the Austro-German Alliance: the next two weeks 
from the 7th-15th October were decisive for the British
(1) F. 0.78/2945 Layard to Salisbury 163 19 February 1879
Secret
Malet to Salisbury 177 26 February
Very Confidential
182 26 February
Confidential
F.0.78/2946 Malet to Salisbury 233 14 March
F.0.78/2949 Malet to Salisbury 343 23 April
Confidential
F.0.78/2953 Layard to Salisbury 559 29 June 1879
Secret
B.M.Add.MSS. 39027 E l l i o t . t o 'Layard 6 July 1879
P.O.78/2956 Layard to  Salisbury 709 8 August 1879
Secret
(2) B.M.Add.MSS.39027 Gould to Layard 20 July, 3 August,
15 Aumst 1879
The latter concerns a private letter of the loth received 
by Gould from Elliot on the subject.
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=ono.ptlo„ or a,
H »  rortnlsfct .1th Ih, or . further
telegram from Crowe ; -
" Düsseldorf.
October 7. 3 p.m.
Crowe was known to have extensive connections through­
out Germany; among Parliamentarians, commercial men, leading 
officials, members of the Cabinet, and with the Crown Prince!^^ 
A former foreign correspondent and foreign sub-editor of 
the Daily Mews, he had made a profession of securing and 
analysing information, and could tap sources not generally
available to professional diplomats. He was valued accordingly,
He had been employed by the Foreign Office in 1860 on a 
special mission of investigation designed to give it reliable ; 
information as to the possibilities of the union'^^ing 
achieved. This was only the first of a series of similar 
missions.
We may perhaps hazard the suggestion that in the present 
instance as well as in the case of his telegram of the 1st, 
Crowe's Information was derived either directly or indirectly 
from a member of the German Cabinet.
(1) F. 0.64/944 Crowe to Salisbury
(2) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 22 May 1880
12 July 1880
J.A. Crowe: Reminiscences of 55 years of my life.
Wemyss: Memoirs and Letters of Sir R. Morler.
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For on his return to Berlin on the 25th, Bismarck immediately
summoned a Cabinet Council for the 28th, and communicated
to the eight men present what had passed at Vienna, It was
a pis-aller for the public treaty which he had originally
desired, ^ as well as a manoeuvre in his struggle with the
Emperor. To judge by von Puttkamer's speech at Essen
towards the end of October when he referred to the signature
(2)
of an alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, secrecy 
was not observed with any great strictness in regard to 
the communication that was made to them. Apart from the 
Crown Prince the only other men who seem to have known of 
the Treaty were members of the diplomatic corps and the 
Foreign Office and military men. Hohenlohe, Radowitz, Bülow 
and MoltKe knew of the Treaty and negotiations to secure it. 
Crowe does not, however, seem to have had any connection 
with these men or their circles.
In any case the Foreign Office had here, and in the 
telegram of the 1st, authoritative information. Unlike other 
information of an authoritative character it was not open 
to the suspicion that it was determined by the wishes of
(1) G.P.Vol.Ill No.487.
C. luu Hohenlohe: Memoirs -■ Vol.II p.273.
J.Î?'5adowitz: AufzeichmunRen und Erinnerungen.
Vol.II p.84 et.sequ.
(2) F. 0.64/935 Russell to Salisbury 456 30 October 1879
' ' Secret
100
Bismarck or Andrassy as to how much they wished the British 
Foreign Office to know.
The Foreign Office, with the definite knowledge that a 
Treaty had been signed, was now free to reach some conclu­
sions as to its purpose and conditions. Two points for con­
sideration had been suggested up to now: that Germany "had 
pledged her word to Austria for some purpose still unknown", 
or that her promises of support and Austria's assurances in 
return were of a more limited character. Crowe's telegram 
suggested a far-reaching agreement of the first type. A 
further despatch from Eger ton, received by Salisbury on his 
return to London on the 11th, suggested possibilities in the j 
same direction. He reported, for example, on the authority ! 
of one of the Austrian Ministers, that "a discussion had 
taken place respecting a proposal of Prince Bismarck's for a |
mutual guarantee of each others possessions." He discussed |
!
the possibility of "any definite agreement in a military 
convention" having been reached.
He was himself inclined to reject both these possibilities, 
the first on the authority of the same Minister from whom his j 
information had originally been derived, the second on the 
less adequate ground that the Austrian military bill had not 
yet been passed by the Delegations. On the other hand, he 
thought "it possible and even probable that some understanding 
had been arrived at for mutual defence." On the whole then, 
the effect of Egerton's despatch was probably to weight the
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scales In favour of the more limited view of the promises
exchanged between Austria and Germany, though it did suggest
the possible constituents of a wider agreement should such
(1)
prove to have been concluded.
Other indications were all in support of the view that 
a limited agreement only had been reached. Münster, the 
German Ambassador, assured Salisbury on the 13th that the
(2)
relations between Austria and Germany were purely defensive. 
Karolyi, the Austrian Ambassador^speaking, as he said, with­
out any official knowledge on the matter, went so far as to 
declare on the 14th, "with great confidence" that no written
agreements had been interchanged, nor even any understanding
(5)
come to on commercial questions.
BfftCimsl'ieW
The tacit withdrawal of what Bismarok had interpreted
as an overture of alliance to England, after the conclusion
of the agreement with Austria-Hungary, was a matter which
might also be interpreted as an indication of the limited
character of the Austro-German Treaty. The withdrawal was
apparent to Salisbury after a conversation with Münster at
(4)
Hatfiejd on the 13th. Had Germany been negotiating an
(1) P.0.7/965 Egerton to Salisbury 639 8 October 1879
(2) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.367.
(3) P.0.7/958 Salisbury to Egerton draft 14 October 1879
(4) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.367.
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offensive alliance with. Austria, she would not have made 
such a proposal to England - except perhaps for the purpose 
of disarming English opposition to the forward policy which 
such an alliance would involve. This object would have held 
good after the conclusion of the agreement as well as during 
its negotiation. The withdrawal of the proposal was in fact 
only explicable in the light of the knowledge that a defensive 
agreement had been concluded with Austria - that Germany had, 
in other words, secured such assurances from the latter Power 
as to make the proposed defensive alliance with England un­
necessary.
Meanwhile, the clearing up of the question in regard 
to the significance of the conversations that had taken place 
in Berlin between Bismarck and the Russian diplomats, strength­
ened the view that the Treaty with Austria had probably had 
an anti-RussiaAaspect. For it was made clear that Bismarck 
was by no means inclined to respond to the Russian advances. 
Oubril, Walsham reported on the 13th, had been informed that 
Bismarck would see Gorehakoff if the meeting could be 
arranged before he left for Varzin, but that he could not
return to Berlin for the Russian's benefit. Prince Bismarck
(1)
left on the 9th and no interview took place. It became
clear, too, that an exchange of views between Germany
(1) P.0.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 492 10 October 1879
Confidential
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and Russia that would lead to a permanent Improvement in
their relations was not likely to occur as long as Russia's
(b 6*
Activity in the East continued^a contributory factor in the
Russo-German estrangement, por.,. a secret report received
from Plunkett on the 15th of October indicated that that
policy was to be maintained if not carried further. The
discussions at Livadia, he reported, had been based on this
premise, A copy of the letter by which one of the Russian
officials had been summoned to Livadia had come into Plunkett's
hands. Russian policy, it read, must be "to destroy Turkey,
help the Bulgarians of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia to unite,
compel Greece to declare war against Turkey, and to interfere
in due time in their interest, and driving the Turk from
Europe, assist the Greeks to occupy Constantinople and herself
(1)
occupy the Bosphorus."
Meanwhile no news of Ministerial changes came from 
Russia.
It seemed then that the incident of the conversations 
between Bismarck and the Russian diplomats at the end of 
September was to be interpreted rather as an unsuccessful 
attempt to check the anti-Russian trend in German policy, or 
at least as an effort to discover its possible scope, than 
a serious or successful endeavour to effect a real improvement 
in Russo-German relations.
(1) F.0.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 501 7 October 1879
Secret
104
Meanwhile Münster had repeated to Salisbury the state­
ments which Beaconsfield reported him to have made on the 
27th September. Russia, he had stated, was entirely given
over to the Panslavists. She mediated an attack on Austria
(1)
and, he added, "Germany would not allow it." Two days 
later a report came from Malet, who was in charge at Constan­
tinople. Count Zichy, the Austrian Ambassador, had informed 
him that, on instructions from his Government, he had told 
the Sultan; "the result of the meeting at Vienna was that the 
Alliance of the Three Emperors was at an end. An exchange 
of views had taken place between the Ministers of the two 
Empires resulting in an understanding which had the Treaty
of Berlin for its base and the danger of Slav aggression as
(2)
its motive."
The information received up to date then indicated that 
a written agreement had been signed for mutual defence against 
an attack from Russia, and particularly against an attack 
directed against Austria as the result of Russia's policy in 
the East.
A speech made by Salisbury at Manchester in the course 
of a political visit there from the 16th-21st of October, 
showed that he accepted this view of the Alliance.
(1) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.367,
(2) P.0.78/2959 Malet to Salisbury 867 6 October 1879
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The speech which was made on the evening of the 17th 
was for the most part a justification of the Circular of 
April 1st and of the policy in regard to Turkey which lay 
behind it. It closed with the reminder that "Europe had 
employed Austria "to arrest the stretching of a Slav Prin­
cipality from sea to sea." "If the Turk falls," the speech 
continued,''no advance of Russia beyond the Balkans or the 
Danube can be made unless the resistance of Austria is con­
quered .... What has happened in the last few weeks justifies
, ( 1 )
us in hoping that Austria if attacked would not be alone.
Thus Salisbury envisaged the possibility of a Russo-Austrian 
conflict arising out of Russia's Eastern policy, and expressed 
the conviction that Germany was now bound to support Austria 
in such an event* There is no indication in the speech, it 
is true, that Salisbury considered that the agreement was a 
formal Treaty. Nothing can be concluded from this. For 
it was, of course, necessary that he should avoid making 
public^ information which he bad acquired from an independent
source. As it was, there was a certain amount of uneasiness 
in Vienna. Reuss reported to Bismarck that it, we# wished 
that Salisbury had waited until he had received official
V\\vn
information from tiaasi or from Berlin. Haymerle was in fact 
suspicious that Bismarck might already have given such
(1) The Times 18 October 1879 i  ^ .
éjirA.tS X TroCJLvt cU. , "il <^K’»vju
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(1)
information. There seems indeed, to be evidence in 
connection with the speech that Salisbury had Crowe's informa­
tion in mind, when he referred to the Alliance. The Times 
reported him clearly enough as having said: "the newspapers 
say, I know not whether they say rightly that a defensive
alliance has been established --- " It seems, however,
possible that originally he spoke of an offensive and 
defensive alliance and that the phrase was subsequently
corrected. The Russian papers in reporting the speech used
(2)
that version, though they subsequently amended it. Karolyi
telegraphed privately to Haymerle that Salisbury had spoken
of an "offensive and defensive alliance," subsequently
(3)
correcting his statement by a further telegram. St. Vallier
writing to Wadding ton from Berlin on the 25th of October
stated that Salisbury had announced at Manchester "en termes
assures --- qu'il existe un traite d'alliance offensive et
 ^ (4)
defensive" between Austria and Germany.
Information during the following week was entirely of
a confirmatory character. It was derived in part from
articles in the Continental Press, and in part from a communi-
(1) H.Rothfels; Bismarck's englische Btindnisnolitik.
(p.130 Reuss to Bismarck 19 October 1879)
(2) p.0.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 543 22 October 1879
(3) Rothfels: op.cit. p.130.
S w i k  I V l A l l
(4) D.D.P. Wo.473.
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cation on the subject of the Alliance from the Austrian 
Government,
The week was remarkable for the number of articles in 
the Austrian and German Press on the subject of the Alliance.
<JT
The most important were reproduced summarised in The Times 
of the 23rd. prom this paper it appeared that the Cologne 
Gazette in Germany and the Pester Lloyd in Austria-?-Hungary 
agreed that the Austro-German Alliance was embodied in a 
Protocol signed by the two Emperors. The Cologne Gazette 
moreover, reproduced Crowe's account of Stolberg's journey 
to Baden Baden to procure the Emperor's assent. The informa­
tion that had reached the Foreign Office as to the written
(1)
character of the Alliance was thus confirmed.
On the 27th came a despatch from Lord Odo Russell, who 
had returned to Berlin on the 19th. His report^ dated the 
24th, was an extensive review of all that could be gleaned 
in Germany on the subject of the Alliance from Government 
circles, the official Press, his colleagues, and "other sound 
sources of information." It added, however, nothing to what 
the Foreign Office already knew. It was true that the 
official version of the agreement which it reported went 
further than that given Egerton and Walsham. It now ücluded
(1) The Times 23 October.
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a promise "of future co-operation in all questions of common
interest", but it still insisted that there was no written
document. The report of the extreme irritation of the Russien
Ambassador in Berlin, and of the fact that politicians there
were "hailing an anti-Russian move in favour of Austria" was
also significant. As far as any further contents went the
despatch had been forestalled by The Times. for the rest of
it concerned the articles in the Cologne Gazette and the
Paster Lloyd. In fact the Ambassador was forced to admit
"nothing was really known of the precise terms of the
(1)
agreement."
On the same day came an official and secret communication 
made verbally by Count Karolyi, of the conclusion of a 
"defensive Alliance" between Austria and Germany. He made 
it clear that Russia was envisaged as the potential aggressor.
Prince Bismarck, he said, had proposed the Alliance "having 
become fri^tened by the attitude of the Russian Government"^ 
and if on issues connected with execution of the Treaty of 
Berlin "or for any other cause Russia were to attack either 
Empire they had agreed to treat it as an attack on both of 
them." He also made it clear that the two Powers in making 
the Alliance had had the Eastern question particularly in 
view. He stated that they had agreed to observe a conciliatory
(1) P.0.64/935 Russell to Salisbury 517 24 October
Secret
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attitude in respect of the matters still outstanding after
the Treaty of Berlin. Their policy in that connection
would be the maintenance of the status quo. Should Turkey
fall, Austria would not attempt to replace her, nor would
she suffer Russia to do so. She would devote her efforts to
(1)
the strengthening the "little states."
It is clear from the above account that as far as our
information on the Alliance was concerned, the importance of
this communication was only of a confirmatory character.
The existence of a written agreement, it is true, was not
confirmed, Karolyi's evasive reply to a point blank question
on the matter, however, was almost equal to confirmation, in
view of the precise information possessed on the matter by
the Foreign Office. After this date no further information
iA received on the subject of the Alliance. Apart from a
communication from Münster on 3rd of November in identical
(2)
terms to Karolyi's, the diplomatic documents do not again
(1) P.O. 7/958 Salisbury to Elliot Most Se- 31 October 1879
cret
marked "not to be printed or sent anywhere"
P.O.64/930 Salisbury to Russell 531 3 November 1879
Secret
Transmits a copy of the above
P.0.27/2300 Salisbury to Lyons 1356 8 November 1879
Secret
Transmits copy of despatch to Elliot. The delay is 
accounted for by the fact that the Ambassador did not 
return to his post until the 8th. The communication, 
it was st^ed, was for his personal information only. 
Buckle : op.cit. p.1363 (Memorandum for the Queen in 
identic terms 'ïs the despatch to Elliot).
(2) P.0.64/930 Salisbury to Russell 558 3 November 1879
Secret
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touch upon the subject for Its own sake. So that the
communication serves to bring the development of British
views respecting the Alliance to a satisfactory c onelusion.
Information was not, however, either accurate or
complete. The Foreign Office had received no indication
that the agreement between the two Powers provided against
an attack in the general sense. When Münster communicated
the existence of the Alliance to Salisbury in the same terms
as Karolyi had done, Salisbury asked whether the defensive
alliance was confined to matters connected with the few
unfulfilled parts of the Treaty of Berlin. Münster "ener-
(1)
getically repelled tlds interpretation."
His reply, however, did not necessarily affect the view 
formed in the Foreign Office that the object of the Treaty 
was primarily the defence of Austria-Hungary and Germany 
against Russia's activities in the East, nor did it enlighten 
Salisbury as to the systematised character of the obligations 
which a determination to treat "every attack against either 
of them as directed against both" actually involved.
The Treaty signed on October 7th was an instrument of 
five articles. It dealt exclusively with the possibility of 
an attack xipon one of the two Powers and determined the atti-
(2)
tude of the two Empires according to the source of the attack.
(1) P.0.64/930 Salisbury to Russell 558 3 November 1879
Secret 1
!
(2) A,P. Pribram: The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary. 1
Vol.I p.7 et sequ.
I l l
In this connection it envisaged three possibilities; an 
attack from Russia; from a Power other than Russia; from 
such a Power aided by Russia either actively or by the 
threatening character of military measures taken by the 
latter. In the first and third cases, it provided for the 
full military support of the one Empire to the other, in
the second for the (benevolentjmalntenance of at least^ 
neutrality by the one towards the other or attacked party.
Count Karolyi's communication^and information collected 
independently had touched on two aspects of the Alliance;- 
the Eastern Question and the Berlin Treaty; the relations of 
the two Empires to Russia. As a result of this gap in 
British information the Foreign Office tended to see the 
second aspect of the Alliance as governed by the first. It 
never seems to have been realised that the first was entirely 
subordinate to the second. Furthermore, the British lack of 
knowledge in this direction.,^  prevented the Foreign Office 
from realising that both these aspects of the Alliance were 
subordinate to an ultimate object: the creation of a system 
of relationships that would relieve Germany from the fear 
of attack. Had the Foreign Office information on this point 
and had it been realised that this Treaty was the pattern 
for the agreements of which it was subsequently informed; 
then information as to the interests of the parties to them, 
as to the tendencies towards association and opposition
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prevailing among the Powers, and as to the meetings which took 
place between their sovereigns and ministers and other 
incidents in the development of relations, would have given a 
very shrewd idea of the nature of the commitments undertaken.
Again, British information did not indicate that any 
other contingencies than war with Russia had been contemplated. 
Yet the Treaty imposed an obligation of neutrality for the 
case of any war in which one signatory might be engaged, 
while the addition of the phrase "at least", and the stipulation 
which allowed threatening military measures taken by Russia 
to be interpreted as assistance to the attacking Pov/er, made 
it very likely that more substantial support would be given 
in such a case by one signatory to the other.
Lastly the Foreign Office had no knowledge of the 
existence of a time limit.
With regard to two points in respect of the Alliance, 
it was realised in the Foreign Office that British information 
was incomplete. The exact effect of the Alliance on the 
relations of the two Empires to Russia; and the question as to 
whether the Treaty implied an exclusive Austro-German combination, 
or whether it might at some stage be merged into a wider agree­
ment, were acknowledged to be open questions.
For, Plunkett reported from St. Petersburg that Jomini 
believed the Austro-German Alliance to be dravm up in such a 
form that it could be communicated to Russia and her adhesion 
invited. The German Ambassador had, in fact, said to him
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that he could not understand why the Austro-German Alliance
(1)
should he regarded as the death blow to the DreIkalserbund.
A series of incidents that now occurred seemed to indicate 
that Russia was attempting to revive that combination, and 
that her efforts were not being rebuffed. The Russian Press 
was instructed to avoid all mention of strained relations
(2)
between Russia and Germany or Russia and Austria-Hungary.
From the 13th-17th of November the Czarewitch and Czarevna
visited Vienna and Berlin on their return to Russia from
Cannes. Egerton^ then reported that he had been told, with
conviction, by one of the Foreign Representatives in Vienna,
that attempts to revive the Dreikaiserbund had been made
(3)
"for the last fortnight," The considered opinion, however, 
of the British representatives concerned, including Egerton 
himself, was that no political proposals were made either at 
Vienna or Berlin. Karolyi, who assured Salisbury with 
some emphasis that no political questions had been discussed^ 
confirmed this. There was general agreement, however, on
(1) F•0.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 569 5 November 1879
Very Confidential
(2) F.0.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 575 8 November 1879
Confidential
(3) P.0.7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 742 16 November 1879
(4) F.0.7/958 Salisbury to Elliot 24 November 1879
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the "personal and. friendly" character of the visit as far
(1)
as the three Emperors were concerned. About the same time
it became known that Labenoff intended to travel via Vienna
and Berlin on his Journey to Russia from Constantinople. The
rumours of a political mission which immediately began to
(2)
circulate^ ■ seemed at first unfounded, for he passed through
(3)
Vienna without seeing either the Emperor or Haymerle. The
matter was, however, not clear, por^ Layard had reported
that Zichy at Labanoff's request had arranged for a meeting
(4)
to take place between Haymerle and the Russian Ambassador. 
Shortly afterwards, it appeared that the Austro-German 
Alliance had been communicated at Livadia and St. Petersburg,
(1) P.0.7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 765 21 November 1879
Confidential
P.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 556 21 November 1879
Describes the visit "as the first attempt 
towards reconciliation."
P.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 557 1 November 1879
Secret
Buckle : Letters of Queen Victoria Second Series Vol.IIIp.58 
(Lady Emily to Russell to Queen Victoria
5 December 1879)
P.0.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury 603 19 November 1879
Very Confidential
(2) P.O. 7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 18 November 1879
P.0.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury
Telegram 167 25 November 1879
Very Confidential
(3) P.0.7/966 Elliot to Salisbury 29 November 1879
(4) P.0.78/2964 Layard to Salisbury 1127 18 December 1879
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(1)
and had not been Ill-received. Meanwhile Government
circles in Russia made as much as possible of the friendly
(2)
reception given to the Czarewitch, and Gorehakoff arrived
in Berlin. There he was received by the Emperor and Crown
Prince, while Bismarck sent civil messages and expressed
(3)
his profound regret that he could not come to Berlin.
British information became clear as to the alleged attempts
of Russia to secure the alliance of Prance. It appeared that.
(4)
besides the tone adopted by the Press on the subject, nothing 
more than unofficial soundings during the French army 
manoeuvres had taken place. In reply to a question from the 
British charge d'affaires Waddington stated that no official
(1) P.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 547 21 November 1879
' oecre u
This was confirmed by the abrupt change in Schuvaloff's 
language. On the 3rd he assured Salisbury that he was 
convinced that no defensive alliance existed.
At the end of the month he spoke of Austria and
Germany having given to each other a "guarantee" and
deprecated Russia's joining the Alliance.
P.0.65/1040 Salisbury to Plunkett 589 3 November
Confidential
Cecil; op.cit. Vol.II p.372 (Salisbury to Odo Russell,
2 December 1879)
Sir A.Lyall: Life of Dufferin p.277.
(2) P.0.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury 612 25 November 1879
Very Confidential
(3) P.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury
Telegram 1 December 1879
(4) c.f. G.P. Vol.Ill No.482.
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overture had been made. "Many hints, however, had been
thrown out from various Russian quarters and much flattery
(1)
bestowed by Russian upon French officers." Every opportunity
had been taken by General Obrutscheff, the Military Attaché
(2)
in Paris reported, to sound French Generals, and other
superior officers during the manoeuvres upon the sympathies
and state of preparation to take the field, of France in
the event of another European V/ar. The Russian Generals had,
however, gone away disappointed with the answers they
received. This information came from a German source which
was important in that the report of a formal Russian overture
had originated as far as the Foreign Office was concerned 
(3)
with Germany. It seemed that Germany accepted this
explanation of the information which had originally led to
their belief that ateps had been taken to bring about a
Eranco-Russian Alliance. The incident was now referred to
by Bismarck as well as others, as "Prince Obrutscheff's
secret mission to negotiate an alliance" and without anything
(4)
being said of a formal overture having been made. One
(1) P.0.27/2374 Adams to Salisbury 1021 10 October 1879
Secret
(2) P.0.27/2375 Conolly (military attache) to :Lyons
695 24 November 1879
Strictly confidential
700 9 December 1879
(3) P.0.45/382 Macdonne11 to Salisbury
465 7 October 1879
Of. G.P.Ill No.477 p.81 footnote. Secret
(4) P.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 556 21 November 1879
Of. G.P.Vol.Ill No.477 p.81 557 Secret
footnote. No.461 p.54 568 28 November 1879
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justification put forward for German fears of Russia,
appeared to be considerably weakened.
On the other hand,. Salisbury after his conversation with
Münster on the 3rd, was convinced that, although the original
draft of the Treaty had been amended to satisfy the pro-
Russian sympathies of the Emperor, the intentions of the
(1)
Ministers remained unaltered. Further, Bismarck and the
German Press were still expressing apprehension that Russia
was preparing an attack against Germany or Austria-Hungary,
Haymerle seemed to share their fears and spoke to Elliot of
the concentration of troops in the Western Provinces of
(2)
Russia, Whether these fears were justified or simulated
(3)
as information from St, Petersburg made them ^pear^with 
some ulterior object in view, the agitation that resulted 
did not augur well for a revival of close relations between 
Russia and the allied Empires.
(1) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p,371 (Salisbury to the Queen
3 November 1879)
(2) F.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 568 28 November 1879
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.5.
P.0.64/936 Methuen (military attache)
to Russell 20 November 1879
P.0,7/966 Elliot to Salisbury 827 24 December 1879
(3) F,0.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury 623 2 December 1879
624
P.O.65/1048 Dufferin to Salisbury 683 31 December 1879
Very Confidential 
P.O.65/1078 Dufferin to Salisbury 17 13 January 1879
Confidential
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"What Bismarck's motive is is still mysterious"
Salisbury wrote at this time in connection with the anti-
(1)
Russian aspect of the Treaty. As the month advanced,
hoY/ever, reports were received from Odo Russell stating his
Hut,
opinion that the situation might be interpreted
as indicating that the Treaty was not incompatible with a
revival of the Dreikaiserbund* "There is in reality" wrote
Russell on the 21st "no danger of a quarrel between the
reigning families of Russia and Germany while the Emperor
William lives, even though there may be little prospect of
improved relations between the two Governments while Prince
a
Gorchakoff remains in office.
In the event,however of the latter being replaced by a
more congenial Chancellor the relations between Russia
and Germany might speedily become more Intimate and the
Dreikaiserbund be re-established on a firmer basis than
(2)
heretofore.*" A month later he wrote again in the same 
sense:- "I am convinced that Prince Bismarck's real object 
is not to quarrel with Russia, but on the contrary to compel 
her by temporary isolation to reflect and to re-enter the 
Dreikaiserbund on his own terms, and not on those of Prince
(1) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.371 (Salisbury to Odo Russell,
5 November 1879)
(2) P.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 557 21 November 1879
•Secret
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(1)
Gorchakoff which have more or less prevailed since 1875."
It is unfortunate that Russell had nothing more to
offer in this direction than his personal conviction. For,
he had made what was in fact a very accurate estimate of
Bismarck's intentions.
"Mit der 6sterreichischen Assekuranz versehen," wrote
uns
Bismarck to the Kaiser, "kdnnen wlr^aher erneuten russischen
Freundschaftsversicheruhgen, ohne Gefahr hingeb^ und, neben
den vertragsmâssig gesicherten Bezlehungen zu 5sterreich,
die russischen Preundschaft mit aller Sorgfalt und Priedens-
liebe pflegen. Das Drei-Kaiser-Bûndnis ----  bleibt ein
ideales Ziel der Politik, zu welcher ich Purer Majestat
(2)
ehrfurchtsvoll rate."
British information, however, was too incomplete to 
enable Russell's opinions to be substantiated. The Foreign |
Office knew nothing of the Protocol and Memorandum which had |
(1) P.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 613 19 December 1879j
Very Confidential I}
(2) G.P.Vol.Ill No.458 (Bismarck to the Kaiser, 5 September 1879
p.41) I
See also No.455 (Bismarck to the Kaiser, 31 August 1879 !
p.30)
No.461 (Bismarck to the Kaiser, 7 September 1879
p. 58)
Hohenlohe:^Vol.II p.273.
W' Schüssler: Bismarck Zwischen England und Russland in der 
Krise von 1879-80 (His tor is die Vierteljahrsciirif t J.G.
27. 1932)
Bismarck to Bülow 5 September and Bismarck to Manteuffel 
7 September.
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been signed by Bismarck and Andrassy on the 24th of September 
(1)
at Vienna.
The Protocol recorded the form of the original proposal 
for the Alliance made by Bismarck and rejected by Andrassy,
This proposal envisaged an undertaking to cultivate friendly 
relations with Russia and an obligation for co-operated 
defence against an attack from any Power whatsoever - not 
only against an attack from Russia. • It further stated that 
the German Chancellor accepted the final Treaty as conforming 
to the spirit, if not to the letter, of this original proposal.
The Memorandum guarded carefully against the Alliance 
assuming an entirely anti-Russian character. It expressed 
the conviction of the two Empires that the conflicting 
interests of the different Powers should be subordinated to 
the demands of world peace. Applied to the particular cir­
cumstances of the moment, this meant that none of the questions 
left over by the Treaty of Berlin was important enough to 
become a casus belli. The two Powers, therefore, would 
treat these questions in a conciliatory way, and would not 
threaten or attack Russia, either on their own account or in 
agreement with other Powers, on issues arising from the non­
execution of the Treaty. A beginning was thus made towards 
the removal of what was, according to British information
(1) Pribram: op.cit. Vol.1% p.3 et sequ.
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the main cause of Ill-feeling between Austria-Hungary
and Russia, and a contributory cause of the Russo-German
estrangement.
Again, nothing was known of the negotiation of the
Alliance. V^hen British information on the subject began to
collect, the Protocol and Memorandum had been signed and the
draft of the Treaty agreed upon.
At Gastein on the 26th of August Bismarck accepted
Andrassy*8 proposals for an Alliance providing for common
defence against attack from Russia or from a fourth Power
(1)
aided by Russia. The matter was then raised with the
Kaiser. In an audience on the 2nd v. Bülow, the Foreign 
Minister, read to him a report from Bismarck of the conver­
sations at Gastein. The Kaiser refused, however, to give a
0 (2)
decision until after the meeting at Alexandrevka. In two
audiences on the 6th and 8 th at Künigsberg, where the Kai ser
had now arrived to attend the military manoeuvres, Bülow
(3)
returned to the subject. Though furnished with a long 
exposition of German policy from Bismarck^he made no headway. 
On the 9th, however, matters came to an issue. A telegram 
from Bülow to the Foreign Office in Berlin definitely
(1) G.P. Vol.Ill No.449.
(2) G.P. vol.Ill No.456.
(3) G.P. Vol.Ill No.460, 462.
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Instructed Bismarck to carry the negotiations no further,
(1)
though it sanctioned a visit to Vienna. A despatch from 
Bismarck to the Foreign Office announced his intention to
(2)
resign if the Emperor did not agree to the proposed Treaty.
Anticipating that this threat would have the desired result,
Bismarck on the 13th furnished the German Ambassador in
(3)
Vienna with a draft for discussion with Andrassy, At last
( 4)
on the 14th came the Emperor’s consent. It was, however,
conditional. The Treaty must make provision for the cultiva­
tion of peaceful relations with Russia, stipulate for mutual 
support against attack from one or more foreign Powers 
without naming Russia specifically, and be communicated to 
the Czar. Knowledge of this resistance and then conditional 
consent on the part of the Emperor would not have altered in 
any way the British interpretation of the Alliance. We were 
informed clearly enough of the Emperor’s attitude. The 
knowledge, however, of the efforts made by Bismarck to secure 
the fulfilment of the conditions laid down by the Kaisei^ and 
so to prevent the Treaty from assuming an anti-Russian 
character, and of his partial success would indeed have been 
enlightening.
(1) G.P. Vol.Ill No.463.
(2) G.P. Vol.Ill No.464.
(3) G.P. Vol.Ill No.467.
(4) G.P. Vol.Ill Nos. 472, 475, 476.
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To fulfil the first of the Emperor’s conditions 
Bismarck devoted his efforts to securing the abandonment by 
Andrassy of his draft for the preamble of the Treaty. It 
was drawn up in terms unfriendly to Russia and seemed even 
to go so far as to preclude the restoration of the Drei­
kaiserbund. For, it stated that whereas "ein freundschaft- 
liches Einverstandnis" between the sovereigns of Austria, 
Germany and Russia had previously afforded all possible 
securities for the interests of the three Empires, it no 
longer seemed to do so. Moreover, it described the Treaty 
as a substitute for military measures that might otherwise 
be taken in reply to the recent increases in the Russian ’
army and to the posting of Russian troops on the frontiers of
(1)
the two Empires. Bismarck’s efforts were so far successful
that the preamble was abandoned. A section of the memorandum, 
already referred to, announced the friendly intentions of 
the two Powers towards Russia, and a reference in Article 
4 to Russian troop movements was coupled with an expression 
of confidence that they were not intended to threaten Austria 
and Germany.
In fulfilment of the second condition, Bismarck instruc­
ted Reuss on the 17th to propose to Andrassy a redaction of
(1) E. Heller: Das deutsch-6 sterreIchisch-ungarische
BÜndnis in BismarcksAussenpolitik. p.145.
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the Treaty which should bind the two Powers to support each
other against any attack whatsoever. If Andrassy objected
to this he might propose the wording; "bei jedem Angriff ...
19 lb
des alten Bundesgebietes von and a mutual guarantee
(1)
of their Polish territory, Andrassy, however, rejected
this proposal outright and made it clear that insistence
(2)
might endanger the whole Treaty. Bismarck, however, 
writing to Andrassy on the 20th to confirm the arrangements 
for tbs meeting at Vienna, held to the proposal for a general
(3)
defensive alliance. At Vienna itself there were stormy
scenes between the two Ministers on the subject before
(4)
Bismarck finally yielded the point.
In fulfilment of the third condition Bismarck was so
far successful as to secure the drawing up of the Memorandum
(5)
for communication to Russia.
Further the British Foreign Office was very badly 
Informed on the subject of Russo-German relations. So far
(1) G.P. Vol.Ill No.478 (Bismarck to Reuss 17 September 1879)
(2) G.P. Vol.Ill No.480 (Reuss to Bismarck 19 September 1879)
(3) E. Heller; op.cit.
(4) T. Sosnosky; Die Balkanpolitik Bsterreich Ungarns Seit
pp.47-52, .
L.Doczi; Andrassy und Bismarck (Meue Preie Presse
25 November and 2 December 1906).
Doczi was in the Press department of the Austrian 
Foreign Office and had been taken by Andrassy to Gastein.
(5)G.P. Vol.Ill No.482 p.95.
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from disapproving of the Manteuffel mission Bismarck saw in
it "eine Reservedeckung für den Fall dass Andrassy*s
Rücktritt den iîhergang der ôsterreichischen Politik in das
(1)
russische Lager hedetLten konnte." The invitation to
the Kaiser from the Czar had been telegraphed already on
the 30th of August and Bismarck had immediately been
(2)
consulted. Although the Chancellor telegraphed back
the advice that the Kaiser should not accept, and although 
his advice was not followed, there was no question of an
(3)
open difference of opinion respecting Russo-German relations.
The Emperor made it clear that he regarded the visit as a
personal affair, and gave his word that he would not engage in
(4) i
political discussions. Bismarck was not opposed to an
interview on that basis. Moreover, the Kaiser went to
Ù
Alexandrovka furnished with a full account of the Gastein 
conversation and an exposition of arguments in favour of an 
Austro-German Alliance.
The Foreign Office knew nothing of the Saburoff-Giers 
party in Russia which aimed at a revival of the Dreikaiserbund 
as keenly as Schuvaloff aimed at an understanding with
(1) G.P. Vol.Ill No.458 p.40.
Radowitz; op.cit p.90.
(2) G.P. Vol.Ill No.450.
(3) G.P. Vol.Ill No.451.
(4) G.P. Vol.Ill Nos.452, 456.
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England, and Gorchakoff and Jominl at an understanding with 
(1)
Prance. Sahuroff was known to the Foreign Office except
as Russian Minister at Athens, until, the rumour of his appoint­
ment as Ambassador at Constantinople drew attention to him.
His conversations with Bismarck at Kissingen in July, con­
versations with Gorchakoff and Schuvaloff that followed, and 
two days spent in Berlin during August when he saw Radowitz, 
and went through all the communications on Eastern affairs 
made by Russia to Germany, passed completely unnotice^V^ No
information was received as to the close relations which
(4)
began to develop between Schweinitz and Giers. The fact 
that Giers on the 27th of August invited the German Ambassador 
to his country estate was not reported. Yet in saburoff’s 
activities at Kissingen and Berlin, and in schweinitz’s 
conversations with Giers lay the roots of Russia’s advances 
to Germany in September. Saburoff,as a result of the 
Kissingen conversations ^ drew up a memorandum in which he 
stated that Russia could not maintain a position of isolation 
and must choose between an alliance with France and an
(1) J.Y. Simpson; The Saburoff Memoirs. .
(2) Simpson; op.cit. pp.50-55.
G.P. Vol.Ill No.461 p.54 and No.514 (Radowitz to Bismarck
15 August 1879)
Radowitz: op.cit. p.8 8 .
M  ti l
(3) G.P.^No.514 p.140.
(4) V .  Schweinitz; Denkwürdigkeiten: Vol.II p.72.
127
alliance with Germany. He put forward arguments on both
(1)
sides and reached a conclusion in favour of Germany.
Giers discussed this memorandum^as well as reports from
London and Constantinople, with Schweinitz on the 27th.
The latter immediately reported to Berlin the Russian desire
(3)
for an improvement in their relations with Germany. The
Council at Livadia discussed and approved the memorandum.
Saburoff as a result was instructed to carry the matter
(4)
further at Berlin.
Because of the lack of information on these points, 
then, the Foreign Office made the fundamental mistake of 
connecting the visit of the Russian diplomats to Berlin on 
the 28-29th of September with the Vienna meeting between^ 
Bismarck and Andrassy and with the tendency of the Livadia 
discussions which appeared from Plunkett’s information, 
towards a forward policy in the East.
Finally, the Foreign Office had no information as to 
the substance of the conversations which took place in Berlin 
between Bismarck and Saburoff. These conversations actually 
initiated negotiations for the revival of the Dreikaiserbund
(1) Simpson: op.cit p.56.
(2) Schweinitz: op.cit. p.72.
(3) Schttssler; op.cit. (Private letter of Schweinitz to
Bülow 29 August 1879}.
(4) Simpson; op.cit. pp.66 et sequ.
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Saburoff’s instructions had been based upon the arguments 
of his memorandum and had enumerated the points to be 
covered by an understanding with Germany, which he might 
propose if Bismarck took the initiative. In his first con­
versation with Bismarck the establishment of such an under­
standing was agreed upon. In their second conversation its
possible terms were discussed and three articles provisionally 
(1)
drafted. There is no evidence that the question of a
meeting between Gorchakoff and Bismarck was raised.
(2)
Saburoff on the contrary regarded Gorchakoff as his enemy. 
There is no indication that the question of Ministerial 
changes in Russia was broached. Orloff’s presence in Berlin 
and Saburoff*8 position as prospective Ambassador at Con­
stantinople seem to have been entirely without significance.
The Austro-Hungarian share in future negotiations was 
also provided for in the course of these conversations.
Not only did one of the projected articles provide for a 
Russian promise to respect the integrity of the Austrian 
dominions and in return an Austrian promise not to extend 
her influence in the Balkans without previous consultation, 
but Radowitz was instructed immediately to draft a letter
(1)Simpson; op.cit. pp.70-83.
Radowitz: op.cit. Vol.II pp.97-98.
(2 )Schüssler: op.cit.
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to Andrassy Informing him of the Russian readiness to come
(1)
to an agreement with Austria-Hungary on that basis.
British information also indicated that the question
as to whether the Austro-German Alliance implied an exclusive
understanding between the two countries, or whether it might
later be merged in a wider agreement could only be determined
by subsequent information.
Münster’s overture on the 27th of September made it
seem very likely at one time, that the English adhesion to
the Alliance might be asked. The overture was not formally
withdrawn and it was only the German delay in inviting
British adhesion which led to the impression that it was
(2)
not likely to be requested. Yet the matter did not seem
entirely settled. For, Russell reported that Moltke in
conversation with him had stated that "an important bulwark
had been secured by the Alliance with Austria, but in his
opinion the peace of Europe could best be secured by a
Tripartite Alliance between England, Germany and Austria
which could alone inspire sufficient confidence to enable
(3)
the armed Powers of Europe to disarm."
(1) Radowitz: Vol.II p.102.
E.Wertheimer : Graf Julius Andrassy. Vol.Ill pp.290 et sequ.
(2) c.f. Cecil: Vol.II p.371 (Salisbury to Russell, 5 November
1879).
(3) F.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 568 28 November 1879
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Further, on I2th of October a despatch reached the
Foreign Office from Macdonnall at Rome which reported that
von Kendell the German Ambassador, had said that it was open
to Italy to join the Austro-German Alliance and that "if
(1)
they were wise they would do so." A few days later he
sent an article from the Opinione of the 3rd to the same
effect, written by its correspondent at Vienna!?'^
By December the Foreign Office had, however, received
certain indications that the Treaty was designed to revive
the connection between the two Powers as German Powers^ as 
ASwell^ to establish commitments between them as members of
the European states system. Russell on the 21st of November
reported that "Bismarck's friends" speak of the Alliance as
designed to revive the state of affairs that existed in the
Germanic Confederation. Dufferin who passed a day with
Bismarck at Varzin on his way from London to St. Petersburg
at the beginning of December was informed by the Chancellor
that he had originally intended to establish an "organic"
alliance between the two Empires that could only have been
altered with the consent of the Legislatures of the two 
( 4)
countries.___________________________ ________ _______________
(1) F.0.45/383 Macdonnell to Salisbury 406 8 October 1879
Secret
(2) F.0,45/383 Macdonnell to Salisbury 13 October 1879
(3) F.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 557 21 November 1879
Secret
(4) Lyall: op.cit. p.277 et sequ.
c.f. G.P.Vol^III No.455 p.30, No.477 p.82, No.509.
No.467 p.72 (instructions to Reuss as to
the terms of the proposed agreement to be suggested to 
Andrassy; notice of a wish to abrogate the Treaty was only 
to be given with the consent of their respective Parlia­
ments).
Schüssler: op.cit.
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The Foreign Office had no Information, however, that
the purely diplomatic agreement which was known to have been
concluded had any wider significance. Nothing was known
of the reference in the preamble of the Treaty to the
former Confederation. Münster»s overture of the 27th of
September was misinterpreted. From the instructions sent
by Radowitz on Bismarck's orders to Münster, it seems that
Bismarck's object was primarily to secure information and
not to offer an Austro-German English alliance. Münster was
to find out what England's policy would be in the event of
(1)
Rus so-German difficulties. On the 9th of September the
differences between the Emperor and Bismarck came to a head.
Discussions were, however, suspended during the next three
days, while the final Instalments of the Kaiser's account of 
0
the Alexandrovka meeting which he concluded In a leisurely 
fashion at Stettin on the 12th,arrived at Gastein. Bülow, 
who was still in attendance on the Kaiser telegraphed that 
the Emperor would accept the proposed Alliance, if the Treaty I
(2) I
did not name Russia as the potential aggressor. Andrassy j 
had rejected the proposal once. It was more than likely j
(1) G.P, Vol.Ill No.709 (Bismarck to Radowitz 14 September 1879)
No.710 (Radowitz to Münster 16 September 1879)
(2) G.P. Vol.Ill No.468.
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(1)
that he would do so again. In these circumstances, the
question then faced the Chancellor whether, if he did not
resign, he should consent to Andrassy*s proposals and fight
the matter out with the Emperor or whether he should risk
the whole Treaty by insisting on a generalised redaction
and face the possibility of being forced to adopt,
temporarily at least, the Emperor's pro-RussIan policy. In
these circumstances he telegraphed on the 14th to Radowitz
the Instructions for Münster. It was necessary for the
Chancellor to have some Indication of the strength of the
Anglo-Austrian friendship based on opposition to Russian
ambitions in the East. Was this friendship strong enough
to enable Austria-Hungary to rely on England's associating
herself with Austria and Germany and not with Russia, if the
anti-Russian direction of the Treaty, exaggerated as it
would appear by the inevitable publicity of a conflict
between himself and the Emperor, should cause a serious
strain on Russo-German relations? Was the friendship between
England and Austria strong enough to enable Andrassy to
refuse the Treaty if Bismarck insisted on a general redaction?
IÔ
Was it strong enough ha seriously^endanger German relations 
with Austria, if she were compelled to adopt for the time 
a pro-Russian policy?
(1) G.P. Vol.Ill No.469.
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Saburoff's overture of the 28th-29 of September removed
the necessity of a decision between a pro-Austrian and a
pro-Russian policy, even before Münster's report of his
(1)
conversation with Beaconsfield was received.
(1) G.P. Vol..IV No.712 (Münster to Bismarck 27 September 1879)?
CHAPTER III.
DWELOPJjIENTS IN EUROPEAN RELATIONS 
JANUARY 1880 - JUNE 1881.
After 1879 the course of diplomatic negotiations ceased 
for the time, to be the most valuable source of British 
information on European relations. It does not again become 
of real Importance until after the agreements, on the pre­
paration of vfhlch during 1880-81 it might have thrown some 
light, had been concluded. It was then inevitable that 
it should reveal some of their results.
The two factors which brought this about were first, a 
change in the diplomatic position of Great Britain and 
second, a change in her diplomatic methods.
The close contact that Britain had maintained with 
European affairs during the last years was necessarily 
interrupted by the General Election that took place at the 
end of March. From the time when the question of dissolution
was first raised in mid-February, and especially after the
(1)
decision was finally taken on March 6 , attention tended 
to be concentrated to an increasing degree on internal affairs,
(1) Buckle: op.cit. Vol.II pp.1383, 1386.
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while Britain's diplomacy and the relations of other Powers
towards her, were hampered hy an element of uncertainty as
to the outcome of the Elections. The normal effect of these
factors was increased. Salisbury was disabled by illness
from the last weeks of January, with short intervals, until
March. From March 22 he was on holiday at Biarritz, and
Tenterden was in sole charge until Granville took over the
(1)
Foreign Office on April 29,
The result of this state of affairs was we11-illustrated
by the negotiations on the Greek frontier question. After
the French had been kept waiting a month for a reply to a
fresh proposal for European mediation, Salisbury formulated
a counter-proposal to the French Ambassador in London on
(2 )
January 15. In spite of hints from Paris as to the dangers
(3)
of delay, it was not until February 29, that the proposal 
was foimally made. Although the assent of the PowersA.
when the proposal was made to them on the 3rd, was given 
almost immediately, the question hung fire throughout
(1) Buckle: op.cit. Vol.II p.1378.
Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II pp.377-379.
(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II Nos. 3, 7.
(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.16.
F.0.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 115 9 February 1880
Confidential
(4) F.O. 27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury
Telegram 13 1 March 1880
D.D.F.Series I Vol.Ill No.144.
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(1 )
March. I/hen the proposal was formally put before the
(2)
Porte, no pressure was exercised to secure a reply. VJhen 
Granville came into office the matter was still open. Again 
Great Britain exercised no influence whatever on the nego­
tiations on the Montenegrin frontier question which were 
taking place at the same time. The Convention of April 18 
between Turkey and Montenegro, v/hich provided for a cession 
of territory to the ^ latter other than that originally
stipulated for in the Berlin Treaty, was due entirely to
(3)
the efforts of Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia. The 
result was that the development in Austro-German relations
(1) F.0.7/984 Salisbury to Elliot Telegram 3 March 1880
Russell 
Dufferin .
Paget
Layard \
Corbett 
Paget to SalisburyF.O.45/403
(2) F.0.27/2429 Lyons to Salisbury
(3) F.0.65/1040 
P.O. 7/966 
F.0.65/1048 
F.O.65/1078 
F.O.45/402 
F.O. 45/400 
F.0.7/984 
F.0.7/989 
F.O.45/404
Salisbury to Plunkett 
Elliot to Salisbury 
Dufferin to Salisbury 
Dufferin to Salisbury 
Paget to Salisbury 
Salisbury to Paget 
Salisbury to Elliot 
Elliot to Salisbury 
Paget to Salisbury
87 5 March 1880
28 April 1880
663 3 December 1879
17 December 1879 
675 26 December 1879
4 4 January 1880
31 27 January 1880
29 January 1880 
12 February 1880
9 April 1880 
160 12 April 1880
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taking place at this time, which effectually broke down the
intimate friendship between Austria-Hungary and Britain,
was unobserved.
It necessarily took Granville some time to re-establish
contact with European affairs. It was never re-established
on the same basis and never became so close.
In the first place, British influence at Constantinople
which had been visibly declining since the summer of 1879
was never recovered. The seeds of Anglo-Turkish mistrust
had, indeed, been sown at Berlin. Britain had proposed
the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and had
herself taken possession of Cyprus, while the advice she
gave in return in the matter of Turkish reforms seemed to
* A
the Porte an infringement of her sovereignty. Subsequently,
the uselessness of Great Britain as an ally was again and
again demonstrated to Turkey. She could secure no money
(1)
from her self-constituted protector, nor support of her
authority in those parts of the Balkans which the Treaty of
Berlin had left to her. On the contrary. Great Britain
reached an agreement with Russia which prevented a Turkish
(2)
occupation of the Balkan line, while largely due to the 
influence of the British Commissioner, a constitution was
(1) P.0.78/2943 Layard to Salisbury 98 26 January 1879 
Cecil: op.cit. Vo..II p.314. Secret
(2) See p.10.
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given to Eastern Rumelia which effectually cut it off from
(1)
other Turkish Provinces and made it virtually independent.
At the beginning of the year, the British representative
promised to see that Turkey was not compelled to give up
(2)
Janlna and Larissa to Greece. In September Layard
(3)
advised the Porte to cede Janlna. The failure to remove
oppression in Asia Minor, tlie war against Afghanistan, and
the disorders in Egypt weakened the position previously held
by Great Britain in Turkish public opinion. Already in
January 1879 there was a spasmodic outbreak of anti-British
(4)
feeling in the Turkish Press. In May the attention of the 
Foreign Office was first drawn to the state of British
(5)
influence at Constantinople as a matter for serious concern.
By July, Salisbury acknowledged that the state of our rela-
(Ô)
tions with Turkey was critical.
(1) F.0.78/2942 Layard to Salisbury 20 6 January 1879
(2) See p.25.
(3) F.O.27/2373 Adams to Salisbury 1003 6 October 1879
Confidential
F.0.78/2958 Layard to Salisbury 806 6 September 1879
(4) F.O.78/2943 Layard to Salisbury 98 26 January 1879
Secret
(5) F.0.78/2949 Malet to Salisbury 375 4 May 1879
(6) Brit.Mus.Add.MSS.39139
Salisbury to Layard 10 July 1879
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In January, the Sultan had immediately informed Layard
(1)
when Russia made an overture to him for a "secret alliance."
Later, Layard reported that the Russian efforts which had
continued, were proving successful. The Sultan made no
(2)
communications on the subject. In November the British
Ambassador had very definite and apparently well-founded
fears that a rapprochement, if not a formal alliance, was
(3)
being negotiated between Russia and Turkey. At the same
time, the improved relations between Austria-Hungary and
(4) .
Turkey, and between Germany and Turkey helped to destroy
(1) P.0.98/2942 Layard to Salisbury 44 12 January 1879
Secret
(2) P.0.78/2953 Layard to Salisbury 559 29 June 1879
Secret
(3) P.0.78/2961 Layard to Salisbury 975 11 November 1879
986 13 November 1879
Secret
Brit.Mus.Add.MSS.39029 Co1.Swaine
(Military attache) to Layard 15 November 1879
P.0.78/2962 Layard to Salisbury 1016 22 November 1879
Secret
1017
secret
P.0.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury 597 18 November 1879
Very Confidential 
P.0.64/938 Russell to Salisbury 42 22 January 1880
Secret
(4) P.0.78/2956 Layard to Salisbury 709 8 August 1879
Secret
P.0.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury 578 16 September 1879
p.0.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 167 13 April 1880
P.0.78/2953 Layard to Salisbury 534 21 June 1879
Very Confidential
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the exclusive influence which Salisbury had aimed at securing
for England at Constantinople by the Convention of June 4.
The anti-British trend at Constantinople was at last
definitely established by the crisis in Anglo-Turkish relations
of November 1879. Since the Congress Layard had subjected
the Porte to a long course of pressure in the matter of
reform. In the Spring it had been accompanied by insistence
on the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish Convention respecting
Bosnia and Herzegovina, In the autumn after a journey through
Syria Layard took up the question of reforms with increased
energy. The Porte was rashly threatened with the summoning
(1)
of the fleet to Besika Bay, A good deal of agitation at
once occurred in the European capitals and the ships remained
(2)
at Malta. It was a false move, however, and seriously
(3)
weakened the British position at Constantinople. It was
not improved by the appearance at this juncture of the Koelle
(4)
case. The papers of a certain Dr. Koelle, a German national
(1) P.0.78/2957 Layard to Salisbury ogYSSt 23 August 1879 
P.0.78/2959 Layard to Salisbury 891 19 October 1879
Very Confidential
(2) P.0.78/2961 Layard to Salisbury 951 5 November 1879
P.0.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 568 5 November 1879
G.P. Vol.Ill No.511 p.131.
(3) P.0.7/958 Salisbury to Egerton 8 November 1879
P.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 557 21 November 1879
Secret
H.S.Edwards; Sir William White, p.198
(Layard to White December 1879)
(4) A.& P. 1880 LXXXI p./ The Case of Dr. Koelle.
141
employed by a London Missionary Society, were confiscated 
and bis Turkish collaborator arrested. Layard took the 
matter up, but could secure no redress. Then, at the 
British invitation all the Powers with the notable exception 
of Russia made representations at Constantinople, The 
matter was satisfactorily settled, but as Tenterden minuted 
on the draft of a despatch to Russell asking for German
(1)
support, "Layard seems to have got himself into rather a mess."
His influence as Salisbury later told Granville, was "worn
(2)
out." British influence was not recovered when Goschen 
took Layard's place in May 1880. Influence depended very 
largely on personal ascendancy, which GosclÇhad first to 
acquire. Moreover, he came to Constantinople charged with 
the definite mission of securing the execution of the unful­
filled parts of the Berlin Treaty.
British influence with the Porte had given her some 
control over decisions taken at Constantinople. As long as 
this influence existed, other Powers would tend to seek an 
exchange of views with Great Britain before any decision 
affecting policy in the Balkans, Asia Minor, Egypt or Tunis
(1) P.0.64/930 Salisbury to Russell 27 December 1879
(2) Letters 2nd series Vol.Ill p.93 footnote.
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was taken, whether merely to secure Information or in order 
to obtain British support. In doing so, another Power in 
order to get a quid pro quo of any value, had to reveal some­
thing of its own intentions and the support it expected to 
secure from other countries. Further, by comparing the 
substance of the exchange of views with one Power with that 
of the conversations with another, a good deal of information 
could be acquired on European relations. To quote only one 
example, the exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and 
England on the question of the peaceful evacuation of Russian 
troops in the previous Spring, supplemented by an exchange 
between England and Russia, had shown the relations that 
existed betweoi Austria-Hungary and Russia and between Austria- 
Hungary and Russia aid Germany. These exchanges of views 
had been the direct result of British influence at Constanti­
nople, both Powers as has been seen, depending upon it to 
secure the Turkish assent to whatever arrangement, whether 
European occupation or restrictions on Turkish occupation, 
resulted. The fact that in all the main questions which 
came under discussion during the next four years, Turkey was 
concerned, emphasises still further the importance of the 
loss of British influence at Constantinople as far as regarded 
information derived from diplomatic negotiations.
At the same time the British connection with Austria- 
Hungary was broken down. The intimacy of Anglo-Russian 
relations began to weaken when the final settlement of the
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organisation of Eastern Rutnelia, the arrangements for the 
garrisoning of the Province by Turkish troops, the departure 
of the Russian army, and the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish 
Convention respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, liquidated 
the different questions upon which the co-operation of the 
two Powers at the Berlin Congress had been based.
After the conclusion of the Austro-German alliance
d'tUVx><*i‘elvyr
Austria-Hungary began under Bismarck's influence e-e-necioualy
to draw apart from England. Haymerle originally intended
that the conclusion of the alliance should make no difference
to Anglo-Austrian relations. It was he who suggested the
communication to England. He had also proposed that
England's "%istunmung and Untersttitzung" should be requested.
Bismarck, however, replied that he desired an alliance à
(1)
deux and not a coalition à trois. He did not object to
the communication, but he insisted that no request for British
(2)
"support" should be made. Again Karolyi's communication
was so worded that it encouraged the impression that the
alliance would result in a strengthening of the Austrian
support of British policy in the East. Münster,as has been
(3)
seen, took pains to destroy this impression. Haymerle,
(1) Rothfels: op.cit. p.57.
(2) Rothfels: op.cit. pp.130-31
(Reuss to Bismarck 19 October 1879)
(Bismarck to the Foreign Office 23 October ).
(3) See p. I/o
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however, did not relinquish his intentions. At the beginning
of November he proposed that a fuller communication should
be made to England and suggested "dass wir den Kabinett von
St. James in etwas deutlicherer Weise unserer Unterstützung
seiner Politik im Orient in Aussicht Stellten." This proposal
Bismarck also rejected. It was not Germany's task, he said,
to quarrel with Russia on England's account, nor to make
herself the tool of England's aggressive purposes." Haymerle
(1)
did not return to the subject. Bismarck had successfully
taken the first step in separating England and Austria.
The overtures of Sabaroff made further progress in the
same direction easy. Although Bismarck for the moment did
not press for Austrian adhesion to the plan of a revived
Dreikaiserbund, it became clear in Austria-Hungary that
the discouraging influence of the Austro-German Alliance on
Russian chauvinism had again made Bismarck master of the
situation and had in fact cut the ground from under the Anglo-
(2)
Austrian friendship. It was not until February, after a
long conversation with Kalnoky on the relations of the two
(3)
Empires to Italy when Austria again suggested the induction
(1) G.P. Vol.Ill No.510 (Reuss to Bismarck 6 November 1879)
No.511 (Bismarck to the Foreign Office
10 November 1879)
(2) Schüsslerî op.cit.
(3) A. Pribram; The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary. Vol.11
p.5.
Schüssler; op.cit. (Bismarck to Schweinitz
10 February 1880)
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of England into the political councils of the Central
Powers, that Bismarck’s efforts were finally successful.
On the 28th, Reuss reported that Ha^mierle would subject
himself to Bismarck’s wishes and desired to avoid everything
(1)
that could be interpreted as an approach to England.
Accordingly Haymerle wrote to Karolyi that Austria would 
put a stop to her confidences to England, in order to please 
Bismarck. The Austrian action shortly afterwards in regard
rvcu
to the eid Agrarian Law in Servia, when she consulted Germany
but not England, afforded her an opportunity to prove her
(2)
good faith to Germany.
The advent of the Liberals in England gave a fresh 
impulse to the drawing apart of the two Powers, and it becomes 
as much a matter of deliberate policy in England as in Austria- 
Hungary. In January, the Emperor had already said to Elliot 
that after Gladstone's recent language in speaking of Austria- 
Hungary "it would be difficult to feel confidence in the
(p
maintenance of the present relations if he returned to power."
(1) Rothfels; op.cit. pp.131 et seq.
(Bismarck to Reuss 11 February 1880)
(Reuss to Bismarck 28 February 1880)
(Haymerle to Karolyi 3 March 1880)
(2) F.0.64/956 Salisbury to Russell 109 18 March 1880
(3) F.0.7/988 Elliot to Salisbury 8 January 1880
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Similar remarks at the time of the Elections caused a
crisis in Anglo-Austrian relations. They were made to Elliot
casually at a charity hall. He had not thought them worth
reporting. On the following morning, however, the Vienna
papers had the news that the Emperor had spoken to the British
(1)
Ambassador against Gladstone and the Liberals. When it
was re-preatW W  ' the Standard, the Emperor 's language was
much exaggerated, and it appeared that Elliot had been sent
for by the Emperor who had spoken to him formally on the
matter. The result was that Gladstone speaking at Edinburgh
on March 17, accused Austria-Hungary of interfering in the
(2)
British elections. Attacks upon Austria-Hungary in
Parliament had already made it clear that the return of the 
Liberals would mean the abandonment of what Gladstone des­
cribed as an "Austrian foreign policy." Gladstone now in­
sisted on that point. Then, with Austrian policy in the 
first half of the century in mind, he made a generalization: 
"There is not an instance, there is not a spot upon the whole 
map where you can lay your finger and say: There Austria 
did good." Karolyi was extremely angry and told Granville 
that if the Liberals came into power, he would leave England.
(1) P.0.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 22 March 1880
(2) E. Fitzmaurice: The Life of Lord Granville Vol.11
pp.200-207.
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Elliot telegraphed, from Vienna asking that the words
(1 )
attributed to the Emperor should be publicly corrected.
Northcote read the telegram with the correct version of the
(2)
Emperor's language at a public meeting the following day.
Three weeks later the Liberals had won the Elections and
Hartington had refused to form a Government, The Oueen sent
(3)
for Gladstone. The latter's accession to power, while it
meant that a reconciliation would have to be brought about,
also meant that a similar confidence to that which had
existed between the two Governments since 1878 would not be
re-established. Gladstone's refusal to give a voluntary
declaration made matters more difficult. It was not until
Karolyi had taken the first step, and informed Granville
officially that the Emperor had not spoken against him as
the Standard alleged, and had declared Austria's intention
to carry out the Treaty of Berlin to the full, that Gladstone
(4)
drew up a letter of explanation. Even then he hesitated, 
and was prepared to hold it back when a telegram arrived from 
Elliot stating that Austria-Hungary could not urge the Porte
(1) P.0.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 22 March 1880
(2) Fitzmaurice: op.cit. p.203.
(3) Letters. 2nd Series Vol.Ill p.82. (Memorandum by
the Queen 23 April).
(4) Fitzmaurice: op.cit. p.206.
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to cede the territory to Montenegro in accordance with the
Convention of April 18, as she would not be in a position
to carry out any threats, nor to allow any other Power to
do so. Gladstone interrupted this as an Austrian effort to
break away from the Concert in order to pursue her own
(1)
aggressive ambitions. The letter, however, was finally
sent and did something to remove the ill-feeling between the 
tv/o countries. Close co-operation on the basis of community 
of political objects in the Balkans did not, however, again 
come into existence.
No close co-operation with any other Power compensated 
for the loss of intimate relations with Austria-Hungary, as 
far as the opportunities offered by the latter for securing 
information were concerned.
The Foreign Office was inclined to estimate the value
of Italy as an ally very low. Her policy was regarded as
(
one of restless intrigue and no serious or consistent purpose 
was thought to guide her activities. she appeared to be 
intriguing against Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and Albania, 
against France in Tunis and against England and France in Egypt.
(1) F.0.7/940 Elliot to Granville
Telegram 47 3 May 1880
Gladstone to Granville 4 May 1880
P.R.O. Gifts and Deposits, Granville Papers; G.D.29/123.
(2) F.0.7/965 Egerton to Salisbury Telegram 28 October 1879
F.0.45/383 Paget to Salisbury 435 15 November 1879
F.0.105/8 Gould to Salisbury 16 November 1879
F.0 .7 / 9 5 8 Salisbury to Egerton ® November 1879
F.0.78/2955 Bayard to Salisbury 604 11 July 1879
Secret
F.0.45/403 Paget to Salisbury 139 27 March 1880
Secret
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A more solid cause for the British attitude was the conviction
that Britain could always exercise some control over Italy
by means of her superior sea-Power. "Italy" as Egerton
worded it in October 1879, "from her extended seaboard must
always remain amenable to any serious pressure on the part
(1)
of Her Majesty's Government. " The result was that the
British representative in Rome was inclined to adopt a
somewhat superior and domineering attitude towards the Italian
Government. Her overtures for a close understanding with
England were regarded as "these somewhat effusive assurances"
(2)
to which a "polite" rejoinder had to be made. Paget
by
continually overstepped the normal limits -ef a diplomat's
position to adminster a strongly worded criticism of Italian
policy. At the time of the Congress, he warned the Italian
Government in very strong terms against offering any opposition
to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even
Salisbury regarded his language on that occasion as too
(3)
impetuous, "but the policy was right." Again in October 
1879, Paget spoke very strongly against the whole conduct of
(1) P.0.7/965 Egerton to Salisbury 18 October 1879
(2) F.0.45/379 Paget to Salisbury 177 25 April 1879
Confidential
Minute by Salisbury
(3) F.0.45/334 Paget to Salisbury 332 5 June 1878
Most Confidential 
and minute by Salisbury
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Italian foreign policy. Her object of remaining aloof from
European combinations in the hope that her alliance might
eventually be sought, when she could give it in return for
a substantial quid pro quo, he told Maffei, was very
dangerous. "He did not see any sign that any Power would
(1)
stand in need of an Italian Alliance." 'When Granville
came into power Italy was still considered in the Foreign
(2 )
Office as "Italia la remuante." . Rebukes were still freely
administered to her Government, whsn the Foreign Office
(3)
thought fit.
There were more fundamental reasons which prevented the 
development of any close understanding between Italy and 
England. In the Franco-Italian rivalry in Tunis England was 
pledged by Salisbury's declarations at Berlin to the support, 
if only by inaction, of the French views. England was bound 
to oppose any efforts of Italy to obtain an equal footing 
with England and France in Egypt. Thus, as soon as Italy 
wished to include these subjects in an exchange of views with
(1) F.0.45/382 Paget to Salisbury 400 3 October 1879
Confidential
(2) F.0.27/2432 Lyons to Granville 545 29 June 1880
Minute by Tenterden
F.0.45/405 Paget to Salisbury 272 14 June 1880
281 16 June 1880
Secret
F.0.7/989 Elliot to Granville 29 April 1880
(3) G.D.29/123 Gladstone to Granville 17 August 1880
151
England, attempts to reach an understanding were at once
checked. In the early months of 1879, the co-operation of
England and Italy on the Eastern question had been drawing
gradually closer. Dn May 26 the Italian Ambassador stated
to Salisbury that he wished to discuss the matters with
which Italy was really preoccupied. He then referred to the
ambitions of France to turn the Mediterranean into a French
lake by the acquisition of the whole North African coast.
Salisbury in reply expressed no opinion on this point, but
stated that he welcomed the desire recently shown by Italy
for an understanding with Her Majesty's Government on questions
(1)
connected with the East. A similar conversation
occurred on June 7 and again on June 24, Menabrea failed
(2)
on both occasions to secure any satisfaction. The result
was, that when Cairoli replaced Depretis as Minister for 
Foreign Affairs at the end of July, Italy abandoned her 
policy of seeking a rapprochement with England. She reached 
an understanding with France on the Greek question and agreed
(3)
with her to recommend to Turkey the cession of Janina,
(1) F.0.45/376 Salisbury to Paget 303 26 May 1879
(2) F.0.45/376 Salisbury to Paget 317 7 June 1879
398 24 June 1879
(3) F.0.45/383 Paget to Salisbury 380 17 September 1879
393 27 September 1879
400 3 October 1879
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and she made difficulties in the negotiations on the
(1)
Egyptian question. When Depretis returned to the Ministry
in November, she separated herself from the other Powers and
(2)
recognised Rumanian independence. Inraatters connected
with the Balkans she appeared to adopt a pro-Russian attitude.
The Italian Press began to adopt a hostile tone towards
(3)
England. In January of the following year a new impediment
to an Anglo-Italian understanding emerged. It was the result 
of the British attitude in regard to Italian activities at 
Assab Bay. News reached the Foreign Office that Italy was 
attempting to establish a coaling station there. Salisbury 
having made sure of his ground, informed the Italian Govern­
ment unofficially that there could be no doubt that the
( 4)
territory belonged to Egypt. He then drew the attention
(1) F.0.45/376 Salisbury to Paget 534 8 November 1879
594 22 December 1879
F.0.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 168 28 February 1880
P.0.7/963 Elliot to Salisbury 467 26 July 1879
Confidential
(2) F.0.45/376 Salisbury to Paget 569 8 December 1879
591 20 December 1879
F.0.45/383 Paget to Salisbury 471 13 December 1879
Confidential
(3) F.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 7 6 January 1880
(4) F.0.45/400 Salisbury to Paget 23 9 January 1880
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of the French Government to the matter, and asked for their
support. Malet, British Consul-General at Cairo, was
instructed to induce the Egyptian Government to send a ship
(1)
of war there and to hoist the Turkish flag. As a result,
the Foreign Office was assured that the enterprise was
(2)
private and purely commercial. Salisbury was not, hov/ever,
satisfied until Paget at the beginning of April obtained a
promise that the Italian Government would not now or at any
future time create a Government settlement there,or erect
(3)
fortifications or other works of a military character.
Granville on coming into office assured Menabrea of the
British desire to continue to co-operate with Italy on the
(4)
Eastern Question. The co-operation that had existed at
(5)
the beginning of 1879 was revived. Again, hov/ever, it 
could be carried no further. At the crucial moment when the 
Italian Cabinet was divided as to whether a policy of closer 
understanding with Aus tria-Hungary and Germany or with 
Great Britain should be pursued, Granville failed entirely
(1) F.0.27/2426 Lyons to Salisbury 22
Secret
and minute by Salisbury
10 January 1880
(2 ) F.0.45/400 Salisbury to Paget 26 17 January 1880
(3) F.0.45/404 Paget to Salisbury 155A 7 April 1880
(4) F.0.45/405 Paget to Granville 219 11 May 1880
(5) F.0.45/406 Paget to Granville 341
393
17 July 1880 
24 August 1880
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(1 )
to respond to Italy's overtures.
With Prance the relations of the Granville Government
were closest. " Although Great Britain as a general rule did
*
not favour special alliances, Granville told the French
chargé d'affaires, he could not emphasise sufficiently the
' (2)
importance attached by her to co-operation with France.
Relations, however, became less rather than more intimate
than those which had existed between Waddington and Salisbury.
The reason for this was the attitude of the Gladstone Government
on the question of Tunis. Shortly after his arrival in London
as French Ambassador Leon Say^  sought to ascertain the view
of the new Government in regard to the declarations of
Salisbury and Beaconsfield at Berlin. Granville made it
clear that England had no right to express an opinion in the
matter and insisted that Salisbury had distinctly
reserved the opinion of Her Majesty's Government respecting
(3)
the position of Italy, Freycinet had meanwhile approached 
Lyons on the question to know if the new Government held "the 
same liberal and enlightened viev/s" as their predecessors on
(1) F.0.45/407 Paget to Granville 439 28 September 1880
Secret
440
F.0.45/408 Paget to Granville 577 23 December 1880
Very Confidential
(2) F.0.27/2421 Granville to Lyons 447 1 May 1880
(3) F.0.27/2422 Granville to Lyons 698 17 June 1880
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the subject. Granville In reply merely expressed the hope
"that any difference of opinion on the subject between Italy
(1)
and France would be discussed in a conciliatory spirit."
Freycinet then told Lyons that he had been led to expect
more than that England would hold aloof in any conflict
between France and Italy on the matter. He had thought
that England might be relied upon to express her disapproval
to Italy. Nothing more, however, could be secured from
(2)
Granville. Friendship with England then was useless to
France. Her policy must be to cultivate a better understanding
with Italy. This policy Barthélémy St. Hilaire pursued
after the dispute with Italy in connection with the Tunis-
Goletta railway had been settled,and the relations between
(3)
England and France grew less close. In August, Freycinet
(1) F.0,27/2432 Lyons to Granville 545 29 June 1880
and minute by Granville
(2) P.0.27/2433 Lyons to Granville 579 8 July 1880
(3) F.0.27/2435 Adams to Granville 921 28 September
Most Confidential
924 29 September 1880
Confidential
929 30 September 1880
Secret
F.0.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville
458 8 October 1880
G.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Sanderson 19 September 1880
rr n
Concerns the activities of M.Binz confidential agent 
of Gambetta's in Rome.
W.L. Langer; The European Powers and the French Occupation 
of Tunis (AmericanHistorical Review,
Jan. 1926 pp.252-65.
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began to show signs of reserve towards England on the 
(X«d [rrvJli^ ( 1 )
Montenegrin^Greek^questions In September, when Granville
informed ChalÆnel Lacour that he desired to consult the
French Government in full confidence before communicating
with the other Cabinets as to the best method of treating the
Greek question, Barthélémy St. Hilaire replied curtly^he
must decline to take the initiative on the question or to
(2) He
discuss it separately with any Power. refused her i*
support the extension of the naval demonstration to deal
with the Greek frontier question as well as the Montenegrin
although in July she had made tliis a condition of taking
(3)
part in the Dulcigno demonstration.
One of Granville's first objects when he took charge of 
the Foreign Office was to effect an improvement in Anglo-
(1) ?.0.27/2433 Adams to Granville 728 23 August 1880
Very Confidential
775 23 August 1880
Very Confidential
780 25 August 1880
Confidential
(2) F.0.27/2436 Lyons to Granville 939 3 October 1880
and minute of Granville's
G.D.29/176 Lyons to Granville 4 October 1880
(3) F.0.27/2436 Lyons to Granville 963,964 9 October 1880
G.D.29/176 Lyons to Granville 9 & 11 October
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Russian relations. It was an object be was prepared to 
pursue in spite of the Queen's opposition, and he instructed 
Dufferin to mark his communications on the subject personal.
"We wish to be good friends with Russia" he wrote to the 
Ambassador. "We do not think there need be any ostentation 
about it, and we do not propose to make any concessions 
excepting with a view to our interests as well as hers,"
Russia was fully prepared to respond. Labanoff told Gran­
ville repeatedly that his mission was to come to an under-
(1)
standing with England on all matters. The Czar made a
point of assuring Dufferin of his conviction that there
v/ould now be no difficulty in establishing a good understanding
(8)
between the two countries. Russia showed herself very
(3)
ready to co-operate with England in the Montenegrin question.
As soon, however, as any real attempt was made to reach an 
understanding England at once drew back. Thus, Labanoff 
speaking unofficially though with the knowledge of the Russian 
Government, said that Russia would be ready to send a con­
tingent of 20,000 to assist an English contingent in coercing
(1) G.D.29/209 Granville to Dufferin Telegram 18 May 1880
24 May 1880 
2 June 1880
(2) P.0.65/1080 Dufferin to Granville 226 19 May 1880
229 20 May 1880
256 15 June 1880
(3) P.O.65/1076 Granville to Dufferin 187 6 May 1880
P.0.65/1080 Dufferin to Granville 277 29 June 1880
303 22 July 1880
158
the Albanians to give up Dulcigno, It was a secret proposal
and seems to have been designed rather to secure some clarity
as to England's ultimate intentions in the Montenegro question
in particular and in Eastern affairs in general, than to
lead to an immediate Anglo-Russian intervention. Granville,
however, did not treat it in that way. He gave no expression
of opinion and much to Russia's discomfiture, allowed the
(1)
proposal to become public. When Russia and Italy alone
showed themselves favourable to Granville’s proposal to follow
up the European naval demonstration off Dulcigno, by the
(2)
seizure of the port and customs house of Smyrna, in the
272 2 1 June 1880
293 15 July 1880
7 July 1880
15 July 1880
377 7 July 1880
G.D.29/209 Granville to Dufferin
G.D.29/185 Dufferin to Granville
P.O.7/992 Elliot to Granville
Confidential
(2) P.O.7/995 Elliot to Granville
Telegram 170 8 October 1880
P.0.64/962 Walsham to Granville
Telegram secret 9 October 1880
P.0.27/2436 Lyons to Granville 963 9 October 1880
report the refusal to participate.
Austria-Hungary, Germany, prance.
P.0.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville
Telegram 140 5 October 1880
P.0.45/1082 Plunkett to Granville 451 5 October 1880
report Italian and Russian acceptance.
P.O.65/1082 Plunkett to Granville 475 12 October 1880
Confidential
491 19 October 1880 
Very Confidential
502 23 October 1880 
Confidential
G.D.29/123 Gladstone to Granville 6 & 14 October 1880 
concern remarks by Jomini as to the impossibility of 
Russia acting alone with England unless there is some 
understanding as to subsequent events.
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interests of the Greek frontier question, Russia once more
attempted to make an opportunity to bring about an understanding
with England on all points connected with the East. If such
an understanding could be effected, Jomini told Plunkett, who
believed he spoke on instructions from Livadia, Russia would
be prepared to go forward alone with England, or with England
(1)
and Italy, in the Smyrna project. Jomini was engaged
at the time in a controversy with Saburoff as to the merits
(2 )
of a Russian alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany.
Had England returned a favourable reply, it would have given
Jomini just the weapon that he lacked to influence the Emperor
to check at least for the moment Saburoff's negotiations with
Bismarck, before they reached the point as they did at the
beginning of the following month, when a text of the proposed
agreement could be drafted. Granville, however, instructed
Plunkett: "We desire to be on friendly terms with Russia and
to avoid all unnecessary antagonism ......... but we have no
wish for special alliances with any particular countries,
which would prevent us from using an influence to maintain
(3)
good relations with all.” The opportunity was lost. The
(1) P.0.65/1082 Plunkett to Granville 525 8 November 1880
Secret
(2) J.Y. Simpson: The Saburoff Memoirs pp.166-67
(Jomini to Saburoff 23 November)
(3) P.0.65/1082 Plunkett to Granville 525 8 November 1880
Secret
Minute by Granville
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Smyrna demonstration abandoned. The negotiations for the 
Dreikaiserbund agreement proceeded with and no further
(1)
reference to a separate understanding with England made.
Any advantages as far as^securing*Jlnformation on the 
relations between the Powers from the course of diplomatic
locx/S CcrrvuL-nvcd ^
negotiations/bhat ^ight have resulted from an effort on 
GranvilleLs part to show confidence in Bismarck, were counter­
balanced by the change in British methods of negotiation. It
was in respect of Anglo-German negotiations that this change
(2)
was most apparent.
During Salisbury's tenure of the Foreign Office the
Powers were faced with a continuous series of propositions in
connection with one question or another, respecting which
they had either to take a favourable or unfavourable decision
or to put forward a counter-proposition. The majority of
those proposals were either put before the Powers by the
British Foreign Office or, as in the case of the later 
(jYi rK*
negotiations, -teto evacuation of the Balkans by another Power 
after an agreement with England. We were thus in a position 
to judge from the replies received, the tendencies towards 
co-operation between the Powers. Granville did not as a rule 
take the initiative in putting proposals before the Powers.
(1) F.0.65/1083 Plunkett to Granville 547 17 November 188^
Confidential
(2) G.D.29/206 Granville to Russell 13 October 1880
12 January 1881
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When he did so, they were either of a general character and
demanded further development by subsequent proposals, or
they dealt with matters which touched the interests of all
the Powers, so that in no case was their decision determined
previously by their alliance policy. The invitation issued
to the Powers immediately on his assumption of office, to
call upon the Porte by means of an identic note, to execute
the remaining portions of the Treaty of Berlin, was an
(1)
example of the first type of proposal. The proposals for
(2)
the naval demonstration off Dulcigno, and for the seizure
(3)
of Smyrna were examples of the second. The British part
tended more and more to become that of a Power called upon to 
take decisions on proposals put forward by Austria-Hungary, 
as in the Montenegrin question, or by France in the Greek 
question, after these Powers had assured themselves of the 
support of the remaining Powers as far as the British Foreign 
Office was concerned, tendencies towards co-operation were, 
therefore, concealed. Again, although as during Salisbury's 
administration of the Foreign Office Great Britain initiated 
exchanges of views with other Powers in regard to the questions
(1) F.0.65/1076 Granville to Lyons 452 4 May 1880
Russell 183 
Elliot 194
Paget 195
Dufferin 176
(2) F.0.65/1077 Granville to Lyons 6 July 1880
Russell
Elliot
Paget
Dufferin
(3) F.0.65/1077 Granville to Lyons 3 October 1880
erin
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under general negotiation, they were not calculated to throw
any light on the relations existing between the Powers, Thus,
on May 1, Granville initiated an exchange of views on the
Montenegrin question. He sent a Circular to the Ambassadors
at the different European capitals instructing them to enquire
of the Governments to which they were accredited "what view
(1)
they take of the matter." In the first place it was not
a case of a confidential consultation with any single Power
which could have drawn from it some information as to its
intentions and expectations of support. In the second place,
as Granville himself made no proposal it was unlikely to
produce anything but vague assurances, or alternatively, as
in the case of Russia, a proposition bn the matter calling for
(2)
a British decision, and not in itself throwing any light
at the time on European relations. Again, on two occasions
Russell was instructed "to thoroughly talk out the matter
(3)
with the Chancellor", and on one occasion Goschen was 
similarly instructed. In these instances a confidential 
and limited exchange of views did take place, but Russell was 
asked to find out what step Bismarck thought should be taken
(1) P.O.65/1084 Granville to Lyons Telegrams 1 May 1880
Russell
Elliot
Paget
Dufferin
(2) P.O.65/1085 Dufferin to Granville  ^ _
Iblegram 65 8 May
(5) G.D.29/206 Granville to Russell 13 October 1880
12 January 1881
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next - the first instance was Just after the Montenegrin 
question reached a solution,and the second after the failure 
of a French proposition for the settlement of the Greek 
question - he was not instructed to secure Bismarck's support 
for an English proposal, which could then be put before the 
Powers. The result was that Bismarck himself suggested a
Solid Tfn
comte-ina-tion, and himself secured the support of the other 
(1)
Powers for it. The tendencies towards co-operation
which the latter process revealed, were then hidden from 
the British Foreign Office,
British information then during 1880-81 is derived in 
the main from reports concerned with the subject of relation- 
ships. It J-s. based upon the interpretation of incidents 
which occurred in the development of re lationshipa^and-frem- 
the declarations of the Ministers of the different countries, 
and the press.
These reports revealed the isolation of Italy brought 
about by Germany,when Italian efforts to seek an understanding 
with England in the early part of 1879, and with France in 
the later months had failed. Secondly, they revealed Italian 
efforts to escape from isolation by reaching an agreement 
with Germany and Austria-Hungary, when attempts to reach an 
understanding with England had again failed, and the Tunis
(1) G.D.29/189 Goschei to Granville 7 February 1881
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question baulked the efforts of prance, in the autumn of 
1880, to improve her relation with Italy.
At the beginning of 1880, British information seemed to
point more and more clearly to the conclusion that Germany
was fomenting ill-feeling between Austria and Italy. In
January the prominent part taken by Cairoli and other
members of the Italian Government in the ceremonies connected
with the funeral of General Avezzanâ, former president of
the Irredenta", and their association on that occasion
with Imbriani, was used as the opportunity for an outbreak
of violent agitation in the Austrian and German Press. It
was directed first against the Irridentist Societies, and then
against the whole policy of the Italian Government. During
February Paget’s conversations with Maffei turned almost
entirely upon the subject of Italo-Austrian relations. By
then, the existence in Austria of a party hostile to Italy
had been acknov/ledged both by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian
Governments and reported by the British Ambassadors accredited
to them. Paget reported that Maffei believed a strong section
of Austrian opinion desired to pick a quarrel with Italy
while she was weak, to prevent her from being a source of
strength to Russia in an eventual Austro-Hussian conflict in
(1)the Balkans. Elliot from Vienna reported that everybody
(1) P.O.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 37 31 January 1880
Confidential
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"from the extreme conservatives to the extreme liberals,
the ministers, military men and the Emperor himself, looked
upon Italy v/ith mistrust." Any sign of aggressive intentions
on her part would mean immediate war. For aggression on
the part of Italy would be met "with a unanimous alacrity
which would be wanting in the case of a rupture with any
(1)
other country." Soon afterwards the Foreign Office w as
informed that four detachments of Austrian troops had been
(2)
moved into the Tyrol. A fortnight later the reports of
(3)
Robilant were still "anything but reassuring."
Another aspect of the question, bov/ever, had now appeared. 
The attitude of the Austrian Government was not consistent 
with a desire, or even readiness, to seek a quarrel with 
Italy. Paget’s reports showed that Haymerle had taken great 
care to reassure Italy in regard to the troop movements.
He had informed Robilant that they were intended some time 
before they took place, and had stated frankly that Austria- 
Hungary must be prepared against a sudden raid organised 
by the Irredentists. At the same time he insisted that he 
had full confidence in the intention of the Italian Government
(1) F.0,7/988 Elliot to Salisbury 4 February 1880
Confidential
(2) F.0,45/402 Paget to Salisbury Telegram 13 February3880 
F.0,45/403 Paget to Salisbury 115 14 March 1880
(3) P.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 77 28 January 1880
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to repress any overt act on their part, and was anxious that
(1)
the Austrian action should not be misinterpreted.
Shortly afterwards an article appeared in the Neüe
Preie Presse urging the maintenance of the most friendly
(2)
relations between the two countries.
The possibility that the agitation in the German and 
Austrian press was artifically promoted then began to be 
suggested.
For the irredentists whose activities were still 
denounced, were unusually quiet. The Italian Government 
appeared to be doing everything possible to remove any 
grounds for Austrian fears of Italian aggression, Already 
on the 22nd February the Times published a telegram from 
Vienna reporting information derived from the Politische 
Correspondenz, that a circular had been issued by the Italian 
Government to the Prefects of - the provinces bordering on 
Austria. It instructed them to repress with "vigorous 
severity* anything calculated to disturb the friendly rela­
tions between Austria-Hungary and Italy. A week later, the
Foreign Office was informed that these instructions had in
(3)
fact been sent. At the same time, Paget reported articles
(1) F.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 51 & 52 13 February 1880
(2) F.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 72 26 February 1880
(3) F.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 47 7 February 1880
167
in the Government Press, notably in the Diritt.o, which declared
that the Italian Government would do everything in their
(1)
power to control the activities of the irredentists. Maffei 
continually urged on the Ambassador the desire of Italy to 
maintain the most friendly relations with Austria. The tone
of the reports of the British Ambassadors changed. Instead 
of dwelling now on the mistrust felt by Austria-Hungary 
towards Italy, Paget pointed out that Maffei was inclined to
(2 )
attach too much importance to a mere newspaper agitation, 
while Elliot informed the Government that Robilant was mis­
taken in believing that everything in the Austrian press was 
inspired by the Austrian Foreign Office. Finally, it appeared
from Elliot's report, that the Vienna correspondent of the
(3)
Daily Telegraph, who had been largely instrumental in spread­
ing an impression that Austria and Italy were on the verge of 
war, had not, as had been assumed in Italy, derived his
(i)
information from the Press Bureau of the Austrian Foreign Office, 
It was the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, however, 
who first suggested that the German Government was possibly
(1) F•0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 39 2 February 1880
52 13 February 1880
77 28 February 1880
(2) F.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 77 28 February 1880
Confidential
(3) Daily Telegraph 26th January and 9th February.
(4) F.0.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 124 15 March 1880
Confidential
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the instigator of the whole agitation. Already, on January 
26 the paper published a telegram which stated that the 
"Representative of a Foreign Power notoriously on the most 
friendly terms with Austria-Hungary'' had made a communication 
in Rome, warning the Italian Government against the marked 
hostility manifested by Italy towards Austria-Hungary, and 
pointing out the disastrous consequences of war. At the
V
time, both Maffei and Kendell denied that any such communica-
(1)
tion had been made. By the end of February, however, Paget
reported that Maffei had begun to speak as if he were
seriously apprehensive that Austria was being urged to seek
(2 )
a cause of quarrel with Italy by Germany. A despatch just
received in the Foreign Office from Odo Russell seemed to
indicate that he was not far wrong. Se reported that Bismarck
was surprised that Austria did not resent more openly the
attitude assumed by Italy, and that Germany was urging the
Austrian Government to strengthen the defences of her Italian
frontiers and to be prepared to resist an invasion which he
believed the Italian Government "will have neither the prudence
(3)
nor the strength to prevent." Paget's comments on the
(1) F.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 37 31 January 1880
Confidential
(2) F.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 77 28 February 1880
Confidential
(3) F.0.64/958 Russell to Salisbury 20 February 1880
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despatch which Salisbury forwarded to him on the 27th, 
pointed out that Prince Bismarck's suspicions were entirely 
unfounded, and encouraged the impression that they were
(1)
made public with some ulterior political object in view.
As suddenly as the agitation had arisen, it again died
down. On March 17 Cairoli declared in a speech before the
Italian Chambers that the Government would show itself
inexorable in repressing any attempt to disturb the relations
(2)
between Italy and Austria-Hungary. Extracts from the
speech were communicated officially to Berlin and Vienna.
Both Austria-Hungary and Germany showed themselves ready to
(3)
accept Cairoli's statements as completely re-assuring.
Bismarck's language in speaking of Italy to Russell a week
( 4)
later, was unexpectedly moderate. During the debate on
Foreign Affairs in the Austrian Chambers, the relations of
(5)
Austria-Hungary to Italy were scarcely mentioned, A little
(1) F.0.45/403 Paget to Salisbury 86 4 March 1880
Confidential
cf. D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill Nos. 32,33,36,38,47,54. 
Pribram: op.cit.-pp.6-7.
Simpson: op.cit, p.105.
(2) F.0.45/403 Paget to Salisbury Telegram 17 March
129 and 130 21 March ,
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.63.
(3) F.0.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 143 22 March 1880
P.O.45/404 Paget to Salisbury 166 20 April 1880
Confidential
(4) P.0.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 148 26 March 1880
Secret
(5) F.0.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 15 April 1880
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later an incident at Trieste showed clearly the confidence
(1)
between the two countries had been fully restored. The 
Inei^ent had, however, left Italy in a position of marked 
isolation.
The next reports of importance in regard to Italian
relations reached the Foreign Office in the late summer of
the same year. Articles in the Italian Press made it clear
that Italy was becoming increasingly preoccupied with the
(2)
question of her relationships to other Powers. Meanwhile,
Macdonnell who was then in charge of the Italian Foreign
Office, had secured a very valuable source of information.
An employe in the Italian Foreign Office, who had once been
"under a very heavy obligation to him" had offered to assist
him "with a few scraps of information." These Macdonnell
tested carefully by discreetly cross-questioning his 
(3)
colleagues. The result was that he secured valuable
information on the Conference that took place from August
26-28 at Cairoli’s summer residence at Belgirate, on the
shores of Lake Como. It was after this Conference that the
first tentative overtures were made by Italy to Germany of a
( 4)
closer understanding.
(1) F.0.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 177 18 April 1880
(2) F.0.45/406 Macdonnell to Salisbury 388 22 August 1880
(3) B.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Granville 23 August 1880
(4) G.P. vol.Ill No.533 footnote.
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On August 16 the Foreign Office received a telegram from
Macdonnell, with information derived from this source. It was
(1)
sent privately to Sanderson, the Assistant Under-Secretary.
"In a conversation last night with the German Ambassador," it
read, "Count Maffei expressed deep regret that since 1866
certain minor questions should have cooled the relations
between Italy and Germany and that he personally thought it
most desirable that the former friendly understanding be revived?
The German Ambassador who had intended to leave Rome for
Germany on the following day, postponed his departure and the
Foreign Office expected developments. For "every possible
overture,® it appeared, "had been made with a view to bringing
about a more intimate entente with Germany." Macdonnell could '
(2) ,
not yet, however, report the result. Further, the charge |
d'affaires reported that Cialdini, the Italian Ambassador at |
Paris, and Maffei were to be the guests of the Italian Prime j
Minister at Belgirate in order to discuss the course of policy
(3)
to be adopted towards France. Meanwhile, Dilke the Under 
Secretary, had established a connection in London, with a 
foreigner who had access to the telegrams received by the
I P y v m  + K Î C  SffV'Oftt O c ’tfc*
Turkish Ambassador from his Government. S® received two 
batches of decyphers in August. From one of them he learnt
(1) G.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Sanderson Telegram 16 August 1880
(2) G.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Granville 23 August 1880
(3) Ibid and F.0.45/406
Macdonnell to Granville 393 24 August 1880
F.0.45/407
Macdonnell to Granville 404 3 September
1880
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that Maffei had informed the Turkish Ambassador in Rome of
the efforts that Italy was making to secure a close friendship
(1)
with Germany. Macdonnell's information was fully confirmed.
Here, then, was a type of information comparable to
that furnished by Crowe, Consul-General at Düsseldorf, in
regard to the Austro-German Alliance, and by Plunlcett in
regard to the discussions at Livadia in September 1879.
The Foreign Office was then able to appreciate the full
significance of the infoimation in regard to the result of
the Belgirate Conference, which Macdonnell derived from
Maffei. The latter prefacing his remarks by asking the
British representative to consider them as private and
personal, did not make any direct communication to him, but
drew his attention to an articlein the Popolo Romano of
September 2, dealing with Tunis, which he said would give
Great Britain some idea of Italian policy. The article
concluded as follows:- "It is probable that, after our bitter
expedience in Tunis, the sympathies of Italy will turn towards
Germany  If Italy draws closer to Germany, more cordial
relations with Austria will be the immediate result, and
that such relations may not again be interrupted is a wish
'(2 )
too often expressed by us to need repetition to-day."
(1) G.D.29/121 Dilke to Granville 30 August 1880
(2) F. 0.45/407 Macdonnell to Salisbury 404 3 September 1880
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An article in the MeÜe Freie presse of Vienna on 
September 4, was the means of providing the Foreign Office 
with further information in this respect. For the article 
believed to be inspired by the Austrian Foreign Office, 
created a stir in Rome and was commented on in all the papers. 
It drew from the Italian Foreign Office an expression of 
opinion which was published in the Diritto. The Üleüe Freie 
Presse recommended the idea of an, alliance with Germany and 
Austria to the serious attention of the Italian Government.
"In case of a general European v;ar", it read, Italy could 
not possibly remain neutral. In alliance with France she 
would have everything to lose and nothing to gain; in alliance 
with Germany and Austria the opposite would probably be the 
case." The Opinione, a paper of the moderate liberal party, 
while proclaiming the policy of liberty of action, welcomed the 
prospect of a rapprochement between Italy and the two Bnpires. 
The Diritto, at the direction of the Foreign Office, agreed 
with the NeWe Freie Presse's views as to the relative dis­
advantages of an alliance with France and an alliance with 
Germany, but wished to know what were the relative advantages 
of the two policies. A little later the tiefa?e Freie Presse, 
supported now by the German Press, returned to the subject.
It maintained that Italy could not remain without allies and 
it asserted that Cairoli was ardently in favour of the triple 
combination which it recommended. No comment was offered in 
the Government papers, and no attempt made to deny its
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(1 )
assertions. Indications were thus favourable to the
view that as a result of the discussions at Belgirate^ the
idea of an alliance with Austria and Germany was at least
being considered, if not acted upon. At that point,
Macdonnell's informant in the Italian Foreign Office told
him that advances had been made to both Austria and Germany.
They had not, however, met with much success. The Italian
(2)
Government he said was "too greedy."
A week later a telegram reached the Foreign Office from 
Macdonnell. It stated that Maffei had authorised him to 
assure Granville "that no secret negotiations whatever were
(3)
going on for more intimate relations with Austria and Germany." 
It appeared in fact that there was a division of opinion 6n 
the question of alliance policy among the Italian Ministers. 
Maffei described himself as having urged upon the Italian 
Cabinet that efforts should be made to reach a more complete 
understanding with England. He believed that he had the 
support of a section of the Cabinet, and that, if the British 
Government showed a desire to respond and took "Italy into 
their confidence as to the policy they intend to pursue" and 
gave such explanations through Menabrea, the policy he
(1) F.0.46/407 Macdonnell to Granville 414 8 September 1880
. 427 19 September 1880
(2) G.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Sanderson 19 September 1880
(3) F.0.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville
Telegram 23 September 1880 
134 Private
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(1)
recommended would prevail. The minor Italian papers
now took up the idea and pointed to the advantages of an I
(2)
Italian alliance with England. Macdonnell had, however, 
advised the Foreign Office a little earlier not "to reckon 
too implicitly on all the fine assurances of the Italian '
tf
Government. Italy was ready to fish in troubled waters.
She would cease her support to England on the Greek and 
Montenegrin question, at the first favourable opportunity 
for doing so. Such an opportunity would be offered if the
tessicTKv br^rtcc-.
Albanians in the near future resisted the of terri­
tory in Epirus to- Greece. The Foreign Office, then, made no 
response to Maffei's invitation. The Montenegrin question 
which had afforded an opportunity for a demonstration of 
Italy's desire to act with England was settled by the 
cession of Dulcigno.
Already, however, the Diritto had returned to the subject 
of an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, which was 
now advocated without the reserve that characterised the 
attitude of the paper, when the subject was first agitated
(1) F.0.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville
Telegram 136 28 September 3380
440 28 September1880
Secret and Confidential
(2) F.0.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville 449 2 October 1880
(3) G.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Sanderson 8 Septemberl880
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at the beginning of September. It further pointed out the 
dangers of attempting to secure a close understanding with 
England. Italy by such an attempt would be drawn into the 
vortex of Balkan politics in a pro-Russian and anti-Austrian 
direction: "there is nothing less stable than Russian
(1)
policy, nothing more precarious than the policy of Gladstone."
The decisIon in regard to the conclusion of the Triple 
Alliance was, however, no longer primarily dependent on 
decisions taken in Italy. Maffei had made advances to 
Kendell, while through Hirling, an agent of Crispins, who
(2)
possessed Haymerle's confidence, Vienna had been Sounded.
Maffei, after the Belgirate Conference, had called in a
correspondent of the Diritto, Gronert Goereke, to inform
Vienna and Berlin of the course that the discussions there
had taken. Ylhen the latter reached Vienna, Haymerle, contrary
to his original plan had not yet returned from his holiday 
fi
on Mordeney. Through Reuss, therefore, Gronert Goercke 
approached Bismarck. The next stage in the development of 
the negotiations depended on the German and Austrian replies.
By October it was clear that neither Austria-Hungary nor 
Germany was prepared to respond unreservedly to Italian 
advances should they be made officially. Gronert Goercke
(1) P.0.45/407 Macdonnell to Salisbury 459 12 October 1880
(2) P.Crispi; Memoirs Vol.II pp.118 et sequ.
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(1 )
v/as, thereupon disavowed. In mid-October, Haymerle raised
u
the matter with Kehdell, who was then in Vienna. He was
evidently ready for an understanding with Italy. Wimpffen,
however, had merely been instructed to cultivate the tendencies
in Rome favourable to an agreement. Haymerle was not prepared
to take the initiative. The Italian Ministers also refused
to make the next move, and fell back upon the policy of the 
( 2 )
free hand. Discussions were restricted to an exchange of
(3)
views between Germany and Austria-Hungary.
On the German and Austrian side of the negotiations, 
however, the Government received at this time no information 
whatever. The result was, that the Foreign Office received 
a false impression as to the final outcome of the conflict 
between the different tendencies influencing Italian alliance 
policy. Macdonnell before relinquishing control of the 
Embassy, sent home an analysis of Italy's policy in regard 
to foreign relations, and of the conclusions which he had 
reached as a result of the events of the last months. The 
report ended by stating his belief that the advances to 
Germany had failed, and that as a result Italy now hoped to 
be drawn into closer relations with England - "the only Power 
whose friendship and support is sought and valued by all
(1) Crispin op.cit./p.118 et sequ.
G.P. Vol.Ill No.553 footnote.
(2) G.P. Vol.Ill Nos.533, 534.
(3) G.P. Vol.Ill No.535.
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parties." The report was put before the Cabinet on October
29, so that some considerable importance was probably
(1)
attached to it by the Foreign Office. For sometime after
this there were no further reports on Italy's foreign rela­
tions, and when, at the end of December, Paget again 
reported on the subject, they seemed to be much the same as 
in the early part of the year. It appeared that while Italy 
had no special relations with any Power, her relations with 
England were sufficiently intimate to arouse the suspicions
of the French Ambassador in Rome that special engagements
(2)
existed between the two countries.
It soon become clear, however, that the Foreign Office
was not justified in forming any final opinion as to Italy's
relations. For, it appeared from a report of the British
representative at Belgrade that Haymerle had recently
addressed "very vehement reproaches" to Count Robilant on
account of the intimate relations existing between the
(3)
British and Italian Governments. Shortly afterwards, Paget 
reported that the Austrian and German Press was again referring 
to the danger to be apprehended from the ambitious and
(1) F.0.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville 471 16 October 1880
(2) F.0.45/408 Paget to Granville 577 23 December 1880
Very Confidential
(3) F.0.45/426 Paget to Granville 44 26 January 1881
Confidential
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quarrelsome designs of Italy In connection with the Italia
Irredenta Society. The Austrian /anbassador had spoken to
(1)
Maffei on the subject.
Austria-Hungary and Germany then seemed prepared to 
repeat their procedure of the previous Spring.
Meanwhile, prance was proceeding from Algiers against 
the Krouniirs of Tunis, Italian efforts to act v/ith England 
on the question failed. Malvano, the Political Director of 
the Italian Foreign Office, informed Paget on May 2, that 
the Italian Government "were determined strictly to follow 
the course which Her Majesty's Government may deem expedient 
to pursue for the protection of its subjects and interests 
in the Regency." Paget replied that the British Government 
intended to send an Ironclad into Tunisian waters. Malvano 
thereupon asked that Italy should be informed of the name of 
the sMp and its date of sailing, so that the Italian
(2)
Government could conform their action to that of the British. 
Menabrea, however, was told that the latter would object to 
anything like a combined movement, and no-information in 
regard to British intentions was given to the Italian Government, 
The Italian Ministers were considerably disconcerted when they 
learnt that a British vessel had arrived in Tunisian waters.
(1) F.0.45/426 Paget to Granville 50 29 January 1881
(2) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 169 2 May 1881
(3) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 169 2 May 1881
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while their ovm which had been held back while a reply from
England was awaited, had not sailed. It at once appeared that
there was again a sharp division of opinion in the Italian
(1)
Cabinet as to the policy to be pursued. The Government
organ, the Diritto, took the opportunity to revive the subject
(2)
of Italian relations with Austria-Hungary. Depretis and
his organ, the Popolo Romano, urged that no action should be
taken by Italy and adopted a moderate and conciliatory tone
(3)
towards France. Cairoli wqs extremely excited and
insisted on the necessity of Italy’s finding some support
(4) )
against France, The divisions among the Ministers were
reflected in the public opinion of Rome. The overtures made 
by England in March 1878 for, as it was described, an under­
standing on all matters relating to their j^<Uricc^P
in the East and in the Mediterranean, was remembered and its
(5)
rejection by Italy regretted. At the same time the
(1) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 170A 3 May 1881
176 5 May 1881
Most Confidential
190 12 May 1881
188 11 May 1881
Confidential
(2) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 181 9 May 1881
(3) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 190 12 May 1881
(4) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 184 9 May 1881
Confidential
(5) Dwight E.Lee: The proposed Mediterranean League of 1878
(Journal of Modern History III pp.30-45, March, 1931).
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Government was attacked for having allowed the irredentist
agitation to produce a coolness in the relations of Italy to
(1)
Austria-Hungary and Germany. The publication in the
Standard at the end of March of Salisbury’s language to
Waddington at Berlin respecting Tunis, which was apparently
confirmed when the Times on April 11 published a despatch
from Salisbury to Lyons of July 1878, was no encouragement
for an attempt to retrieve the advantages lost by the rejection
of English overtures. This was now pointed out by the
(2)
Opinione and the Italie. Then the formal denial in the
Commons by Dilke that Salisbury had made any promises to
Italy in regard to Tripoli the irritation against
C3)
England. Shortly afterwards the fall of the Ministry and
(4)
the appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mane ini, 
who had been Minister of Justice at the time of Crispi’s 
mission to the European capitals in the autumn of 1877, when 
British information showed eete attempt to negotiate an under-
(1) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 188 11 May 1881
Confidential
(2) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 213 & 214 26 May 1881
(3) F.Crispi: Memoirs Vol.II pp.114-117.
(4) F.0.45/428 Paget to Granville 219 28 May 1881
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(1 )
standing with Germany had been made, seemed also to 
indicate that relations with Germany and Austria would be 
drawn closer rather than those with England. Further,
Depretis was now President of the Council as he had been 
during the Autumn of 1877 and Spring of 1878. The moderate 
tone adopted by Depretis towards France was also more favour­
able to any attempt at an understanding with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, should it be made, proving successful. For 
British information indicated that Germany gave her full
Fr&nok aciVipi (2)
support to Ion(8 3: ^torprioo in Tunis.
In the second place, reports on the subject of diplomatic
relations led the Foreign Office to believe that a revival of
the Dreikaiserbund was slowly being prepared in accordance
with Russell's reports of November 21 and December 19, the
views of which the Ambassador had repeated to Granville in
(3)
forceful terms in May.
(1) F. Crispi: op.cit. Vol.II pp.8-89.
F.0 .4 5 / 3 3 9 Paget to Salisbury 351 2 July 1876 1^7?
368 22 July 1898 /%??
F.0.45/315 Paget to Derby 340 27 September 1877
(2) P.O.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 18 3 January 1879
Most Confidential 
P.O.64/980 Russell to Granville 88 18 February 1881
Secret
concern occasions since the Congress when the French 
Ambassador was known to have received assurances of support 
from Bismarck.
G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 17 January 1881
. 14 May 1881
(3) Fitzmaurice: op.cit. Vol.II pp.209, 211-212.
G.D.2 9 / 1 7 7 Russell to Granville 1 May 1880
G.D.29/206 Granville to Russell 5 May 1880
G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 8 May 1880
' 15 May 1880
22 May 1880 
29 May 1880
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In January information was received to the effect that
serious intentions to bring about an improvement in Russo-
German relations had been behind Saburoff's journey to Berlin
in September, and that it was not merely the result of
Russia's anxiety lest the meeting at Vienna indicated an
anti-Russian trend in German policy. The Czar, determined to
revive the former relations between Russia and Germany, had
chosen the summer of 1879 as the moment to comply with
Bismarck's request, made as early as 1876, that Oubril should
be replaced by an Ambassador who was less pro-French and less
pro-Gorchakoff. He had consulted Bismarck as to whom he
should appoint. Bismarck, on Radowitz's recommendation had
suggested Saburoff, and asked that he might make the letter's
personal acquaintance before the final decision was taken.
Russell also reported that Saburoff had had conversations
with Bismarck at Eissingen. On the all-important question
as to the substance of these conversations he could, however,
(1)
give no information. In February 1880, the introduction
of the army bill in the Reichstag explained the outcry which
(2)
still continued against Russian troop movements.
The estrangement that took place in the Spring between
(1) F.0.64/958 Russell to Salisbury 1 1 January 1880
(2) F.0.64/958 Russell to Salisbury 20 February 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV Nos.21, 51.
F.0.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 3 March 1880
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Prance and Russia afforded a further indication to the
Foreign Office that a revival of the former intimacy between
Russia and Germany might reasonably be expected. The Foreign
Office had seen in^ro-French tendencies of Russia
factor in bringing about the Russo-German estrangement of 1879.
One of the principal agents in planning the explosion
of the train in which the Czar was thought to be travelling
in November 1879, was alleged to be, Leon Hartmann. He was
arrested in Paris in February 1880. Russia applied for his
extradition. The nature of the charge prevented the request
from being of purely legal importance. The strong opposition
that broke out among Republican Deputies and in the Radical
Press,made it clear that it would become a question of con-
(1)
siderable political importance. Orloff on the 27th, told
Lyons that he had not as yet, made any threats as to the con­
sequences of the decision of the French Government on the
(2)
political relations between Russia and France. On March 6 ,
the Havas Agency announced the refusal of the French Government
(3)
to grant the extradition. On the 15th it announced that
(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.29 note.
F.0.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 163 27 February 1880
Confidential 
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.55.
(2) p.0.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 163 27 February 1880
Confidential
(3) F.0.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 196 9 March 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.53.
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(1 )
Orloff had left for St, Petersburg. Lyons drew the
attention of tbs Government to the Importance of his
departure. For Orloff had pointed out to him that the same
procedure was used when Russian relations with the Vatican
(2)
were suspended. Freycinet's language to Lyons held out
no hope that France would make any attempt to conciliate
(3)
Russia. From St. Petersburg came the information that
the Czar had publicly treated General Chdtizy, the French
Ambassador, with marked 'coldness. Dufferin considered that
( 4)
he mi^t ask to be relieved of his post.
It was then made clear to the Foreign Office that the 
possible reaction of these events on Russo-German relations 
was fully appreciated in Germany. The German Press made no 
effort to conceal that it welcomed the incident as preventing
for some years at least the conclusion of a Fran co-Russian
( 3 ) \y Wfco swd _
Alliance. If France had been prepared to show herself
A
(1) F.0.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 225 16 March 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.62.
(2) F.0.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 227 17 March 1880
(3) F.0.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 228 17 March 1880
(4) F. 0.65/1079 Duff erin to Salisbury 146 25 March 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.69.
(5) F.0.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 123 12 March 1880
Secret
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill Nos. 37 & 58.
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disposed to give adequate guarantees to Russia against the
development of socialism, Russia's tendency to cultivate
her relations with Germany would have been checked. France
had, however, given a demonstration of her republican
feelings. Russia would now be compelled to fall back upon
Germany's friendship. Prom Bismarck himself Russell could,
however, derive no information. His language at the end of
March made it appear that Russo-German relations were in the
(1)
same strained state as in the early summer of 1879. It 
was clear, however, that Bismarck was determined not only 
to welcome the estrangement that had taken place, but if 
possible to increase it. The Chancellor chose what was
in fact the turning point of the crisis - the moment when the
outcry of the French radicals had subsided and the legal 
aspect of the question been examined, but the decision of 
the Government not yet announced - to demonstrate the 
friendly feelings of Germany towards France. The Emperor 
and Empress, for the first time since 1871, attended a dinner 
given by the French Ambassador. An unusual degree of pub­
licity was given to the event in the French and German Press. 
Hohenlohe was appointed to the dual position of permanent 
Ambassador at Paris, and provisional Minister for Foreign
(1) P.0.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 146 25 March 1880
Secret 
148 25 March 1880
Secret
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(1 )
Affairs.
Soon afterwards an incident significant for the
relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, as well as
those between Germany and Russia, was reported. On April
29 Austrian and German Generals arrived in St. Petersburg
on a mission of congratulation to the Czar on the occasion
of his birthday. Continental, especially Austrian, papers
alluded to it as an unprecedented event and the forerunner
of a new Dreikaiserbund. Dufferin and Elliot agreed,
however, that the incident had no immediate political
significance. "The renewal of the Dreikaiserbund", reported
Elliot, "was the last thing the Austrian Government would
wish." Yet, both Ambassadors saw in it a demonstration of
Austria-Hungary's desire to keep the way open to Russia.
(2)
Duff erin had Kalnoky's authority for this opinion.
Incidents followed which indicated that the improved 
relations between the three Emperors which this mission 
marked, was supported at least as far as Germany was concerned, 
by an improvement in the relations of the two Governments.
In the second week of May, Orloff returned to Paris.
On his way he stayed two days in Berlin. He was received by
(1) F.0.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 4 March 1880
123 12 March 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill Nos.42 & 81.^®°^®^
(2) P.0.7/990 Elliot to Granville 205 4 May 1880
Confidential
F. 0.65/1080 Dufferin to Granville 197 5 May 1880
188
the .Snperor and by Bismarck, and Russell reported that he
was the bearer of conciliatory assurances designed "to
gradually re-establish the friendly relations which formerly
(1)
existed between Russia and Germany." His mission,
according to Russell, was in fact but a symptom of a general
attempt on the part of the Russians to ingratiate themselves
at Berlin - an attempt which considerably gratified the
(2 )
Chancellor.
On June 1, Prince Gorchakoff arrived in Berlin on his 
way to Baden. He was received on this occasion by Bismarck 
as well as by the Emperor. Russell informed the Foreign 
Office that the visit signified a reconciliation between the 
two Chancellors and the re-establishment of "those confi­
dential relations between Germany and Russia which had
(3)
formerly prevailed,"
Reports, based upon statements of the Emperor to 
Russell, that were received in August, showed that the Eastern 
Question - the one question which offered the basis for 
any real improvement in Russo-German relations - afforded 
the basis for the rapprochement that was seen to be taking 
place.__________;______________________ ______________________
(1) F.0.64/960 Russell to Granville 211 17 May 1880
Confidential
(2) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 15 May 1880
(3) F.0.64/960 Russell to Granville 239 2 June 1880
Most Confidential
189
In April Russia had presented Prince Alexander with
(1) ^ 
a small warship. Shortly afterwards the Foreign Office
was informed that Russian non-commissioned officers were
being admitted into the Bulgarian army and Russian rifles
(2)
supplied to it. Meanwhile Eastern Rumelia was falling
(3)
into a state of complete disorder. By June 1880, a
formidable unionist agitation had broken out both in the
Province and the Principality. Alarm was widespread that
Russia was about to precipitate matters and to take the
(4)
first step towards overthrowing the Berlin Treaty.
' It appeared, hov/ever, that an exchange of views had 
taken place on the subject between the German Emperor and 
the Czar, The former told Russell on August 17, that he 
had received the most positive assurances from theCzar that 
he would do all in his power to prevent the union of Bulgaria 
and Eastern Rumelia. Hohenlohe, in reply to Russell's 
questions, took care to avoid giving him any further informa­
tion, but he went so far as to state that Germany felt full
(1) F.0.7/990 Elliot to Granville 217 8 May 1880
Confidential
(2) F.0.7/985 Granville to Elliot Telegram 7 May 1880
F.0.7/992 Elliot to Granville 382 10 July 1880
(3) F.0.7/990 Elliot to Granville 248 20 Hay 1880
Confidential
(4) F.0.7/991 Elliot to Granville 307 12 June 1880
Confidential
F.0.7/991 Elliot to Granville 320 17 June 1880
Very Confidential 
concerns a conversation between Elliot and Prince Alexander
E.0.7/991 Elliot to Granville 355 29 June 1880
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confidence in the Czar's intentions to prevent the union.
Hitherto, British information had shown that the
Austro-Hungarian Government was little affected by the
disposition of Russia to improve her relations with Germany,
On the contrary, Russell wrote that Bismarck showed more
readiness to respond to Russian advances "than the Austrians
(2)
will quite like when they find it out." Elliot reported
that "he could detect no corresponding change or modification"
in the feelings of Austria-Hungary to Russia, such as was
reported to be taking place in the relations between Germany
(3)
and Russia.
The Czar, however, shortly after the Kaiser's visit to
the Emperor of Austria,conferred upon the latter the rank of
commander in a Russian regiment. An act of courtesy which
indicated that the intimate relations between the German and
Austrian Emperors recently demonstrated by a meeting between 
( 4 )
them at Ischi were balanced by the friendly feelings of the
(5)
Czar towards the Austrian Emperor.
(1) P.0.64/961 Russell to Granville 385 17 August 1880
Secret 
370 18 August 1880
Secret
(2) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 15 May 1880
(3) P.0.7/991 Elliot to Granville 350 28 June 1880
Confidential
(4) D.D.F. Series 1 Vol.Ill No.237.
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It now appeared that the Austrian Empe^o-a  ^Francis 
Joseph, at— le-a-at had had some part in the exchange of views 
that had recently taken place between the Kaiser and the 
Czar. No particular importance had been attached at the 
time to the Ischl meeting by the British representatives, 
and no report on the subject was received by the Foreign
hfivwu
Office. Russell^now reported that the Kaiser had informed
Francis Joseph on that occasion of his own views on the
Bulgarian question and of the Czar's assurances. The
question, that is, upon which Austro-Russian relations had
(1)
hinged since 1877, had come under discussion.
The information brou^t into focus both previous and
subsequent reports received respecting Austria’s Eastern
policy. British information indicated that Austria had
been showing an increasing preoccupation with the possible
results of a collapse of Turkey. In speaking to Count Cort&
in the Spring, Haymerle, according to Paget, had expressed
the opinion that the Turkish Empire was gradually and surely
breaking up, and had dwelt on the attitude that the Powers
(2)
should adopt in such an event. Elliot reported that
(1) P.O.7/961 Russell to Granville 370 18 August
Secret
(2) F.0.45/405 Paget to Granville 214 8 May 1880
Most Confidential
G.D.29/182 Paget to Granville 8 May 1880
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Haymerle repeatedly expressed the opinion that "the process
of decomposition was so far advanced in Turkey as to render
it impossible effectually to stay it." The Austrian Minister
was concerned only with the conditions under which the
(1)
dissolution might best take place. On September 11,
Elliot endeavoured to give a reasoned account of Austrian
policy in the East. He reached the conclusion that Austria-
Hungary would endorse the observation recently made by
(2)
Gladstone in the Commons, that Turkish independence and
M'
integrity must learn to shift for themselves^ without Glad­
stone's qualifying phrase\^ unless the porte reformed its
administration. Austria-Hungary would only stop short out
(3)
encouraging the agitation of discontented subjects.
Moreover, v/hen in July Granville had proposed the
signature of a self-denying protocol before the Dulcigno
naval demonstration was carried out by the Powers, Haymerle
insisted that the agreement should be strictly "applicable
only to what mi^t arise out of the measures which were the
(4)
cause of its being made." Elliot had then pointed out
(1) F. 0.7/991 Elliot to Granville 297 9 June 1880
Confidential
(2) Hansard: 3rd Series Vol.CCLVI pp.1318 et sequ.
(3) P.0.7/994 Elliot to Granville 554 11 September
(4) P.0.7/992 Elliot to Granville
Telegram 111 24 July 1880 
P.0.7/986 Granville to Elliot 431 24 July 1880
. P. 0.7/992 Elliot to Granville 428 27 July 1880
Confidential
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that Austria-Hungary desired to keep herself free from all
embarrassing engagements if events should bring about an
"unsettlement" of Turkey. Although he did not believe that
Austria desired to extend the territory which she controlled
in the Balkans, he said in guarded language that circumstances,
such as an extension of Russian influence in Bulgaria, might
(1)
arise which would induce them to push on to the Aegean.
Another report stated that Austria-Hungary might be disposed
to favour a limited form of union between Bulgaria and Eastern
(2 )
Hume lia.
On the other hand, there were indications that symptoms 
of a -Bulgarian movement would effectually prevent the 
reestablishment of anything like cordiality or a good under­
standing between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and might revive
the co-operation that had formerly existed between Great
(3) TKt IcUW
Britain and Austria-Hungary. These two Powers ^ exchanged 
information on the subject and together - though not in 
identic terms and not through their Ambassadors at St. Peters­
burg - demanded explanations from Russia, and exchanged views
(1) P.0.7/992 Elliot to Granville 436 ' 31 July 1880
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/992 Elliot to Granville 412 22 July 1880
Very Confidential
(3) P.0.7/991 Elliot to Granville 350 28 June 1880
Confidential
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as to the validity of the explanat^ns^  ^ Austria-Hungary,
however, did not show herself disposed to take any serious
step in the matter,
Russell's informâtion as to the discussions at Ischl
seemed to indicate that the Bulgarian question would be
settled between the three Empires. The suspicions aroused
by Elliot's reports on Austria-Hungary's Eastern policy,that
she was more disposed than hitherto to come to a "squaring"
agreement with Russia, such as Russell had suggested in May
(2)
mi^t come about, were encouraged. The Kaiser’s state­
ment, reported by the Ambassador, that Francis Joseph had 
listened to his account of Alexander II's assurances in
(3)
silent embarrassment further confiimed these suspicions.
At this point a telegram arrived from Mr. Stephen,
British Consul-General at Philippopolis. It read;-
Secret, I am informed on good authority that Russian
Government proposed to Austria about a fortnight àgo to
secure to her full possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(4)
provided she agrees to a Bulgarian union. bcnm
(1) P. 0.7/992 Elliot to Granville 424 26 July 1880
Confidential
426 27 July 1880
Confidential
478 13 August 1880
Confidential
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P.0.7/996 Elliot to Granville 655 15 October 1880
P.0.7/996 Elliot to Granville 691 27 October 1880
Confidential
(2) G.E.29/177 Russell to Granville 29 May 1880
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the Crown Prince of Austria arrived in Berlin. There he 
stated per-s-oe^ l ep4ni-»n in confidential conversation
Kj8 WA/O
among his friends,^in favour of sharing with Russia the
fruits of a concerted policy of aggression, "The possession
of Salonica" he said, "might compensate Austria for
(1)
the preponderance of Russia at Constantinople."
No confirmation of Stephen's report reached the Foreign
Office, nor information as to the result of the overture,if
it had in fact been made. Together with the language of
the Crown Prince, it was important as an indication of the
trend of Austro-Hungarian and Russian policy rather than as
information on an event which had actually taken place.
The press now afforded an opportunity for securing
further information on the subject. At the end of October
a series of articles appeared in the English and continental
Press, calling attention to an alleged tendency on the part
of Austria-Hungary to pursue a pro-Russian policy, fn the East,
(2)
and to a v/eakening of the Austro-German friendship. The 
assertions in the latter respect were soon disproved, A 
good deal of publicity was given to a letter from Francis 
Joseph to Moltke congratulating him on his eightieth birthday.
(1) F.0.64/962 Russell to Granville 430 17 September 1880
Secret
(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.287.
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The Austrian and German papers denied the statements in
(1)
this sense which they had originally made. The declaration
of Haymerle to the Austrian Delegations that Austria-Hungary
was, above all, constant to the Alliance with Germany,
published in the Wiener Zeitung of November, finally disposed
of the assertions of the press. No attempt, ho?/ever, was
made to deny the pro-Russian tendency of Austria's Eastern
(2)
policy. Walsham, who was in charge of the Berlin Embassy
was disposed to interpret the incident as the result of the
fact that Germany was pursuing, and advising Austria-Hungary
to pursue, a policy favourable to the revival of the Drei-
kaiserbund. For the visible effect of such a policy would'
naturally be more noticeable in the case of Austria than in
the case of Germany, and might reasonably account for the
observations of the Press on the subject of Austro-German
(3)
relations.
No information on the subject of the Austro-Hungarian- 
Russian rapprochement could be secured in Vienna. Haymerle's 
public declarations and private statements to Elliot were 
both directed to encourage the impression that Austria-Hungary 
was opposed to a revival of the Dreikaiserbund, and desired
(1) F.0.64/964 walsham to Granville 515 6 November 1880
Confidential
(2) F.0.7/996 Elliot to Granville 213 5 November 1880
(3) F.0.64/964 Walsham to Granville 515 6 November 1880
Confidential
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only friendship with England to supplement her relations
with Germany. Baron Hiibner urged on the Austrian Delegation
that the policy of opposition to Russia in the East should
be abandoned. A conflagration engendered by Prance, he
insisted, was inevitable unless the "three Empires were seen
to be so closely banded together as to render it impossible."
Haymerle in reply, emphasised the danger of splitting Europe
into two groups. He intended to follow the programme of
England and Germany in the East, and so to create a nucleus
(1)
round which the European Concert might be built up. The
Emperor told Elliot, that Hübner's speech was "uncalled for,
(2)
injudicious and its conclusions absolutely mistaken."
Haymerle's language, however, was not altogether clear.
"Much has been talked about Alliances and understandings," 
he said. "As regards Austria-Hungary, the foundation of 
her policy in the last years has been constancy. On this 
subject I will refrain from giving promises, for these could 
have no bther effect than that of weakening our policy." 
Moreover, Calice, who had been Austrian Ambassador at Constanti- 
nople since the previous June, had recently hinted to Goschen 
that a "squaring arrangement" between Austria-Hungary and
(1) F. 0.7/996 Elliot to Granville 713 5 November 1880
717 7 November 1880
(2) F.0.7/996 Elliot to Granville 718 7 November 1880
Very confidential
193
(1)
Russia might be expected in the near future.
Meanwhile, an incident that occurred in September seems
to indicate that Germany was now sufficiently confident of
the friendship of Russia to allow the suspicions and distruct,
such as had led to the "Scare" of 1875, to generate again against
Prance. Gambetta, in a speech at Cherbourg on August 12,
expressed the hope that France would soon again take her
place in the world and referred to the inherent justice in
(2)
human affairs. A series of articles in his organ France,
boasted of the strength of Prance and raised the question of
(3)
Alsace Lorraine. Agitation immediately broke out in the
German Press. The semi-official Word deutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung played a prominent part. The celebration of the
victory of Sedan organised, Russell reported, on Bismarck's i
(4)
instructions, and the speech of von Varnbühler, a supporter
of Bismarck in the Reichstag, which revived again the
subject of the Russian overtures to France in the autumn of
(5)
1879, marked the peak point of the agitation* , It died
(1) G.D.29/189 Goschen to Granville 5 October 1880
G.D.23/123 Gladstone to Granville 13 October 1880
(2) P.O.27/2434 Adams to Granville 719 12 August 1880
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(3) P.O.27/2434 Adams to Granville 781 25 August 1880
Confidential
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down as suddenly as it had arisen and the relations between
(1)
the two countries appeared to be unaffected.
Towards the end of the year, largely from the statements 
of Russian diplomats and officials, a certain amount of 
information was secured as to the use to which Bismarck was 
turning the improved relations between Russia and Germany, 
in connection v/ith the conclusion of an Austro-Russian 
arrangement respecting the Eastern•Question.
The diplomatic centre in Germany in the autumn of 1880, 
was at Friedrichs^ute. At the beginning of September,
Elliot and Russell reported that Haymerle had visited 
Bismarck there. His visit was not, however, connected with 
that of Saburoff which too^ place at the beginning of December. 
For both Russell and St. Vallier visited Bismarck during the 
intervening months. It seemed, moreover, to have too in­
formal a character to be the occasion for any decisive dis­
cussions. It was made unexpectedly on Haymerle's return from
a three weeks ' holiday on Mordeney, and appeared as an act
(2)
of courtesy only. Its main importance did not appear
to be political. Bismarck was at the moment primarily con-
(3)
cerned with internal affairs. He. had, in fact, recently
(1) F. 0.27/2437 Lyons to Granville 1019 1 November 1880
Confidential
(2) F.0.7/993 Elliot to Granville Telegram 5 August 1880
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taken over the duties of the Minister of Commerce. His 
object in doing so, Russell reported, was to bring into being 
the customs union with Austria-Hungary, and he had made 
proposals for this purpose to Haymerle at Friedrichee^«.
So far as political matters were discussed, only the diplo­
matic negotiations under general European consideration, 
seemed to have been touched upon. Haymerle informed Elliot 
of Bismarck's anxiety as the result- of Gambetta's Cherbourg
speech, and of his desire to see the pending questions in
(2 )
the East settled.
Neither Elliot nor Russell were, however, satisfied
that the information they had secured from official sources
represented a complete account of what had taken place.
Elliot had informed Granville privately before Haymerle's
return to Berlin, that he had probably raised with Bismarck
the question of the agitation in Macedonia, Bulgaria and
Eastern Rumelia, with a view to finding out what support he
might expect from Germany, should he be compelled to take
(3)
measures against it. Russell also wrote privately to
Granville. He stated that to judge by the language of 
Bismarck to a friend, he thought it likely that the Chancellor
(1) F.0.64/962 Russell to Granville 430 17 September 1880
Secret
F.0.64/963 Russell to Granville 600 31 December
Secret
(2) F.0.7/994 Elliot to Granville 563 15 September 1880
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had advised Haymerle at FriedrichS^re, not to resist the 
agitation^ Secondly, Elliot informed Granville that he
believed the execution of the Berlin Award on the Greek , 
frontier question had also been discussed, Bismarck, he 
thought, had suggested to Austria that she should not 
oppose the use of coercion. Without taking part in actual 
military measures, she might advance her Bosnian garrisons 
as far as Mitrovica, when she could control the course events 
might take. The Chancellor, Elliot wrote, and Russell later 
agreed with him, was actively pursuing the policy of encour­
aging the extension of Austrian influence in the western
(2 )
part of the Peninsula.
Shortly afterwards a report arrived from Plunkett at 
St. Petersburg to the effect that Germany was trying to bring 
about an understanding between Russia and Austria-Hungary. 
Information which had reached him confidentially that a 
secret understanding had been come to in regard to the 
Eastern Question, he believed was, as Stephen’s information 
had been, "a precursor of the turn which a collapse in the 
unity of action of the Powers at Constantinople might bring 
about."
(1) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 11 September 1880
(2) G.D.29/155 Elliot to Granville 17 September 1880
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Secret
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Bismarck's language to Russell when he visited the 
Chancellor at FreIdrlchsow-le in the second week of October 
amply confirmed Plunkett's information. "The only real 
interest Germany had in the Eastern question", he said, "was 
the preservation of peace among the Powers directly interes­
ted. ... It was his policy to exert all his influence to keep 
the peace betv/een Austria-Hungary and Russia, and to har­
monize, as far as benevolent neutrality in the future fate
of Turkey could do so, their respective aspirations,
(1)
ambitions and interests."
British information indicated that JcSini's overture to 
Plunkett for a "general alliance" with England was a further 
indication of the efforts which Bismarck was making to induce 
Russia to come to an agreement with Austria. Plunkett had 
several times recently reported that Jogaini was guided by 
anti-Austrian and anti-German motives. As the tendency
towards an improvement in Austro-Russian relations became
M s (2)
more and more clear, Jonini's distrust of Austria increased.
(1) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 13 October 1880
(2) P.O.65/1082 Plunkett to Granville 475 12 October 1880
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Walsham, therefore. Informed the Foreign Office that,^overture
to England might be interpreted as an attempt on the part of
one of the political pa-gptire-s in Russia to check the trend of
Russian policy towards a revival of the Dreikaiserbund. The
alliance of England would enable Russia to resist "Prince
Bismarck and his combinations." She could not do so single-
handed and àhe^fretted under the obligation of having to
accept them. The alarm raised- in Germany against Russia
in December, seemed to be the result of German fears that
Russia's attempt to shake herself free from Germany might be
successful. The accusations that Russia intended to attack
Germany or Austria-Hungary, the Foreign Office was informed,
were as usual completely unjustified, and were made on
(2)
Bismarck's instructions, i'he extreme anxiety which the
German and Austrian Ambassadors in St. Petersburg and London
were showing as to the possible existence of an Anglo-Russian
alliance seemed to offer the only clue to the reason why they 
(3)
were made. ■
At first the visits of St. Vd. lier and Saburoff to 
Friedricha^^âe, appeared only to be concerned with the attitude 
that France and Russia might take up in regard to the settle-
(1) F.0.64/964 Walsham to Granville 525  ^13 November
Confidential
(2) F.0.64/965 Russell to Granville 575 18 December 1880
Most Confidential
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ment of the Greek frontier question which "became urgent
after the Montenegrin question had been concluded, and upon
which Russell himself had recently consulted Bismarck.
Saburoff, however, seems deliberately to have attempted to
give the Ambassador some inkling of the negotiations he was
conducting. Thus, he hinted to Russell that the question of
rvJrJL
the Straits had been discussed at Friedrichsoule between
himself and Bismarck. British information indicated no
ordinary explanation for Saburoff's remarks. The Russo-British
antagonism respecting the Straits had not been mentioned
since November 1879, when there had been a question of
(1)
Bayard's summoning the fleet to Constantinople. Again, 
on returning to Berlin in January, Saburoff told Russell 
clearly that Russia was working to secure "practical" rela­
tions with Austria and had the cordial support of Bismarck
(2)
in so doing. The meeting that had recently taken place
in St. Petersburg between himself and Oubril, the Russian
Ambassador in Vienna, had been concerned with these efforts,
Infoimation received from Elliot and from Dufferin showed
that Saburoff's statements on that point were probably
(3)
accurate. When he spoke, however, of the projected
(1) P.0.64/965 Russell to Granville 600 51 December
Secret
(2) P.0.64/979 Russell to Granville ■ 20 14 January 1887
Secret
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rapprochement as based upon the Berlin Treaty and the 
European Concert and as precluding any alliance, he was 
deliberately misleading.
Yet suspicions had already been formed that the 
discussions at Friedrichs-e%le ' had touched upon the subject 
of an Austro-Russian understanding, and Saburoff*s state­
ments appeared as confirmation. Thus, on December 18,
Russell had reported: "there is reason to apprehend a 
practical understanding between Germany, Russia and Austria
in regard to Eastern Affairs, which may prove fatal to
(1)
Turkish rule in the Balkan Peninsula." Lyons reported
that Gambetta in speaking to Sheffield, second secretary in
the Paris Embassy, had expressed his conviction that the
(2)
three Emperors had come to an understanding. Duff erin
(3)
perceived signs of a "friendlier understanding" between
the three Powers, Granville felt uncomfortable to think
that "the secret understanding between the three Emperors
(4)
had gone very far." By February 12 Russell was writing of
( 3 )
Bismarck's "allies", Austria and Russia. Goschen on his
(1) F.0.64/963 Russell to Granville 576 18 December 1880
Very Confidential
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sonal and Secret
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return to Constantinople from London, was instructed to
visit Haymerle and to discover what truth, if any, there
was in the different rumours which had been circulating.
He reached the conclusion that no agreement had as yet been
formally concluded.
Before any information was received to the effect that
the suspected agreement had actually come into being, British
information put before the Foreign Office another feature
that would probably belong to any understanding betv/eoi the
three Empires. On March 13 the Emperor Alexander II died,
the victim of a Mihilist conspiracy. It was at first thought
that the accession of Alexander III would check the develo-
(1)
ment of the Dreikaiserbund. It soon became clear,
however, that full and satisfactory assurances had been
(2)
exchanged between the three Emperors. By April the news­
papers were spreading the rumour that theCzar intended
shortly to go to Berlin and then to Vienna and to bring about
(3)
the re-establishment of the Dreikaiserbund. Meanwhile, on
(1) G.D.29/210 Granville to Goschen 18 March 1881
G.D. 29/206 Granville to Amp thill 16 March 1881
(2) G.D.29/177 .Ampthill to Granville 19 March 1881
G.D.29/185 Dufferin to Granville 24 March 1881
F. 0.64/980 Amp thill to Granville 22 March 1881
(3) F.0.7/1014 Elliot to Granville 11 April 1881
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.444.
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March. 51, Russia had addressed a circular to her representatives 
at the courts of the five Powers, proposing that an inter­
national Conference should assemble in order to discover means 
for dealing effectively with revolutionary plots throughout 
Europe. The proposal immediately split the Powers into two
groups. Italy rejected the proposal outright. Great Britain
(i)
softened her refusal by alleging Parliamentary reasons.
France adopted the same attitude and insisted on acting with 
England. The tliree Empires were grouped together on the 
basis of their constitutional principles. References to the 
revival of the Holy Alliance and to the plans of the three
(2)
Northern Courts to suppress political liberty were frequent.
The proposal of France to codify her extradition treaties
with Germany, and to conclude a new extradition treaty with
(3)
Russia, and the British proposal that a general exchange of
i
I
views should take place between the Cabinets in order to ^
remedy any deficiencies in their extradition laws eventually
(4)
settled the question satisfactorily. The fundamental
(1) G.D.29/124 Granville to Gladstone 12 April 1881
G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 16 April 1881
(2) F.0.27/2491 Lyons to Granville 358 17 April 1881
Very Confidential
(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.III.
p.0.27/2492 Lyons to Granville 377 25 April 1881
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sympathies between the three Empires had, however, been
made clear. The attitude assumed by Germany, who immediately
took the lead in the agitation against the socialist danger,
made it clear that Bismarck intended to exploit the incident
to the advantage of the political understanding which he had
(1)
for some time been endeavouring to bring about. Granville
suspected that Bismarck was endeavouring to create a sore
(2)
between Russia and England and between Russia and France.
It was to Germany that Granville made his proposals for the 
settlement of the question.
British information, then by the early summer of 1881 
had shown certain principles to-be established in connection 
with the relations between the three Empires. It had not 
however, brou^t matters to a conclusion by showing that 
an agreement embodying these principles had in fact been signed.
In this it was an accurate reflection of the true situ­
ation. The three articles provisionally drafted by Bismarck
and Saburoff in September had envisaged an exchange of pledges
(3)
between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Bismarck, as has been 
seen, had at once begun to prepare the way towards the entrance
(1) G.D.29/177 Ampthi 11 to Granville 14 April
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No. 16 April
(2) G.D. 29/206 Granville to Amp thill 13 April
G.D.29/124 Granville to Gladstone 13 April
(3) J.Y. Simpson: The Saburoff Memoirs pp.70-83.
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(1)
of Austria into the agreement as a separate party. After
further references between Saburoff and Bismarck in January
and February the principle of a Triple understanding had
(2)
been accepted by Russia.
In September 1879, the third article had envisaged
an understanding between the three Powers in the event of a
threat of an alteration in the status quo in the Balkans.
After the discussions of January andFebruary the principle
of an Austro-Russian agreement respecting the interests of the
two Powers in the Balkans, to be negotiated independently of
the question whether the status quo, were threatened or not,
 ^ 3Î -
had been accepted by Saburoff. In October, 1880 when
British information first began to be considered on the
point of a possible Austro-Russian understanding, Haymerle
had got so far as to express his readiness to enter its
pourparlers with Russia and Germany with a view to giving
practical form to the Russo-German views in regard to the
(4)
Straits. In the first months of 1881, when information
again accumulated in the Foreign Office as to the possibility 
of an Austro-Russian understanding, negotiations with Vienna
(1) See p.128.
(2) G.P.Vol.III 515 p.142.
Simpson: op.cit. p.127.
(5) G.P. Vol.Ill No.515, p.141. Simpson, op.cit., pp.156-60.
(4) Simpson: op.cit., p.165.
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were formally opened, and the discussions which eventually
led to the addition of a supplementary Protocol to the
(1)
agreement signed by the three Powers initiated. This
Protocol was the form which the "squaring" agreement between
Austria-Hungary and Russia that the Foreign Office was led
to anticipate, in fact took.
Thirdly, the position of Germany in the new triple
friendship had in fact been determined in the course of the
year, in the manner that the information received by the
Foreign Office indicated. During the Conferences of January
and February, Saburoff proposed that Germany should take the
responsibility for bringing about an agreement between Austria-
(2)
Hungary and Russia. At the time, Bismarck refused. in
the summer, however, as the information of the British Foreign 
indicated, the Chancellor did in fact assume the role that 
that Saburoff had sought to assign to him. In the course of 
his conversations with Haymerle at Friedrichsoule he took
(1) Simpson; op.cit.,pp.184 et sequ.
G.P. Vol.Ill Nos. 519, 520, particularly No.522:- 
Reuss described Haymerle's view as to the object cfthe projected 
agreement as "die Mëglichkeit eines Interessenkonfliktes 
zwischen Osterreich, Deutschland und Russland auf Jdire, 
hiAaus auszuschliessen," and enumerated the points, after­
wards Included in the supplementary Protocol, of an 
understanding designed for that purpose (Reuss to Bis­
marck, 25 December 1880).
No.524 encloses the draft agreed upon between Saburoff and 
Bismarck (Bismarck to Reuss, 14 June, 1881).
(2) G.P. Vol.Ill No.515.
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the first step^towards bringing about an Austro-Russian 
und erstand ing.
Elliot's information that the question of the agitation 
in Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, had been dis­
cussed between Bismarck and Haymerle at Friedrichsoule, 
was accurate. So too, was Russell's report that Bismarck 
had advised the Austro-Hungarian Minister not to oppose the 
agitation, and Elliot's report that Haymerle would agree to 
a limited union. The Foreign Office, however, lacked such 
information as would have enabled it to feel confident that 
this information was accurate, and that Stephen's report that 
an understanding, based on the Austrian annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the union of Bulgaria, had been 
formally proposed, was entirely unfounded.
The last aspect of the projected Dreikaiserbund, upon
which British information had touched, that of the common
monarchical sympathies of the three Empires, had also in fact
influenced the negotiations. In April Bismarck urged upon
Saburoff the necessity of some agreement between them, on
the grounds that the advent of the Gladstone Government was
a sign that the republican spirit was rousing itself through-
(2)
out Europe. In July he pointed out the advantages of a
(1) Simpson: op.cit., pp.145-147.
(2) Simpson: op.cit., p.128.
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Triple understanding as "securing the solidarity of the
monarchical square, and relieving it from anxiety in regard
(1)
to the less stable West." The character of the alliance
as essentially an understanding between the three Emperors
was preserved. It had originally been intended that the
Grand Duke of Saxony should negotiate with Francis Joseph
while Reuss conducted the negotiations with Haymerle. When
the Grand Duke refused the opening of negotiations with
Austria-Hungary in January, was signalised by a personal
(2)
letter from the German Kaiser to Francis Joseph and Reuss
was charged to negotiate with the Emperor as well as his
(3)
Minister.
IMhile the information received by the Foreign Office 
in regard to these aspects of the future Dreikaiserbund 
was fairly complete, it did not touch at all upon two other 
aspects of equal, importance •
The first two of the three articles sketched out in 
September had dealt with the problem of a war in which either 
of the signatory parties migjht become engaged. In the event 
of a Ruisso-English war, Germany would remain neutral, and 
direct her efforts to keep the conflict localized. Russia
(1) Simpson: op.cit., p.137.
(2) G.P. Vol.Ill No. 524, p.161.
(3) Simpson: op.cit., pp.184 et sequ.
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would do the same for Germany In the event of a Franco-German
(1)
war. During the January and February Conferences, these
articles had been much developed, Russia had sought to 
extend Germany's obligation of neutrality to an obligation 
to prevent the passage of the English fleet through the
(2)
Straits, incumbent on both Germany and Austria-Hungary.
The general obligation was as a result of January-February
Conferences, condensed and formed a single article in the
project drafted by Saburoff. In spite of the fact that in
the conversation of February 5, the possibility of an
interchange of pledges of support against France, between
(3)
Russia and Germany, had been mentioned, this general
obligation of neutrality was not further developed.
The second aspect of the relations between the three
Empires, not covered by British information was that of
their eventual co-operation on all diplomatic questions -
"The Caucus principle" as Elliot described it in speaking of
( 4 )
the Dreikaiserbund as it existed from 1873-75. This aspect
(1) Simpson: op.cit., pp.70-83.
(2) Simpson: op.cit., p.105.
G.P. Vol.Ill, No.516.
G.P. Vol.Ill, No.518 (Saburoff to Bismarck, 6 February, 
enclosing a draft for the projected agreement).
Simpson: op.cit., pp.177-79 (draft of agreement drawn up 
at Friedricha^ j^ele by Bismarck and Saburoff).
(3) G.P. Vol.Ill, No.516, p.144.
(4) G.D.29/155 Elliot to Granville 28 April 1880
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did not emerge very clearly in the course of the negotiations
of 1880. It was seen, however, when Bismarck on February 7,
recommended to Saburoff the inclusion in the proposed
agreement of an article providing that in the event of a
dispute between two members of the Alliance it should be
(1)
referred to the third for mediation, and when this purpose 
was achieved by Article I of the December draft. Due to 
Russia's insistence this provision was omitted in the final 
text. Very close diplomatic co-operation nevertheless, 
characterised the relations of the three Empires after the 
agreement had finally been concluded.
The Foreign Office, hovfever, had no information such 
as would enable them to appreciate that the information they 
possessed reflected the course of actual negotiation between 
the three Powers. It appeared only that they had been led 
to expect an agreement to be concluded in one direction, and 
then in another, and that on every occasion their expectations 
had proved groundless. The result was that when, after 
the Dreikaiserbund had been concluded, information v/as 
received of an agreement on the Eastern question between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia it was mistrusted. The Foreign 
Office in connection with the Dreikaiserbund lacked information 
derived from a reliable and independent source, such as they
(1) Simpson: op.cit., p.l20.«
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received in connection with Italy's alliance policy, and 
from Crowe in connection with the Austro-German Alliance.
The course of diplomatic negotiations as a source of
information cannot be neglected entirely. It revealed
most in connection with French relations. For British
relations during the year were closer with France than with
any other Povirer. Before the advent of the Liberal Ministry
they also served to confirm, to some extent, the impression
derived from reports on Italian relations with Austria-
Hungary and Germany, of the isolation of Italy and of Germany's
endeavours to foment ill-feeling between her and Austria-
Hungary. The attitude of Germany appeared to be one of the
factors in separating Austrian from Italian action in regard
to Egypt. Salisbury on the 5th November had found it
necessary to represent to Monteglas, secretary in the Austrian
Embassy, that it was "somevfhat hard, that we should find
Austria heading a combination of Italy and Germany against ,
(1)
us." On the 11th the Foreign Office learnt that after
repeated applications St. Vallier had at last secured an
(2)
invitation to visit Bismarck at Varzin. It appeared that
(1) F.0.7/956 Salisbury to Elliot 8 November 1879
(2) F.0.64/956 Russell to Salisbury 545 8 November 1879
Confidential
216
he had been instructed to press upon the Chancellor, that it
was impossible to admit any other Powers to an equal share of
influence with England and France in Egypt, and to point
out to him the consequences of the claims raised by Austria-
Hungary. A week later, Lyons informed the Foreign Office
of Bismarck's reply. The Chancellor had stated that he was
not prepared to support the Austro-Hungarian claim for a
third controller to represent the interests of Italy, Austria-
Hungary and Germany, and had advised the Austrians to with-
(2)
draw it. Odo Russell confirmed and amplified this infor­
mation, and was able to inform the Foreign Office that this
(3)
advice had in fact been given. Before this despatch was
received, it was already clear that Austria-Hungary would
( 4 ) i
not maintain her extreme pretensions. ' She did not abandon 
her position entirely. On December 6 , Karolyi urged more 
distinctly than before that Austria-Hungary should obtain 
some share, even though a small one, in the future Government
(1) F.0.27/2375 Lyons to Salisbury 1127 11 November 1879
Very Confidential
(2) F.0.27/2375 Lyons to Salisbury 1150 19 November 1879
Very Confidential
(3) F.0.64/936 Russell to Salisbury . 26 November 1879
G.P. Vol.Ill, No.661.
(4) F.0.27/2360 Salisbury to Lyons 410 24 November 1879
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Egypt after the Liquidation Commission had reported, hut
he suggested that such a share might he accorded to Austria-
(1)
Hungary exclusively, and the demands of Italy rejected.
Formal proposals were made in London and Paris for this
(2 )
purpose. Italy continued to devote her efforts to
securing that international control of Egyptian affairs which 
had heen the aim of the policy hitherto concerted with
(3)
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian and German
acceptance of the arrangements for the Commission of Liquida­
tion determined upon between Britain and France made the 
separation of Austria-Hungary and Italy still dearer. For 
Italy acting in isolation, insisted on far-reaching amend- 
ment8 on the line of previous Austrian proposals, Bismarck
immediately let Odo Russell know that he supported Britain
(5)
in withholding her assent to the Italian proposals. Austria- 
Hungary showed no signs of giving Italy any encouragement.
(6)
Yet the latter refused her adherence for another three weeks.
(1) F.0.7/958 Salisbury to Elliot 25 November 1879
(2) F.0.27/2376 Lyons to Salisbury 1215 15 December 1879
(3) F.0.45/376 Salisbury to Paget 594 22 December 1879
(4) F.0.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 168 28 February 1880
(5) F.0.64/959 Russell to Salisbury Telegram 4 March 1880
(6 ) F.0.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 247 23 March 1880
F.0.7/984 Salisbury to Elliot 23 March 1880
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When the negotiations on the Greek question were re­
opened, it was at once apparent that the tendency towards 
co-operation with France no longer existed. When Waddington
renewed his proposal for European mediation on December 18,
(1)
he had consulted England and Germany, but not Italy. When 
Salisbury having rejected the French plan put forward a 
counter-proposition, Preycinet, Lyons reported, had communi­
cated the British proposal to Austria-Hungary and Germany,
(2 )
but not to Italy. The separation of Italy from both
Austria-Hungary and Prance was again brought out, when the
British proposal was accepted with reserves by France,
Germany and Austria-Hungary and unconditionally by Italy.
Austria let it be known that distrust of Italy was her sole
motive in thus supporting the French views on the Greek
(3)
question.
The tendency of Prance to co-operate with Austria- 
Hungary and Germany indicated to some extent by the negotiations 
just touched upon, was the main feature in European relation­
ships revealed by the negotiations of 1880. Granville’s 
Circular of May 1, asking for the views of the Powers in
(1) P.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 26 November 1879
P.O.27/2376 Lyons to Salisbury 1206 12 December 1879
1233 18 December 1879
Confidential
G.P. Vol.Ill No.660.
(2) F.0.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 133 18 February 1880
(3) P.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 18 March 1880
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(1)
regard to the Montenegrin question, led to no indications
being given as to tendencies of co-operation. It resulted
in an Austro-Hungarian proposition for a further modification
of the cession of territory originally promised to Montenegro
at Berlin, and the negotiation,without any consultation of
the other Powers taking place, as far at least as the
Foreign Office vas aware, between the Austrian and British
representatives at Cettinje of a new line of frontier to be
(2)
recommended to Turkey. When final agreement was reached
(3)
at Cettinje the proposal was accepted by all the powers. 
France had taken the initiative in the Greek question in 
the same way as Austria-Hungary in the Montenegrin question, 
and on April 28, proposed that the international Commission 
which Salisbury had proposed should meet in Greece to settle 
the Turko-Greek boundary question, should meet at Berlin or 
Paris in the first place. The proposal was similarly
(1) F.0.65/1084 Granville to Lyons 77
Paget 51 Telegram 1 May 1880
Elliot 74
Russell 41
Dufferin 71
(2) F.0.7/985 Granville to Elliot 220 8 May 1880
Secret
221 10 May 1880
221A 11 May 1880
Confidential
263 31 May 1880
(3) F.0.65/1084 Granville to Lyons 117 & 118
Paget 89 & 90 3 June 1880
Russell 64 & 65
Dufferin 326 & 127
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accepted by all the Powers and no distinction in their
(1)
several attitudes was perceptible to the Foreign Office.
Thus the British Circulars of May 4 and May 11, the one a
general proposal for identic action at Constantinople calling
upon the Turk to give a statement of its intentions in
regard to the Greek and Montenegrin frontier question, and
the question of Armenian reforms; the other.proposing that
the alternative of a Conference at Berlin or Paris should
be offered to the Porte instead of the international
Commission to meet in Greek territory - caused no light to
be thrown on European relations.
Something, however, was shown by the reaction of the
Powers to minor proposals. Thus Münster proposed to Granville
that Turkey should be represented on the international frontier
Commission if it met. Granville thereupon consulted the
French Ambassador. It soon afterwards appeared that Prance
had expressed her disapproval of that arrangement in Berlin.
(2)
Bismarck immediately disavowed Münster. A further Olixuiar
from Granville propoai3»g that the Conference should assemble 
immediately at Berlin and Turkey and Greece be invited to
(3)
send delegates, was accepted by all the Powers. France and
(1) F.0.27/2430 Lyons to Granville 336 28 April 1880
(2) F. 0.64/960 Russell to Granville 219^ 21 May 1880
' Secret
(3) P.0.65/1084 Granville to Russell 71
Telegram 22 May 1880 
Dufferin 107
Elliot , 102
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Austrla-Hungaiy Informed the Foreign Office, however, that
they v/ished to adopt a German suggestion that delegates from
Turkey and Greece should not be formally invited, but that
it should be left to the initiative of these Governments
(1)
to lay their arguments before the Conference, France
took the initiative in effecting an agreement as to the basis
(2)
of discussion in the Conference. Russell advised Gran­
ville to attempt to arrange with France the line of 
to be put forward there, as the line whatever it was, put 
forward by France, would have Austro-Hungarian sud German 
support, Granville on June 17, issued a further Circular 
asking the opinions of the Powers as to the rejoinder to 
be made to the Porte’s reply in regard to the Identic Note
(3)
Elliot reported that Haymerle could give no reply until he
(4 )
had consulted Germany. Lyons reported that Preycinet
had already consulted Bismarck and had agreed with the
(5)
Chancellor that no rejoinder should be sent. Soon after-
(1) F. 0.27/2450 Lyons to Granville 221 29 May 1880
P.0.7/990 Elliot to Granville 265 29 May 1880
F.0.64/960 Russell to Granville
Telegram 45 28 May 1880
?
(2) F. 0.27/2421 Granville to Lyons 879 31 May 1880
G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 5 June 1880
(3) P.O.65/1084 Granville to Dufferin
Telegram 173 17 June 1880
(4) P.0.7/991 Elliot to Granvllle^^^^^^ 18 June 1880
(5) P.0.27/2432 Lyons to C-ranvllle^^^^^^^ gg 19 june 1880
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wards Austria-Hungary expressed an opinion in the same
(1)
sense. A further Circular from Granville stating that
Britain accepted the view of these three Powers closed the 
matter •
lytien the question of a Naval Demonstration off the
coast of Albania arose, the co-operation between France,
Germany and Austria-Hungary was seen to weaken. France
made her participation conditional on all the Powers taking
part, and on similar measures being employed, if necessary
(3)
for the Greek question. Hohenlohe, Russell wrote to
Granville "yielded cheerfully to your wishes about sending
( 4)
ships to Dulcigno.® Austriâ-Hungary, on the other hand,
at first insisted that the demonstration should be confined
(5)
to British and Austrian vessels. liVhen Granville refused,
she gave a conditional assent to the British proposal as
France had done, but her reserves were not entirely the same
as the French reserves. They were that there should be 
ct
no la^nb^ing force, and that the Powers should not call upon
(1) P.O. 7/991 Elliot to Granville 550 21 June 1880
(3) P.0.27/2432 Lyons to Granville
Telegram 51 14 July 1880
(4) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 17 July 1880
(5) P.0.7/991 Elliot to Granville 362 30 June 1880
confidential
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(1)
the Prince to occupy the territory in question. The
reaction to this weakening of the co-operation of the three
Powers was seen to he a French attempt to improve her
relations with England. Adams reported a French desire to
(2)
act in particular unison with Her Majesty’s Government.
Courcel, head of the political department of the Foreign
Office, told the British representative that the instructions
to the French Admiral taking part.in the Naval Demonstration
(3)
would he communicated to England alone. V/hen, however,
the question of further coercion, and the seizure of Smyrna
(4)
arose, the three Powers were again seen to act together.
Barthélémy St. Hilaire, v/ho had now succeeded Preycinet,
had at first stated that he had no objection to the Smyrna
(5)
plan. When he leamt that both Germany and Austria-Hungary
rejected it, the French views changed and only Italy and
(6)
Russia accepted the British proposal. Again, while Russia
(1) G.D.29/121 Dilke to Granville  ^ 7 July 1880
(reports a conversation with Karolyi)
(2) P.0.27/2434 Adams to Granville 728 23 August 1880
Very Confidential
(3) P.0.27/2435 Adams to Granville 845 13 September 1880
(4) P.0.7/992 Elliot to Granville 383 13 July 1880
(5) P.0.27/2436 Lyons to Granville
Telegram 111 5 October 1880
(6 ) P.0.27/2436 Lyons to Granville 963 & 964 9 October 1880
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and Italy accepted the project of the self-denying Protocol
"se-tM duo
as^it was made, Germany, prance and Ans tria-Hungary made
their acceptance conditional on its being limited to the
(1)
Greek and Montenegrin questions. After the settlement of
(2)
the Montenegrin question, the co-operation of the three
Powers in insisting that coercion should not be used was
(3)
again evident. They seemed to be acting upon the
principles which Bismarck advised Russell at Priedrichsoule
should guide the action of the Powers - for the present to
devote their efforts to preventing the outbreak of Greco-
Turkish conflict and for the future to rely solely on
(4)
diplomatic pressure. The first indication of this
tendency came when simultaneously Austria, Germany and France
replaced their representatives at Athens by more experienced
diplomats. Radowitz, who had been at Paris while Hohenlohe
was in charge of the Berlin Foreign Office, was sent back to
(5)
M s  old post, Wrede, the Austrian representative in Rome,
(6)
was transferred to Athens. Prance sent Moüy, who had
(1) P.O.78/3076 Granville to Goschen
Telegram 455 1 September 1880
(2) Pitzmaurice; op.cit. Vol.II pp.221-224.
(3) B.D.P. Series I, Vol.11 No.284.
(4) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville , 18 October 1880
(5) P.0.27/2437 Lyons to Granville 1018 1 November 1880
(6) P.0.7/996 Elliot to Granville 712 5 November 1880
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previously been Secretary in the Vienna Embassy and charge
d'affaires in the absence of the Ambassador, to replace
(1)
Ternaux-Courfans. Elliot reported that Austria had
concerted with prance in sending instructions to her 
representative at Athens that Greece could expect no assis­
tance if she attacked Turkey, The Powers were acting in a
mediatory capacity and could not enforce the Berlin Award.
(2)
The German representative was similarly instructed.
Diplomatic negotiations did not reveal the Russian 
rapprochement to Austria-Hungary and Germany until the 
beginning of 1881, when a good deal of information on the 
subject had already reached the Foreign Office. The three 
Powers then appeared to act together and Germany took the 
initiative, which had hitherto been left to France, in 
putting proposals before the Powers, turning to the profit 
of her relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia, such 
tendencies as had existed in Russia to seek an understanding 
vd.th England, and Granville's desire that Germany should 
commit herself to some definite attitude on the question and 
cease to determine her attitude according to the decisions 
taken by other Powers. The principles of pressure on Turkey 
rather than on Greece, and of active pressure rather than
(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.297.
(2) P.0.7/997 Elliot to Granville 782 4 December 1880
Very Confidential
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purely diplomatic pressure which had furnished a basis for
Anglo-Russian co-operation in regard to the Smyrna proposal,
and the principle of compensation to Greece by the cession
of Crete for the territory promised to her at the Berlin
Conference in Epiri^js, which Giers had recently suggested 
m
)&ight frem the basis of an Anglo-Russian agreement on the
(1)
Greek question were now taken up by Bismarck and formed
part of a far-reaching proposal for the settlement of the
whole question. The Ambassadors were to agree upon a new
cession to include Crete or not, as may seem best to them.
They were then to secure Greek acceptance. The proposals
were then to be put before Turkey. If Turkey refused
coercion was to be used. Gosche^ to whom the plan was
explained when he visited Bismarck on his way back to
Constantinople after leave in England, reported that Bismarck
had "Austria andRussia in his pocket" and that their consent 
(2)
was assured. Bismarck also proposed that in the event
of coercion being necessary, it might be delayed until 
Greece attacked Turkey; ail ^h^ mighty take the shape of the 
Powers joining together to prevent Turkey from attacking 
Greece by sea. Both Elliot and Russell informed the Foreign
(1) E.0.65/1110 Dufferin to Granville 12 3 January 1881
Confidential
(2) G.D.29/189 Goschen to Granville 7 February 1881
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Office that they had evidence that^proposal e-f- what ho
10 Ojo ttaxxM."" Ô-I
aiaspected-to hav.e token place-some time before 4-a- an exchange
of views between Russia, Austria and Germany as to the means
to be taken to localize a Greece-Turkish war should it 
C«)
break out. , -The" present proposal was a d-evolo-gmient frem ■ that j
"(dr)-
exehomge.. o f  vLovj's.
The result of this proposal was completely unexpected
as far as the British Foreign Office was concerned. Goschen
prepared to concert with Hatzfeldt at Constantinople, and
to bring about a settlement of the question on the lines
of Bismarck's proposals. Hatzfeldt, hov/ever, on his way
to Constantinople had had two long conferences with Haymerle
at Vienna and some agreement was apparently reached in
accordance with Haymerle's views that Turkish acceptance of
whatever cession the Ambassadors agreed upon should be
(2)
secured first,and the Greek acceptance afterwards. For j
under Hatzfeldt's leadership, and in spite of Goschen's
attempts to adhere to Bismarck's plan, and of British complaints
(3)
to Bismarck, that course was adopted at Constantinople.
(1) F.0.7/1013 Elliot to Granville 50 29 January 1881
Confidential i
F.0.64/979 Russell to Granville 55 30 January 1881
Secret
(2) F.0.7/1013 Elliot to Granville
Telegram 23 11 February 1881
Telegram 24 12 February 1881
Telegram 26 15 February 1881
G.D.7/1014 Elliot to Granville 117 1 March 1881
(3) F.0.7/1014 Elliot to Granville 125  ^ 8 March 1881
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill Ho.400 Confidential
F.0.64/980 Russell to Granville 119A Secret 6 March 1881 i
122, 123 8 March 1881 I
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Yûien discussion arose on the actual line to be recommended,
Corti, the Italian, and Tissot, the French Ambassador,
adopted a line of their ov/n, Goschen and Hatzfeldt were
separated by a sharp division of opinion, and Bismarck
refused to give the latter instructions to reconcile his
(1)
views with those of the British representative. Hatzfeldt, 
Calice and Wovikoff, were thus left in concert and separated 
from the other Pov/ers, It was not until March 6 that an
agreement was reached. It was then only reached as the
result of the Italian and French adhesion to their views, 
which caused Granville to instruct Goschen to abandon the 
position he had taken up.
The only source of information on European relations 
comparable to negotiations on the Balkan Commissions of 1878-
79, was the negotiation in the Berlin Conference on the
Greek Frontier which assembled on June 16, and the negotiations 
in the Madrid Conference from May 6 to July 3, 1880, on the 
question of the protection of nationals in Morocco. The one 
was too short to afford more than the smallest amount of 
information, the other was too much concerned with purely 
technical questions, to throw much li^t on political relations. 
So far as either gave any evidence on this subject, it was
(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill 409.
G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 14 March 1881
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to show the closeness of French relations with Austria- 
Hungary and Germany. These two Powers fulfilled the promise 
of support which they had given for any line that France, 
might propose in the Berlin Conference, in spite of an effort 
made by Saburoff to secure their support of an entirely 
different line which he put forward on Russia's behalf.
At Madrid, the Protocols show that whenever a division of 
opinion occurred that could not be settled by technical 
considerations, the representatives of the three Powers 
voted together.
Some contribution, then, was made by information 
respecting the developments of 1880-81, towards closing the 
two questions left open in connection with the Austro-German 
Alliance. As to the exclusive character of the Alliance,.: 
in February 1880 the speech from the throne at the opening 
of the German Reichstag referred to "the League of Peace" 
of which the Aus tro-German Alliance ^designed to be the basis»* 
Germany aimed at the maintenance of peace and at securing 
"the co-operation and guarantee of Powers similarly disposed.
(Î.) British and Foreign State Papers Vol.71 pp.
G.P. Vol.Ill Nos.664, 665.
(&) F.0.64/958 Russell to Salisbury 14 February 1880
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The Ne]t;e Frele Presse advocated an Italo-Austrian German
Alliance on the terms of an Italian adhesion to the Austro-
(1)
German Alliance. Russell reported that it vms hoped
in Germany, that France might gradually be induced to join
(2 )
the Austro-German Alliance. Beginning with an officially
inspired article in the Nord deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
provoked by an electioneering speech of Hartington's, which 
stated that it was neither Germany's nor Austria-Hungary's
(3)
interest to gain England over to the Austro-German "system," 
slowly matters were seen to change. Only in connection v/ith 
Italy v/as an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany spoken 
of. Italian adhesion to the Aavi-German agreement was not 
mentioned and the Italian approach to Germany began to have 
an anti-French aspect, that was not entirely compatible 
with the commitments which the Foreign Office considered to 
exist between Austria and Germany.
In regard to the relations of the Allied Empires, with 
Russia, it had been made very clear that the conclusion of 
the Austro-German Alliance did not necessarily involve a
(1) F.0.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 72 26 February 1880
(2) F.0.64/958 Russell to Salisbury 83 20 February 1880
(3) F.0.64/959 Russell'to Salisbury 154 29 March 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.Ill No.78.
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permanent estrangement between Russia and her neighbours.
It was not yet clear whether tendencies towards a revival 
of the Dreikaiserbund would be actualised.
The information on European relations in the following 
years concerned two main topics in the relations between 
the three Empires and between Italy, Austria-Hungary and 
Germany... It afforded, however, scarcely sufficient evidence 
to settle the doubtful points in regard to the Aus tro-German 
Alliance. It was only by the cumulative effect of informa­
tion acquired over a period of three years that these points 
were finally settled, and that at the same time some definite 
conceptions were at last acquired in regard to the Dreikaiser- 
bund and Triple Alliance. For, unlike the case of the 
Austro-German Alliance the formation of these combinations did 
not appear as diplomatic events, upon which, within a limited 
time a certain amount of information was collected, and a 
definite notion formed. There were a series of events upon 
each of which information was so collected. Definite and 
credited information, however, that an agreement had actually 
been concluded was in both cases lacking. Until, therefore, 
some event gave confirmation to the conclusion which the 
course of events had begun to force upon the Foreign Office, 
that some agreement must exist, there was nothing to give 
logical sequence to the information that was acquired. In
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the case of the Triple Alliance this did not occur until 
April 1883. In the case of the Drekaiserhund it seemed 
about to occur in December 1881, but did not do so finally 
until 1884.
CHAPTER IV.
THE DREIIfAISERBUND, JUNE 18. 1881.
The signature of the Treaty and supplementary Protocol
which re-established the Dreikaiserbund coincided with a
complete break in the series of reports which reached the
Foreign Office concerning the relations between the three
Empires, por over tv/o months the British representatives
were completely silent on the subject. Both the Continental
and British Press began then to assert that Russia was now
(1)
less friendly towards Germany. Reports from Vienna,
moreover, spoke of the Aus tro-Hungarian determination to
maintain the status quo in the Turkish Empire against Russian
efforts to disturb it, and increased vigour in the war for
predominance which it was asserted was going on throughout
(2)
the Balkan Peninsula between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
Rumours that the panslavist leader, count Ignatieff, who had
(3)
replaced Dordf Melikoff as Minister of Interior in May,
was now to be appointed Foreign Minister, furnished the press
with grounds for the assertion that Austro-Russian relations
(1) F.0,7/1016 Elliot to Granville 554 26 July 1881
(2) F.0.7/1016 Fraser to Granville 380 24 August 1881
Confidential
(3) F.0.65/1112 Wyndham to Granville 222 18 May 1881
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(1 )
were about to deteriorate. The appointment was not,
(2 )
however, made and the alarm of the Press soon died down.
It had probably exercised very little influence upon the
views of the British Foreign Office. It serve to emphasise
the complete lack of evidence that any development in the
relations of the three Empires had taken place.
The quiet signature in Berlin by Bismarck and the
Austrian and Russian Ambassadors, of the Treaty and Protocol,
when the terms of the latter had been decided upon in prin-
(3)
ciple, as far back as September 1880, and the terms of the
former agreed upon in detail three months before, was not an
(4)
event likely to be observed by diplomats. The more limited
number, especially in Berlin, of those who knew of the 
existence of the agreement as compared with the number of 
those who knew of the Austro-German Alliance, was a further 
factor in ensuring its secrecy. Again, no communication 
concerning it was made to the press or to any Foreign
(1) F.0.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 305 23 June 1881
(2) F.0.65/1113 Wyndham to Granville 383 20 July 1881
Confidential
(3) Simpson: op. cit., pp.145-147.
(4) Simpson: op.cit., pp.235 et sequ.
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Government. The Foreign Office, therefore, was compelled
to rely upon the independent resources of the diplomatic
machine for any information that might be secured. These
resources were already more limited than in 1379 as a result
of the facts just mentioned. The absence of Crowe in Paris,
where he was a member of the commission for the negotiation of
(1)
a commercial treaty between England and France, and the ab-
(2 )
sence of Amp thill who was on leave, still further diminished 
the chances of securing reliable information. From St, Peters­
burg nothing could be expected. Dufferin had been recalled in 
April, to become Ambassador at Constantinople, Plunkett, who 
had had some experience in managing the affairs of the Embassy
and valuable connections in St. Petersburg, had left Russia in
(3)
the previous December and was now Secretary in the Paris 
Embassy, wyndham, who was charge d'affaires until the 
arrival of Sir E. Thornton, the new Ambassador in October, 
had no experience of Russian politics, and had his connections
(1) G.D.29/121
(2) P.0.64/982
Dilke to Granville 
Ampthill to Granville 282
25 May 1881 
2 June 1881
(3) P.0.65/1083 Dufferin to Granville 614
(4) P.0.65/1111 Gosselin to Granville 166
17 December 
1881
21 April 1881
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Meanwhile, the Emperor and his court remained at the palace
of Gotchina, and Wyndham had little opportunity to establish
close contact with some of the most important influences in
(1)
Russian policy. Elliot, it is true, was at his post in
Vienna, but of all the capitals, Vienna was the least likely
to afford any valuable information. The confidence between
the Emperor and his Ministers, and in turn between Haymerle
and other members of the Government or Haymerle and the
subordinates of the Foreign Office, made it unlikely that
differences of opinion on the question of policy, any more
than the necessity of justifying policy before Parliament or
country, would offer an opportunity for securing information.
Further, Haymerle himself left Vienna on holiday shortly
after the signature of the Treaty and did not return until
(2)
September 2.
The break in the series of reports concerning the rela­
tions of the three Empires caused the connection between 
their relations and diplomatic questions of current import­
ance to be lost. The result was that when in September, 
the Foreign Office again received information on the relations
of the three Empires, it had no knowledge of any specific
questions which could at that time form the subject of an
(1) F.0.65/1111 Wyndham to Granville ' 170 26 April 1881
(2) P.0.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 308 24 June 1881
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agreeiiiGii t between them « Moreover, the Eastern Question which 
the information received by the Foreign Office during 1880-81 
had indicated as a possible subject of any agreement between 
the three Powers, was at the moment completely in the back­
ground. By the end of May 1881, all the matters left out­
standing by the Treaty of Berlin had been settled, with 
the exception of the question of Armenian reforms. That 
question was regarded as concerning England and Russia alone.
The other Powers agreed to instruct their representatives
at Constantinople to support whatever recommendation England
(1)
and Russia made to the Porte on the subject. The
unionist agitation in Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia and
Macedonia, which had seemed to be about to re-open an issue
which had up to nov; been very closely connected with the
question of the relations between the three Empires, was
put into the background in the Spring of 1881 by a constitu-
(2)
tional crisis in.Bulgaria. In regard to that matter, Russia
and Austria-Hungary made a similar, although according to 
the information received by the Foreign Office, not concerted 
proposal that the Great Powers should act in unison and give
(1) P.0.64/983 Amp thill to Granville 387 26 August 1881
P.O.64/983 Ampthill to Granville 393 17 September 1881
Secret
(2) P.0.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 246 10 May 1881
257 14 May 1881
262 17 May 1881
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assurances of support to the Prince. The proposal was 
accepted and no occasion was therefore offered for evidence 
to be given of a separate understanding between any of the 
Powers. Only the question of socialism in fact seemed to
afford a suitable subject for an exchange of views between 
the three Powers.
The agreements signed by them, however, embodied the 
principles which had been established in the course of the 
negotiations of 1879-81. They dealt, therefore, as the 
Austro-German Treaty had dealt, with the problem of the 
attitude of the others if one of the Contracting Parties were 
engaged in war. A short preamble described the object of 
the Treaty as to assure the defensive position of the three 
Empires. Article I imposed a general obligation of benevolent 
neutrality in the event of war between one of the Contracting ■ 
Parties and a non-Signatory. No precise obligation was 
provided for in regard to active assistance in any specific 
case. By Article I the non-combatants undertook to devote 
their efforts to localizing the conflict. It was not stated
(1) P.0.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 294 15 June 1881
P.0.65/1113 Wyndham to Granville 347 29 June 1881
P.0 .7 / 1 0 7 6 Elliot to Granville 328 4 July 1881
D.D.P. Series I Vol. IV No.61.
(2) Pribram; op.cit., vol.I, pp.11 et sequ.
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whether forcible measures were to be used to prevent the 
entry of other Powers. Article III was designed to prevent 
the passage of enemy ships through the Straits in the event 
of a war between Russia and a fourth Power - particularly 
England. It did not state whether the warning which in the 
event of an infraction of the London Treaty the three Powers 
bound themselves to deliver to Turkey, to the effect that 
she had put herself in a state of war respecting the injured 
party, and deprived herself of the security of her territorial 
status quo, assured to her by the Treaty of Berlin, was to 
be follov/ed by more active measures if it failed to achieve 
its purpose.
The documents of the Dreikaiserbund were, however, 
primarily concerned to establish principles of policy respect­
ing certain specific issues. The principle of co-operation 
in regard to the Eastern Question was accepted by the three 
Powers. A mutual recognition of their position and interests 
in the Balkans, provided for by Article II was a necessary pre­
liminary to this. The same Article then provided that 
changes in the territorial status quo of Turkey should not 
come about except by virtue of an understanding between the 
three Powers. The fifth paragraph of the supplementary 
Protocol stipulated that the agents of the three powers in
240
the East should be furnished with general Instructions 
enjoining them to smooth away divergences of opinion by 
friendly explanations, and when this proved impossible 
to refer the matter home.
The attitude of the Signatories was determined on a 
number of specific issues connected with the Eastern Question. 
By Article III of the main agreement, they bound themselves 
to accept the principle of the closure of the Straits, and 
its interpretation as binding on all the European Powers 
in respect of each other as well as in respect of each 
separately and Turkey, Russia and Germany by paragraph 1 
of the Protocol acknowledged Austria-Hungary's right to 
annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. The remaining stipulations 
of the Protocol favoured the eventual union of Bulgaria and 
Eastern Rumelia. The three Powers agreed not to oppose 
that development, and undertook to dissuade Turkey from 
occupying either the Balkan line or Eastern Rumelia itself - 
from using, that is, the one means she possessed to prevent 
the union from taking place. It was also stipulated that the 
united state, if it came into existence, should not extend 
beyond the present limits of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, 
and that neither Bulgaria nor Eastern Rumelia should be allowed 
to attack Macedonia or any other Turkish province.
Article V of the main agreement stipulated for a time 
limit of three years, and Article'll provided for secrecy.
At the end of July and the beginning of August, Berlin 
and Vienna temporarily ceased to be important diplomatic
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centres. Bismarck was at Klssengen, the Emperor William
at Gastein and Ampthill still on leave in England. Haymerle
had not returned to Vienna, Francis Joseph was at Salzburg
(1)
and Elliot left for England on August 2. It had already
been announced in Vienna and Berlin that Francis Joseph
(2)
would visit the Emperor William at Gas te in on the 4 th. 
Elliot, hov/ever, did not attach sufficient importance to 
the projected meeting to defer his departure, and Ivïr. Hugh 
Fraser who had only lately joined the Embassy was left in 
charge. He did not consider the meeting of sufficient 
importance to justify any attempt to discover what had taken
, (3)
place. V/hen the Press took the matter up and pointed to
a political motive for the meeting, Walsham reported from 
Berlin that he was convinced that its sole object was to 
give a public manifestation of the firmness of the Austro- 
German Alliance* The absence of both Haymerle and Bismarck 
was conclusive evidence, that there had been no other motive. 
Walsham then pointed out how close the relations between 
Austria-Hungary and Germany in fact were. He quoted an 
article in the official German National Zeitung and pointed
(1) F.0.7/1016 Fraser to Granville 359 2 August 1881
(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.70. - -
F.0.64/982 Walsham to Granville 338 30 July 1881
(3) F.0.7/1016 Fraser to Granville 360 5 August 1880
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to the attitude of the two Governments, in face of a recent
quarrel between Czechs and Germans at Prague, as evidence
(1)
in support of his views.
Throughout August the reports received by the Foreign 
Office from its representatives at the five capitals, were 
very few. No information had been received such as would 
put the meeting between the two Emperors and Walsham's 
interpretation of it into the background when a report
U )
arrived from Ampthill v;ho had returned to Berlin on the 24th,
to the effect that a meeting between the Emperors of Russia
(3)
and Germany was to take place during the following week.
Three days later he telegraphed that Saburoff had left
Berlin to take part in the meeting and that Bismarck and
(4)
Moltke would also be present. On the same day the Foreign
Office received a telegram from St. Petersburg announcing
(5)
that the Czar had left unexpectedly that morning for Danzig. 
Walsham^s report then as to the strength of the Austro- 
German friendship was of considerable importance. For when 
coupled with information that the Danzig meeting marked the
(1) F.0.64/983 Vfalsham to Granville 345 6 August 1881
Confidential
348 13 August 1881
(2) P.O.64/983 Ampthill to Granville 364 24 August 1881
(3) P.0.64/983 Ampthill to Granville 377 5 September 1881
(4) P.0.64/983 Ampthill to Granville 379 8 September 1881
(5) P.O.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 459 8 September 1881
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renewal of the Russo-German Alliance*' it pointed to the 
development of a triple friendship dependent upon Germany.
Russian sources furnished the earliest information in
this connection. Immediately on his return to Berlin
Saburoff called on Ampthill and described in detail the
meeting on the yacht in Danzig harbour. The motive of the
meeting, he asserted, had been the Russian Emperor's desire
to relieve himself of the general accusation of anti-German
tendencies and to revive the traditional ties which had
hitherto united the Royal Houses of Russia and Germany. The
Emperor William and Prince Bismarck had responded most
cordially. During the course of the meeting, general assurances
of goodwill and of moral support in the interests of peace
had been exchanged and the "Austro-German Alliance strengthened
(1)
by the addition of Russia to it." At first Y/yndham's
personal impression was that the meeting had very little 
significance. He believed it had been a mere act of courtesy. 
The presence of Bismarck, Giers, the German military attache 
at St. Petersburg, and the two brothers of the Czar who held 
high commands in the army and navy, he stated v/as due to the 
desire of the Czar to convince Europe that he intended to 
pursue a peaceful policy not only towards Germany but towards
(1) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville 12 September 1881
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(1)
all other states. On the following day, however, the
Official Gazette of St. Petersburg published a Circular to
the Russian representatives abroad, informing them of "the
renewal of the close relations and the hereditary friendship"
( 2 )
between Russia and Germany. On the same day the semi­
official Journal de St. Petersburg spoke of the union of the
three Empires that had been established as the result of
(3)
the meeting. The Novoe Vremya alluded to the "agreement"
that had been reached between Russia and Germany. The
(4)
Novosti welcomed a new Russo-German Alliance. A conversa­
tion with Giers, moreover, confirmed the evidence of the 
Press as to the significance of the meeting for the revival 
of a close Russo-German friendship. Wyndham indeed inferred 
from the latter»s language that the meeting was so far from
a mere general demonstration of Russia's peaceful intentions, ;
(5) I
as to have roused the resentment of France. |
. I
(1) P.0.65/1114 V/yndham to Granville 462 13 September 1881
Confidential |
(2) P.0.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 463 14 September 1881
D.D.P. Series I Vol. IV No.118. j
(3) P.0.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 466 14 September 1881
Cf. D.D.P. Series I Vol.IV No.137 (The Charge d'affaires I
at St. Petersburg to Barthélémy St. Hilaire) ,
describing a conversation with Giers. '
(4) P.0.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 472 15 September 1881
(5) p.0.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 466 14 September 1881
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Prom German sources Ampthill could secure no Information.
Bismarck was at Varzin, where he remained during the rest
of the winter. Berlin Society was still out of town and
informed circles, still largely occupied with the manoeuvres,
were not accessible. "I have knocked at every friendly and
confidential door," he wrote to Sanderson, "and have found
(1)
nobody at home." Busch, the acting Minister for Poreign
Affairs, to whom Ai^ apthill spoke a week later, professed to
(2 )
know nothing about the meeting. A "friend" who had been
(3)
present was also unable to give him any further information.
Only the Press, which hailed the meeting as the "sensational
renewal of the Russo-German Alliance" afforded some slight
( 4)
confirmation of Saburoff*8 statements.
Further information indicated that the triple friendship 
was not only dependent upon Germany, but that the close 
relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and between 
Germany and Russia, were supplemented by a Russo-Austrian 
friendship._________________________ ____________ _____________
(1) P.0.64/983 Ampthill to Sanderson 10 September 1881
(2) P.0.64/983 Ampthill to Granville 391 17 September 1881
Secret
(3) P.0.64/983 Ampthill to Granville 393 17 September 1881
Secret
(4) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville ' 12 September 1881
P.0.64/983 Ampthill to Granville 391 17 September 1881
Secret
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Saburoff had told Ampthill that Bismarck had received
a telegram from Vienna to the effect that the Emperor and
Haymerle welcomed "the nev/ departure" as an additional
(1)
guarantee of peace. Fraser in Vienna v/as considerably
surprised when the Austrian press failed to show any anxiety
at the re-establishment of close relations between Russia
and Germany. Possibly, he thought, relations between
Austria-Hungary and Russia were more friendly than the
(2 )
Embassy had been accustomed to consider them. A week later
a pesth paper, the Egytertes, published a telegram from the
Emperor Alexander to Francis Joseph. The Czar thanked the
Austrian Emperor in warm terms for the birthday congratulations
which the latter had recently sent and expressed his pleasure
at his meeting with the Kaiser. The paper also published a
telegram from Kalnoky to Haymerle, which informed the Russian
Minister that Giers had recounted to him in full the course
of the discussions at Danzig and had stated that the Kaiser
communicated to the Czar "the tranquilizing declaration
(5)
which Francis Joseph had made to him at Gas te in." The
(1) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville 12 September 1881
(2) P.0.7/1017 Fraser to Granville 398 14 September 1881
D.D.P. Series I Vol.IV No.135.
(3) P.0.7/1017 Fraser to Granville 402 23 September 1881
p.0.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville ■ 486 28 September 1881
confident ial
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authenticity of these documents was indisputable. Fraser
I
pointed out that no official announcement had been made
that the documents were spurious or inaccurate, which he
considered would have been made, if that were the case.
Giers and a member of the Austrian Embassy vouched for their
accuracy to Y/yndham. Some time later it appeared that
an official enquiry in Vienna had revealed that copies of
the documents sent on to the Emperor at pesth had been found
in his wastepaper basket and sold by the finder to the
(2)
newspaper.
I
The exchange of courtesies between the Czar and Francis |
Joseph had indicated the existence of friendly relations between i
the two countries. The Austrian Emperor had been clearly 
associated with the meeting, both by the Czar’s telegram and 
by the reported communication of the Kaiser to the Czar.
The persistence, in spite of repeated denials of the rumour 
that a meeting between Francis Joseph and Alexander III was 
to take place in the near future, further confirmed the 
information that had then been received respecting the
(3 )
increased friendliness between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
(1) p.0.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 487 28 September 1881
(2) P.0.7/1017 Fraser to Granville 434 25 October 1881
(3) P.0.65/1014 Wyndham to Granville 484 26 September 1881
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Kallay Indeed, who on account of Haymerle’s death was
in charge of the Foreign Office under the nominal direction of
Slavy, the Finance Ministe^^* informed the Austrian Delegations
that although there neither was nor had been any question
of such a meeting "it was not impossible that it might take
(2 )
place at some future date,"
The appointment of Kalnoky, who since January 1879
had been Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to
succeed Haymerle, shortly afterwards appeared as further
evidence of Austro-Russian friendship. His appointment was
reported as likely by Fraser within two weeks of Haymerle's
(3)
death. There was no opportunity for speculation as to
possible successors. The decision of the Emperor and his
advisers appeared to have been taken without hesitation.
Yet little or nothing, Fraser reported, was known of Kalnoky’s
political views or abilities, and those whom public opinion
considered most eligible for the position were to be passed 
( 4 )
over. All that was knovm in regard to Kalnoky was that
(1) P.0.7/1017 Fraser to Granville 418 14 October 1881
(2) P.0.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 468 11 November 1881
(3) P.0.7/1017 Eraser to Granville 428 22 October 1881
Confidential
(4) P.0.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 482 24 November 1881
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he was supposed to be particularly friendly to Russia and
was well looked upon by both Russia and Germany, When the
Neue Freie Presse announced the probable appointment of
Kalnoky, and reported, prematurely as it proved, that he had
had a long conference with Bismarck recently on his way from
St. Petersburg to Vienna, Fraser informed the Foreign Office
that he believed Germany would use Kalnoky to bring about
(1)
closer relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia. The
official announcement of the appointment on the 2 2nd afforded
(2 )
the opportunity for this view to be substantiated. Articles 
in the Russian Press which Thornton stated were officially 
inspired, described Kalnoky’s future policy as one of friend­
ship to Russia and looked forward to the consolidation of the 
relations between the two Empires. Kalnoky left St. Peters­
burg for Vienna again on December 5, after presenting his
(3)
letters of recall. On his way he stayed in Berlin. There
he was received by the Emperor and had two long conferences 
with Bismarck. "It is firmly hoped and believed in Berlin," 
Ampthill then reported, "that Kalnoky will be even better able
(1) P.0.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 478 18 November 1881
Confidential
P.0.65/1015 Thornton to Granville 548 16 November 1881
(2) P.0.7/1018 Fraser to Granville
Telegram 76 22 November 1881
D.D.P. Series I Vol.IV No.192 30 November 1881
(3) P.O.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 570 7 December 1881
575 7 December 1881
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to cement and consolidate the alliance between Austria,
(1)
Germany and Russia than his predecessor." In a private
letter to Granville he wrote; "He clings to the alliance with
(2 )
Bismarck and to the Dreikaiserbund." Elliot on returning
to his post had a conversation with Kalnoky. The new Minister
insisted on the necessity for cordial relations between the
Governments of Austria-Hungary and Russia and his determina-
(3)
tion to remove the distrust between the two peoples.
There had not as yet been a single mention of the possible
existence of a written agreement. Kallay’s declaration
before the Delegations on November 10, that "the Danzig
meeting had not led to any alliance verbal or written", seems
( 4)
to have been accepted without question. The present
diplomatic situation appeared to afford no subject for such 
an agreement. That possible subjects were only looked for 
among questions of immediate interest,was shown by the fact 
that whenever it was suggested that the discussions at Danzig 
had been of a less general nature, the only subject in regard 
to which it was thou^t some agreement might thus have been
(1) P.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 464 9 December 
D.P. D.D.P. Series I Vol.IV No.205,210 (St. vallier to
Gambetta. St. Vallier’s information is much fuller 
than Ampthill's in the same direction).
(2) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville • 5 10 December 1881
(3) P.0.7/1018 Elliot to Granville 507 23 December 1881
Confidential
(4) p.0.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 467 11 November 1881
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planned, was that of Socialism, por, in spite of the lull
in affairs during the summer this subject had been kept open
since the failure of Russia's proposal for an international
Conference to deal with Nihilism. The Journal de St.
Petersbourg alluded to the Danzig meeting as above all a
(1 )
guarantee against the revolutionary party. Kalnolcy, 
according to the telegram in the Egytertes, informed Haymerle 
that the conversations at Danzig had turned principally upon 
the struggle with the Socialist danger. The Times believed 
that if any other discussions had taken place, they were a
(2)
mere screen for the problem of combatting Nihilist activities. 
The issue shortly afterwards of a series of Ukazes imposing 
what amounted to martial law in certain districts of Russia, 
again suggested that some agreement might have been reached 
on the subject.
Moreover, the idea survived that the Austro-German 
Alliance involved German acceptance and support of Austria- 
Hungary’s mission in the East as a bulwark against the Russian 
advance. Cnly if Austria-Hungary abandoned this policy was an 
Austro-Russian agreement possible. The antagonism between 
their interests in the Balkans precluded any agreement
(1) P.C.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 466 14 September 1881 
D.D.P. Series I Vol.IV Nos.129, 137.
(2) The Times, 1C September.
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between them except on the basis of a forward, policy. Thus,
the Times in a leader on the Danzig interview asserted that
the tightening of Russo-German relations involved at the most,
only the weakening of Russian opposition to the German and
Austrian policy of maintaining the existing conditions in
the East. As long as Austria-Hungary and Germany remained
true to that policy, the antagonism between thei* interests
and those of Russia would be so strong that "England could
remain indifferent to the degree of warmth infused into their
relations and the methods they chose to guarantee each other
(1)
against endeavours to snatch an unfair advantage." The
Times was confident that Austria and Germany would not abandon
their policy. "England," it wrote, "might confidently entrust
the representation of her interests in the new system of
relations brought about between the three Imperial courts, to
Austria." She should encourage the extension of Austrian
(2 )
influence in the Balkans.
The language of Bismarck to the British Ambassador at 
this time confirmed the view that Germany intended to support 
the policy and interests of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 
in the East. Towards the end of December Bismarck asked 
Ampthill to come and see him as he wished to speak to him of
(1) The Times, 10 September 1881.
(2) The Times, 23 and 29 September.
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the mission of Mizami Pasha and Rishid Bey who were then in
Berlin. The frank manner in which Bismarck communicated to
Ampthill the overtures that they had made appeared in itself
as an indication of Bismarck’s desire to act with Britain in
Turkish affairs. The Chancellor, however, went further. He
stated that he proposed to reply by urging the Sultan to
place implicit confidence in the good faith and friendly
advice of England with virhom he himself wished to act at all
times in harmony and cordial concert. Germany,he said,
had every reason to support the policy of England, which he
described as based upon the absolute necessity to keep the
road to India free, and the earnest desire to maintain the
political status quo in Turkey, Asia, and Egypt, because it
was conducive to the maintenance of peace and order in Europe.
Meanwhile the Panslavist Press in Russia began a violent
(2)
campaign against Austrian activity in the Balkans. The Neue
Freie Presse took up the challenge. Russia, it insisted, must
grow accustomed to find the "moral and commercial influence"
of Austria in the Balkans. She had begun to recover her old
predominance, and Russia had no causé, for anger if her progress
(3)
continued. In St. Petersburg the Russ attacked the Treaty
(1) F.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 481 20 December 1881
Secret
(2) F.0.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 543 10 November 1881
(3) F.0.7/1018 Elliot to Granville 484 25 November 1881
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of Berlin and was supported by the more moderate Novoe Vremya.^
The German Press notably the Nord deutsche Allgemeine Zeituns^ ----------
came in on the side of Austria and the Berlin Treaty.
It was in the atmosphere created by this Press campaign, 
that the Foreign Office received information which if it had 
been confirmed or had been received under other circumstances, 
might have convinced it of the existence of a formal agreement 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia. For a leakage in regard 
to the Protocol signed by the three Powers seems to have 
occurred in St. Petersburg. In the second week of December 
Thornton, v/ho had now taken up his post as Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg, had heard rumours that "some agreement had
(3)
been arrived at and signed by Count Kalnoky and M. de Giers."
At about the same time the Volnoe Slova, a proscribed journal
published in Geneva, printed the full text of a Protocol,
which it asserted had been signed by Kalnoky and Giers. The
Times,. when it published the protocol on the 23rd, described
(4)
Geneva as the source of its information. The YBsner Allge- 
meine Zeitimg when it printed the Protocol, acknowledged 
clearly that the Volnoe Slova was the source of its information.
(1) F.0.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 581 13 December 1881
(2) F.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 459 6 December 1881
(3) F.0.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 590 21 December 1881
Confidential
(4) The Times, December 23, 1881.
255
The Novosti of St. Petersburg copied the news from the Vienna
paper. At the same time Thornton received a copy of
the alleged Protocol from "one of his colleagues" - probably
( 2 )
the Turkish Ambassador. Por Dufferin soon afterwards 
reported from Constantinople the rumour of "an arrangement 
between Russia and Austria as to the Balkans" directed to 
bring about a partition.
The alleged Protocol was a secret document which touched 
upon all the issues that might arise in the Balkans, and 
determined the policy to be pursued by the two Powers in 
regard to them. The adhesion of Germany was to be invited.
There were eleven points in all. The chief of which provided 
that the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
should be permanent; that every possible assistance should 
be given to Bulgaria to consolidate her Government and if 
union with Eastern Rumelia became inevitable, that it should 
be effected without disturbance; that the two Governments 
should take measures of protection if complications arose 
which threatened communications through the Peninsula and 
Straits, and the preservation of good order at Constantinople.
Other paragraphs dealt with the maintenance of the indepen-
(1) P.0.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 599 28 December 1881
(2) P.0.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 590 21 December 1881
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dence of Servia, Montenegro and Rumania; and good order in
Albania. Lastly, the two Powers would resist the ambitions
(1)
of all other States in the LaIkans.
Gladstone took the matter seriously. He hoped there
was nothing in it, but urged Granville "to place on record
that we would not view with approval any arrangement between
foreign Powers which either directly or indirectlv tended to
.(2 )
undermine the liberties of the Balkan states." Giers,
(3)
however, categorically denied the truth of the report.
Labanoff told Granville that "it was an absolute canard," and
(4)
the latter was "inclined to believe" him. Thornton wrote
privately to Granville that he had no faith in it. He
believed that nothing had been put down in writing during
(5)
the discussions between Giers and Kalnoky. The fact that,
as far as can be seen from the documents available, the 
protocol was not again mentioned nor any attempt made to 
secure further information seems to indicate that Thornton’s 
opinion was accepted by the Foreign Office.
(1) p.0.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 590 21 December 1881
Confidential
599 28 December 1881
The first transmits the text of the Protocol as reported 
to Thornton by one of his colleagues. The second transmits 
the text as published in the Novosti and the Times. There 
are verbal differences between the two.
(2) G.D.29/124 Gladstone to Granville 28 December 1881
(3) P.0.65/1115 Thornton to Granville ' 590 21 December 1881
Confidential
(4) G.D.29/124 Granville to Gladstone 30 December 1881
(5) G.D.29/185 Thornton to Granville 22 December 1881
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It was some time before any such, definite information on 
the subject of the relations between the three Empires was 
again received by the Foreign Office, not indeed until the 
Imperial meeting at Skiernewirce in 1884. Meanwhile the 
only indication that some agreement might perhaps exist was 
afforded by a series of incidents which revealed the existence 
of a greater confidence between the three Empires than the 
assurances reported to have been exchanged at Danzig, or the 
feelings of the three peoples warranted. The first of these 
was a violent recrudescence of panslavist and anti-German 
agitation in Russia at the beginning of 1882. The signal 
for the outbreak was given by a speech of General Skobeleff, 
who had commanded the Russian troops in Bulgaria, and subse­
quently the Russian expedition against the Akkal Turcomans. 
After referring to Russian victories in Central Asia, he spoke 
in passionate terms of the aggressive ambitions of Austria- 
Hungary in the Balkans. Aksakov in the Russ then urged the 
Government to place itself at the head of the struggling
Herzegovinians and Bozniaks. The Austrian campaign to quell
(1)
their revolt was a "campaign against ourselves." Other papers
(2)
took up the cry. The German and Austrian Press replied
with accusations against Russia, and Elliot reported a good
(1) P.0.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 55 7 February 1882
(2) P.0.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 45 2 February 1882
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(1)
deal of excitement among the public in Vienna. By mid-
February Skobeleff was in Paris. There, on the 16th, he
addressed a body of Servian students. His speech was a
violent attack upon Germany. Her sinister influence was
everywhere apparent in Russian affairs. It was she who
prevented Russia from fulfilling her patriotic duties.
(2)
"L’enneni, c’est 1’allemand". In still stronger terms 
he repeated his views to the editor of the Voltaire who
W )
reported them in his newspaper on the 17th. The attacks on
Austria-Hungary meanwhile continued in the Russian Press.
By the 22nd the Novoe Vremya was discussing the probable
position of Russia in a war against Austria and Germany.
Thornton thought it significant that the question should thus
be under discussion, when there seemed to be no intention on
the part of either Aus tria-Hungary or Germany to provoke or
( 4 )
engage in war with Russia. The Austrian-Press fully appre­
ciated the apparent significance of the article. It accused 
Russia openly of aggressive designs against Austria and 
Germany, while the degree of public indignation was sufficient
to cause Elliot considerable anxiety as to the future relations
(5)
between the two Empires. Questions were asked both in the
(1) P.0.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 65 11 February 1882
(2) F.0.27/2560 Lyons to Granville 150 17 February 1882
(3) D.D.P. Series I Vol.IV No.259 Note.
(4) P.0.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 73 28 February 1882
(5) P.0.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 82 24 February 1882
D.D.P. Series I Vol. IV No.260 (Courcel to Freycinet; 
reports the existence of the opinion in Berlin, that a 
Russo-German war v/as imminent).
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(1)
Lords and Commons, as to the possibility of war. At the
beginning of the following month Thornton reported a speech
by the President of the St. Petersburg Slavonic Benevolent
Society, who used similar though less violent language to that
(2)
used by Skobeleff. A little later, he wrote that there were
seriou-s apprehensions of war in St. Petersburg sufficient to
(3)
have a depressing influence on trade. Colonel Gonne, the
British military attache, v/as instructed to investigate whether
there was any real danger of Russia being involved in war
(4)
with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Skobeleff meanwhile had
gone from Paris to Warsaw. There he delivered on March 7, a
further inflammatory speech. He spoke of the indissoluble bonds
which united Poland and Russia and the danger to Poland of Ger-
(5) (6)
man ambitions. A new outcry in the German Press followed
and the commander of the German troops at Posen made a speech in
reply. It was not until the end of March that the agitation
began to die down and Thornton could report a renewal of
(7) „
confidence in the maintenance of peace. There was a final
(1) P.0.65/1133 Granville to Thornton 64 27 February 1882
Confidential
(2) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 78 9 March 1882
(3) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 84 11 March 1882
(4) P.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 138 21 April 1882
Confidential
enclosing Gonne i? April 1882
(5) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 86 13 March 1882
(6) P.O.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 84 11 March 1882
Very confidential
(7). P.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 102 23 March 1882
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flicker w ^ n  Skobeleff spoke at a regimental dinner on 
the 21st. In April an injunction was issued by the Govern­
ment forbidding persons serving in the army from making
(2 )
public speeches or engaging in political discussions.
'^ t the end of the month when a body of Russian peasants
attacked a colony of Germans in the South of Russia, Thornton
again saw reason to fear a break in the friendly relations
(3)
between Russia and Germany. There was, however, no
revival of anti-German or anti-Austrian agitation. Skobeleff's
death at the beginning of July checked for the time any
(4)
further developments.
In spite of the alarming proportions which British 
information showed the agitation to have reached, the reports 
received from the Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna made it 
clear that the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments were 
completely unmoved by it. Their complacency was all the 
more striking in view of the attitude of Germany to Russia 
in 1879, and to Italy in 1850. On both occasions there had been 
less provocation.
(1) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 108 27 March 1882
Confidential
(2) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 140 21 April 1882
(3) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville No.166 13 May 1882
(4) Sosnosky; op.cit. Vol.II p.68.
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"Little importance," wrote Elliot referring to
Skobeleff»s first speech and the outcry in the Press which
followed, "appears to be attached to it by the Imperial 
{1 )
Government." "Prince Bismarck," reported Ampthill, "is
(2 )
said to attach no importance to the incident." Reports 
that Austria-Hungary and Germany had protested at St. 
Petersburg were soon proved unfounded. The two Governments 
were completely satisfied by a spontaneous expression of 
regret from Giers. Elliot reported, in fact, that the 
Austrian Government had warned the Press "to moderate its 
comments upon a friendly Government." The warning was 
effective until Skobeleff*s Paris speech caused a fresh out­
burst. In reporting this Elliot impressed upon the Foreign 
Office that the Austrian Government did not share in any 
way the alarmist views that prevailed. Kalnoky had refrained 
from asking for explanations and told Elliot that he felt
complete confidence in the friendly disposition of the
(3)
Russian Government. When rumours of v/ar began to circulate
moùniroLÎn col ,
this attitude was still 3^ nt-1"Oimd by the Austrian Government. 
The Austrian Cabinet, reported Elliot, regarded the threat
(1) F.0.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 65 11 February 1882
(2) F.0.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 31 3 February 1882
Confidential
D.D.P. Series I Vol.IV No.260.
(3) F.0.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 82 24 February 1882
D.D.F, Series I Vol.IV NÔ.259
262
as purely imaginary; and the Emperor had spoken laughingly
to him of the difficulties of Russia in controlling the pan-
slavists. Prince Bismarck, Ampthill reported, v/as not in
the least apprehensive, and says himself that the Powers were
never more pacific than under the present order of things 
( 2 )
in Europe. A few days later the Ambassador reported a
more signal proof of Bismarck’s complacency. The Emperor,
it appeared, had called on Prince Bismarck who was ill and
urged that some warning should be given to the Czar of the
danger to his dynasty and Empire if he did not make an
example of Skobeleff and take strong measures against the
panslavists. "Prince Bismarck reiterated the advice he had
all along tendered to His Majesty, which was not to interfere
in the internal concerns of Russia ... but to leave the
Skobeleff incident to settle itself unaided, and ignored by
His Majesty and His Majesty’s Government, who had otherwise
no official complaint to make of the Czar and of his Govern-
(3)
ment since the Danzig interview."
(1) P.0.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 147 24 March 1882
Confidential
(2) F.0.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 84 11 March 1882
Very Confidential
(3) F.0.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 95 18 March 1882
Very Confidential 
D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.276.
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The friendly relations of the three Empires continued
as if no agitation had taken place. On the last day of
February Orloff on his way to St. Petersburg from Paris,
passed throu^ Berlin. He was received as usual by the
Emperor, Crown Prince and Chancellor. No attempt was made
to warn the Russian Government through him to control the
Panslavists. The Emperor, Ampthill reported, had merely
expressed his satisfaction at the "assurances of the
cordial sentiments which animated the Czar and the Russian
(1)
Government towards Germany." ' On the Kaiser's birthday,
March 22, the Czar telegraphed his congratulations, and
invited Schweinitz and the members of the German Embassy
to dine at Gatchina. On the 23rd Giers attended the
dinner at the German Embassy also given in celebration
of the Emperor's birthday. The Golos and the Journal de St.
Petersburg, devoted articles to the event, eulogising the
Emperor William and dwelling on the good relations between
(2)
Germany and Russia. A few days later Elliot reported the
(1) F.0.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 62 2 March
very confidential
(2) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 103 24 March
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arrival in Vienna of the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess
Vladimir. They stayed three days as the guests of the
Emperor. They were treated with great distinction and the
assurances they brought of the Czar’s friendship to Austria-
Hungary were^"listened to with pleasure and willingly
credited." Finally, with complete disregard of the
Panslavists who wished for Ignatieff»s appointment, Giers
(2 )
was made Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had, reported
Ampthill, all along enjoyed the confidence both of the
(3)
German and Austrian Governments. Much satisfaction
(4)
was expressed at Berlin and Vienna.
It appeared, moreover, that the Russian Government was 
so confident that nothing could disturb the good relations 
between the three Powers, that it could afford to humour 
the Panslavists. Thus, Thornton reported that no attempt 
was made to suppress the newspapers in which inflammatory 
and offensive articles appeared. Yet the Government was well
(1) F.0.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 153 29 March
D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.286, 287.
(2) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 127 10 April 1882
and 130 12 April 1882
(3) F.0.64/1006 Ampthill to Granville 116 12 April 1882
(4) P.0.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 173 12 April 1882
265
able to do so as the recent suspension of the Golos and
(1)  
Panadok and the change of tone adopted by the Novoe
Vremya, when at the end of March a warning was at last
(2)
given to it showed. Again, Skobeleff was summoned to
Gatchina on his return from Paris and 'Warsaw and severely
reprimanded. But as Thornton noted, there was no
(3)
suggestion of his resignation or dismissal.
During the winter of 1882-83, there was a repetition
of the situation; violent recriminations in the press
of the three Powers, alarmist rumours and an attitude of
absolute complacency and indifference on the part of the
Governments. At the end of November, Elliot reported, that
without warning or any apparent cause, the Austro-Hungarian
Press had raised the alarm of an imminent rupture between
(4)
Austria-Hungary and Russia. This development was the
more unexpected in that Kalnoky had recently declared before 
the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Austrian Delegations 
that no breach of the European peace was to be expected
(1) F.0.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 62 15 February 1882
(2) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 102 23 March 1882
(3) F.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 84 11 March
(4) P.0.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 545 22 November 1882
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(1)
from Russia. At the beginning of Cecember, again without
any apparent cause, the German Press suddenly began to stress
the existence of alliance obligations between Aus tri a-Hungary
and Germany. By the middle of the month a further series
of articles had appeared which purported to give the substance
of the Austro-German Treaty. The Grenzboten and Cologne
Gazette made the earliest and fullest disclosures. The
different articles contradicted each other especially on
the point of the duration of the Treaty and actually revealed
nothing new to the British Foreign Office. They served,
however, to arouse an agitation that was reflected in all
the continental newspapers. The simple explanation that an
indiscretion had occurred or that Bismarck, having recently
given a demonstration of friendship to Russia by inviting
(2 )
Giers to see him at Varzin, was anxious to show that his
friendship to Austria-Hungary was in no way diminished, were
(3)
rejected as inadequate. It was stated, instead, that
(1) F.0.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 535 10 November 1882
(2) F.0.64/1008 Ampthill to Granville 392 20 October 1882
Confidential
418 16 November 1882
(3) F.0.64/1008 Ampthill to Granville 466 15 December 1882
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Bismarck intended, with some unknown purpose in view, to 
give a warning to France or to Russia, or even to Austria 
herself. Corroboration was considered to have been given 
to the more extreme views when it was learnt that Herbert 
Bismarck had paid a visit to Vienna and had seen Kalnoky.
Both the German and Austrian Press, the Foreign Office was' 
informed, stated that he had been charged by his father 
with a communication too secret and important to be entrusted 
to the ordinary diplomatic channels. The German National 
Zeitung saw war between Austria and Russia "looming on the 
horizon." Elsewhere, it was stated, that he had been 
instructed to warn Austria to mobilize immediately. ' Direc­
tion was given to these alarmist rumours when the Cologne
Gazette on the 15th, published an article denouncing Russians
(1)
armaments. Its accusations were immediately taken
up by other papers. The Vienna Press professed to have 
found the real explanation of the disclosures in regard to 
the Austro-German Alliance. It had been a warning from 
Prince Bismarck to Russia provoked by a knowledge of her 
hostile designs. The papers were soon filled with accounts 
of the preparations which were being made against Austria 
and Germany. There was a general feeling of uneasiness,
(1) P. 0.64/1008 Amp thill to Granville 474 19 December
Secret
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public securities were depressed, the traditional Hungarian
hatred and distrust of Russia found vent in innumerable
(1 )
intemperate and offensive articles. The Russian Press
now took up the challenge. The Golos on the 27th, insisted
that the Austro-German Alliance could only be looked upon
(2 )
as a menace to Russia. In January other papers
asserted that Germany was making an opportunity to annex
(3)
the Baltic Provinces. On February 9, the Golos stated
that Austria-Hungary was spending large sums on the estab­
lishment of armed camps and on the repair of fortresses on 
her North Eastern frontier. She was concentrating troops 
there, and re-organising the militia in Galicia. She was 
rapidly acquiring tliat military ascendancy over Russia,
which Germany already possessed. It urged the Government
(4)
to take measures to paralyse her activities.
Once more the Foreign Office were informed that the 
Governments of the three Empires were unpurturbed. Giers
(1) F.0.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 580 22 December 1882
and 583 26 December 1882
Very Confidential
(2) P.0.65/1137 Thornton to Granville 386 29 December 1882
(3) F.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 7 11 January 1883
(4) F,0.65/1155 Thornton to Granville 39 16 February 1883
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stayed on quietly at Pisa, where he had gone on leave.
Adhering to his original intention, he stopped at Vienna
on his return in January, as he had stopped at Berlin on
his outward Journey, and visited Kalnoky as he had visited
Bismarck. British information indicated that neither visit
was at all connected with the agitation provoked by the
disclosures in regard to the Austro-German Alliance.
Giers’ language to Ampthill indicated that Russia’s "need
for peace to devote herself to internal development and
progress" had been the subject of his conversations with
Bismarck. Ampthill’s confidential information that Giers
had consulted certain leading bankers in Berlin with a
view to the development of Russia’s financial interests
corroborated this information. Ampthill furnished no other
information and he seemed to be satisfied that there was
(1)
nothing of greater interest to report. Kalnoky told
Elliot that his conversations with Giers had concerned 
the question of the Kilia mouths of the Danube, and Egypt.
(1) P.0.64/1008 Ampthill to Granville 421 22 November 1882
Confidential
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Elliot also seemed satisfied that nothing more important
had been discussed* Russia had made no protest against
the attitude of the Austrian and German Press. Austria-
Hungary and Germany, it appeared, had offered no explanations.
Bismarck by making an exception in favour of the Russian
Ambassador, when he refused to see anyone or conduct any
business on his return to Berlin in December, on the plea of
(2)
illness, and Kalnoky by the warmth of the reception accorded
to Giers in Vienna, dissociated themselves from the anti-
Russian agitation of press and Public. Articles believed to
have been officially inspired appeared in the Nord deutsche
(3)
Allgemeine Zeitung, on two occasions, and in the Austrian
Fremdenblatt, designed to prove the accusations against
Russia and the rumours in regard to Herbert Bismarck’s visit
( 4)
to Vienna unfounded. Kalnoky spoke to Elliot in the same
(5)
sense.
(1) P.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 32 26 January 1883
34 29 January 1883 
Confidential
35 29 January 1883
(2) P.0.64/1008 Ampthill to Granville 471 16 December 1882
Secret
(3) P.0.64/1008 Ampthill to Granville 479 23 December 1882
489 30 December 1882
(4) P.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 7 11 January 1883
(5) P.0.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 583 26 December 1882
very Confidential
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It seemed that Germany was so confident of Russia’s 
friendship that she could afford to let the agitation 
take its course, if not to encourage it. Kalnoky informed 
Elliot that while Bismarck had not authorised the divulga­
tions in regard to the Austro-German Alliance, he did not
(1)
disapprove of them. The Cologne Gazette and the Grenzhoten
were both believed to be closely connected with the German
Government. Ampthill’s information seemed to afford positive
evidence that Bismarck had inspired the agitation. The
military authorities, he reported, had for a long time urged
that a vote of money for the building of barracks and strategic
railways should be sought from the Reichstag. Bismarck had
(2)
at last agreed, but in doing so, had said "V/e must begin by
rattling our swords." The agitation against Russia was
(3)
presumably the result.
(1) P.0.64/1024 Ampthill to Granville 54 9 February 1883
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 583 26 December 1883
Very Confidential
(3) P.0.64/1608 Ampthill to Granville 474 19 December
Secret
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There was evidence that an equal confidence existed
where specific questions of policy were concerned. In Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary imposed in November 1881 a
fresn law respecting military service and the disorder that
had been prevalent since the summer became open rebellion.
Russia showed no signs of suspicion either then, or in the
following January, v;hen a large Austrian force advanced
into the Provinces. Yet technically at least, Austria in
imposing compulsory military service was going beyond the
position assigned to her at Berlin, while Russia might
reasonably have been expected to sound the alarm at the
fresh advance of Austrian troops. The departure from
Odessa of volunteers under Russian officers to assist the
(2)
rebels was announced but did not in fact take place. The
panslavist Novoe Vremya appealed for a European Congress to
take the settlement of the question out of Austria’s hands.
The Russian Foreign Office immediately dissociated itself
(3)
from the views of that newspaper.
(1) T.Sosnosky: Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich IJngarns. Vol.II
Seit 1866 p.33 et Sequ.
(2) P.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 124 5 April 1882
(3) P.0.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 95 15 March 1882
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Austria-Hungary, on her part, showed no traces of
suspicion that the insurrection was fomented by Russian
agitators. Opportunity was continually afforded for her
Ministers to voice such suspicions. Elliot for instance,
asked Slavy, the Minister in charge of the matters connected
with tlie occupation, what classes of persons were behind
(1)
the insurrection. Kalnoky was directly questioned in
the course of the discussion in the Committee of the Hungarian
Delegations on the vote of credit for which the Government
had asked, whether Russia was encouraging the rebellion.
Kalnoky both then and before the Committee of the Austrian
(2)
Delegations, testified to the correct bearing of Russia. 
Kalnoky was satisfied, Elliot also reported that the Novoe 
Vremya did not represent the views of the Russian Government. 
In mid-April, when the rebellion had been quelled, Kalnoky 
again informed the Delegations that, although there had been 
evidence of English agitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
(3)
there had been no Russian agitation. Yet there seemed 
valid enough grounds for suspecting Russian activity. Elliot 
himself drew Kalnoky’s attention to reports received by the
(1) P.0.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 52 8 February 1882
Confidential
(2) P.O.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 37 1 February 1882
(3) P.0.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 191 20 April 1882
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British Foreign Office from their Consul General at Sophia,
that armed bands under Russian leaders were crossing from
Bulgaria into Macedonia and marching into Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Kalnoky appeared to be aware of it, but saw
(1)
no- cause for uneasiness. A few days before, the Wiener
Extrablatt had published a conversation with Hitrovo, the 
Russian Consul at Sophia. He was alleged to have said that 
as Russia could not forcibly dispute with Austria the 
supremacy over the Slav nations, she must endeavour to raise 
"the spark of discontent" wherever Austrian influence pre­
dominated. The Panslavist committees were putting that 
policy into practice and. would not allow the disorders in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to subside. Elliot considered that
the Foreign Office might regard the information of the
(2)
newspaper as correct. At the same time, British informa­
tion indicated that Yonine, Russian Consul General at Ragusa,
(3)
was openly supporting the rebels. Again, when the in­
surrectionary movem«.Y>t was revived in the early summer of 
1882, Freeman, British Consul at Bosnia-Serai reported, and
(1) P.O.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 201 26 April 1882
(2) p.0.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 187 17 April 1882
(3) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 204 24 July 1883
Confidential
Refers to information received by the Foreign Office 
from Kirby Green, British Consul at Cettinje in 
the Spring of 1882.
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preser\ct.
Elliot confirmed, the presure- among the rebels, of Bulgarians
( 1}
under Russian leaders.
Although the Austro-Hungarian Press became very alarmed
when in September 1882 Prince Nicholas of Montenegro paid
a tliree weeks’ visit to St. Petersburg, the Government was to
Elliot’s surprise undisturbed, ’’An exhibition of the sympathy
between Russia and Montenegro’’, he wrote, "neither surprises
. (2)nor irritates Count Kalnoky." Yet it took place just
at the time when documents had come to light proving the 
participation of Montenegrins in the rebellion in Bosnia and
(3)
Herzegovina, and when a personal quarrel between the
Austrian representative at Cettinje and the Montenegrin
Government had resulted in a temporary suspension of
(4)
relations. Kalnoky still showed no signs of uneasiness
when the Prince repeated his visit in September 1883. Demon­
strations of sympathy were even more marked on that occasion 
than previously. He was the guest of the Emperor for 
practically the whole month. Orders were conferred upon him.
A deputation of the Slav Benevolent Society waited upon him
(1) P.0.7/1035 Elliot to Granville 356 14 July 1882
(2) P.0.7/1035 Elliot to Granville 469 29 September 1882
(3) P.0.7/1035 Elliot to Granville 434 31 August 1882
Confidential
(4) p.0.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 503 20 October 1882
Very Confidential 
referring to Kirby Green 80 29 September 1882
to Granville Confidential
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and he delivered a speech to them enlarging upon the
affinities of the Slav race. At Moscow the Prince again
made a speech and showed clearly his acquiesence in Pan-
(1 )
slavist ambitions.
The progress of Russian influence in Bulgaria and Eastern
Rumelia appeared also to be a matter of indifference to the
Austro-Hungarian Government. Kalnoky, when Elliot spoke to
him on the matter, showed no disposition to protest against
the overbearing attitude assumed by the Russian consul at
A le Ko (2)
PhilippopoliS towards Akko pasha. When in January 1883
the struggle at Sophia between the Bulgarian and Russian 
members of the Prince’s Government came to a head, Kalnoky’s 
uneasiness was caused not by the fear that the Russian group 
would probably secure the victory, but by the anxiety lest 
the Prince’s refusal to appoint a Russian Minister of Public 
Works, and his attempt to rely on Bulgarian Ministers only, 
should result in the collapse of his authority in the Princi­
pality. The Prince, he told Elliot, could not have a Govern­
ment without a certain Russian element. In so far as he 
disapproved of the Russian insistence on the appointment of a
(1) P.0.65/1137 Kennedy to Granville 277 6 September 1883
288 14 September 1883
301 27 September 1883
(2) P.0.65/1155 Thornton to Granville • 2 3 January 1883
F.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 1 3 January 1883
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Russian Minister for Public Works, he made it clear to Elliot
that his disapproval was not directed against Giers but
against Sobeleff and Kaulbars, Alexander’s Minister of Interior
(1)
and War respectively. The fact that he had spoken
frankly and unofficially to Labanoff, now Russian Ambassador
in Vienna in that sense, appeared rather as a mark of con-
(2)
fidence than otherwise. He expressed no opinion when in
June, in spite of appeals to the Czar, Alexander failed to
secure the recall of Sobeleff and Kaulbars and the appointment 
. (3)
of General Enroth in the latter’s place, nor, when Yonine
was appointed to succeed Hitrovo as Consul-General at Sophia.
'When the Prince passed througjh Vienna, Kalnoky spoke to him of
the dangers of the military organisation of the Principality,
but from Elliot’s report it did not appear that his remarks
had had an anti-Russian tone. in August Elliot had a
long conversation on the question with Kalnoky, but could get
nothing from him and the discussion became purely academic
in character. V/hen Yonine on the way to his post, stopped &t
Vienna and saw Kalnoky, the latter informed Elliot that he
(1) P.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 6 11 January 1883
Confidential
(2) E.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 92 21 March 1883
Confidential
(3) P.O.7/IO5O Elliot to Granville 204 24 July 1883
Confidential
(4j P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 202 24 July 1883
Confidential
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(1 )
"was perfectly satisfied." Yet the newspapers at the
moment were full of reports that Russia was sending large
(2 )
quantities of arms into Bulgaria. In September Yonine’s
arrival at Sophia caused a crisis. He delivered what was
virtually an ultimatum to the Prince in the shape of a
project for a new constitution which was to replace the
absolute powers assumed by the Prince in May 1881. Alexander
rejected it and dismissed Sobeleff and Kaulbars from the
Ministry. Sobeleff then paraded the army and appealed to the
(3)
people. Kalnoky appeared to take the incident very
seriously, but it was soon clear that he was more concerned by
the disorders which seemed inevitable than by the probable
outcome of the struggle. In any case, Elliot reported he was
not prepared to take the initiative in protesting against the
(4)
action of Russia. As soon as the crisis had passed Kalnoky
(5)
expressed himself "as satisfied" with affairs in Bulgaria.
(1) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 229 22 August 1883
Confidential
(2) F.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 218 13 August 1883
Confidential
(3) p.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 262 11 September 1883
encloses a detailed account of the v/hole incident 
by col. Primrose, military attache at Vienna.
(4) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 249 4 September 1883
(5) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 250 5 September 1883
257. 10 September 1883
Confidential
Busch, who was In charge of the German Foreign Office, made
clear to Ampthill that Germany shared the Austrian point of
view. As the Prince had submitted, he said, events must be
(1)
allowed to take their course. Yet the submission of the
Prince and the re-instatement of Sobeleff and Kaulbars
closed the incident by a confirmation of the Russian control
over the Province. Giers made it clear that Russia intended
to maintain that control. Bulgaria was a creation of Russia
and the Emperor Intended to see that her Government was
(2 )
conducted in accordance with his views. The attitude
of the non-official Berlin and Austrian Press, which asserted 
that Germany and Austria were much irritated against Russia 
for her action in Bulgaria and raised the cry that Europe should 
unite against Russia’s ambitions, contrasted sharply with the 
attitude of the two Governments and seemed to point very
4clearly to the existence fer some cause for confidence on
(3)
their part which v/as not possessed by the general public.
The state of affairs outlined above was exactly repeated 
when Alexander’s abandonment of the Yonine constitution and
fécond ( ^ )
^dismissal of Sobeleff and Kaulbars re-opened the question.
(1) P.0.64/1027 Ampthill to Granville 266 13 September3S83
(2) P.0.65/1157 Kennedy to Granville 206 10 September 1883
Confidential
(3) P.0.64/1027 Ampthill to Granville 266 13 September 1883
(4) P.0.65/1157 Kennedy to Granville 221 24 September 1883
Confidential
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Austria-Hungary’s only concern appeared to be that Russia 
should do everything to sustain the authority of the Prince. 
The determination of Russia to turn the incident to the 
advantage of her own position in Bulgaria was obvious. An 
officially inspired article in the Journal de St. Petersburg 
declared that Bulgaria owed everything to Russia, and showed 
why she would find it impossible to free herself from Russian
(1 ) tUy
influence. M. Vlangaly, who was temporarily in charge
of the Russian Foreign Office told the British charge
d ’affaires that the dismissal of Sobeleff and Kaulbars could
not diminish Russian influence or prestige. The people and
(2 )
army were thoroughly Russian. Sobeleff returned to
Russia but Kaulbars,though he resigned his position, remained
in Bulgaria, where 200-300 Russian officers of the Bulgarian .
army were under his command. At the end of November, he
negotiated an agreement with the Prince whereby the Minister
of War was still to be a Russian appointed by the Czar and
the Russian officers serving in Bulgaria were to remain there,
thou^ he himself left the country. Strict regulations were
issued prohibiting these men from taking part in politics, but
( 3 )
Russian influence in the Principality was not thereby checked.
(1) p.0.65/1157 Kennedy to Granville 212 15 September 1883
(2) P.0.65/1157 Kennedy to Granville 221 24 September 1883
Confidential
(3) P.0.65/1158 Thornton to Granville 270 1 November 1883
296 21 November 1883 
314 11 December 1883
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Elliot during these events had sounded Kalnoky again 
and again with a view to securing some expression of opinion 
from him that was not of mere academic importance. He 
secured nothing but a statement that Austria-Hungary was
(1)
convinced that Russia would not abandon her policy in Bulgaria.
There was nothing to show that this caused the Austrian
Minister any alarm. In December Calice at Constantinople
told Dufferin, and Kalnoky in Vienna told Elliot, that Bulgaria
(2)
was a British rather than an Austrian interest. Ampthill 
reported from Berlin that Bismarck was prepared to be as
(3)
"accommodating as possible" to Russian ambitions in Bulgaria.
Again the attitude of the two Governments was in marked
contrast to the attitude of the Press and public of the
three countries. The Russian Press accused Austria-Hungary
and Germany of supporting the Prince. By November, the
resulting agitation had developed such proportions that rumours
were current of Russian military preparations on the Austrian
(4)
and German frontiers. Giers, however, impressed upon
Kennedy, the British charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg
(1) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 277 3 October 1883
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 329 4 December 1883
Confidential
(3) P.0.64/1027 Ampthill to Granville 308 17 November 1883
Confidential
(4) P.0.65/1158 Thornton to Granville 274 7 November 1883
281
285 10 November 1883
P.0.64/1027 Ampthill to Granville 319 23 November 1883
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that M s  whole object was to prevent the Bulgarian
question from developing from a purely local into a
( ^  )
European issue. Mohrenheim, nov/ Russian Ambassador in
London, told Granville during a visit he paid to Walmer
Castle in October, that "the Governments of Austria-Hungary
and Germany recognised the legitimate interests of Russia
in the Principality and did not attempt to interfere with
(2)
her action in the matter.
The tour of the Balkan States made by the Crown Prince
and Princess of Austria from April 14-29, 1884, afforded
another occasion for a demonstration of confidence between
the three Empires. Travelling by Budapest, Rustchuk and
Varna, they reached Constantinople. There they stayed five
days. On the return journey the prince of Bulgaria met
them at Varna and conducted them to Rustchuk, where they stayed
a day. The courts of Bucharest and Belgrade were then visited
(3)
in turn. Although it was denied tliat the visit had a
political object, no secret was made of the political results 
it was expected to achieve. It would consolidate the good
(1) P.0.65/1157 Kennedy to Granville 232 4 October 1883
Confidential
241 7 October 1883
Confidential
P.0.65/1158 Thornton to Granville 285 10 November 1883
(2) P.0.65/1154 Granville to Thornton 289 24 October 1883
(3) P.0.7/1062 Paget to Granville 62 23 February 1884
74 5 March 1884
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relations of -Austria-Hungary with Rumania and ^ervia, and v/in 
over the prince of Bulgaria who was at present entirely con­
trolled by Russia. The German Press attached considerable
importance to the mission as a demonstration of the influence
(1)
of the Austro-German Alliance in South Eastern Europe. yet
Thornton could report no trace of suspicion, anxiety or
irritation in Russia.
Very little importance was attached by the British
representatives to the meetings which took place during 1882
and 1883 between the Austrian and German Emperors, and between
Giers, Kalnoky, and Bismarck. In August 1882 the Austrian
(2)
and German Emperors met at Isclil. No report was received
by the Foreign Office with information either upon the 
substance of their discussions or upon the significance of 
the meeting. The journey of Giers to Varzin, Berlin and Vienna 
followed. The Foreign Office received no information such 
as would lead them to interpret this visit as a demonstration 
of a triple friendship. As long as British information 
showed that the Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany
(1) P.0.7/1062 Paget to Granville 30A 30 April 1884
(2) D.D.P. Series I Vol.IV No.504 (Courcel to Duclerc,
11 August 1882, concerns the Eastern policy of 
Austria-Hungary and Germany and the strength of 
the Austro-German Alliance of which the recent 
imperial meeting afforded a fresh manifestation).
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had not weakened. It was not likely that information
respecting a Russian initiative in drawing closer her
relations with the two other Empires would be considered in
the same light as a German initiative in the same direction.
Thus Giers*8 visit to Varzin from November 18-19, and his
subsequent conversations in Berlin with the Emperor and
Count Hatzfeldt, were reported by Ampthill as significant
only in so far as they produced a very favourable impression
on public opinion. Yet a long, if desultory, conversation
with Giers had afforded the Ambassador a certain amount
of information on the Russo-German discussions and offered
(1)
the opportunity to secure more. The Foreign Office was
not informed that any connection existed between this visit
and the visit to Vienna which followed on January 24-28 on
(2)
the return of Giers from Italy. Further, it did not
appear that the subjects which had been discussed were 
subjects of major importance for Austro-Russian relations. 
Kalnoky told Elliot that he had urged on Giers the necessity 
of some clarity as to Russia’s intentions on the Danube
(1) P.0.64/1008 Ampthill to Granville 392 20 October 1882
Confidential
418 16 November 1882
421 22 November 1882
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 32 26 January 1883
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question, while Giers had expressed to him some dissatis­
faction in regard to the British Circular of January 3,
(1 )
respecting the Egyptian question. The meeting, however
offered an opportunity for a demonstration of marked civility
(2 )
on the part of Austria-Hungary towards Russia, Giers
had, in fact, come to Vienna at the special request of
(3)
Francis Joseph. Information reached the Foreign Office
a little later that Ampthill believed Bismarck appreciated
and encouraged Kalnoky’s desire for friendly relations
(4)
with Russia, Yet no information was received that any
substantial step in the direction had been taken. When
the Austro-Hungarian and German Emperors met at Gastein
on August 8, 1883 the British Foreign Office again received
no information as to the discussions that had taken place
(5)
between them or as to the significance of the meeting.
(1) P.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 34 29 January 1883
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 35 29 January 1883
(3) P.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 32 26 January 1883
(4) P.0.64/1024 Ampthill to Granville 54 9 February 1883
Confidential
(5) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 222 13 August 1883
P.0.64/1026 Walsham to c-ranville 238 10 August 1883
C.f. D.D.P. Series I Vol.V No.73 (Montmarin, charge 
d'affaires at Vienna to Challemel Lacour, points out the 
significance of the meeting as a demonstration of the 
continued "solidarity" of Austro-German relations).
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On August 30, Kalnoky visited Bismarck at Salzburg, The
Foreign Office received no report containing information as to
the substance or significance of the discussions between them.
The only report that mentioned the subject gave no information
as to the significance of the meeting for the relations of
the two Pov/ers, At the end of September Elliot reported that
Kalnoky had told him that at Salzburg he had agreed with
Bismarck that the decline of British influence at Constantinople
(1)
was much to be regretted. Hengelmüller, the Austro-
liungarian charge d'affaires in London on Kalnoky's instructions
made a communication to Granville on the subject of the
meeting but it added nothing to the information of the Foreign
Office. For he stated that the meeting had been occasioned
by no special occurrence and that no decisions had been taken.
It had served only to confirm the friendly relations existing
(2 )
between the two countries.
Vifhen Giers again visited Bismarck, this time at
Friedrichsruhe on November 18, the only information received
by the British Foreign Office was derived from a statement
by Kalnoky that Bismarck was satisfied with the Russian
(5) . . . .
assurances. Yet the French charge d'affaires in Berlin had
received information that Bismarck had proposed to Russia "that
she should ask to be included in the Austro-German Alliance,"
(1) F.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 271 26 September 1883
(2) F.0.7/1047 Granville to Elliot 205 3 October 1883
(3) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 323 30 November 1883
Confidential
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and that Bismarck had especially requested Giers to visit
him, both because he wished to make that proposal and because
(1 )
he wished to discuss the Eastern Question with him. The
Berlin visit was again followed by a visit to Vienna. Again,
no connection between the two visits was apparent from the
Information in possession of the Foreign Office. Paget,
who arrived in Vienna to replace Elliot as Ambassador,
the day before the meeting took place, was not in a very
favourable position to secure complete information. He
reported, however, that he had reason to believe that Giers'
visit to Vienna was significant only in so far as it indicated
the desire of Austria-Hungary, to whose initiative it was
due, to maintain friendly relations with Russia, The
discussions had not gone further than an exchange of assurances
(2 )
for this purpose.
At the beginning of February, however, the Foreign 
Office was informed that Bismarck had now taken the initiative 
towards the further development of the relations between the 
three Empires, He had taken practical measures to bring 
about closer relations between Germany and Russia, Ampthill 
had been privately informed that Count Herbert Bismarck who had
(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.V No,85.
(2) P.O.7/1062 Drummond to Granville , 23 14 January 1884
Paget to Granville 32 22 January 1884
D.D.F. Series I Vol.V. No,183 (Poucher de Careil to Jules 
Perry, 2 January, reports that an entente was on the 
point of being established between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia and that Giers' visit was designed to bring it
No,193.
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been sent to St. Petersburg in January to learn the duties
(1)
of first Secretary, had been instructed to"insinuate in
High Quarters that the re-establishment of the former friendly
and intimate relations between Russia and Prussia might be
facilitated and promoted by the appointment of an Ambassador
who enjoyed the full confidence of the Czar, and would be
in a position to communicate Prince Bismarck's views
directly to His Majesty." Orloff v/as particularly mentioned
(2)
as fulfilling these requirements.
Ampthill reported that considerable importance was 
attached to Orloff's appointment by political and financial 
circles in Berlin, and it was talked of "as an earnest attempt 
to re-establish the close and intimate relations existing 
between Russia and Germany before the Treaty of Berlin brought 
about an estrangement." The Emperor had informed Lady Ampthill
,(3)
that he believed "much good would come of the appointment."
(1) G.P. Vol.Ill Nos.617,619,622; show that Giers' fear of
the increase of Saburoff's influence, and the latter's 
efforts to remodel the Dreikaiserbund, for the renewal of 
which negotiations were then going on, to Russia's ad­
vantage, were the causes of his recall.
(2) P.0.64/1049 Ampthill to Granville 30 11 February 1884
Secret
D.D.P. Series I Vol.V No.234 (Courcel to Jules Perry,
19 February
describes Bismarck's efforts to secure the removal of 
Russian cavalry regiments from her South Western frontiers 
as the subject of the discussions.between Giers and Bis­
marck at Friedrichsruhe, and negotiations which Orloff 
had been appointed to conduct).
(3) P.0.64/1049 Ampthill to Granville 35 16 February 1884
Secret
2 m
Prince Dalgorouki, Russian military attache in Berlin, 
came from St. Petersburg where he had been on leave, and 
announced the appointment to the Kaiser, and afterwards 
visited Bismarck at F r i e d r i c h s T h i s  was considered a 
further indication of the tightening of Russo-German relations. 
Paget's sources of information were limited to the public 
press and the views "generally held in Vienna". He reported 
that there were two currents of thought. It was asserted 
that a tightening of Russo-German relations was taking place 
with some unknown object in view, and at the expense of some 
third Power. It was also stated that the tightening of 
Russo-German relations and the indications that Austria-Hungary 
welcomed that development, portended the re-establishment of 
the Dreikaiserbund. Paget believed that the latter develop­
ment was scarcely desired. His only ground for that belief
however, was that the antagonism between Austro-Hungarian
(1)
and Russian interests in the Balkans still existed.
Shortly afterwards a further demonstration of Russo- 
German friendship was given when a Delegation more impressive 
than the circumstances warranted, arrived from Russia to 
congratulate the Emperor on the seventieth anniversary of the
(1) P.0.7/1062 Paget to Granville 60 23 February 1884
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receipt of the Russian Order of St. George. It was a proof,
the Emperor informed Ampthill, "of an earnest desire on the
part of the Czar to re-establish and continue the intimate
relations of the past between the Courts of Russia and
(1)
Prussia."
Meanwhile, a conversation with Kalnoky had given to 
Paget more authoritative information on the subject of the 
relations between the three Empires. The Austrian Minister 
treated as unworthy of notice the rumours which had circu­
lated as to the possible re-establishment of the Dreikaiser­
bund. Austria-Hungary, however, welcomed the readiness
that Russia nov/ showed "to join in the peaceful under-
(2 )
standing between Austria and Germany." Tisza, the Hungarian
Prime Minister, speaking in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, 
gave similar information. Russia, he said, had shovm a 
desire to tighten her relations first with Germany, and then
(1) E.0.64/1049 Ampthill to Granville 43 23 February 1884
45 27 February 1884
Secret
D.D.P. Series I Vol.V No.208
No.211 (Courcel to Jules Ferry,
29 February
describes the incident as "la premiere demonstration 
solennel et publique du rapprochement opéré depuis peu 
entre la Russie et l'Allemagne").
(2) P.0.7/1062 Paget to Granville 69 27 February 1884
Confidential
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with Austria-Hungary. The Austro-German Alliance remained 
unaffected. "Si d'autres puissance se rapprochement de cette 
alliance, c'est là une^nouvelle garantie pour que la paix 
ne soit pas troublée." The speech from the throne at
the opening of the German Reichstag referred to the strengthen­
ing of the hereditary friendship between the three Imperial
(2)
Courts.
The negotiation in Berlin of a loan of fifteen millions 
for the Russian Government partly through the firm of 
BleichrOder, and partly through the Royal Prussian Financial 
Institution, which was under the direct control of the 
Prussian Minister for Finance, afforded a further demonstration 
of the Russo-German rapprochement, and a guarantee of the
(3)
solidarity of future relations between the two countries.
On the 25th April the Foreign Office received information
that the necessity of a meeting between the three Emperors
had been agreed upon, and that steps were being taken to
(4)
bring it about after the following June. In
(1) F.0.7/1062 Paget to Granville 86 15 March 1884
(2) F.0.64/1049 Ampthill to Granville 55 6 March 1884
(5) F.0.64/1050 Ampthill to Granville 99 18 April 1884
(4) F.0.7/1063 Paget to Granville 123 21 Açril 1884
enclosing Col. Primrose (military Attaché)
to Paget 524 20 April
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reply to a question from Paget, Kalnoky stated in guarded
terms that it was possible that the Czar might pay a visit
to Francis Joseph some time during the tour he intended to
make through his Dominions on the proclamation of the
(1)
majority of the Czarewitch.
iVhen the Emperor of Germany paid his annual visit to
Francis Joseph, there was more interest shown on this
occasion by the British Ambassador. Paget had himself gone
to C-astein, arriving there at the same time as the German
Emperor. The meeting actually took place at Ischl on
August 6 , but Paget had been received by the Kaiser in
Gastein, before the meeting took place. Paget was, however,
unable to secure any substantial information. The Austrian
press, which spoke of the meeting as ”a fresh proof of the
cordiality of the relations between the two Empires" alone
(2 )
afforded some indication as to its significance. A
subsequent conversation with Kalnoky revealed only the 
latter’s desire to divest the meeting of all political 
importance. The visit of the Emperor to Ischl for a few 
hours, attended only by aides-de-camp, could not be considered
(1) F.0.7/1063 Paget to Granville 127 25 April 1884
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville 207 27 July 1884
221 9 August 1884
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a fitting occasion for the transaction of affairs of
State. His ovm presence and that of the Hungarian Prime
(1 )
Minister could be explained by non-political reasons.
In regard to Kalnoky»s visit to Bismarck at Varzin,
(2 )
which followed immediately upon the meeting of the
Emperors at Ischl, Paget was again able to furnish the
Foreign Office with more information that had been received
respecting the Salzburg meeting. A conversation with Kalnoky
showed that the object of the visit v/as an exchange of
(3)
views on matters of general policy," As the result
of a further conversation Paget learnt that the outcome of 
the visit "had been to place the relations of the two 
Empires on an even more intimate footing than before if 
that were possible." He then asked Kalnoky "whether there 
was anything new in regard to the relations between the Allied 
Emuire8 and Russia." The Austrian Minister replied that
(1) F.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville 222 10 August 1884
Confidential
(2) F.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville
Telegram 10 11 August 1884
11 14 August 1884
F.0.64/1051 Ampthill to Granville 219 11 August 1884
221 15 August 1884
(3) F.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville 222 10 August 1884
Confidential
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nothing new had occurred and repeated to Paget the statements 
he had made in the Spring in regard to a possible interview 
between the three Emperors. He then said: "A good under­
standing with Russia was a very desirable object for both
Austria and Germany, and it was the best guarantee of her
(1)
pursuing a peaceful policy in the East." In Berlin
Ampthill was seriously ill and Scott, who had now taken
(2)
Walsham's place as first Secretary, was in charge. He
had no authoritative information on the Varzin meeting. He 
reported, however, the general opinion of the diplomatic 
corps in regard to it "that a meeting of the Emperors of 
Austria, Germany, and Russia is in contemplation, and that 
the date and details of the meeting have been settled by 
Count Kalnoky and Prince Bismarck." He added that a 
meeting of the tliree Emperors could only be intended to
(3)
celebrate the re-establishment of the Dreikaiserbund.
The meeting of the three Emperors took place at 
Skiernerwirce from the 15th to the 16th of September. Giers,
(1) P.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville Separate 24 August 1884
and Secret
(2) P.0.64/1051 Ampthill to Granville 222 16 August 1884
(3) P.0.64/1051 Scott to GranviHe 227 19 August 1884
confidential
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Kalnoky, Bismarck, and Counts Herbert and William Bismarck, 
as well as the Russian Ambassadors accredited to the three
cn
courts, were also present. British information in regard
to it was derived from articles in the Continental Press,
and from statements made in public or in private conversation
with the Ambassador, by Francis Joseph and Kalnoky. Lord
Ampthill died in Berlin just before the meeting took place.
The Foreign Office, therefore, had no expression of opinion
from him on the subject. Malet, however, who arrived as
(2)
Ambassador at Berlin in October was able to furnish the 
Foreign Office with important information, which was derived 
from an independent source.
Complete secrecy had been maintained in regard to the 
preparation for the interview, and little information had 
been available as to the objects of the meeting before it 
tooÿ place. An article in the Vienna Correspondence Politique 
which Paget believed to have been officially inspired, put 
forward views in accordance with language already held to
(1) P.0.64/1051 Scott to Granville 274 15 September 1884
and Telegram 16
281 20 September 1884
P.0.65/1183 Thornton to Granville 267 6 September 1884
274 10 September 1884
296 29 September 1884
P.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville ' 246 12 September 1884
253 20 September 1884
D.D.P. Series I Vol.V Nos.388, 392, 394.
(2) P.0.64/1152 Malet to Granville 310 10 October 1884
D.D.P. Series I Vol.V No.403 pp.419-420.
p.0.64/1051 Scott to Granville 284 23 September 1884
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the Ambassador by Kalnoky. "L'entrevue", It asserted,
"n'aura pas de caractère politique proprement dit." It 
was intended as an act of courtesy and a public manifestation
(1)
of the close relations which existed between the three courts.
Similar information came from Berlin. Scott reported that
the object of the meeting "was understood in Berlin, to be
to give an outward and visible sign of the perfect understanding
.(2 )
which had been arrived at between- the three Governments."
For some time after the meeting no information reached 
the Foreign Office as to its results. The Novoe Vremya
(3)
believed that it had prepared the way for an agreement.
There was nothing, however, to confirm these assertions and
the effects of the meeting were not immediately evident. Paget
could not ascertain anything with precision, but suspected that
something more than a public manifestation of friendship had
(4)
been involved. His task was not made easier when the
(1) F,0.7/1064 Paget to Granville Separate 24 August 1884
and Secret
F.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville 241 7 September 1884
(2) p.0.64/1151 Scott to Granville 268 13 September 1884
Confidential
(3) F.0.65/1183 Thornton to Granville 281 18 September 1884
(4) P.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville 253 20 September 1884
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Emperor In the speech at the ooening of the Hungarian
(1)
Parliament omitted any reference to the meeting. The
Press, however, had now taken up the matter. It maintained 
the view that some understanding had been reached at 
Skiernerwirce and all differences between the three Empires 
removed. It asserted, however, that no written Treaty 
existed. Articles to this effect appeared in the Pester
Lloyd, the Moscow Verdomesti and in Bulgarian papers. The 
Nord deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Scott informed the Foreign 
Office, furnished evidence that "the Imperial Government 
wished them to be considered as containing an authentic resume" 
of the discussions at Skiernerwirce." A little later the
Novosti of St. Petersburg described what it considered were
(3)
the possible points of the agreement that had been reached.
The Address drawn up by the Liberal Majority of the Hungarian '
Parliament, in reply to the speech from the throne, expressed
approval of the existence of less close relations between Austria^
Hungary and Russia than those between Austria-Hungary and
Germany, which the speech seemed to indicate. As a result it .
drew from the Vienna Press further statements as to the "closer j
alliance" between the three Empires which the Skiernerwirce j
(4) '
meeting had established.__________________________ ;
(1) F.0.7/1064 Paget to Granville .262 30 September 1884 I
F.0.7/1065 Paget to Granville 266 3 October 1884
(2) F.0.64/1052 Scott to Granville 305 7 October 1884 '
(3) F.0.65/1183 Thornton to Granville 302 10 October 1884
(4) P.0.7/1065 Paget to Granville 277 14 October 1884
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These statements, Tisza confirmed during the Debate on
the Address. He stated that a definite understanding for the
maintenance of peace had been reached, but denied the existence
(1)
of written documents of any sort. Ten days later Paget in­
formed the Foreign Office that the speech of the Emperor on 
the occasion of his reception at Buda Pesth of the Austrian and 
Hungarian Delegations, showed "the complete agreement between
the three Emperors and their Governments for the preservation of
(2)
peace and the maintenance of the territorial status quo."
Kalnoky in the Debate on Foreign Affairs in the Delegations
spoke of the "consolidation" that had taken place in the rela-
(3)
tions between the three Empires. A report, however, was
received from Malet on November 1, of a conversation with a
(4)
"Gentleman whose position enables him to be well informed."
The Foreign Office as a result had precise information as to 
the conclusion of an informal agreement between the three 
Empires, and as to the points which it covered.
Information as to the probable character of any agreement 
between the three Empires, had been accumulating, as has been 
seen, since 1880. The course of events during 1881-83 
suggested that the information already received was
still generally valid, but indicated that in certain___________
(1) F.0.7/1065 Paget to Granville 279 19 October 1884
(2) F.0.7/1065 Paget to Granville 286 30 October 1884
C.f. D.D.F. Series I Vol.V 399 (courcel to Jules Ferry
15 Septemoer
pp.411-12)
and 400
(3) F.0.7/1065 Paget to Granville 290 6 November 1884
(4) F*0.64/1152 Scott to Granville 340 1 November 1884
Confidential
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directions the conceptions of the Foreign Office should 
be modified. The basic factor in any such triple agree­
ment was still seen to be an Austro-Russian understanding 
in regard to the Eastern Question. The conception of a 
"squaring" agreement which resulted from British information 
during 1880-81, was modified in so far as the course of 
events during 1881-85 indicated that it would assume not 
the form of a division of the spoils resulting from a con­
certed forward policy, but a division of the Balkans, to use 
a later term, into Austrian and Russian spheres of influence. 
The existence at the same time of rebellion in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and of constitutional troubles in Bulgaria, was 
the opportunity which first enabled the Government to secure 
information in this connection. As has already been seen there 
was no effort on the part of Austria-Hungary and Russia to 
use the opportunity to pursue in concert a forward policy, 
while on the other hand neither Government showed any serious 
concern as to the activities of the other, Russia did not 
interfere when the Austrian hold on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was strengthened by the successful action of her troops against 
the rebels and the imposition of compulsory military service. 
Austria-Hungary did not protest against the extension of 
Russian influence in Bulgaria. The outbreak of constitutional 
difficulties in Servla, coincident with the renewal of 
Bulgarian troubles afforded a further opportunity for the
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securing of information on this point. Kalnoky, in speaking
to Elliot in March 1883, referred to the Russian policy in
Bulgaria and the Austrian policy in Servia as if Bulgaria
was exclusively a Russian and Servia exclusively an Austrian
(1)
question. Later Mohrenheim visited Granville at Walmer
Castle and made an important declaration on Russian policy
in the Balkans. In Servia, he said, the Russian Minister
had been instructed to maintain.an attitude of absolute
reserve. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, Austria and
Germany recognised the legitimate interests of Russia and
(2)
did not attempt to interfere with her action. Giers had
(3)
already spoken in the same sense to Thornton. Calice in
January used to .Paget similar language to that used by
Kalnoky to Elliot comparing the policy of Russia in Bulgaria
(4)
with the policy of Austria-Hungary to Servia. On two
occasions the King of Greece, who was the brother-in-law 
of the Czar, informed Elliot of the possibility of a 
division of Balkan territory between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, insisting at the same time on the Austrian desire to
(1) P.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 107 27 March 1883
Confidential
(2) P.0.65/1154 Granville to Thornton 289 _ 24 October 1883
(3) F.0.65/1157 Thornton to Granville 253 4 October 1883
Confidential
(4) P.0.7/1062 Paget to Granville 39 27 January 1884
Confidential
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(1)
maintain Turkish integrity. Elliot reported then that
in the event of Russian aggression, Austria-Hungary would
annex territory towards Salonica, hut otherwise her policy
(2)would he limited to extending her commerôial influence.
The Foreign Office during 1881-3 were informed of the 
cessation, at least as far as the tv\ro Governments were 
concerned, of the rivalry for predominance in the Balkans. 
Finally, when in the late autumn of 1884 British information 
indicated that an actual if informal agreement existed 
between the three Empires, Malet reported that he had been 
clearly informed that the agreement provided that the rival 
intrigues of the three Powers in the Balkans should cease; 
that the influence of Russia should be predominant henee-
(3)
forth in Bulgaria, and that of Austria-Hungary in servia.
Thus, the article of the Protocol of June 1881 providing 
for the general instruction to the representatives of the 
three Powers in the Balkans, was reflected in British 
information.
The Foreign Office during 1880 and 1881 had received 
information that the basis of any Austro-Russian agreement
(1) P.0.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 488 11 October 1882
Confidential
P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 255 13 October 1883
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 533 14 December 1883
Confidential
(3) P.0.64/1152 Malet to Granville 340 1 November 1884
Confidential
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concerning the Balkans would be an Austrian annexation of*
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Austrian acquiescence in
the union of* Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The course of*
events during 1881-83, as has already been seen, indicated
that Russia was in fact prepared to allow Austria-Hungary
a free hand in regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Austria-Hungary was prepared to acquiesce in the union of
Bulgaria and Eastern Runelia. ' The indications in this
connection were confirmed by the statements of the respective
Ministers. Giers already in December 1881 told Thornton
that he believed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
would become permanent. Kalnoky informed Paget in
November 1884 that he would not be absolutely opposed to
the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, provided that
it would be distinctly proved that such was the general wish
of the population. Union might in fact be the means of
(2 )
stabilising the Balkan situation.
Again, when the Foreign Office was informed in the 
autumn of 1884 of the existence of a triple agreement, it 
received information on thés point* The Kovosti, the Nord 
of Brussels, and the Pall Mall gazette reproduced a version
(1) F.0.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 590 31 December 1881
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1065 Paget to Granville 203 21 November 1884
Confidential
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of the agreement which provided for the Austrian annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the union of Bulgaria and
Eastern Rumelia,
Two other points covered by the Protocol of June 1881
were thus reflected in British information.
A third point to be included in an Austro-Russian
understanding in regard to the Eastern Question emerged in
the course of 1881-84. In May 1883 the Movoe Vremya
unexpectedly raised the question of the Straits. Until Russia
could close the Bosphorus to the fleets of hostile Powers,
it stated, she could make no further progress inher Eastern
(2)
policy. Malet reported in November 1884 that permission to
re-open the Straits question had been accorded to Russia by
(3)
the agreement that resulted from the Skiernerwirce meeting.
Here then the Foreign Office had. information on a further 
provision of the Dreikaiserbund Treaty of June 1881..
In another direction British conceptions respecting tbe 
character of an agreement between the three Empires had been 
modified in the course of 1881-84. The monarchical principle 
as a factor in drawing the three Powers together had fallen 
into the background. The meeting of Skiernerwirce preserved
(1) F.0.65/1164 Thornton to Granville 302 10 October 1884
(2) F.0.65/1156 Thornton to Granville 115 8 May 1883
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the character of the agreement as essentially an understanding
between the three Emperors and Scott believed that the
internal security of the tliree Empires against subversive or
anti-monarchical agitation had formed an object of their
(1)
understanding in 1884. Otherwise, however, the monar­
chical principle does not seem to have been mentioned after 
1881 as a factor in their relations. On the other hand, 
co-operation in regard to all questions that might come 
under general diplomatic discussion emerged during 1881-84 
as a probable element in any agreement between the three 
Empires. The Joint Mote of January 8 , 1882, which re-opened 
the Egyptian Question, had initiated a period of close co-oper­
ation between the three Empires. The Porte communicated the 
Anglo-French Note to them and asked for an expression of 
opinion. The three Powers consulted together and identical 
verbal communications were made to Asseno Pasha in reply. 
Ampthill reported that Germany, with the support of her "allies
Austria and Russia" was about to pursue a policy favourable
(3)
to Turkish intervention in Egypt. The reply of the three
(1) F.0.64/1151 Scott to Granville 268 13 September 1884
Confidential
(2) F.0.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 50 6 February 1882
51 7 February 1882
(3) F.0.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 9 9 January 1884
Most Confidential
P.0.64/1006 Ampthill to Granville  ^ 137^ 22 April 1884
' Secret
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Powers to the British Circular of February 11, was again 
concerted. At the beginning of May the British and French 
Governments invited the three Empires to instruct their 
representatives at Constantinople to advise the Khedive not
(1)
to interfere in Egypt. Austria-Hungary and Russia refused.
Whereupon Germany stated that she could not separate herself
(2 )
from her allies and also refused. Again, when the British
Government informed the three courts of the reasons for her
naval demonstration, they replied in similar terms stating
(3)
that they would maintain an attitude of reserve. Ampthill
now reported that Turkish intervention was indirectly
( 4)
tantamount to the intervention of the Dreikaiserbund.
When a conference at Constantinople was proposed, Kalnoky it
appeared, had immediately consulted Russia and Germany as to
(5)
the instructions to be given to their representatives. In
June 1884 a dispute arose between Servia and Bulgaria.
Russia invited Austria-Hungary and Germany to join with
(1) F.0.7/1034 Elliot to Granville 218 16 May 1884
(2) F.0.64/1006 Ampthill to Granville 167 19 May 1884
(3) P.0.64/1006 Ampthill to Granville 165 19 May 1884
Confidential
P.O.7/1034 Elliot to Granville 245A 30 May 1884
Confidential
(4) P.O.64/1006 Ampthill to Granville 187 27 May 1884
Secret
(5) P.0.7/1035 Elliot to Granville 347 13 July
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Russia in offering their mediation. They accepted the 
invitation and their representatives acted together at
(1)
Belgrade and the question was settled with the Dreikaiserbund. 
The "caucus principle" to which Elliot referred in 1880, 
had been re-established.
The Foreign Office by the end of 1884 was in possession 
of materials which would have enabled it to form a generally 
accurate conception of the relations between the three Empires, 
except in tv/o particulars. Nothing at all was known of 
their pledge to observe neutrality in the event of one of 
them being engaged in war with a Power outside.the Alliance. 
Nothing was known in regard to the existence of a written 
Treaty. No information was received, however, such as would 
indicate that the evidence respecting the existence and 
character of an agreement between the three Empires was any 
more reliable than the information received in December 1881 
as to the conclusion of a written agreement between Austria- 
Hungary and Russia. No further information was received 
such as would set the inf ormation received in 1833-84 in 
its correct relationship with that received in 1881 and show 
that the first information was the result of the conclusion
(1) F.0.7/1063 Paget to Granville 167 11 June 1884
F.0.65/1182 Thornton to Granville 188 18 June 1884
p.0.7/1063 Paget to Granville 171 15 June 1884
sot
(1)
of the agreement and the second of its renewal. The
indecisive character of British information in regard to 
the re-establishment of the Dreikaiserbund was preserved.
(1) G.P. Vol.Ill No.582.
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CHAPTER V
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE - 
May 20, 1882.
The assembling of information in regard to the Triple 
Alliance illustrates the important part played by the Press 
in the process of securing diplomatic information. The 
importance of other sources is also illustrated, notably the 
course of diplomatic negotiations, the statements to the 
British representative by the Foreign Minister of the Govern­
ment to which he is accredited, and the declarations in 
parliament by the Foreign Ministers. The press is seen to 
have been the most important factor on this occasion. It 
supplied information that was of value in itself and it 
afforded material on which enquiries that led to important i
revelations, were based. No spontaneous communication in 
regard to the Alliance was made by the three powers concerned. 
The Foreign Office did not have the advantage of any important 
information derived from an independent source. Although thus 
practically dependent for authoritative information upon such 
disclosures as the three Governments considered it in their 
interests to make to Great Britain, the Foreign office was 
more completely informed in regard to the Triple Alliance than 
in regard to any other agreement of the period. Its informa­
tion, moreover, was such as to lead it to feel entire confidence 
both in its completeness and accuracy, and in fact was not to
30 q
any serious degree deficient in either respect, except in so 
far as the actual wording of the Treaty was concerned. It 
gave the Triple Alliance obligations a somewhat less formal 
character than they in fact possessed, and it was not received 
until almost a year after its conclusion. V/hen it was 
received however, it was decisive and was assembled within 
a short space of time. Knowledge of the existence and' 
character of the obligations between the three powers was not 
as in the case of the obligations between the three Empires, 
the result of the cumulative effect of imperfect evidence 
derived from different sources over the space of four years.
The Foreign office was able to form a precise conception 
within a limited time, after which the question as to the 
nature of the relations between Italy and the German Empires 
was not re-opened within the period of this thesis.
The result of the dependency upon these sources was that 
the British Foreign Office during the months immediately 
following June 1881 had no information as to the true situation 
in regard to Italian Foreign policy. It was in fact a period 
of critical importance. King Humbert was convinced of the 
necessity of joining the Central Powers. Depretis still 
insisted upon the policy of the free hand, and Mancini appeared 
entirely passive. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office, 
Baron Blanc, led the partisans in favour of the King's view.
(1) Pribram op.cit.V o l . p p . 10-11.
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Upon the outcome of the conflict between these views depended
the future relations of Italy with the other powers. The
British Foreign Office had no information on this state of
affairs. Mancini in June and July had four conversations
with the British Ambassador which the latter reported to the
Foreign office. None of them threw any light upon the policy
that Italy might adopt in regard to her relations with European
powers. In the first, he spoke of the deep impression which
the Tunis affair had made upon Italy. The policy of Italy,
however, he said would be one of complete passiveness, and she
would do nothing else which would imply in any way a recognition
of the French position. The Government on the other hand was
about to open negotiations with France respecting a new
commercial Treaty to which Mancini attached great political
(1 )
importance. Mancini's language in the second conversation was
(2)
largely a repetition of his language in the first. In the
third he appealed to England for assistance to "regularise the
(3) .
Italian position in Assab Bay." In view of the attitude
assumed by the British Foreign Office on this question, Mancini*s 
appeal was no indication that an Italo-British rapprochement 
v/as about to take place. Tenterden minuted on Paget* s dispatch
(1) F.0.45/429 Paget to Granville , 252 3 June 1881
Confidential
D.D.F. Series I. Vol.IV. No.81.
(2) P.O.45/429 paget to Granville 239 10 June 1881
(3) F.0.45/429 Paget to Granville 252 15 June 1881
Confidential
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that he considered it an act of political blindness to be
cajoled into allowing the Italians to establish their sovereign
-ty over Assab Bay. "In case of war we should be compelled
to secure the alliance of Italy, or at once to capture the
place with torpedoes, and as a naval station it would be
(1)
fatal to our control over the Red Sea." On July 21, Mancini
again raised the subject. The .Foreign Office referred the
case to the India Office and maintained that it could not
(2)
agree to Italy’s claim to territorial sovereignty.
Macdonnell while charge d’affaires when Paget was on leave, 
reported only one conversation with Mancini. On that 
occasion the Italian Foreign Minister informed the British 
representative that he had addressed identic notes to the 
French and British Government’s proposing that the diffi­
culties in Egypt resulting from Arabi’s revolt should be 
dealt with by the exercise of "joint moral pressure" by 
Italy, France and England to be followed, if necessary, by 
Turkish intervention controlled by the three powers^and if 
that failed by their joint occupation of Egypt. He reminded
(1) F,0.45/429 Paget to Granville 252 15 June 1881
Confidential 
Minute by Tenterden 22 June 1881.
G.D.29/124 Gladstone to Granville 30 August 1881 
Concerns a discussion between Granville and Gladstone 
as to recommending a settlement by arbitration, or 
alternatively the sending of a British ship to assist 
the Turkish Government to keep the Italians out.
(2) P.0.45/430 Paget to Granville 309 21 July 1881.
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ivi8.cdonnell that had Italy been allowed to co-operate previously
in the administration of Egypt the solution of the present
crisis would have been in the hands of Her Majesty's
(1)
Government . Again in view of the policy in regard to Egypt
adopted by Granville the conversation was no indication of
(2 )
an eventual Italo-British rapprochement,
Mancini*s statements to Parliament were of no greater
value as far as concerned the information which they afforded
in regard to Italian alliance policy. On the 19th, Paget
reported that Mancini had informed the Chambers that France
(3)
s^onpathised with Italian conditions in regard to Assab Bay.
Three days later, he reported that Mancini had described
the relations between Italy and France as friendly and
conciliatory and had cited facts to prove the goodwill of
the latter such as the recent opening of negotiations for a
(4)
commercial treaty. These declarations gave no indication 
that the policy of rapprochement with the Central powers 
was under consideration. Taken in conjunction with incidents
(1) F.0.45/451 Macdonnell to Granville 357 16 September
Confidential 1881.
(2) G.D.29/124 Gladstone to Granville 12 September, 13 Sept­
ember, 2 October, 4 October and 5 October.
Granville to Gladstone 7 October.
This correspondence established the formula for dealing 
with Egypt of "co-operation with France alone, a mini­
mum of interference, and to work for the good of Egypt 
only."
(3) F.0.45/429 Paget to Granville 256 19 June 1881,
(4) F.0.45/429 Paget to Granville 260 22 June 1881.
which were then going on they proved of very little value 
as an indication of an Italian desire for good relations with 
France. Throughout Italy in the summer of 1881 demonstra­
tions broke out against France, and were answered by French 
demonstrations against Italy particularly at Marseilles.
The press alone gave some indication that the policy of 
rapprochement with the Central powers had not entirely been 
given up. During August it revived the idea of an alliance 
with Italy and Germany. The National Zeitung took up the 
matter, mile insisting upon the sympathy between Germany 
and Italy and the community of interests between the two 
countries, it pointed out that relations had recently cooled 
and expressed the fear that Italian policy was too restless 
to allow of any firm alliance. The Italian press in reply i
generally denied that any coolness existed between Italy and :
Germany and insisted on Italy's desire for a German alliance, i
I
The popolo Romano which, as Macdonnell informed the Foreign !
Office, represented the views of the Italian Government
adopted a similar attitude although it denied the necessity i
(2) !
of a "formal alliance in the ordinary acceptance of the term." '
(1) F.0.45/430 Paget to Granville 203 22 June 1881.
277 30 June 1881. ;
. 286 8 July 1881.
D.D.F. Series I, Vol.IV. No.38.
(2) F.0.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 320 3 August 1881.
Confidential i
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Throughout the month, frequent articles on the same subject
appeared. The Opinions Macdonnell reported, in insisting
that the action of France in regard to Tunis rendered it
impossible to maintain friendly relations with her, and
that relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany should be
cemented so that when a critical moment arrived a favourable
Treaty could be concluded with these powers, represented
(1)
the views expressed Dy a number of papers. These press 
articles were important on their own account in that they 
indicated that an Italian alliance with Austria-Hungary 
and Germany was still a possible diplomatic development.
They were also important because they drew an expression of 
opinion on the subject from Macdonnell based upon the inter­
pretation of the articles in question in the light of his 
general knowledge of Italian foreign policy, and further 
information from Fraser, charge d'affaires at Vienna to 
whom Granville sent a copy of Macdonnell's report of August
17. Macdonnell stated his belief that Italy was again
(2)
turning her eyes towards Austria-Hungary and Germany. Fraser 
reported that the Vienese newspapers had spoken favourably
(1) F.0.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 332 17 August 1881.
(2) F.0.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 320 3 August 1881.
Confidential
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for some time past of the idea of intimate relations with
Italy but expected Italy to take the initiative. They
believed that Italy would choose a visit of her King to
(1)
Vienna as the means to do this.
The reports however, concerning information in regard 
to Italy's alliance policy derived from the press illus­
trated the deficiencies of this source of information. 
Articles of different newspapers and articles of the same 
newspapers^did not point in the same direction. Thus the 
popolo Romano on July 1 printed a communication from the 
Stefani Agency to the effect that the French Ambassador in 
Rome had been instructed to thank Mancini for his tranquil- 
ising declarations in the Chambers, and to assure him of
the French desire to establish cordial relations between the
(2)
two countries. The Opinione, Macdonnell reported on 
August 30, stated that Gaçnbetta had written to some of the 
leaders of the party now in power in Italy, warning them 
not to bind themselves by any alliance with Germany or 
Austria-Hungary and offering "reparation" from France after
(3)
the elections which he expected would bring him to power.
(1) F.0.7/1017 Fraser to Granville 389 1 September 1881
(2) F.0.45/430 Paget to Granville 280 1 July 1881
(3) F.0.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville
343 30 August 1881.
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After Gambetta had come into power the Opinione stated that 
intrigues to secure an Italian Alliance were being energet­
ically carried on.
Again it was from the press that information was derived 
by the British representative in regard to the attitude of 
the Italian Government respecting an outbreak of anti­
clericalism - an attitude which in view of British informa­
tion on German and Austrian relations with the Vatican did 
not augur well for an Italo-German or for an Italo-Austrian 
rapprochement.
British information in regard to the relations between 
Germany and the Vatican had been exceptionally full since 
the of Leo XIII in 1878. In April, Crowe had sent
a long report on the effect which Leo* XIII*s election might 
be expected to have on German relations with the Vatican.
(ltd
He^pointed out that a marked change had occurred in the 
public demeanour of the ultramontane party in Germany and 
that a desire to avoid all provocation was general. The 
Cologne Gazette he had said, had published a series of 
articles outlining a possible modus vivendi. The report had
(1) P.0.45/432 Paget to Granville 460 22 December 1881
Secret and 
Confidential.
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left the Impression that Germany would he ready to respond
(1)
to an initiative in this direction taken by the Vatican.
By a correspondence published in July in the German newspapers
of the Kaiser, and later^the Crown Prince acting for his
father, with the pope conducted through the agency of the
Bavarian court, the possibility of an understanding had
(2)
been clearly established, on July 27, 1878, Crowe had
written privately to Salisbury that the Pope had declared
his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with
Germany for the purpose of establishing a modus vivendi,
and had given instructions to Cardinal Franchi for that
(3)
purpose. The Prussian envoy, von Werthern, at the Bavarian 
Court had also entered into communication with Mascella the 
Papal nuncio at Munich, who had been invited to Berlin. In 
August, both Crowe and Qdo Russell had reported that Mascella
(4)
had had important conferences with Bismarck at Kissingen.
Dering, who was in charge at Berlin while Russell was on
leave in the autumn of 1878 had obtained detailed information
from some private source as to Mascella*s instructions and
(5)
as to the outcome of the discussions at Kissingen. At that
(1) F.0.64/917 Crowe to Salisbury Political 1. 29 Agril
(2) P.0.64/906 Russell to Salisbury 410 2 July 1878.
(3) P.0.64/917 Crowe to Salisbury Private &
Confidential.27 July 1878.
(4) P.0.64/917 Crowe to Salisbury, political 2. 1 Aug.1878.
P.0.64/907 Russell to Salisbury. 2 Aug.1878.
(5) P.0.54/907 Dering to Salisbury 12 Aug.1878.
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point Radowitz who was then in charge of the German Foreign
Office, had confirmed the information so far received by
informing Daring that an agreement v/as about to be reached 
(1)
on minor points. During 1879 and 1880 British information 
had indicated a change in the Parliamentary situation favour­
able to an abandonment of the Kulturkatopf. Early in 1879,
in
Windhorst the leader of the Centre party/ the Reichstag, 
introduced a motion for the re-establishment of these parts 
of the Prussian constitution which had been abrogated in 
1875 - the articles assuring to the Catholic Church indepen­
dent administration of property, and the uncontrolled nomin-
(2)
ation to ecclesiastical appointments. The motion was lost, 
but the reception with which it met, together with the resig­
nation soon afterwards of Dr. Falk, had led Walsham to
believe that Bismarck was willing to allow the May laws to
(3)
fall into abeyance. He had been encouraged in this view
when it had been learnt that Bismarck had been promised the
support of the Conservative and Ultramontane parties in
(4)
the Reichstag. During 1881, Ampthill had kept Granville
(1) F.0.64/907 Dering to Salisbury .17 August 1878.
31 August 1878.
P.0.64/909 Russell to Salisbury 616. 12 November 1878 
Provincial zeitung urges all parties to co-operate in 
effecting an understanding with the Vatican.
(2) P.0.64/931 Russell to Salisbury, 68 4 February 1880.
(3) P.0.64/934 Walsham to Granville 545 5 July 1879. ;
(4) P.0.64/934 Walsham to Granville 16 August 1879.
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privately informed in regard to the secret mission of von
(1)
Schlozer to the Vatican, Paget had at first been unable to
secure any information to confirm Ampthill*s statements.
Kendell had told him that the matter was at rest and Paget
. (2)
believed that he knew nothing of Schlozer*s activities.
(3)
Depretis had also appeared to know nothing. A little later
however, Paget discovered that Schlozer had in fact been in
(4)
Rome, public evidence was soon afterwards given of the change
in German relations with the Vatican by the consecration of
Dr. Korum, Canon of Strasburg as Bishop of Treves. The German
charge d*affaires in Rome was present and the occasion
attracted considerable attention as Dr. Korum was the first
Bishop appointed by common accord between the Vatican and the
(5)
German Government. The event was moreover, brought into 
connection with information received by the Foreign Office 
from Ampthill respecting SchloZer*s activities, by a report 
from Macdonnell that the appointment of Dr. Korum had been
(1) F.0.45/423 Granville to Paget 333 13 July 1881.
(2) F.0.45/430 Paget to Granville 303 16 July 1881.
Very confidential.
(3) P.0.45/430 Macdonnell to Gran- 316 30 July 1881.
ville.
(4) P.0.45/430 Paget to Granville 310 22 July 1881.
Confidential
(5) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville^^^ 1881.
Confidential
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the first result of the negotiation of which he had been
(1)
in charge. At the beginning of September, it was publicly
known that Schlozer had resumed negotiations and that they
were directed to fill the existing vacancies in the German
(2)
Sees agreeably to both the Vatican and the German Government.
At the end of the month Walsham on the authority of the
German Foreign Office and Macdonnell on that of the German
charge d'affaires in Rome, reported that the resumption of
diplomatic relations had been agreed upon and that Schlozer
(3)
was to be appointed German representative at the Vatican.
Just at the moment when the secret negotiations between
Germany and the Holy See were thus being brought to a
successful conclusion and the consecration of Father Dolbauer
as Archbishop of Vienna was being pointed out as calculated
to strengthen the relations between Austria-Hungary and the
(4)
Vatican, the Italian press indicated a serious worsening of 
Italian relations with the Pope. On the night of July 
12-15, the body of plus IX was removed from the tomb in St. 
Peter's to the Basilica of San Lorenzo with a good deal of 
ceremony. The anti-clericals saw their opportunity and
(1) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 335 18 August 1881
Secret. p
(2) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 351 12 Sept. 1881
(3) F.O.45/431 Macdonnell to Granville 361 23 Sept? 1881
F.O.64/983 Walsham to Granville 404 30 Sept? 1881
(4) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 318 2 August 1881
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(1)
disorders broke out. The Clerical party made the most of 
the incident and propogated the idea that the Guarantees Law 
was no protection to the pope and that he was nothing less 
than a prisoner in his Palace. The first indications of 
the Government's attitude were given by the Press were not 
considered by Paget as trustworthy. It was stated that the 
Government had been informed before the procession took 
place that it would be conducted with a good deal of osten­
tation, and that it had failed entirely to take the necessary
(2)
precautions . These indications that the Government was not 
prepared to take any extraordinary measures against the 
activities of the anti-clericals were howev-or confirmed.
At the end of the month the Italian papers published a 
communique from the Minister of the Interior stating that 
the Government had decided to stop all manifestations against 
the Holy See for the abolition of the Law of Guarantees, "but 
those who seek its abolition are at liberty," the notice 
continued, "to petition Parliament and with that object may
(5) „
form societies and clubs and hold meetings." The newspapers 
during the next days reported that anti-clerical clubs were 
being formed throughout Italy, and referred to the encourage-
(1) F.O.45/430 Paget to Granville 297 13 July 1881.
(2) F.O.45/430 Paget to Granville 298 14 July 1881.
(3) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville
318 2 August 1881.
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-ment derived from anti-clerical attitude of the Government
(1)
by the promoters of the disorders of the 13th, The Diritto
insisted that the situation was becoming so serious that the
(2)
Pope had decided to leave Rome for Malta. Throughout August
the Papers continued to announce demonstrations against the
(3)
Law of Guarantees. A notice published in the Official
Gazette on August 2oth, to the effect that the Government
"disapproved and deplored the recent formation of clubs"
and that it was "fully resolved to assure the safety of the
Pontiff and the independence of his Spiritual sovereignty,"
put an end for the time being to the danger of a serious
(4)
conflict. It did not however indicate the strain in 
Italian relations with the Vatican which had resulted from 
the attitude at first assumed by the Government would be 
removed.
No information in regard to Italy's relations with 
other powers was received at the time from diplomatic nego­
tiations. "There is a complete lull in political affairs," 
Paget wrote to Granville on his return to Rome in October.
(1) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 318 2 August 1881
326 8 August 1881
(2) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 328 10 August 1881
Confidential.
(3) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 333 17 August 1881
Confidential.
(4) F.0.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 340 21 August 1881
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It has already been shown that the chief questions which 
had furnished subjects for negotiations during 1 8 8 0 - 8 1  
had been settled by the summer of 1880. Only from Walsham 
at Berlin was information received as the result of conver­
sations between the British representative and his colleagues. 
The Italian Ambassador, Count de Launay, had told Walsham 
plainly that recent events must necessarily weaken the confi­
dence felt by the Italians in France. A desire was therefore 
gaining ground in Italy, he had said, to use every opportunity
to improve the relations with Germany and Austria "as a
(1)
matter of expediency and self-defence." This information
however was received just at the time when Mancini's
language in private to the British Ambassador and in public
to the Italian Chambers seemed to indicate that Italy was
prepared to ignore the Tunis episode and ^ o attempt to
improve her relations with France. The interpretation to
be put upon it was not therefore entirely clear. The
Foreign Office was then furnished with no authoritative
information as to the real attitude of the Italian Minister
w*a-
towards a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary and . Germany, &¥id 
was supplied with evidence as to the intentions of the Italian 
Government respecting their relations with France and Great
(1) F,0.64/982 Walsham to Granville 336 30 July 1881
Confidential
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Britain, and with evidence as to Italo-German relations not
German
favourable to the view that an Italo/Austria combination was 
likely to be constituted. In these circumstances the visit 
of King Humbert to Vienna from October 27-30 1881 was likely 
to appear as the first step towards a detente with those 
Powers rather than as the occasion for the conclusion of 
an agreement. Information received concerning the interview 
encouraged this impression.
Conversations of the British representative in Rome 
and Vienna with members of the Italian Government, and with 
Kallay who was temporarily in charge of the Austrian Foreign 
Office, conversations of the British representative in Rome 
with his colleagues, the press, and the bare facts respect­
ing the visit, furnished evidence in this respect.
Thus the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Rome 
informed Paget privately that the visit was to take place. 
Two,days later he called upon the British Ambassador and 
informed him that the Italian Government had realised that 
if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy were to 
be placed on a friendly footing, Austria-Hungary must be 
reassured in some formal manner against further outbreaks 
of irredentist agitation. It had been decided that King 
Humbert^whose influence on Italian politics lasted longer 
than that of his Ministers, should give personal assurances 
to Francis-Joseph. In response to Paget's enquiries.
Ja%6ra stated categorically that the meeting was unconnected
with any political object apart from that of removing the
(1)
obstacles to complete cordiality between the two countries.
The only information derived from Kallay and Mancini
(2)
concerned the time and place of the meeting. From Blanc 
however, paget secured exact confirmation of the statements 
of the Austro-Hungarian charge d'affaires. Blanc asserted 
in the most distinct terms that while the statements of 
part of the Italian press during the summer as to the desire 
of Italy to draw closer to Austria-Hungary and Germany, 
might have le(/to the suspicion that the meeting was the 
first step towards the realization of an Austro-German 
Alliance, such was not the case. The object of the meeting 
was to efface all reminiscences of the past and to remove 
all cause of mistrust for the future. Foreign Alliances 
were of no advantage to Italy. She desired only to place 
her relations with Austria-Hungary "sur un pied régulier." 
Depretis assured Paget that the meeting would not effect 
any change in Italian policy and that he remained true to 
his policy of alliance with the Western Powers and with
(1) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 591 19 October 1881
Confidential.
(2) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 397 24 October 1881.
Confidential.
F.O.7/1017 Fraser to Granville 424 21 October 1881.
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(1)
England in particular. After the meeting Mancini's language
to Paget was directed mainly to support Depretis' statements.
He spoke chiefly of the Commercial Treaty with France and
the beneficial effect which he expected it to have upon the
political relations between Italy and France. In reply,
however, to a question from Paget as to which Italy might
now be considered to have joined the Austro-German Alliance,
Mancini replied that no specific questions had been discussed
and no engagements entered into. He had "assured Kallay
that Italy would act with Austria-Hungary for the maintenance
of peace and on questions to which the interests of the two
countries were the same. While the fact of the King's
visit was a pledge for the removal of the distrust which
had recently characterised Italy's relations with her
(2)
neighbour, a strictly private conversation with "a gentleman 
who holds a high position with the Italian Government", 
afforded more precise information as to the assurances that 
had been exchanged. Austria-Hungary it appeared had been 
assured that she need fear no attack from Italy, and Italy 
that she need not fear that in the event of any question 
arising with the Vatican, Austria would take an active part
(1) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 400 25 October 1881
Most Confidential.
(2) P.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 404 6 November 1881
Confidential
405 6 November 1881
Confidential
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(1)
in it. There was no indication in all this that anything 
more positive had resulted from the meeting.
paget as a result of his experience of Italian policy 
in the past and his knowledge of the nature of Austro-German 
relations informed the Foreign Office that the Italian 
Government have in view the object of removing the
mistrust and dislike of Italy which prince Bismarck is well
(S),,
known to entertain. Information derived from Mancini
confirmed this view. In reply to a question from Paget,
the Foreign Minister admitted that the German Government
had expressed its satisfaction at the rapprochement that
was taking place between Italy and Austria-Hungary and
had said that what was done at Vienna would be considered
as having been done at Berlin also. He further stated that
a visit of King Humbert to Berlin might take place in the
(3)
near future.
The parliamentary declarations first of Kallay and then 
of Mancini generally confirmed the information received from 
other so'orces. Kallay»s explanations to the Committee on
(1) F.O.45/432 Paget to Granville 466 22 December 1881*
Secret and Confidential.
(2) F.0.45/431 Paget to Granville 400 25 October 1881.
Most Confidential.
(3) F.0.45/431 Paget to Granville 405 6 November 1881.
Confidential.
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Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Delegations during its 
private session, indicated that no agreement and nothing
iV #
positive had resulted from the meeting. Austria-Hungary
I »
he said had nothing either to ask or to fear from Italy.
Italy had realised that it was in her interest to remove
the difficulties in the way of complete cordiality between
(1)
the two countries and had taken, steps to do so. Mancini
during the Debate on Foreign Affairs in the Italian Chambers,
in the course of which it had, significally, been urged
that the removal of distrust between Italy and Austria-
Hungary should be followed up by an effort to secure an
Austro-German Alliance, stated that the visit to Vienna
had been approved by the Berlin Cabinet,and made public the
information he had given privately to paget respecting the
assurances received from Berlin that what was done in Vienna
would be considered as done also in Berlin. All coolness
and indifference he concluded had been entirely removed from
(2)
Italo-Austrian relations.
The facts in connection with the visit reported by 
Fraser indicated that no agreement had been r e a c h e d t h a t  
the meeting was significant as involving a detente in Austro-
(1) F.O.7/1018 ‘Fraser to Granville 464 11 November 1881.
(2) F.O.45/432 Paget to Granville 441 7 December 1881.
Italian relations, and confirmed the impression which
Mancini had taken pains to convey that it did not indicate
the consolidation of their relations in an anti-French
sense. Although Depretis and Mancini accompanied the King
to Vienna, in view of the fact that there was no Minister
for Foreign affairs in Austria-Hungary at the time, and that
Kallay was only a subordinate official, it was concluded
that no positive or- iij^'trni:rij'i|«i»uiy political decision had been
(1)
taken during the visit. Secondly the marked attention
which Fraser reported King Humbert to have paid to the French
Ambassador, appeared as the counterpart of Mancini*s efforts
to secure the signature of the Italo-French commercial
(2)
Treaty at the exact time of the King's visit to Vienna...
The press also played its part in determining the . 
nature of British information on the meeting. Its most 
important contribution on this occasion was to afford material 
for Paget to frame his questions to Mancini on the subject.
The Riforma, the organ of Crispi, who since 1877* had
been the protagonist of the Alliance with Austria-Hungary 
and Germany, gave the substance of a conversation between
(1) F.O.7/I0I8 Fraser to Granville 447 31 October 1881.
F.O.4 5 / 4 3 1 Paget to Granville 405 6 November 1881
Confidential
(2) F.O.7/I0I8 ,Fraser to Granville 446 31 October 1881.
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Mancini and its Vienna correspondent. The Italian Minister 
it alleged had stated that the adhesion of Italy to the 
Austro-German Alliance was a fait accompli. The German 
Government had made known to the Government of Italy before 
the departure of the King for Vienna that it would look
(1)
upon what was done at Vienna as having been done at Berlin,
It was with this information in his possession that Paget
was able to draw from Mancini the information described
above, when the Italian Minister in speaking of the meeting
limited himself to statements as to the improvement in Franco-
Italian relations and as to the cordial reception which
had been given to King Humbert. The British Ambassador thus
secured more precise statements respecting the nature of the
discussions at Vienna, and confirmation of information which
otherwise would have rested on the doubtful authority of a
newspaper article.
In the second place, an article in the Vienna
Fremdenblatt which Fraser described as reflecting exactly 
“  (2)
the views of the Austrian Government, and an article in the 
Opinions confirmed the view of the meeting as directed rather 
to remove the obstacles in the way of good relations between
(1) F.0.45/431 Paget to Granville 402 1 November 1881.
(2) F.O.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 429 24 October 1881,
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the two countries than to establish any understanding 
between them. In this respect, however, the fact that no 
evidence in the contrary direction appeared in the press, 
which if a pretext offered to report a far-reaching devel­
opment would generally use it, was more significant.
Lastly the Italian papers partly controlled by,or 
favourable to the Government gave important indications of 
the reality of Italy's desire to remove the difficulties 
in the way of her relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany 
They exhibited no irritation whatsoever at Kallay's state­
ments to the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian
Delegations which as they were reported in the press were
(2)
offensive to Italy. Again no irritation was shown when 
Bismarck in the Reichstag cited the political development 
of Italy as an example of the insidious and dangerous nature 
of revolutionary doctrines. The popolo Romano at once 
explained away the unfortunate aspect of Kallay*s declara­
tions. . It insisted that no apprehensions need be excited 
by Bismarck's references to revolutionary doctrines. He
(1) F.O.4 5 / 4 3 1 Paget to Granville 406 9 November 1881
(2) F.O.4 5 / 4 3 1 Paget to Granville 406 9 November 1881
F.0.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 472 14 November 1881
464 11 November 1881
(The discussions of the Committee being confidential, 
the Press reports were liable to be inaccurate.)
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had acted only «a expediency. The Italie and the Opinione
(1)   ---
expressed similar views. In this connection information
derived by Paget from von Kendell that Mancini was completely
satisfied with the assurances he had given on the subject
(2)
only confirmed the information secured from the Press.
Although Paget was fully prepared to credit the inform^
ation that he had given to the Foreign Office to the effect
that the Meeting was only important as removing the causes
of mistrust between the two countries, he believed that it
(3)
might prepare the way for the negotiation of an alliance.
Articles in the Italian press and a conversation with the
Russian Ambassador in Rome gave suggested the form which
such an alliance might take. Thus the Riforma presumed
that on all questions of the East and the Mediterranean
a perfect agreement between Italy and Austria-Hungary would 
(4 )
be established. Baron Uxkull the Russian Ambassador in 
Rome told Paget that he had asked Mancini whether Egypt 
had been discussed at Vienna and had been told in reply
(1) F.O.45/432 Paget to Granville 435 3 December 1881.
439 6 December 1881.
(2) F.0,45/432 Paget to Granville 442 7 December 1881.
Confidential.
(3) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 400 25 October 1881.
Most confidential.
(4) F.O.45/451 Paget to Granville 402 1 November 1881.
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"that it had been agreed on both sides that the status quo
should be respected" and Paget was prepared to see in that
agreement the first step towards the realization of Italy's
aim to induce Austria-Hungary and Germany to join with her
(1)
in claiming a share in the administration of Egypt. A
little later the Opinione in an article on Italian relations
with France made the important statement that the closer
bonds of sympathy between Italy and Austria entailed for
Italy the obligation of permitting Austria to reinforce
herself on the Adriatic, the Aejean and the Danube, In
return Italy must recover the balance of power in the Medit-
(2)
erranean .
The course of diplomatic negotiations was the main 
source of information on Italy's relations with Austria- 
Hungary and Germany during 1882. It indicated that in 
accordance with these suppositions their relations were being 
drawn closer upon the basis of co-operation in regard to 
Turkey and the Eastern Question, and more particularly in 
regard to Egypt. In January, a report from Paget drew the 
attention of the British Foreign office,if it had not already 
observed it ^ to the identity of language used by Italy and 
Austria-Hungary in speaking of the execution by Turkey of
(1) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 405 6 November 1881
Confidential
(2) F.0.45/430 Paget to Granville 408 10 November 1881.
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(1)
the conditions of the Greek frontier arrangement. At about 
the same time the Porte addressed a telegram to its represent­
atives at the Courts of Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia and 
Germany, describing the action of the British and French 
Governments in addressing the Joint Note of January 8, to 
the Khedive as uncalled for and an infringement of Turkish 
sovereignty, and instructing them to elicit an expression 
of opinion from the respective Governments, Mancini informed 
Paget that the Italian policy was to respect the present 
state of things in Egypt as long as it continued to exist, 
but that in the event of a disruption occurring, they would 
consider the Egyptian question as having assumed a European 
character and themselves as entitled to claim participation 
in its settlement. This statement led Paget at once to
suspect that an exchange of views had taken place between
(2)
the Cabinets of Vienna, Rome and Constantinople.
His suspicions were in part confirmed by information from
Vienna. Elliot reported on January 19 that Robilant in
speaking to him in regard to Egypt, "concluded his remarks
/ *
by saying 'enfin vous avez reussè a nous mettre tous d'accord'
(3)
- the 'tous' being Italy and the three Empires." Then 
MancinijOn the 31st told Paget that it had been decided that
(1) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 16 17 January 1881
Confidential
(2) F.O.4 5 / 4 5 2 Paget to Granville 16 17 January 1882
Confidential
(3) F.O.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 25 19 January 1882
' Confidential
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the four powers would make an Identic reply to the Turkish
communication, and informed him of the instructions that
had accordingly been sent to the Italian Ambassadors at the
(1)
three courts. On February 19, Blanc expressed to Paget
the same general view respecting Egyptian affairs as that
(2) (3)
which Ampthill reported from Berlin, and Elliot from Vienna
to be held respectively by the German and the Austro-
Hungarian Governments; if armed intervention in Egypt became
necessary it should be undertaken by Turkey aad the super-
(4 )
vision of the Powers. Blanc denied that any communication 
had taken place between Rome, Vienna and Berlin since the 
exchange of views preceding the identic replies to the 
Turkish circular, but he admitted that communications had 
taken place on that occasion, that the reply had been drawn 
up by the Vienna and Berlin and that the Italian Government 
had been invited to give its adherence and had done so.
A further opportunity for the co-operation of the three
ih.'n
powers respecting the Egypt^ question to be shown was afforded
(1) F.0 .4 5 / 4 5 2 Paget to Granville 30 1 February 1882
(2) F.O.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 32 3 February 1882
Confidential.
(3) P.O. 7/1032 Elliot to Granville 53 8 February 1882.
(4) P.0 .4 5 / 4 5 2 Paget to Granville 38 9 February 1882
Secret.
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When Granville issued the circular of February 11 inviting
a general exchange of views between the powers for the
event of further action being necessary in Egypt. Mancini
stated plainly that before replying he wished to communicate
(1)
with the other Powers. Again, the Italian Minister refused 
to reply to the British and French communications respect­
ing the proposed changes in the Organic Law concerning the
powers of the Chamber of Notables, until he had communicated
(2)
with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The same situation arose
when the British Government communicated its intention to
send a squadron to Egypt, and when a request was made to
the different Governments that their representatives at
Constantinople should Join Lord Dufferin in inviting the
(3)
porte to refrain from interference in Egypt. In every 
case the reply that was ultimately given by the Italian 
Government was similar to or identical with the replies of 
Austria-Hungary and Germany. Paget moreover believed that 
communications were going on between Italy, Germany and 
Austria-Hungary respecting the course to be pursued if
(4 )
circumstances arose which called for some interference.
(1) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 46 16 February 1882.
55 23 February 1882.
(2) F.O.4 5 / 4 5 3 Paget to Granville 88 22 March 1882.
(3) P.0 .4 5 / 4 5 4 Paget to Granville 147 16 May 1882.
(4) F.O.4 5 / 4 5 4 Paget to Granville 142 11 May 1882.
Confidential
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Thestsuspiclons were confirmed when Mancini acknowledged some 
time later that the Italian representatives at Berlin,
Vienna and St. Petersburg had been instructed to suggest 
that the English and French Governments should be asked to
tz Hu (itfvu TifkXmTS d U Hi
make known ^ the measures which they contemplated ether
pewo-rc smd the pe^a* in the event of nol^securing a pacific
(1)
solution. The co-operation of Italy with Austria-Hungary
and Germany was again shown by the replies of the three
Governments to the series of British and French proposals
respecting the Conference at Constantinople in June and the
conditions of Turkish intervention. By the end of July
when the Conference had failed to arrange successfully for
a Turkish intervention under European control, Paget
believed that Mancini "had in view the probability that
Italy would be delegated to represent the four Powers which
had been acting together in any armed intervention which
might be decided on,as a consequence of the possible refusal
(2).of the Sultan to send troops,"
Paget recapitulating at the time the evidence that the 
Egyptian negotiation afforded in regard to Italy's relations 
with other powers wrote that the basis of Mancini's policy
(1) F.O.4 5 / 4 5 4 Paget to Granville 166 29 May 1882.
(2) F.O.4 5 / 4 5 5 Paget to Granville 248 5 July 1882
Confidential
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was an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and that
as far as regarde! the Egyptian question he had succeeded in
establishing it. If the British Government requested
Italy's co-operation in Egypt, it was likely to be refused
unless the request were backed by the German powers. The
Ambassador's views were proved to be justified. Some days
later Granville asked Menabrea informally whether he thought
the Italian Government would be willing to join England in
(2)
military operations in Egypt. A formal invitation to
co-operate with the British and French Governments in taking
(2a)
measures for the protection of the Suez Canal followed.
At the same time it was intimated that Her Majesty's Govern­
ment would also welcome the co-operation of Italy "in a 
movement in the interior for which they were then making
(3)
active preparations Mancini informed the British
Government that he could make no reply until he had ascer-
(4)
tained the view that would be taken by the other Powers.
(5)
His reply when it came was a refusal. He stated however,
(1) P.0.45/455 Paget to Granville 290 18 July 1882
Confidential.
(2) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 246a 22 July 1882
Confidential.
(2^  F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 260 24 July 1882
Telegram.
(5) F.0.45/451 Granville to Paget 250 26 July 1882
(4) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 250 26 July 1882
(5) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 260 29 July 1882.
that if Italy could secure the formal sanction of Europe, 
for the joint intervention he would be prepared to re­
consider the British invitation. Both Mancini and Depretis 
in speaking to paget sought to give the impression that
fear of France was the cause of the attitude assumed by
(1)
Italy. When however, the British invitation had been
finally declined, Menabrea came dovm to Walmer Castle to
explain Italy's motives to the British Minister.
"In^he first place," he said, "some delay although not
insurmountable would have been necessary in consequence of
Italy's engagements towards other Powers, to wit Austria-
Hungary and Germany, and the necessity of first obtaining
(2)
their assent."
During 1882, practically the only source for general 
information as to the relations of Italy with other powers 
was the press. It confirmed the impression that in general 
the relations between the three powers were being drawn 
closer. In January The popolo Romano, which it will be 
recalled, was believed to have connections with the Italian 
Government, advocated "an intimate alliance" between Italy, 
Austria-Hungary and Germany on the Egyptian question. The
(1) F.0.45/456 Paget to Granville 325 2 August 1882
Most Confidential
(2) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 316 27 September 1882,
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Joint Note it asserted had been received with decided 
signs of disapprobation at Vienna and Berlin. If an inter­
vention followed, Austria-Hungary would claim for herself
and for her allies an equal share with England and France
(1)
in the direction of affairs. The Opinions in May, Paget
reported, aptly described the feeling of irritation against
France that prevailed in Italy. If Italy is not in alliance
with the two Empires, it continued, she deserved to be
(2)
relegated to the limbo of the nations. In March it was 
as the result of newspaper articles which stated that the 
Emperor of Austria intended to return King Humbert's visit 
to Vienna by visiting the King of Italy at Turin, that the 
Foreign Office was able to obtain the information through 
paget and Elliot, that although no formal overtures had 
yet been made, a return visit was likely to take place in
(3)
the Spring. It was from the Press again that the Foreign 
Office derived the impression that the developments which 
took place at the beginning of 1882 in the Roman question 
might be interpreted favourably to an increase of friendship 
between Italy and the German Empires. In January, discus-
(1) P.0.45/452 Paget to Granville 12 12 January 1882
(2) F.0.45/454 Paget to Granville . 158 23 May 1882.
(3) P.0.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 165 4 April 1882.
Confidential.
F.O.45/453 Paget to Granville 82 16 March 1882.
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-Sion was revived in the Continental newspapers as to the
possibility of providing for the greater security and
independence of the Papacy either by modifying the Guaranteed
Law or by giving to it an international character. The
Cologne Gazette unexpectedly suggested that "without
touching the Guarantees Law the Italian Government would
act in a manner conformable to its own and to the interests
of the powers with whom it Was desirable to cultivate
better relations, to wit Germany." The Law, it continued,
only protected the Pope in the exercise of his spiritual
functions. As a man the pope if he conspired against the
Italian Government was within the reach of the Italian 
(1)
Penal Code. Nhen the Secolo of Milan published the
instructions sent by Mancini to Launay to the effect that
the Roman question was a purely internal question and could
not be discussed with any Foreign Government, Paget was
inclined to expect a worsening of Italian relations with
(2)
Germany. An important article in the Rassenga, an inde­
pendent paper of moderate views convinced the Ambassador 
that the disclosures of the Secolo by drawing Ministerial 
and public attention to the "tendency of the Government to 
be nothing more than the weak instrument of partizan groups
(1) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 5 5 January 1882.
(2) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 31 2 February 1882.
Confidential.
in Parliament - any member of it considering himself bound 
to prove by the production of the most confidential documents' 
that the sacred rights of the popular cause were not being 
betrayed by the Cabinet in concert with Bismarck and Kalnoky” j 
- might remove some of the weaknesses in the Italian policy ' 
of drawing closer to Austria-Hungary and Germany, always ;
I
provided that such was the serious intention of the Govern- 
(1) 
ment.
i
Again, articles in the Italian papers provided informa- j 
tion as to a counter-current towards alliance with France, | 
and as to its eventual elimination as a factor in Italian 1
i
alliance policy. Thus the Capitale announced that agents of |
Gambetta were again in Rome seeking to improve the relations j
i{
between France and Italy. A little later the newspapers •;
published the information that a certain M. Obleight had j 
sold his title of ownership of several of the oldest Italian j
I
newspapers to French financiers. The Riforma contained an i
authentic account of the transaction on obleight*s authority j
and the Qpinione drew the attention of the public to its
(2)
significance for Italian foreign policy. Again it was to 
the Press that Paget drew the attention of the Foreign 
Office as showing that Ggybetta's faill eliminated the possi-
(1) F.0.45/452 Paget to Granville 54 4 February 1882
(2) F.0.45/452, Paget to Granville 17 19 January 1882
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bility that plans for a Franco-Italian alliance would be 
realized. The pro-Government papers, the Popolo Romano 
and the Opinions, he reported, pointed out that the consti­
tution of Freycinet's Government made the maintenance of 
friendly relations between Italy and France compatible
with the Italian object of still further cementing her
(1)
relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany.
Lastly, information derived from the press convinced 
the Foreign Office of the impossibility of an Anglo-Italian 
rapprochement developing from the British invitation to 
Italy to co-operate in Egypt. After the bombardment of 
Alexandria at the beginning of . July, the Italian papers 
were with virulent abuse of the British Government.
As a result Paget began to suspect that while the official 
language and official conduct of the Italian Government 
had been more or less favourable to Great Britain, encour­
agement and instigation had been given to Arabi. "During 
my experience in this country," Paget wrote, "I have gener­
ally found that when important questions have arisen, 
there has been one organ at all events, which has undertaken 
on behalf of the Ministry to correct misapprehensions.
On the present occasion all has been abuse and nothing but
(1) F.0.45/452 Paget to Granville 28 1 February 1882
abuse of their oldest and most constant ally. 1 think 
that for the future it may be permitted to accept with a 
certain amount of caution the profuse professions of friend­
ship of Italy towards England which are so abundantly
(1)
lavished upon us." The hostility of the press towards
England had not in any way diminished by October. Eraser, 
who had joined the Embassy at Rome in the early Summer was 
now in charge while Paget was on leave. He thought it 
necessary to attempt to explain the attitude of the news­
papers and expressed the belief that it was largely due to 
the number of papers published in Italy by Frenchmen,and 
stated that one paper at least had been established in the 
interests of official French policy. He was forced to
admit however, that the native Press without exception was
(2)
equally hostile to England. Blanc attempted to convince
Paget that the activity of French journalists which Fraser
had described,was the only reason for the attitude of the
hi t a i j
Italian Press. A great part^had been bought up by
Ga^betta*s party ite- s-aid, and spoke as the result of a
mot d'ordre issued by it. He asserted in the most earnest 
terms that the Consulta had no connection with any paper
(1) P.0,45/455 Paget to Granville 283 14 July 1882
(2) F.0.45/456 Fraser to Granville 379 3 October 1882
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whatever either directly or indirectly. Paget was not 
inclined to credit his statements and again drew the atten­
tion of the Foreign Office to the marked unanimity of the
(1)
Italian press. In November, the publication in the 
piritto of information to the effect that Chevalier Migra 
would be proposed by Italy as Ambassador to London, v/hich 
Blanc had only just given privately to the British Ambassa­
dor, gave the latter the opportunity to say pointedly to 
Blanc that "it would now be difficult to persuade anybody
that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had no relations with 
, (2 ) 
the Press.
Very little information on the subject of the general
relations between Italy and other European powers was
derived directly from statements of the Foreign Ministers
or Ambassadors of the countries concerned. Menabrea in
September, in describing Italy's motives for declining to
co-operate in Egypt, stated that Italy's military forces
were adequate for the protection of her own interests and
"for the support of her allies on the Continent if occasion
(3)
arose." Blanc in conversation with Paget in October,
(1) F.0.45/456 Paget to Granville 388 27 October 1882
Confidential |
!
(2) F,0.45/457 Paget to Granville 405 15 November 1882 I
(3) F.0.45/451 Granville to Paget 316 27 September 1882
3 ké'
(1)
alluded to the "Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany."
The Election speeches of Mancini and other members of the
Government in October referred to the existence of an inti-
(2)
mate understanding between Italy and the German Empire .
on two occasions Mancini made important declarations on
foreign policy in the Chambers. In January, he informed
them that Italy's relations with Austria-Hungary and
(3)
Germany "were excellent", in June he stated that since
September 1881, the Italian Government had communicated to
the Cabinets of Berlin, Vienna and St.Petersburg, the
programme of their policy in Egypt, The four Cabinets
(4 )
had been perfectly agreed throughout. These communications 
public and private however, added nothing material to the 
information already possessed by the Foreign Office, and 
seem to have attracted no attention.
no
In this connection only the statements of Ealuky in
the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Delegation 
(5)
were important. In reply to a question whether the reasons
(1) P.O.45/456 Paget to Granville 388 27 October 1882
Confidential
(2) P.O.45/456 Fraser to Granville 384 20 October 1882
(3) F.0.45/452 Paget to Granville 24 25 January 1882
(4) P.O.45/454 Paget to Granville 195 13 June 1882
(5) P.O.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 524 1 November 1882.
why the visit of the King and Qieen of Italy to Vienna had 
not yet been returned^were personal or political, the 
Foreign Minister stated that the objects of Humbert's 
visit were two-fold. He wished to give expression to the 
friendly feelings towards Austria-Hungary which animated 
the Italian Government, and secondly, to make clear to the 
world that Italy intended to pursue a peaceful policy.
A return visit would only be made for the same objects.
There was no indication in Kalnoky's speech that any devel­
opment had taken place in Italy's relations with the two 
Empires since October 1881. The incident to which the 
further statements of Kalnoky gave rise confirmed the view 
that general relations between Italy and the German Empire 
had not been devdloped. Kalnoky had stated that the 
danger of political demonstrations prevented the return 
visit of the King and Queen being made to Rome. The 
Italian Ministers had suggested no other place. Both Paget
and Elliot reported that this announcement had produced a
(1)
good deal of irritation in Italy. At the same time, informa­
tion which Paget had now taken steps to procure from Count 
Ludolf, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Rome, seemed to 
show that the Italian Government was in fact by no means
(1) P.O.45/457 Paget to Granville 393 4 November 1882.
P.O.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 539 14 November 1882.
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eager to facilitate the visit of Francis Joseph to Italy.
It had been intimated to Count Robilant in August,
Ludolf stated, that the Emperor desired to return, the King's 
visit at some time between the 1st and 15th of September 
at any place in Italy except Rome. It was thought the 
Italian army manoevres and the time of year would offer a 
plausible excuse for the meeting taking place at a provin­
cial town. Robilant on instructions from his Government
(1)
had insisted that the meeting must take place in Rome.
When Depretis in speaking to Paget insisted that the
Austrian Government alone was to blame for the meeting
not having taken place, as strongly as Kalnoky had insisted
that the Italian Government was responsible, and went so
far as to deny that any proposal for a visit during the
(2)
army manoeuvres had been made by Austria-Hungary, the 
impression was further strengthened that no change had
taken place in Italian relations with Austria-Hungary and
Germany since October 1881. Information that any develop­
ment had taken place was confined to indications that rela­
tions had been drawn closer on the basis of co-operation in 
the Eastern and Egyptian questions.
(1) F.0 .4 5 / 4 5 7 Paget to Granville 400 11 November 1882
Confidential.
(2) P.O.4 5 / 4 5 7 Paget to Granville 407 15 November 1882
Confidential.
The paucity of information directly concerning the 
relations between Italy and the Empires derived from 
communications from the Governments of the three powers, 
and complete lack of any information from independent 
sources, brought it about that the Foreign Office had no 
knowledge whatsoever of the negotiations that began in 
December 1881 and resulted in the signature of the Triple 
Alliance in May 1882.
In December Blanc first raised the matter of a formal
Treaty with both the German and the Austro-Hungarian
(1)
Ambassadors in Rome. Both Ambassadors reported that the 
Italians aimed at securing a territorial guarantee. An 
exchange of views at once followed between Bismarck and 
Kalnoky. As a result, agreement not to discourage the 
Italian advances, but to avoid a Treaty of guarantee, and 
to make the undertaking of obligations on their part 
dependent upon the maintenance of the present relations 
of Austria-Hungary and Germany towards Russia, was reached 
Bismarck's suggestion that the Austrian and German reply 
to Italy's overtures should propose that she should first
(1) G.P. Vol.111. No.538. (KeWell to Bismarck
16 December 1881), 
and No.540. (Reuss to Bismarck,
23 December 1881), 
referring to a dispatch from Tv imp f fen to 
Kalnoky.
Pribram op.cit.Vol.IXpp.il. (refers to Wimpffen to
Kalnoky,9 December 1881) .
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reach a settlement of her difficulties with the Papacy, was
rejected by Kalnoky. On January 18, Robilant made a formal
overture to Kalnoky, and on January 31, faunay did the same
(2)
with Bismarck. Italy it was stated had decided to associate
herself closely with the policy of Austria-Hungary and
Germany and proposed that the decision should be formulated
in a written document. The Italian overture was received
in a friendly spirit, but Bismarck referred Launay to Vienna
and Kalnoky told Robilant that there was no hurry - "on en
no
causera." When/further step was taken by Italy in spite 
of the fact that Launay had informed Bismarck that instruc­
tions had been sent to Robilant to open formal negotiations 
at Vienna, Kalnoky himself raised the matter with the Italian 
Ambassador and made it clear that Austria-Hungary could not 
accept a Treaty of Guarantee, She was ready to accept a 
Treaty of Neutrality for a limited period, Robilant then 
touched upon that other potential aspect of any alliance 
agreement. Obligation he said might be undertaken for 
certain specific cases such as the Egyptian question.
( ê )
Kalnoky seems to have made no reply.
(1) G.P. Vol.111. Nos.540, 541, 542.
(2) G.P.Vol.111. Nos.543 and 545.
Pribram op cit.Vol.lIpp.13-14.
(3) G.P.Vol.111. NO.547.
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Before formal proposals came from Italy, the idea of a
Treaty of Neutrality put forward by Kalnoky had been
further developed by a suggestion from Bismarck for a
pledge of mutual support in the event of an unprovoked
(1)
attack upon either party by France. It then appeared, 
however, that Italy herself contemplated nothing more than 
an unsigned promemoria which should record,first a declara­
tion by Italy that in all important political questions 
which arose she desired to come to an understanding with 
Austria-Hungary, and a counter-declaration to the same 
effect from Austria-Hungary, and second a mutual promise . 
that if the European peace appeared to be threatened by any
Power, an understanding for common defence should be nego-
(2)
tiated. Kalnoky was convinced that such an agreement did
not answer the needs of either Austria-Hungary or Italy
and stood firm by his original plan for a Neutrality Treaty
developed as it now was by Bismarck's proposal for pledges
of support against France,and a further Austrian proposal
that these pledges should be generalised to apply to Russia
(3)
as well though Russia should not be formally named. He
(1) G.P.Vol.III.No.548.
(2) G.P.Vol.III.No.549 (Kehdell to Bismarck,26 February 1382)
and No.552.
Pribram bp.cit.Vol.iXp.19 (refers to Wimpffen to Kalnoky
3 March 1882) .
(3) G.P.Vol.III.No.552 (Reuss to Bismarck 10 March 1882).
and No.553 (Busch to Reuss 16 March 1882).
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(1)
accordingly drew up a draft embodying the ideas which
(2 )
was accepted by Germany. On March 22 formal proposals
were at last made by Robilant to Kalnoky. They differed
from the latter's project in that Italy was only prepared
to promise armed neutrality in the event of a war between
Russia and the German powers, whereas Austria-Hungary
desired a promise of active assistance. The Italian
proposals also included a mutual promise of support in
general political questions. The Treatv was to be signed
(3)
by all three Powers. In a conference on April 12, Kalnoky
(4)
and Robilant discussed a draft for the proposed Treaty.
(5)
Bismarck's acceptance followed on the 17th. In a further
conference on the 27th, Robilant informed Kalnoky of
certain amendments desired by his Government and proposed
the signature of a secret protocol which should leave the
way open for England to accede to the Alliance either in all
its stipulations or at least in the provision for neutrality
in the event of a war between a non-signatory and one of
(6)
the Parties to the Treaty. At Bismarck's suggestion the
(1) G.P.Voblll.No.554 (Reuss to Bismarck, 18 March 1882) 
Pribram op.cit; Vol.11 pp.21-22.
(2) G.P.Vol.III. No.555,
(3) G.P.Vol.III.No,556 (Reuss to Bismarck,24 March 1882). 
Pribram op.cit.Vol.lIpp.22 et seq.
(4) G.P.Vol.III.No.559 (Reuss to Bismarck, 13 April 1882).
(5) G.P.Vol.III.NO.560.
(6) G.P.Vol.III.No,561. Pribram op.cit.Vol.Up.33.
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latter proposal was modified and a Ministerial Declaration
to the effect that the Treaty was not directed against
(1 )
England agreed upon. Final agreement was reached by
(2) (3)
the middle of May and the Treaty signed on the 20th.
The Treaty of the Triple Alliance followed more 
closely than the Dreikaiserbund agreement, the type of the 
Austro-German Treaty. It was concerned primarly to 
determine the attitude of the contracting parties in the 
event of an attack upon one or more of them by a non­
signatory and only secondarily with the question of policy.
As the Austro-German Treaty had done, it determined the 
attitude of the Signatories according to the source of the 
attack. • In the event of an attack from France directed 
against Italy, the two other signatories undertook to give 
Italy full military support. In the event of attack 
from France directed against Germany, Italy alone undertook 
to give full military assistance against the aggressor.
In the event of an attack from two or more great Powers 
non-signatories to the Treaty, presumably France assisted 
by Russia, the three powers undertook to give full military 
assistance to the attacked power or powers. Article V
(1) G.P. Vol.III. Nos.562, 563.
(2) G.P. Vol.III. Nos.567, 568.
(3) G.P. Vol.III. No.570.
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stipulated for concerted military measures, and the 
conclusion of an armistice or of peace by common agreement 
only.
A new factor was introduced. The defensive character 
of the Treaty was considered to cover the case where one 
of the Signatories though technically the aggressor, in 
fact made war as the result of a threat to its security by 
a Great power outside the Treaty. In this event the two 
non-combattants undertook to maintain benevolent neutrality 
while reserving to themselves the right to give active 
assistance .
The question of policy was touched upon in the preamble 
and in Article I. The former affirmed the desire of the 
Contracting Parties to strengthen the monarchical principle 
and to ensure the maintenance of the present political and 
social order of their respective states. Article I 
imposed an obligation to engage in an exchange of ideas 
respecting the principal questions of political and 
economic policy and a promise of mutual support "dans le 
limite de leur propre intérêts."
The stipulations of the Treaty were to be kept secret 
and to last for five years. A ministerial declaration 
to the effect that the Alliance could not in any circumstances 
be considered as directed against England, supplemented the 
Treaty.
As the Treaty dealt to such a limited degree with the 
question of policy and no casus foederis occurred in connec­
tion with its other stipulations, British information as to 
its existence could be secured from the course of events 
only in so far as they indicated an unexpected confidence 
between the Governments of the three countries. Otherwise 
information could only be secured as the result of some 
unintentional leakage or of deliberate disclosures on the 
part of the three Governments.
At the beginning of 1883, there was one incident which 
Paget reported as indicating the existence of confidence 
between the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Italy that 
was not shared by the people of the two countries. At the 
end of December 1883 Oberdank, an Italian, was executed in 
Austria-Hungary for political activities against the
Austrian Government. Anti-Austrian demonstrations were
(1)
made at Turin, Milan and Rome. In January shots were
fired at the residence of the Austrian Ambassador in Rome
(2)
and at the consulate in Rimini. Both Paget and Elliot 
drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact that
(1) F.0 ,4 5 / 4 5 7 Paget to Granville 447 23 December 1882.
(2) F.0.45/476 Paget to Granville 6 5 January 1883.
D.D.F.Series I. Vol.IV. No.593.
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these manifestations had produced no irritation between
(1)
the two Governments,
In March' and April important disclosures on the subject 
of the Alliance by Mancini and someone who was presumably 
either' a member of the Italian Government or employed in 
the Foreign Office, with the assistance of information 
derived from the press, enabled the British Foreign Office 
to form a conception of the commitments existing between 
Italy and the German Empires that fell little short of 
the actual situation created by the Treaty.
The necessity of defending his policy before a critical 
and largely hostile Chamber drew from Mancini a statement 
as to the relations existing between Italy, Austria-Hungary 
and Germany. "He replied to those who had twitted him with 
having knocked in vain at the doors of Berlin and Vienna 
in search of the alliance of these two Cabinets," Paget 
reported, "by referring them to the published official 
documents in proof of the good understanding which exists 
between the three powers. At present His Excellency said 
there was no danger of an external aggression, but should 
one arise, Italy would be able to appreciate the solidity
(1) F,0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 28 24 January 1883.
F.0.45/476 Paget to Granville 17 12 January 1883.
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(1)
of the intimate union which had been established." This
hint at the existence of commitments between the three
Powers to meet the case of an attack upon one of them by
a fourth power was favourably received at Vienna and■
Berlin^ and was considered as an indication of the close
friendship between the three powers rather than as giving
grounds for the supposition that a formal agreement existed
(2 )
between them.
Further disclosures would possibly not have followed had 
it not been for the attitude now taken by the press. The 
Continental Papers professed to see in Mancini's otnbntg? 
an indication of the existence of formal commitments and 
"revelations" as to their exact character soon followed.
The chief of these was contained in a Reuter telegram 
from Rome published in the English papers on April 1, and 
later reproduced in the Italian, Austrian and German papers. 
It stated that a formal Treaty existed which bound the 
three powers to do everything possible to avoid a war 
with France. "But if one of the three Powers should be 
attacked by France, the other tv;o will support their Ally 
and make common cause with her. If one of the three Powers
(1) P.O.4 5 / 4 7 7 Paget to Granville 87 4 March 1883.
(2) F.0 .4 5 / 4 7 7 Paget to Granville co8îid§3tMtî°^ 1883.
F.0.7/1048 Drummond to Granville q q March 1883.
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should he constrained to declare war against another
power other than France, then the other two will be free
to remain neutral." This disclosure was incomplete and
its accuracy was denied by an officious communication in
the Fremdenblatt, somewhat less categorically by the
Diritto, and by Depretis who told Paget that no written
(1)
"engagements whatever existed between the three powers."
It was however, sufficient to cause Mancini to make further
disclosures in the Senate when the Budget of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs was debated there on April 11. No
official summary being published of the proceedings the
(2)
first report respecting them disclosed nothing. Paget 
however, learnt tvfo days later from one of the members 
that Mancini had clearly admitted the existence of formal 
agreements. "I will neither confirm nor contradict the 
suppositions which are found in the Press, Mancini was 
stated to have said" with respect to the agreements of 
Italy with the two Empires, but agreements do exist having 
for object an entirely pacific end, with full reciprocity
(3).
of rights and obligations." Furnished with this informa-
(1) P.O.4 5 / 4 7 7 Paget to Granville 109 6 April 1883.
(2) F.0 .4 5 / 4 7 7 Paget to Granville 115 12 April 1883.
(3) P.O.4 5 / 4 7 7 Paget to Granville 116 13 April 1883.
Of.D.D.F.Series I.Vol.V.No.17 footnote; the French 
Ambassador only knew of Mancini's statements from 
the Press report.
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and with the full knowledge of the alleged revelations of the 
press, Paget questioned Ms.ncini, As a result he informed 
the Government that he was convinced that "a real Alliance, 
though purely defensive and pacific in its objects has 
been concluded between the three powers - - - by direct 
negotiation as much with Berlin as with Vienna." Mancini 
refused to confide in the Ambassador respecting the precise 
form in which the engagements were taken. From a source 
which Paget described as equally authentic, he had learnt 
however, that the engagements had been undertaken by the 
communication of copies of despatches addressed by the 
respective Governments to their Ambassadors at the three 
Courts. From this source also he learnt that the Alliance 
was contracted for five years.
From Mancini Paget learnt further that the three 
States had bound themselves "to defend each other in the 
event of an attack by any other power; no other Power 
whatever is named, and the Alliance would come into effect, 
quite as much if the attacking power were Russia as if it 
were France." In the second place Mancini stated that 
"he had made a distinct stipulation that under no circum­
stances would Italy ever contemplate the case of finding
»)
herself in hostility with England.
From the other source already mentioned the information 
was made complete except f«r mention^of the substance
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of the preamble and of Article IV. which provided for the 
neutrality of the other signatories in the event of one 
of them declaring war as a result of a menace to its 
security by a fourth power. For Paget's informant stated 
that in addition to the undertakings referred to by Mancini, 
the three powers had agreed that in the event of any 
important question arising "They will concert together 
with the view of establishing a common line of policy."
The negotiations he further informed Paget had begun 
during Gajnbetta's tenure of office and had been concluded 
some time after his fall.
Tv/o unfounded pieces of Information came from this 
source however; first that Italy had undertaken to pursue 
"une politique correcti vis a vis l'Irrédentisme. ", 
and secondly that "in the event of circumstances ever lead­
ing to a practical realization of the Alliance, England 
should be invited to join i^I^ The British conception of
the literal contents of the Treaty but not of the spirit 
nr< rWt-tU I» ^  if
behind it, was rendered less accurate by this information.
M
No confirmation of Paget's information was received 
from other sources. Elliot stated plainly that he could 
secure no information and that he could only give a personal
(1) F. 0 ,4 5 / 4 7 7 Paget to Granville 119 13 April 1883.
Most confidential.
mopinion that no specific Treaty obligations had been
taken. On the other hand he considered it possible that
a Declaration of a more or less formal character as to
the principles upon which the three Governments propose
(1)
to guide their policy had been made Kalnoky had stated
(2)
only that no undertaking directed against France existed.
(1) F.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 119 14 April 1883
Confidential
(2) F.0.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 19 April 1883.
Footnote ;C)) tr^ Vvi^ t4
P.O. 64/1025 
F.O. 64/1025 
F.O. 64/1025
Ampthill to Granville 127 12 April 1883
Confidential
Ampthill to Granville 143 27 April 1883
Confidential
Ampthill to Granville 165 16 May 1883
Secret
Ampthill considered "a formal offensive and defensive" 
alliance against France "which as a result of Mancini*s 
speech was spoken of in Berlin, as ahsur^d, the present 
state of affairs in France so entirely suiting Germany 
that France could reckon on Bismarck*s support. On 
receiving Paget*s reports from Granville he was still 
somewhat sceptical as Hatzfeldt maintained an attitude 
of absolute ignorance. After a conversation with Bismarck, 
who assured him that the "Triple Alliance was more a 
situation than a Treaty***^ , Germany and Austria having 
professed their readiness to assist Italy, in order^H:o 
keep her Dynasty in the saddle," Ampthill was bownvn-p 
ready to believe.that "the three powers were at least 
bound to assist each other against any aggressive move­
ment on the parti of France and Russia."
CHAPTER V I .
SERVIA, RUMANIA and TURKEY.
The policy pursued by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, 
by imposing upon her the necessity of seeking support against 
Russia, had made it possible for Bismarck to bring into being 
the Austro-German Alliance. It had also furnished him with 
a basis upon which the DreiKaiserbund would be renewed.
Again, it had emphasised for Austria-Hungary the necessity 
of a guarantee of Italian neutrality in the event of a conflict 
between herself and another European power. Italian efforts, 
therefore, to bring about a Triple Alliance had been encouraged 
and had finally succeeded. The Alliance concluded between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia on June 28, 1881 ensured that this 
policy would be continued.
The Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Rumania, to 
which Germany acceded, and the relations cultivated by Austria- 
Hungary and Germany with Turkey, counteracted as far as the 
pursuit of a forward policy in the Balkans was concerned the 
advantages which Russia might have derived from the existence 
of the DreiKaiserbund. They ensured that the collapse of that 
combination would not be brought about by the same factors 
which caused the failure of a similar combination during the 
Eastern crisis 1875-8.
The relations with Turkey cultivated by all three
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Empires at a time when British and French influence at the 
porte was at its lowest ensured the control of the Eastern 
Question by the DrelKaiserbund and encouraged Russia to remain 
faithful to that combination.
British information on these relationships, crucial for 
the success and continued existence of the system of Alliances 
established by Bismarck was comparatively full, but where it 
touched upon the existence of definite commitments, and 
especially when it concerned those designed to meet the 
contingency of an attack upon one of the parties, was inde­
cisive.
As has been shown, the Foreign Office were fully 
informed in regard to Austria-Hungary's policy of increasing 
her influence in the Western part of the Balkan peninsula, 
and particularly in Servia. The geographical position of 
Montenegro between Bosnia and Herzegovina, controlled by 
Austria-Hungary, and a hostile Albania diminished the 
political importance of the principality.
During 1879-80 British information showed that the 
development of Austria-Hungary*s influence in Servia, was not 
uninterrupted. In the first place, it was informed of 
considerable resistance in Servia to Austrian efforts.
In the late summer of 1879 Ristic, the Servian prime Minister, 
was prepared to resign rather than yield to the Austro- 
Hungarian demand that Servia should engage to construct the
railway connections between Nisch and Belgrade and the
(1)
Austrian lines, before those between Nisch and Salonica.
He devoted his efforts to securing the establishment of the
latter connections, believing that they would save Servia
(2)
from the commercial domination of Austria-Hungary. % e n
the latter refused to open commercial negotiations with
Servia until the Railway Convention had been concluded,
relations became seriously embittered, but Ristic showed no
(3)
signs of giving way. In February 1880 Gould, British 
Minister at Belgrade, reported that his resignation was a 
matter of days, as he could not agree to a new Austrian demand 
that Servia should build the line from Nisch to pirot immed­
iately, without waiting for Bulgaria to engage to effect a
(4)
junction with it. Austro-Hungarian pressure was seen by 
the Foreign Office to be finally successful, though not
(1) B.M.Add Mss,39027. Gould to Layard 2o July 1879
(2) B.Singer; die Vertrage init Serbien Ghapt.II.
(3) F.O.105/18 Gould to Salisbury 20 December 1379
(4) F.O.105/12 Gould to Salisbury
Telegram 27 February 1880
B.Singer; op clt. Ghapt.II.
G.D.29/123. Gladstone to Granville 4 May 1880
contains a long Minute by Granville as to information 
received on the Railway Convention, signed on April 9.
entirely so. A convention, Gould reported on May 12th, had 
been concluded, which satisfied the Austrian demands in regard 
to the building of the Nisch-Belgrade line before the construc­
tion of the connections with Salonica, but not those in regard
(1)
to the Servo-Bulgarian railways*
In the second place the development of British commercial
influence in Servia was seen to act as a check upon the success
of Austria-Hungary*s policy. Thus, Gould in the interests of
British trade with Servia, which accounted for one third of
(2)
the latter*s imports of manufactured goods, had encouraged
Ristic in his attempts to open communication with Salonica
(3)
rather than with Austria-Hungary.
Again the conclusion of a commercial Treaty with Servia
weakened the force of the measures taken by Austria-Hungary
(4)
to secure Servian pliancy on the Railway question. Austria- 
Hungary* s refusal to open negotiations for a commercial Treaty 
was not important when Servia was assured of an agreement 
with Great Britain. Gould moreover was instructed to assist 
the Austrian representative in the railway negotiations, but
(1) P.0.105/12 Gould to Granville 50 12 May 1880
42 22 June 1880 
47 23 June 1880 
Confidential
(2) P.O.105/4 Gould to Salisbury 8 31 October 1878
Commercial
(3) Add Mss.39028 Gould to Layard 15 August 1879
G.D.29/123 Gladstone to Granville 4 May 1880
P.O. 7/996 Egerton to Granville p^^ga^$aÿ°vember 1880
(4) F.0.105/12 Gould to Salisbury ' 10 10 February 1880
12 16 February 1880
3éé
not to allow them to interfere with his own negotiations for
(1)
the Commercial Treaty. After the Railway Convention had
been successfully concluded, the existence of the Commercial
Treaty with England encouraged Servia to refuse for some time
the terms which Austria-Hungary proposed for the Austro-Servian
Treaty. Immediately after the conclusion of the British
Treaty the Servian Minister in Vienna had, in fact, informed
the Austrian Government that Servia could not engage in any
(2)
negotiations for a treaty with Austria-Hungary.
Lastly,during 1879-80, Austria-Hungary had to contend 
with Russian rivalry for predominance to Servia. At the 
beginning of 1879, the mission of the Servian Minister for 
Education to St. Petersburg had attracted a good deal of
(5)
attention. Later, Russian contractors apparently backed by
the Russian Government, were making repeated efforts to obtain
the concession of the projected lines of railway through
(4)
Servia. It then appeared that Russia was also attempting to
(1) P.0.105/12. Salisbury to Gould 1 January 1880
Telegram
(2) Singer: op.cit. Chapt.ll.
(5) P.0.105/6. Gould to Salisbury. 1 2 January 1879
(4) P.0.105/6. Gould to Salisbury. 5 7 January 1879.
P.0.105/6. Gould to Salisbury. 10 January 1879
Telegram
P.0.105/6. Gould to Salisbury. 20 19 January 1879
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(1)
negotiate a commercial Treaty. By the Summer, however,
(2)
Russian influence in Servia had begun to decline,
A conflict on a question connected with the Servian frontier
between the Servian Government and the Russian representative
(3)
caused relations to become considerably strained.
At the beginning of 1880, the Foreign Office was
informed that the first step.towards an improvement in the
political relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia was
about to be made. Elliot reported from Vienna on May 20,
that prince Milan proposed to visit Vienna in the course of
the following month. He believed the opportunity would be
taken to convince Servia of the friendly disposition of the
(4)
Austrian Government towards her. Gould reported on the 25th,
that it was almost decided that Milan was to proceed to
Vienna, "it is hoped," he wrote, "that this will place the
relations between Servia and Austria on a more friendly
(5)
footing. The visit actually took place June 26 - 30. Milan
(1) P.0.105/6 Gould to Salisbury 21 20 January 1879.
(2) P.O.105/6 Gould to Salisbury 156 4 June 1879
(3) P.0.105/6 ^ Confid^ntial^g 1879
'  ^  ^  ^ 172 20 June 1879
(4) P.O. 7/990 Elliot to Granville 247 2o May 1880.
(5) P.O.105/12 Gould to Granville 36 25 May 1880.
went on to Pranzensbad, Ischl and Gastien, returning to Vienna
on September 13 and to Servia on the 22nd, He saw the Emperor
of Austria again at Ischl and again at Vienna in September,
(1)
and visited the Emperor of Germany at Gastien. The Prince
was given a cordial reception and appeared to be fully
satisfied with the friendly disposition of the Austro-
(2)
Hungarian Government.
British information gave more substantial evidence 
as to the significance of the visit. Colonel Catargi,
Milan*s uncle, and confidential adviser had had a long conver­
sation with Eaymerle and he gave Gould the gist of what had 
been said. Catargi had informed the Austrian Minister that 
prince Milan would feel himself obliged to assume the title 
of King if prince Charles of Rumania did so. Haymerle had 
replied that he saw no objection to the proposed change.in
(3)
Milan*8 title. In the second place the visit caused the 
struggle, which Ristic had led against Austria-Hungary, to 
be brought slowly to a clear issue. On August 18, Gould 
informed the Foreign Office of the increasing ill-feeling
(1) P.0.105/12 Gould to Granville 48 23 July 1880
P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville 75 8 September 1880
88 22 September 1880.
(2) P.O. 7/995 Elliot to Granville 701 29 October 1880.
P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville 60 31 July 1880.
(3) P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville 63 3 August 1880.
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(1)
between Milan and his Minister . While Milan prepared the
way for friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, Ristic
prepared for a renewal of the struggle to secure Servian
rather than Austrian control of the port of Salonica, the
possession of which he regarded as the key to the maintenance
(2)
of friendship with Austria-Hungary upon equal terms. Immed­
iately after Milan*s return to Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian 
Government renewed its former demands and threats respecting 
commercial matters. Ristic and his colleagues thereupon
Cl)tendered their resignation. The turning point in Servia*s 
relations with Austria-Hungary had been reached. Ristic,
Gould reported, offered a policy of friendship to Austria- 
Hungary, but opposition to the view which he believed to be 
prevalent in Vienna, that Servia might be considered as a 
"dependency of the Empire in all that relates to its commerce, 
railways and navigation, that the principality might be turned 
to her exclusive advantage without her having to incur the 
political responsibility of administering it." Milan with 
whom Gould had also had a conversation, believed that Servia 
was not strong enough to resist Austria-Hungary, and was
(1) P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville 675 18 August 1880
and 676
(2) P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville 70 28 August 1880
Confidential
(3) P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville 23 October 1880
Telegram 6
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prepared to acquiesce completely with anything she might
demand. When Milan formed a new Ministry and Ristic fell,
the Foreign Office had full information as to the significance
of the event for the extension of Austrian influence in
(2)
Servia. The new Ministry, strongly supported by a newly
elected Skuptchina accepted the Austro-Hungarian demands
(3)
and her influence was paramount in the Principality.
Elliot, meanwhile had commented on Gould’s despatch of
October 23, which went through Vienna under Plying Seal, that
Ristic*s views as to the domination of Austria-Hungary over
Servia, which would result from the Servian acceptance of
the Austrian demands, was exaggerated. He admitted however,
the general affect of the outcome of the recent crisis upon
(4)
the Austrian influence in the principality.
The negotiations for a commercial Treaty were then 
(5)
formally opened. It was not, however, until April that the 
difficulties in the relations between the two countries were 
finally removed. In January, the Servian Skuptchina began
(1) P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville 96 23 October 1880
Confidential
(2) P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville Telegram
7 1 November 1880
(3) P.0.105/13 Gould to Granville Telegram
11 17 November 1880
115 4 December 1880
116 7 December 1880
Confidential
(4) P.0.7/995 Elliot to Granville 70l 29 October 1880
(5) P.0.7/996 Egerton to Granville 724 11 November 1880
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to grow restless at further unreasonable demands of Austria-
(1)
Hungary and in March there was a revulsion of feeling in
(2)
favour of Russia. Even Elliot spoke novf of Austria-Hungary* s
(3)
"monstrous pretensions
In April, the negotiations in the Commercial Treaty
which was finally signed on May 6, were practically concluded,
the Foreign Office was informed and steps were at once taken
to bring about closer political relations. The question of
Milan*s assumption of the title of King which had been broached
in June 1880, was again raised. Mijatovich, who was now
foreign Minister of Servia, told Gould that confidential
communications had taken place on the subject between the
Governments of Servia and Austria-Hungary, and that he had
(4)
been assured that no objection would be made by the latter. 
Elliot on receiving Gould*s despatch, asked both the Emperor 
and Haymerle whether any such communications had taken place.
(1) F.0.105/19 Baker (Vice-Consul) 
to Gould 1 22 January 1880
&.D.29/155 Elliot to Granville 8 January 1880.
(2) F.0.105/19 Gould to Granville 27 12 March 1880.
(3) G.D.29/155 Elliot to Granville 24 February 1881.
(4) F.0.105/19 Gould to Granville 35 1 April 1881.
Confidential
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(1)
He was told that nothing had been said. Later it seemed
clear that Austria-Hungary contemplated "with less repugnance.
than formerly the probability of the change being eventually 
(2)
made." The question meanwhile appeared to be under discussion
(3)
among the Servian Ministers.
Information was then received that Milan was preparing
(4)
for a visit to Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg. The visit 
took place according to plan, Milan arriving in Vienna on 
June 6, going on to Berlin and St.Petersburg and returning to 
Vienna on June 12.
British information at first indicated that only the 
question of the eventual assumption by Milan of the title of
Oft
King had been discussed. It did^appear, however, that the
matter had been formally raised or that an agreement had been
reached. Elliot reported that the matter had been lightly
(5)
touched upon and Austria-Hungary had made no objections. 
Mijatovich told Gould that the matter had been mentioned at 
Berlin and St.Petersburg, and no objections raised. The
(1) F.0.7/1014 Elliot to Granville 197 14 April 1881
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 271 25 May 1881
(3) P.0.105/19 Gould to Granville 14 April 1881
Telegram 3
(4) P.0.105/19 Gould to Granville 60 29 April 1881
74 31 May 1881
75 1 June 1881
(5) P.0.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 289 8 June 1881
309 14 June 1881
P.0.65/1113 Wyndham to Granviffe^%f June 188166 «june .Loox
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(1)
Prince had not himself introduced the subject.
In reality a formal agreement had already been come to
on the matter between Austria-Hungary and Servia when
Mijatovich spoke to Gould,
Milan returned to Belgrade on June 25. Three days later
a Treaty of Alliance was signed by Mijatovich and the Austrian
(2)
Minister at Belgrade. Article II provided that Austria- 
Hungary would recognize Milan as King whenever he saw fit to 
take the title, and would use her influence with other powers 
to secure their recognition.
Furthermore by Article III Austria-Hungary bound herself 
to direct her efforts to maintain and strengthen the Servian 
dynasty. In return Servia pledged herself not to tolerate 
political,religious or other intrigues within her territory 
directed against Austria-Hungary. The Alliance which was a 
secret agreement to remain in force for ten years, provided 
also for the furtherance of that control by Austria-Hungary 
over Servia which Gould had informed the Foreign Office ought 
to be expected to result from Ristic*s fall. Article I bound 
the two Governments to pursue a "mutually friendly policy." 
Article IV provided "that Servia should neither negotiate nor
(1) P.0.105/19 Gould to Granville 95 6, July 1881
(2) Pribram: op.cit Vol.I.
pp.51 et seq.
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conclude any political treaty with another Government" and 
not admit a foreign armed force within her territory, without 
a previous understanding with Austria-Hungary. Lastly in 
accordance with the example of the Alliance agreements already 
concluded, it dealt with the attitude of the two States in 
the event of war. Article V bound each to observe friendly 
neutrality in the event of the other being engaged in war. 
Article VI envisaged eventual military assistance and provided 
that a military convention should be concluded for that 
purpose when the case arose. By Article VII, Austria-Hungary 
bound herself not to oppose territorial acquisitions should 
servia be in a position to make them. The engagement under 
Article IV was the subject of further negotiation and eventually 
it became a personal undertaking on the part of Prince Milan 
alone, while the Servian Government recognised only an engage­
ment not to negotiate or conclude any political treaty contrary
(1)
to the spirit and tenor of the Alliance Treaty.
With regard to these subsequent negotiations, only the
(2)
facts of the journey to Vienna of Mijatovich, and of pirochanats,
(1) Pribram; op.cit.Vol.I.pp.55 et seq.
Pribram Milan IV von Servien und die Geheimvertra9& 
Q s t e r r e i c h - Ü n g a r n s Serbien 1È81-16Ù91 (Historische 
Blatter 1, 1921-22, pp.464-94). — —
(2) F.0.105/19 Gould to Granville 6 July 1881
8 September 1881
(1)
and of the second visit of Milan, which they involved were
reported to the Foreign Office, In regard to the existence
of an Alliance Treaty, some information was received, but
it was not such as to lead the Foreign Office to feel any
confidence in its accuracy. Early in June, an English paper
contained information to the effect that Milan had been
informed in Vienna that Austria-Hungary would agree to his
assumption of the title of King, on condition that Servia
concluded a military alliance with her, putting her army at
Austria-Hungary*s disposal, and command in the event of war.
\7hen, however, Gould asked Mijatovich if this information v/as
correct, he replied that no Servian Minister would consider 
(2)
the proposal. In September, the Servian press insisted that
a military union between Austria-Hungary and Servia was in
contemplation. Mijatovich assured Gould that there was
(3)
positively no foundation for such information.
Subsequent information received before 1885, reflected 
only that part of the Austro-Servian Alliance which dealt with 
the assumption by prince Milan of the title of King, and the 
Austro-Hungarian promise of support to Milan*s dynasty against 
revolutionary movements. Milan was proclaimed King early in
(1) F.0.105/19 Gould to Granville 9 October 1881
(2) F.0.105/19 Gould to Granville 82 13 June 1881
(3) F.0.105/20 Gould to Granville 123 12 September 1881
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March 1882. Elliot reported that the Austro-Hungarian Minister 
at Belgrade had been directed to intimate the Austrian recog­
nition as soon as he was proclaimed. The Emperor of Austria
(1)
desired to be the first to recognize him. The Emperor in 
person later confirmed to Elliot that he welcomed the step 
taken by Milan. Elliot in guarded language hinted that Servia 
had probably done something in return for Austria-Hungary to 
account for her marked readiness to recognize the Prince as 
King, which contrasted strongly with what Elliot had previously 
reported the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government to be 
in the matter.
The present Servian Government he wrote had found some 
means to achieve the dearest ambitions of the Principality 
without arousing the misunderstanding with Austria-Hungary 
that might have been expected. The Ambassador*s language, 
however, did not give the impression that a formal agreement 
had been concluded. The correct attitude of the Servian 
Government during the troubles in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the necessity that the Principality should continue to main­
tain strict neutrality, afforded a sufficient explanation of 
the Austrian attitude.
The Austrian recognition of the title thus assumed by 
Milan, afforded an opportunity for the British Foreign Office 
to secure information in regard to Austria-Hungary*s readiness
(1) F.0.7/lo5& Elliot to Granville 1Ô5 8 March 1081“
(2) F.0.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 104 8 March 1881.
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to maintain his dynasty and to protect him against any revolu­
tionary movement. The motive for her readiness to recognize 
the King v;as alleged by Austria-Hungary to be the desire to
"strengthen his position" or to"strengthen the monarchical
(1)
principle and lessen the chance of revolution." The actual 
threat of revolution three months later, and the constitutional 
difficulties in the Autumn of the following year afforded a 
further opportunity for the British Foreign Office to secure 
information. Locock, who was now Minister at Belgrade,reported 
positively that Austria-Hungary had given assurances of 
support to Milan, amounting even to an offer of military aid 
if it should be necessary, in the event of insurrection break­
ing out. Kalnoky, however, assured Elliot that "A question
of sending troops to the support of the King had never been 
(2)
entertained. Vftien Elliot spoke to him again on the subject,
(3)
he repeated this assertion more emphatically. When Milan
visited Vienna in August 1883, it appeared, however, that he
looked to Austria-Hungary for assistance if the rival Servian
dynasty - the Karageorgavitch - should obtain a footing in
(4)
Eastern Runelia, which the King considered likely .
(1) P.0.7/1033. Elliot to Granville 103 & 8 March 1882.
104.
(2) F.0.7/1034. Elliot to Granville 294 18 June 1882.
(3) F.0.7/1034. Elliot to Granville 297. .20 June 1882.
Confidential
(4) P.O.7/1050. Elliot to Granville 236. 25 August 1883.
Confidential
In the autumn, the recent dismissal by the King of the
Metropolitan Bishop of Belgrade brought about a constitutional
crisis, and the election of a S k u p t c h i n a sTilk) W  Wei.
Milan appealed to Austria for assistance in appointing a new
(1)
Bishop, and intended to prolong his stay in Vienna while with
the assistance of Kalnoky*s advice he took the decisions
(2)
necessary to deal with the hostile Skuptchina. When, however,
insurrection actually broke out in November, Austria-Hungary
made no move, and the outbreak was crushed without Austrian
(3)
assistance.
British information then did not indicate clearly that 
any formal agreement either upon this point or concerning ether 
matters, existed. The truth of any evidence that was received 
in the opposite direction had been denied but had not been 
corroborated. revealed the close relations between
Austria-Hungary and Servia, but not such close relations that 
the existence of an Alliance was suspected. Kalnoky*s repeated 
denials that Austria exercised any influence on the internal
(1) P.0.65/1057 Thornton to Granville 233 4 October 1883
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 275 3 October 1883
Confidential
(3) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 310 15 November 1883
314 17 November 1883
Confidential
322 28 November 1883
Confidential
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(1)
affairs of Servia, coupled with complaints that Milan made a
(2)
parade of his friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, were 
sufficient to counteract the impression which the events of 
1880-81 had encouraged, to use the expression of pirochanats, 
that Austria-Hungary was "seeking to control Servia as France 
controlled Tunis." Subsequent events did not afford a
VP
casas foederis under any article of the Treaty, apart from 
those articles dealing with the assumption by Milan of the 
title of King, and Austrian support of the Servian dynasty.
The Foreign Office derived no information from independent 
sources, nor from communications of the Ministers concerned, 
nor from the press. They were left therefore, with the 
impression that a close political friendship between Austria- 
Hungary and Servia supplemented Austria-Hungary’s commercial 
control of the Principality, but that no formal commitments 
existed.
The British information on Rumanian relations with the 
two Empires, at the end of the Salisbury Ministry may be 
summed up as follows*». Austria-Hungary could probably rely 
on Rumanian support in the event of war with Russia. Rumania 
could rely upon the support of the two Empires if she were 
compelled to face an unprovoked attack from Russia. A formal 
agreement, however, was not shown to exist, although the
(1) P.0.7/1051: Elliot to Granville 266 2o September 1883
P.0.7/1062 Paget to Granville 39 27 January 1884
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 288 17 October 1883
Confidential
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conclusion in the near future of a Military Convention
between Austria-Hungary and Rumania appeared probable. In
addition there was a tendency of the Rumanian Government
towards political dependency upon Germany brought about by
the German handling of the question of Jewish Emancipation
and of the Rumanian determination to purchase their railways
(1)
from the German company.
This information had begun to assemble in August 1879,
when Archduke Albert visited Bucharest. The visit confirmed
the existence of a tendency on the part of Austria-Hungary,
which her promptitude in recognising Rumanian independence
had first indicated, to cultivate the friendship of Rumania.
On the Archduke’s return, Egerton reported that the relations
(2)
between Austria-Hungary and Rumania were "most cordial."
In January, Colonel Primrose, the Military Attache at Vienna, 
informed the Foreign office that Austria-Hungary was taking 
more substantial steps to bind Rumania to her. She was 
supplying the principality with arms, inviting Rumanian 
officers to join Austrian military colleges and offering 
inducements to the Rumanian Government to study and imitate !
the Austrian military system. "As a result," General Beck,
chief of the Emperor’s Military Chancery, had informed primrose,
"Austria-Hungary could count on Rumanian assistance in the
JT) see ppTlS-2i7
(2) F,0.7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 740 17 November 1879
(1)
event of a war with Russia.
The idea that Rumania had received assurances of support
from Vienna and Berlin originated with information from these
capitals respecting M. Bratiano’s mission to Austria-Hungary
(2)
and Germany in the latter half of March 1880. The Rumanian
Prime Minister stated to Odo Russell that the object of his
visit was partly connected with the Railway Convention
recently concluded with Germany, but that he had also a
secret mission. He was instructed "to sound the German
Government secretly as to the prospects for the future since
the geographical position of Rumania between Austria-Hungary
and Russia exposed her to great dangers and complications in
(3)
the event of war." Elliot could confirm Bratiano’s state­
ments. For, Haymerle had told him that the Rumanian Minister 
had sought to ascertain what would be the position of the 
principality in the event of a war of Russia against Austria- 
Hungary and Germany. It appeared from the reports of both 
Ambassadors that he had been given satisfactory assurances. 
Bratiano told Russell nothing more than that he left Berlin 
with the conviction that the Austro-German Alliance was a
(1) F.0.7/988 primrose (military attache^ )
to Elliot. 15 January 1880
(2) D.D.F. Series I, Vol.Ill No.81.
(3) F.0.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 131 20 March 1880.
Most Confidential.
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(1)
guarantee for the Peace of Rumania. From some other source,
however, the Ambassador was confidentially informed that
Bismarck now wanted Rumania to join the Austro-German Alliance.
He had therefore promised to support and advocate at Vienna
the plan whereby the Rumanian Chambers were to confer upon
prince Charles the title of King, on Bratiano*s return to
Bucharest, upon which the Prince had written personally to
(2)
Bismarck to ask his advice. Elliot reported that he had
leannt from Haymerle that the Rumanian Minister had "obtained
from the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Germany assurances
of support in the event of an unprovoked attack upon the
(3)
principality by Russia."
British information indicated however, that no formal
understanding had been reached. Egerton in November had
written that Austria-Hungary did not appear to have any scheme
(4)
in contemplation to bind Rumania indissolubly to her.
General Beck in speaking to primrose in January had given a
(5)
similar impression. In March, Haymerle informed Elliot that 
"no clear engagement" had been entered into by either Austria-
(1) F.0.64/959. Russell to Salisbury 131 20 March 1880
Most Confidential.
(2) F.0.64/959. Russell to Salisbury 141 23 March I860
Secret 
145 25 March 1880
Most Confidential
(3) F.0.7/989. Elliot to Salisbury 157 29 March 1880
Confidential
(4) F.0.7/966. Egerton to Salisbury 740 17 November 1879
(5) F.0.7/988. primrose to Elliot 15 January 1880.
Hungary or Rumania, and that the admission of Rumania to 
the Austro-German Alliance could not come about. The
(1)
Rumanian Minister in Vienna, confirmed this information.
The idea that a formal understanding might yet be 
established was not discouraged by the information which the 
Foreign Office received. In October, Egerton had informed 
the Foreign Office that the Archduke Albert had been sent to
j
Rumania to negotiate a military convention. No confirmation
of this report was received. Egerton however considered that
this showed rather that the convention had not yet been
signed, than that negotiations to bring it about had not
(2)
been opened. In November, he still hoped that he might be 
mistaken when he admitted that it did not seem that any such 
convention was about to be concluded. The clarity of Egerton’s 
ideas as to what such a military convention would involve - 
the building among other things of fortifications at Galatz 
on the frontier of Russian Bessarabia - encouraged the impres­
sion that he had good grounds for believing that the negotiation
(3)
of some such agreement had been seriously contemplated.
General Beck told primrose indeed, that efforts had been made
(4)
during the last two years to bring about a military convention.
(1) F.O. 7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 158 1 April 1880
Very confidential.
(2) F.O.7/965 Egerton to Salisbury 9 October 1880
(3) F.O.7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 740 17 November IS"#
Confidential.
(4) F.O.7/988 primrose to Elliot 15 January .1880
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There appeared to be parties in both countries eager to
effect a formal understanding. Balatchano, Rumanian Minister
in Vienna, told Elliot that Bratiano had failed in his mission.
He had not achieved its real object; the establishment of
engagements which should bind his country to common action
with Austria-Hungary and Germany if an emergency arose.
Bratiano and his supporters considered a definite engagement
essential, in order to defeat the champions of Rumanian
(1)
neutrality.
Information received by the Foreign Office from 1879-80
justified the expectation that relations between Austria-
Hungary and Rumania might eventually be thought of in the terms
of a mutual pledge of military assistance in the event of
an attack upon either by Russia and a pledge of a less far
reaching character between Rumania and Germany.
In October 1883, this expectation was fulfilled.
on August 19, Bismarck telegraphed to Reuss from Kissingen
(2 )
concerning the meeting with Kalnoky that was then impending.
He proposed as the principal subject of discussion the poss-
bility of widening the understanding with Italy to include the
(3)
near Eastern States, and particularly Rumania, Kalnoky was 
ready to use the visit of King Charles to the courts,of
(4)
Ber&in eæcé Vienna which took place at the end of the month
(1) F.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 158 1 April 1880
Very Confidential.
(2) see page
(3) G.P.Vol.III. No.583.
(4) F.O. 1 0 4 / 3 3 Sanderson to Granville 65 17 August 1883.
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to raise the question of Rumania’s inclusion in the Alliance
immediately and suggested that further negotiations should
then be carried on with Bratiano who alone could offer some
security that an agreement if it was reached would be
(1)
observed. In two conversations between Bismarck and Bratiano 
who visited the Chancellor at Gastein on September %, Rumania’s 
determination to act unreservedly with Germany, and with 
Austria-Hungary, so far as Germany did, was established.
The anti-Russian, but purely defensive character of any agree­
ment that might be reached between Rumania, Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, v;as then determined and it was decided that such an I
agreement should take the form of a preliminary understanding |
between Rumania and Austria-Hungary, to which Germany would [
accede. For there were certain differences to be settled !:
between Rumania and Austria-Hungary before an agreement could I
(2) I
be effective. Bratiano arrived in Vienna at the beginning of |
September, and an agreement with Kalnoky was rapidly effected, j
the Rumanian Prime Minister accepting a draft Treaty drawn up ï
I
by the latter. As a result of negotiations between Austria- | 
Hungary and Germany, some slight modifications were introduced; \ 
in order to satisfy the Emperor’s scruples. Russia was not i
to be specifically named as the potential aggressor against Ï
(1) G.P. vol.III. No.584. I
(2) G.P. Vol.III. No.585 J
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whom the Treaty was directed, and the purely defensive char­
acter of the Treaty was strengthened by alterations in the 
.(1)
preamble. A German attempt to avoid the signature of, or
accession to, the Treaty by an undertaking that a casus
foederis under the Austro-German Alliance would exist for
Germany as the result of a Russian attack upon Rumania as
well as of a Russian attack upon Austria-Hungary, failed owing
to Rumanian and Austro-Hungarian insistence on Germany’s
(2)
direct participation in the Alliance. On October 30, the
(3)
Treaty was signed and Germany acceded on the same day.
It was again a secret document and was to remain in force for 
five years. The preamble established as the objects of the 
Treaty, the maintenance of friendly relations between the 
three powers, the preservation in a conservative sense of 
the present political order, and the maintenance of peace.
The aspect of the Alliance which concerned policy was not 
developed. Article I provided merely that the Contracting 
parties should follow a policy of friendship towards each 
other and support one another within the limit of their 
interests. It bound them also not to enter any alliance or
(1) G.P. Vol.III. No.588, 590, 593, 594.
(2) G.P. Vol.III. Nos.588, 589, 590, 596.
(3) pribram, op cit. Volume I. pp.32 et seq
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engagement directed against the present Treaty. The rest of 
the Treaty was concerned with engagements the event of an 
aggression upon either party. The Signatories by Article II 
bound themselves to give Immediate assistance to the attacked 
Power. Articles III and IV strengthen the value of this 
obligation by providing for the regulation of details respect­
ing such assistance by a military convention when the occasion 
arose, and by stipulating for the conclusion of a common 
peace if the obligation came into effect. The source from 
which aggression was expected was not named. The Treaty
however, was based upon the conviction that Rumania in reality
(1)
was likely to be attacked only by Russia, while the clause 
"si l’Autriche était attaquée dans une partie de ses Etats 
limitrophes a la Roumanie," in fact limited the undertaking 
from the Rumanian side, for the event of an attack upon Austria- 
Hungary by Russia.
During 1880 the relations between Rumania and Austria- 
Hungary and Germany did not appear from the information in 
possession of the Foreign Office, to have developed. They 
seemed still to hinge upon the two questions; the admission of 
Rumania to the Austro-German Alliance, and the recognition of 
prince Charles as King. On August 28, the Prince and Princess 
arrived in Berlin. Russell reported that the.Prince had been 
very satisfied by a long conversation with Bismarck. He had
(1) G.P. Vol.III. No.585, 590, p.275 and 593.
not been Informed of the details but it was generally believed
in Berlin that the admission of Rumania to the Austro-German
Alliance, and the recognition of the Prince as King had formed
(1)
the subjects of discussion. Haymerle however, told Elliot
categorically that Prince Charles had not raised the question
of his recognition as King either with himself or with Prince
(2)
Bismarck. There was indeed no evidence either that the
subjects of discussion had been as Russell reported them, or
assuming that they were, that they had been successful from
the Rumanian point of view, on the contrary after this date
British information showed that the relations of Rumania with
Austria-Hungary and, to a less extent, her relations with
Germany, were steadily deteriorating. Already in November
Plunkett reported that the Rumanian Minister at St.Petersburg
had informed him that "Rumania, if driven to choose between
an alliance with Austria or one with Russia, would see less
danger to herself in accepting the latter." Russia, he added,
(3)
was now cultivating friendly relations with the principality. 
The appointment by Russia shortly afterwards of a Minister 
plenipotentiary at the court of Rumania, where she had hitherto
(1) P.0.64/962 Russell to Granville 407 1 September 1880
Confidential
(2) P.0.7/994 Elliot to Granville 514 15 September 1880
(5) P.0.65/1083 Plunkett to Granville 531 12 November 1880
Confidential
been represented only by a charge d'affaires, seemed to confirm
(1)
this information. As yet however, no serious change was
apparent. When the Prince was eventually proclaimed King in
the following March, no difficulties were made by Germany
and Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, neither power showed
any eagerness in recognising him. Germany, Russell reported,
(2)
wished to leave the initiative.in doing so to the other Powers.
In December, relations did in fact become strained,
Austria-Hungary took offence at the tone of the King's speech
on opening the Rumanian Chambers, and at his references to
obstacles placed by her in the way of Rumanian trade, and to
the Danube question which was about to come before the powers
as a result of the expiration in 1882 of the authority of the
(3)
International Commission. The Austrian representative at
Bucharest was first instructed to abstain from personal
(4)
relations with the Rumanian Government , and then summoned to
Vienna. A charge d'affaires was however left in his place.
Kalnoky refused to be satisfied with the explanations offered
(5)
by Rumania and insisted on a complete retraction. The matter
(1) P.0.65/1083
(2) P.0.7/1013 
P.0.64/980 
P. 0 .7 / 1 0 1 4
(3) P.0.7/1018
(4) P.0.7/1018
(5) P.0.7/1018
Dufferin to Granville 528 27 December 1880
Elliot to Granville 
Russell to Granville 
Elliot to Granville
Fraser to Granville 
Elliot to Granville
Elliot to Granville
79 17 February 1881
164 28 March 1881
164 29 March 1881
489 1 December 1881
493 19 December 1881
505 22 December 1881
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(1)
was cleared up by the end of the month, but it proved to be 
only the first of a series of similar incidents.
With the re-opening of the Danube question in 1882, 
serious differences of opinion occurred between Austria- 
Hungary and Rumania as to the navigation and control of the 
Upper River, while Russia's contention that where the river 
flowed between Russian and Rumanian territory the regulations 
made by the International Commission should be applied under 
the superintendence of the Rumanian and Russian members of 
Commission only, afforded the opportunity for a Russo-Rumanian 
rapprochement. At the same time, Russia's insistence that 
the Kilia mouths of the river had been surrendered to her 
by the Treaty of Berlin, and that the practical superinten­
dence of the waterway there should belong to her as the
sovereign power in control of both banks, caused considerable
(2)
alarm in Rumania. By the end of the year, a dangerous situ­
ation appeared to have developed from this state of affairs. 
Stourdza, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, told Colonel Primrose 
in November that his Government was preparing for war.
Rumania could not acquiesce in Russia's pretensions respecting 
the Kilia mouths. On the other hand, the Austrians were
(1) P.0.7/1018 Elliot to Granville 513 28 December 1881
F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 17 13 January 1882
(2)
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hated at Bucharest, and with the best of intentions could
never make themselves tolerated. Rumania could not agree to
the Austrian demands in regard to the navigation of the Upper
River. Stourdza concluded by expressing the hope that Rumania
(1) îf-ritôJTo»i
would secure British and French support. The mutual -imitati&n
between Austria and Rumania found expression in untoward
incidents, which still further increased it. In Vienna, it
was complained that Austrian commerce was subjected to petty
obstructions. Rumania complained that her customs officers
at a little place on the Galician frontier had been unlawfully
arrested by Austrian gendarmerie. The speeches at a public
banquet at Jassy where, in the King*s presence and apparently
with his approval, the toast”to the former provinces of
(2)
Rumania” was drunk, finally brought about a crisis.
Austria-Hungary demanded explanations, and Germany warned King
Charles against the dangerous attitude he was adopting. The
(3)
explanations offered were deemed unsatisfactory. Kalnoky
made further representations and raised the matter of the
w
Address of the Rumanian Chambers which styled the King, King 
of the Rumaniansan incident of which official notice had not
(1) P.0.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 526 1 November 1882.
(2) P.0.7/1049 Elliot to Granville 181 27 June 1883 |
Confidential.
P.0.104/33 White to Granville 52 26 June 1883 1
(3) P.0.104/33 Sanderson to Granville 56 2 July 1883 \
P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville Telegram 4 july'1883 |
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at the time been taken. He demanded something explicit, he
told Elliot, in regard to the whole attitude of Rumania
(1)
towards Austria-Hungary. Meanwhile General Brialmont, a
Belgian had been at Bucharest to give advice to the Rumanian
Government respecting the military organisation of the
country and the state of its defences it was said towards
the Austrian frontier. When a note from the Rumania finally
(2)
closed the Jassy incident, there were still several questions
to be settled between the two Governments. A joint Commission
(3)
was appointed for the purpose. At the same time, Austria-
Hungary took up the question of Brialmont*s activities and
addressed a representation to the Belgian Government. She
was Informed that the General had been struck off the active
(4)
list of the Belgian army. Assurances were then received
from Rumania that no fortifications were to be erected on the
(5)
Austrian frontier.
It was at this point, when a detente was taking place 
between Austria-Hungary and Rumania that the Foreign Office
(1) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 186 5 July 1883
Confidential.
(2) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville Telegram 7 July 1883
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192 16 July 1883
(3) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 2ol 23 July 1883.
(4) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 207 30 July 1883.
(5) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 219 13 August 1883
Confidential
3A3
was informed of the visits to Berlin and Vienna of King
(1)
Charles and later of Bratiano. Information derived from
statements by Bratiano and Kalnoky did not show that the
visits were significant except in so far as they furthered
this detente. Bratiano arrived in Vienna on September 7.
On the 8th he went on to Gastein. Elliot reported that this
object was to see Kalnoky and Bismarck, and that he hoped
thereby to remove the differences between Austria-Hungary and
Rumania which resulted from Rumania's attitude on the Danube
question and her refusal to sign the treaty drafted by the
(2)
London Conference. Kalnoky-confirmed Elliot's information.
He stated further that the general relations between Austria-
Hungary and Rumania had also been discussed and that they had
as a result been placed upon a more satisfactory footing.
There appeared still to be an obstacle in the way of Austro -
Rumania friendship. The Rumanian Envoy in Vienna had intimated:
that closer relations between Austria-Hungary and Rumania
could only be a prelude to war with Russia and Kalnoky appeared
(3)
to be considerably imitated by his language. Kalnoky i
however, informed the Delegations that he had indicated to 
the Rumanian Government the necessity for good relations
(1) P.0«104/35 Sanderson to Granville 64 13 August 1883^
Confidential !
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P.0 .7 / 1 0 5 1 Elliot to Granville 253 7 Sept? 1883j
(2) D.D.P. Series I. Vol.V. No.$4.
(3) F.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville «.§56 10 SeptV 1883
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being maintained, and that King Charles in passing through
Vienna on his way to Berlin had expressed a lively desire for
(1)
reconciliation. Bratiano, after he had again seen Kalnoky
when he returned to Vienna on the 21st told Elliot that the
exchange of ideas which had taken place between himself and
the Austro-Hungarian Minister had led to the view that there
was no conflict of interests between the two countries to
(2)
justify the strained relations that had existed. The Foreign
Office, as has already been mentioned, had no information on
the interview between Kalnoky and Bismarck at Salzburg on
August So, when the subject of the Rumanian Alliance was
(3)
apparently discussed between Bismarck and Kalnoky.
It v/as from Bucharest that the only information was 
received which Indicated that something more than a detente 
had taken place. Sanderson who was temporarily in charge 
there, reported on September 8, that it was generally
believed in Rumania that the Government contemplated entering
into an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. He stated 
his conviction that any negotiations which were taking place 
had not as yet assumed a definite form. His conjectures as 
to what was in.fact happening were equally accurate. He
(1) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 297 27 October 1883.
(2) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 297 27 October 1883.
(3) See
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suggested that during the King's visit at Berlin it had been 
hinted that the isolated position which Rumania was taking 
up was fraught with danger, and that, this warning having 
been taken as a hint, Bratiano had gone to Vienna and -Berlin 
in order to ascertain on what terms a favourable agreement 
might be concluded. In the event of a war between Russia 
and Austria-Hungary, Sanderson continued, neither belligerent 
would be likely to accept a declaration of neutrality unless 
it were accompanied by reasonable proofs of the power of 
Rumania to defend her whole frontier. This he regarded as 
far beyond her capacity. He left it to the Foreign Office 
to draw the conclusion that an agreement between Austria- 
Hungary and Rumania would involve a pledge of support for
Rumania to Austria-Hungary in the event of anAustro-Russian
(1)
war.
(2)
Vyhen White returned to Bucharest, at the end of September,
he reported that it was generally believed that a permanent
and important change had come over the relations of Rumania
to Austria-Hungary and informed the Foreign Office that it |
might be said to date from Bratiano*s conversation with
(3)
Bismarck at Gastein. Sanderson's only grounds for believing
(1) P.0.104/33 Sanderson to Granville 72 8 September ]S83
Confidential
(2) P.0.104/33 White to Granville 75 19 September 18$
(3) P.0.104/33 White to Granville 77 22 September 1883
Confidential
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that an Alliance was under negotiation between Russia and 
Austria-Hungary was the fact that after leaving Vienna, King 
Charles had requested Bratiano to see Bismarck and Kalnoky. 
The only authority for his other statements was the opinion 
generally held in Bucharest and among his colleagues. His 
report was unconfirmed. In October therefore, when the 
speculations of Bucharest could be separated from the facts 
that were actually known respecting Bratiano*s communications 
with Kalnoky and Bismarck, White reported that nothing had 
occurred beyond the removal, under Bismarck's guidance of
the dangerous imtto'tien that had characterized Rumanian
(1)
relations with Austria-Hungary. Baron Mayr, the Austrian
Minister at Bucharest stated moreover, that "no alteration had
taken place in the relations between Austria-Hungary and
Rumania, except that Austria-Hungary had expressed herself as
satisfied with the wish manifested by Rumania to resume more
(2)
friendly relations." .White then reported that he did not 
share the curiosity of his colleagues as to "the mysterious 
points of the suspected Alliance" - a curiosity which he 
stated remained unsatisfied in spite of repeated efforts to
(1) P.O.104/33 White to Granville 83 8 October 1883
Confidential
(2) P.0.104/33 White to Granville 85 15 October 1883
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(1)
secure Information. "l am more and more convinced,” he wrote,
”that the understanding rests entirely upon the conversation at
Gastein between Bismarck and Bratiano and that there is no
record of it. Its object is to keep up a thorough intimacy
between this kingdom and Austria-Hungary; to protect the former
and its dynasty from all Russia's encroachments and eventually
(2)
to make it side with the Germanic Empires should a war arise."
Tendencies towards a Turko-German rapprochement began to
develop soon after the delusion of the Austro-German Alliance.
Abdul Hamid attacked the problem of restoring his Empire after
the disintegrating effects of the Berlin Congress from the
(3)
financial and military standpoint. Great Britain failed to
assist the Sultan to re-organise his finances, she was not
likely to assist him to reform his army. He began then to
turn towards Austria-Hungary who had offered her protection in
(4)
1878. He saw in the Austro-German Alliance which associated 
Austria-Hungary with the strongest military Power of Europe 
an opportunity to secure the assistance he desired in reorganis­
ing his army. Early in 1880, therefore, he sent his military
(1) P.0.104/33 White to Granville 80 5 October 1883.
concerns Turkish efforts to discover the details 
of the Alliance.
D.D.P.Series I. Vol.V. Nos.91, 99.
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p. S'lO
(4) P.0.7/932 Elliot to Salisbury 499 18 July 1878
Secret 
505 23 July 1878
Confidential
517 12 Aqgust 1878
Confidential
39
adviser, Captain Dreyse, to Count Hatzfeldt, the German
Ambassador to sound him as to whether Germany would be ready
to respond to Turkish overtures for friendship and to a
request for assistance in reorganising his army and finances,
Hatzfeldt did not report the matter until the Sultan had
(1)
spoken to him in person. Bismarck then seaned quite prepared
to comply with the Sultan's wishes. He instructed Reuss
however, to find out whether Austria-Hungary would have any
objections. Reuss replied that Haymerle saw no danger in a
strong Turkish army, but regarded it as a useful element of
(2)
order in a situation that was otherwise chaotic. The Kaiser
sanctioned the sending of German civil servants and accepted,
in principal, the sending of military officers. Wettendorf
was thereupon sent to Constantinople and received an appoint­
es)
ment as Under-Secretary in the Turkish Ministry of Finance.
At this point the British Foreign office received its
first important information on the Turko-German rapprochement.
(4)
For evidence had now been publicly given respecting it, and
Bismarck had consulted Granville before Wettendorf was
(5)
appointed. Russell informed the Foreign office that Bismarcks
(1) Holbôtn op.cit.p i (Hatzfeldt to Bismarck 14 May 1880)
(2) Holbetn op.cit.pp iKiv (Bismarck to Reuss 22 May 1880)
(Reuss to Bismarck 26 May 1880)
(3) Holbctu op.cit p.<]
(4) F.0.64/960 Russell to Granville 302 14 July 1880
(5) F.0.64/960 Russell to Granville.Telegram.17 July 1880
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principal motive was to secure inside information as to the
activities of the powers at Constantinople, in order to be
in a favourable position to frame a sound policy when the
final contest for the possession of Constantinople took place.
"The next race," the Chancellor was reported to have said,
"would bring all three rivals, England, Russia, and Austria-
Hungary, still nearer to the winning post when a comfortable
seat secured beforehand in the Grand Stand might enable Germany
to judge of their respective chances and to make her book 
(1),
accordingly." Bismarck's motives however, went further than
Russell reported. He had,it is true, told Hatzfeldt that one
advantage of complying with the Sultan's request would be the
reliable information which Germany would then be able to 
(2)
secure. He saw also however, an opportunity of influencing
(3)
events at Constantinople. He believed moreover that control 
of events at Constantinople would give Germany the whip hand 
as far as Russia was concerned, and would both compel her to 
re-enter the DreiKaiserbund, for which as has been seen nego­
tiations were then going on, and to remain true to that
(4)
combination when it had been formed. Furthermore, the consol-
(1) F.0.64/961 Russell to Granville 514 17 July 1880
Secret
(2) HolbUS op.cit.p. i"L (Comment of Bismarck on a report
of Hatzfeldt. 6 July 1880)
(5 ) HolbeSi op.cit.p. » 2. (Bismarck to the Kaiser 1 June 1880)
(4) Hohenlohe: Deukwurdigkeitin Vol.II. p.301.
(Hohenlohe to the Crown Prince).
HolbMn op.cit .pp 10-^
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idation of Turkey which the reorganisation of her finances
and army would bring about, would prevent the re-opening of
issues which would disturb the European peace, and yet would
not permanently close the Eastern Question and make possible
thereby Anglo-Austro-Russian coalition directed against
Germany. "Unserer Uberzeugung nach eutspricht es der
Europaischen politik," he wrote to Hohenlohe, "der Reporte
zur Konsolidienung des Besitzes, der ihr schliesslich
(1)
verbleiben wird, behelflich zu sein."
Meanwhile, there was an outcry in the French and English
press against the sending of German officials to Turkey, and
Prance raised objections with the German Foreign office.
Granville then withdrew the unreserved approval which he had
at first expressed to Munster and suggested that financial
advisers only should be sent. Bismarck therefore informed
the Ambassadors at the different courts that only financial
advisers would be sent, and that while permission had been
granted to certain officers to transfer to the Turkish Army,
they would not leave Germany until the Greek and Montenegrin
(2)
frontier questions were settled.
Crowe was able to keep Russell informed of Wettendorf*s 
activities at Constantinople. For it seems that he kept up
(1) Holbôïs op.cit.p. 1% (Bismarck to Hohenlohe
19 July 1880).
(2) Holbeïn op.cit.pp 17-19
toi
a correspondence with the latter. The Foreign Office was thus
informed of Turkey*s desire not only to secure German officers
to train her army, hut also a pledge of German support in the
(1)
event of war with Russia. A report, indeed, reached
Granville from another source which he did not specify, that
a project had been drawn up for an offensive and defensive
(2)
alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
Russell, however, informed Granville that Crowe for once had
not convinced him, and that he was certain that Bismarck
would never consent to an alliance with Turkey "which would
alienate Russia, France and Italy from, and unite them against
(3)
Germany." Elliot reported in reply to Granville»s enquiry
that he had been unable ,to detect in any quarter a suspicion
of the existence of the Treaty, and that he was himself not
(4)
Inclined to credit the rumour.
After the definitive settlement of the Greek question 
by the Treaty of 2 July 1881, both Greece and Turkey asked 
for German instructors for their armies. The conclusion of
(1) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville , 5 November 1880.
enclosing Crowe to 
Russell 29 0ct?1880.
(2) F.0.64/978 Granville to Russell 35 20 January 1881
Confidential
(3) F.0.64/979 Russell to Granville 51 28 January 1881
Confidential
(4) F.0.7/1013 Elliot to Granville 74 10 February 1881
the DreiKaiserhund had improved Germany»s diplomatic position
since the previous year. The coincidence of the Greek and
Turkish requests created a difficult situation as their
armies were likely to be used against each other. Bismarck
therefore complied with neither request. He instructed
Hatzfeldt, however, to handle the Turkish request in a
dilatory manner and only to give a definite refusal if a
(1)
plausible ground offered itself.
At this time indisputable evidence respecting German
relations with Turkey was afforded by the frequent interviews
which were seen to be taking place between Hatzfeldt and the
(2)
Sultan and the German dragomans and the porte, and in Berlin
between the Turkish Ambassador and Limburg-Stirum who was in
(3)
charge of the German Foreign Office. They led Ampthill to 
make enquiries. Limburg-Stirum was reserved, but he acknow­
ledged that the Sultan constantly appealed to Germany for 
advice on the Egyptian question. Ampthill was convinced that 
Bismarck had definitely embarked on a policy of cultivating 
intimate relations with Turkey and would not endanger his
opportunity of securing in^^y supporting England in the
(4)
Egyptian question.
(1) HolbeeSi op.cit.^%0 (Herbert Bismarck to Bush) 6 October 1880.
(2) G.D.29/206. Granville to Ampthill(enclosing 27 Sept? 1881.
Dufferin to Granville). 20 September 18^
(3) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville. 1 October 1881.
(4) F.0.64/983 Ampthill to Granville. 412 3 October 1881.
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Bismarck still maintained his policy of keeping Great
Britain informed of his relations with Turkey and Hatzfeldt
who took charge of the Foreign Office on October 22, asked
Ampthill to inform Granville privately of Bismarck* s desire
to send four military officers to Turkey, and to enquire
(1)
whether he had any objections. Granville telegraphed his
approval. Before however, any action was taken by Germany
(2)
there was a fresh incident in Turko-German relations.
At the beginning of December 1881, Ali Nizami pasha,and
Reshid Bey the Sultan*s private secretary, together with a
(3)
large suite, arrived in Berlin. The purpose of their mission
was ostensibly to present to the Kaiser the insignia of an
order which the Sultan had conferred upon him. The length
of their stay in Berlin, and the warmth of the reception which
they were given, led the press to assert that a secret Treaty
of Alliance with Germany was being negotiated. Ampthill was
(4)
inclined to believe the official denials of these assertions, 
and information which was received to the effect that the 
Sultan*s emissaries were in Berlin to secure the investment of
(1) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville 29 October 1881
Telegram 4 November 1881.
(2) G.D.29/206 Granville to Ampthill 5 November 1881.
(3) F.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 459 4 December 1881.
(4) F.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 468 14 December 1881.
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(1)
German capital in Turkey encouraged him to do so. It
appeared that they were in communication with several German
financial houses and were attempting to raise a loan, and to
form a company of German capitalists for the construction of
a railway to Baghdad. Useful information was secured in
this connection from Dr. Budde the Constantinople Correspondent
of the Cologne Gazette, who was a persona grata with the
Sultan, on intimate terms with Wettendorf and had access to
(2)
official sources of information. Bismarck when he made a 
communication on the subject of the Turkish mission to Ampthill, 
confirmed the information the latter had received from this 
source. He also confirmed the Ambassador*s impression that 
an Alliance was not being negotiated. The Chancellor stated 
however, that Nizami Pasha had asked for a formal promise of 
moral support from Germany, and offered in return an offensive 
and defensive alliance. The Sultan had in view a Franco- 
German war when Turkish assistance to Germany might be repaid 
by the recovery of Tunis. Bismarck had replied that Germany 
would never attack France, and would never fire a cartridge 
for Turkey. Bismarck made clear to Ampthill however, that 
he desired to establish a close friendship with the porte.
(1) P.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 468 14 December 1881
Confidential
(2) F.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 475 18 December 1881
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For this reason he must refuse to support Britain in urging
(1)
administrative reforms upon the Sultan. The Ambassador was
in fact convinced that Nizami Pasha and Reshid Bey "are
getting round Bismarck" and that "German influence will now
(2)
become very great at Constantinople." Shortly afterwards
Nizami Pasha arrived in Vienna. The length of his stay
(3)
there again aroused suspicions. Dufferin telegraphed from
Constantinople that the Sultan had offered Crete and Rhodes
(4)
to Austria-Hungary in return for Bosnia. Kalnoky assured
Elliot that only the junction of the Turkish and Servian
railways had been discussed between himself and the Turkish
(5)
envoy. Ampthill however, remained of opinion that the Sultan
was in fact working for an alliance with Austria-Hungary and
(6)
Germany directed against France. His conjecture on this matter 
was correct. In February the Sultan made a formal overture 
of alliance to Calice at Constantinople. The arrangement which
(1) F.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 481 20 December 1881
Secret.
c.f. G.P.Vol.Ill.No.671. Bismarck»3 record of his conver­
sation with the Turkish envoys. It follows closely the 
account he gave to Ampthill,
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(3) F.0.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 2 5 January 1882
Confidential
(4) F.0.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 497 31 December 1881
Secret.
(5) F.0.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 2 5 January 1882
Confidential
(6 ) F.0.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 1 1 January 1882
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he proposed was to include Turkish support for Austria-Hungary
in dealing with the Bosnian insurrection and a division of the
Balkans into a Northern region controlled by Austria-Hungary
(1)
and a Southern region controlled by Turkey. Ampthill had 
however no definite information that this overture had been 
made .
During the following years British information showed 
that the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary did not 
develop in any new direction. The main features of their rela­
tions during 1879-82 were preserved during 1882-84. The 
exchange of courtesies, the increasing influence at Constan­
tinople of Austria-Hungary and Germany, resulting from the 
employment of German officials by Turkey, and the Sultan’s 
reliance on German and Austro-Hungarian advice, and the 
failure of Turkish efforts to secure an alliance from her 
protectors or any pledges of support continued to characterise 
German and Austrian relations with Turkey.
Ampthill reported that the German Emperor at the reception 
of the diplomatic corps on New Year’s Day 1882 and again on
his birthday in March showed marked attention to the Turkish
(2 )
Ambassador. Prince Radiziwill, the Emperor’s aide-de-camp
left for Constantinople in January to carry the insignia of
(S)
the order of the Black Eagle to the Sultan. In September 1882
(1) Holt&A; op.cit .pp.fi-i-16 (Reuss to Bismarck 5 February 1882)
(2) P.0.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 1 ^1 January 1882
' ' 101 22 March 1882
(5) P.O.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 50 31 January 1882.
if or
Fuad Pasha arrived in Vienna to present the insignia of an
(1)
Order conferred on the Emperor Francis Joseph by the Sultan,
In October 1883 General Mouktar Pasha arrived in Vienna and was
received by the Emperor. He went to German military manoeuvres
(2)
and was received by the Kaiser in Berlin.
In April 1882 four German officers at last entered the
(3)
Turkish army to serve as military instructors. In March 1884
a contingent of Turkish officers arrived in Berlin for service
(4)
in the German army, . Meanwhile the Sultan’s efforts to secure
the investment of German capital in Turkey continued and an
attempt was made in June 1882 to form a German Company for the
(5)
execution of Turkish public works. There could be no doubt
of Austria-Hungary’s anxiety to appear to the Porte as the
supporter and protector of Turkey, and of the existing rights
(6)
of the sultan. ”We must," wrote Elliot’, "be prepared to see
(1) F.0.7/1035 Elliot to Granville 331 4 July 1882
445 5 September 1882 .
(2) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 297 27 October 1883.
(3) F.0.64/1006 Ampthill to Granville 143 27 April 1882
151, 6 May 1882.
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Austria exercise at Constantinople a greater influence than
(1)
she has previously enjoyed. In 1883 Kalnoky refused to
support Dufferin*s representations to the Sultan respecting
Armenian reforms. Austria-Hungary kept steadily in view the
determination to increase her influence at Constantinople,
(2)
and would do nothing to endanger it. During the Egyptian
crisis Austria-Hungary saw an opportunity to prove to Turkey
the reality of her offers of protection, Kalnoky repeatedly
spoke to Elliot of the danger of Mussulman unrest resulting
from the British operations in Egypt. He told him that an
impression was growing throughout Turkey as a result of the
pressure to secure the execution of the Berlin Treaty, the
Tunis episode and the present events in Egypt, that a policy
of systematic hostility was being pursued by the Christian
Powers. Austria-Hungary therefore warned the Sultan not to
withdraw his troops from Syria and herself sent a gunboat to
Jaffa to guard against a serious outbreak of disaffection.
Austria-Hungary’s action was the more noticeable in that she
had only the support of Germany. Britain, Turkey’s former
ally, refused to believe that there was any disturbance of
(3)
Mussulman feeling. There is no need to refer again in detail to
(1) P.0 .7 / 1 0 3 3 Elliot to Granville 171 10 April 1882.
Confidential.
(2) P.0.7/1049 Elliot to Granville 156 22 May 1883
Confidential.
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the negotiations on the Egyptian question when Austria- 
Hungary and Germany advocated the settlement of the difficul­
ties by means of a Turkish intervention, and supported the 
rights of the Sultan as Suzerain, and the light which they 
therefore threw upon the relations of the two Empires with
Turkey. Suffice it to say that Bismarck went so far as to
(1)
advocate a Turkish intervention even without European control
and that Ampthill at one point feared he might even be
prepared to support the Sultan in an effort to re-establish
the national movement of Arab! against all foreign inter-
(2) 
ference.
Already in 1882 Ampthill described to Granville the
consequences of the state of affairs. There existed a state
of real intimacy between Germany and Turkey, and prince
Bismarck had a useful ally in case of war with either France
(3)
or Russia or with both France and Russia.
(1) F.0.64/1004 Granville to Ampthill 390 11 September 1882
Most Confidential 
F.0.64/1006 Ampthill to Granville 214 16 June 1882
Secret.
(2) F.0.64/1006 Ampthill to Granville 245 21 June 1882
Secret.
(3) F.0.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 102 22 March 1882
Confidential.
It seemed clear however that no pledge had been given
by Germany in return, and that every attempt on Turkey’s part
(1)
to secure an alliance had failed. A report spread that 
Radiziwill*s mission had been used as the opportunity to 
negotiate a military convention between Germany and Turkey. 
Ampthill was certain that the report was unfounded.
(1) Kalnoky did not reject the Sultan’s overture of February 
1882 outright, but stated that the neutrality of Turkey 
in the Bosnian troubles would be sufficient and that 
he would welcome the co-operation of Turkey in general 
questions iiythe Balkans. He appealed to Germany to 
assist him to retain Turkey’s friendship and to avoid 
the necessity of giving a pledge of support (Holborn 
op cit.p.27 et seq).
At the end of 1883 a conversation between one of the 
German officials in the Turkish employment and the 
Sultan, gave the latter an opening to offer a Turkish 
assurance that she would stand by Austria-Hungary and 
Germany in the event of war, provided he was given an 
assurance in return that Turkey would not then be 
attacked by England. Bismarck was prepared to respond 
to the Sultan’s overtures, if German relations with 
Russia deteriorated. (Graf Waldersee: DenkwUrdigkeiten 
Vol.I, pp.219-222).
In 1883 the rumour was circulated that Turkey was seeking
to establish commitments between herself and Austria-Hungary
and Germany. Kalnoky assured Elliot that nothing of the
(1)
sort was taking place. Again Mouktar Pasha was suspected
of seeking to negotiate an alliance. Kalnoky informed the
Delegations that "no agreement on concrete political questions
(2)
had been come to."
British information indicated that Russia’s relations 
with Turkey developed on very similar lines to those between 
Turkey and the two Empires. As long as the Greek and 
Montenegrin frontier questions remained unsettled and there 
seemed some prospect that forcible action of the European 
Concert against Turkey might bring about further disintegra­
tion, there was no evidence that Russian Influence at 
Constantinople had increased since 1879. Gier accurately 
described the situation to Dufferin. "Shortly before Prince 
Labaroff," he said, "had quitted Constantinople, he had 
brought the Sultan very much under Russian influence. Now
(3)
however, we are again unfriendly with the Porte." By 1882
(1) P.0.7/1049 Elliot to Granville 164 31 May 1883
Confidential,
(2) P.0.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 297 27 October 1883
(3) P.O.65/1081 Dufferin to Granville 337 12 August 1880
Confidential.
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however, British information indicated a change. Thornton
reported that the Turkish Ambassador in St. Petersburg had
told him Russia desired to be on friendly terms with the
(1)
Porte. At about the same time an article appeared in the
Official Messenger drawn up according to Thornton by Jomini.
It expressed pleasure at the closer friendship between
Germany and the porte and stated that Russia hoped to part-
(2 )
icipate in it. The Egypt question was seen to offer to 
Russia the same opportunity as to Austria-Hungary and Germany 
for a demonstration of friendship to Turkey. Russia in
(3)
contrast to the attitude she had previously adopted , by
(4)
June 1882 was also advocating a Turkish intervention. The
Sultan appealed to the Czar”for moral support against
(5)
British and French aggression." In the summer Novikoff
(1) F.0.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 6 7 January 1882
Confidential
(2) P.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 17 13 January 1882
(3) P.0.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 51 7 February 1882
(4) P.0.65/1136 Thornton to Granville 222 5 July 1882
(5) P.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 57 15 May 1882
Telegram.
P.0.65/1136 Thornton to Granville 186 1 June 1882
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Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, was replaced by
Nelidoff, and the Foreign Office was informed that it might
(1)
expect considerable Russian activity there. These expect­
ations seemed to be justified when it appeared shortly 
afterwards that Nelidoff was supporting the Sultan in his 
resistance to British efforts to secure his signature of the
Military Convention respecting the conditions on which
(2)
Turkish troops were to be sent to Egypt. Suspicions that
Russia was inciting Turkey against England continued through-
(3)
out 1883. At the same time information of a serious
rapprochement and an attempt to secure a formal alliance
reached the Foreign Office. In October, The Novoe Vremya
announced that a rapprochement had taken place and urged
(4)
that a formal alliance should be concluded. In November,
Granville received definite information that ignatieff was
intriguing with the Turkish Ambassador in St.Petersburg to
(5)
bring about an offensive and defensive alliance. Ampthill
(1) P.0.7/1035 Elliot to Granville 414 12 August 1882.
(2) P.0.64/1007 Ampthill to Granville 330 19 August 1882
Confidential.
refers to a series ofreports on the subject received 
from Constantinople.
P.0 .7 / 1 0 3 5 Elliot to Granville 426 23 August 1882
Confidential
466 22 September 1882
Confidential
(3) P.0.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 208 30 July 1883
Confidential
P.0.65/1180 Granville to Thornton 81a 8 April 1884
(4) P.0 .4 5 / 1 0 5 7 Thornton to Granville 236 4 October 1883
(5) P,0.64/lo23 Granville to Ampthill 34 23 November 1883
and 55 
Telegrams
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secured very clear confirmation from Schweinitz who was 
(1)
then In Berlin. British information however indicated that 
as in the case of Turkish relations with Austria-HUngary and 
Germany while relations were obviously close, no formal 
commitments existed.
(1) P.0.64/1027 Ampthill to Granville 328 28 November 1883
Secret.
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CONCLUSION
'We are then able to assign certain general characteristics 
to British information on European alliances and ententes 
during the period 1879-85. In the first place while the 
British Foreign Office on no occasion received exact informa­
tion as to the type of agreement that had been concluded 
or as to its text, with some minor exceptions it received 
accurate Information as to the effects which each of the 
agreements under certain circumstances might have on the 
development of European politics. Thus while the Foreign 
Office was informed that the Austro-German Alliance was 
recorded in a formal treaty, no Information was received 
respecting the Protocol and Memorandum which supplemented it. 
Information was received at one point that a Protocol had 
been signed by Kalnoky and Giers, but no information was 
received on any occasion that a formal Treaty had been signed 
by Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. The conclusion 
finally reached by the British representatives was that only 
an informal agreement existed between them. Information was 
received■that a written agreement existed between Italy,
Germany and Austria-Hungary, but not that a Treaty existed.
The Foreign Office was informed that the exchange of despatches 
addressed by the respective Ambassadors to their Governments 
established the Alliance. In regard to Austrian relations
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with Servis, and Austrian and German relations with Rumania, 
Information was received at different times that a military 
alliance or military convention had been signed. The final 
conclusion reached by the British representatives, however.
In the first case was that no'agreement existed at all and 
In the second that only an Informal agreement existed based 
upon conversations between the Rumanian Prime Minister and 
Bismarck and Kalnoky.
No part of the text of the Austro-German Alliance was 
known to the British Foreign Office. It was Informed, however, 
that In the event of a Russian attack upon one of the two powers 
It would have the assistance of the other. This Information 
led It to expect as probable the other situation which would 
result from the Treaty: Austrlaoi-Hungarian assistance to 
Germany In the event of a war against France and Russia 
combined. Information received In regard to the close 
diplomatic co-operation of the two Powers and the evidence of 
their friendship given by tlie periodic exchange of views 
between the Emperors and the Ministers of the two countries, 
led the Foreign Office by 1884 to expect that neutrality 
would at least be maintained by. the one Ppwer If the other 
were engaged In war. The Information received In 1884 that 
an agreement, if an Informal one, existed between the three 
Empires closed the question that had been left open In 1879 
respecting the relations of the allied Empires with Russia.
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Evidence again in regard to the close diplomatic co-operation 
between Austria-Hungary and Germany from 1879-84, together 
wltil the Information received In 1883 that agreements entirely 
separate from the Austro-German Alliance existed between 
Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, and Austria-Hungary,
Germany and Rumania finally enlightened the Foreign Office 
as to the character of the Alliance as an exclusive agree­
ment between Austria-Hungary and Germany based on their 
existence as German Powers as well as a purely diplomatic 
agreement based on common political Interests. Paget In 
November 1884 In reviewing Austria-Hungary's European relations 
described the Austro-German Alliance as the basis of a system,
which agreements with Italy and Russia and close friendships
(1)
with üervla and Rumania completed.
Again the Foreign Office was Informed as to the general 
results of the Drelkalserbund. Its Information as to the 
existence of an agreement, although an Informal one, between 
the three Empires, and Information as to their diplomatic 
co-operation since 1881, made the assumption that the other 
two would observe at least benevolent neutrality In the event 
of one of them being engaged In war natural. This, as has 
been seen was the only effect on European politics that
(1) F.0.7/1065 Paget to Granville 304 27 November 1884
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would arise from the stipulations of the Treaty in the event 
of war. As to the effects of the Treaty in other circum­
stances, the Foreign Office was informed that the three 
Powers would co-operate In the Eastern Question and endeavour 
to keep the settlement of any fresh crisis that arose in 
connection with it in their own hands. It was led to expect 
that Russia would not disapprove of an Austrian annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor Austria-Hungary of the eventual 
union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumella. It received Information 
which led It to believe that Russia might raise the Straits 
question, not however that an agreement respecting It had 
actually been reached by the three Powers.
In regard to the Triple Alliance, Information received 
by the British Foreign Office led It to expect first that 
In the event of an attack upon Germany, Austria-Hungary 
or Italy by either France or Russia the three Powers would 
unite In their common defence, and secondly that they would 
co-operate In all questions which came under general diplomatic 
discussion. In the first respect It anticipated a situation 
that would not entirely arise from the stipulations of the 
Treaty. In the event of an attack upon Germany by France 
only Italy was bound to act with her. Only If Russia were 
assisted by a second Power would the three Signatories co­
operate against her. In the event of the third contingency
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provided for by the Treaty - a declaration of war by one 
of the Signatories as a result of the menacing attitude of 
a fourth Power actually occurlng, the information received 
by the Foreign Office as to the close friendship between 
the three Pov/ers was sufficient to lead It to consider the 
maintenance of neutrality by the other Signatories as probable. 
Lastly, the Foreign Office was Informed that the alliance 
would be In force until 1887.
In regard to Servla the Information possessed by the 
Foreign Office was sufficient to lead It to expect that she 
would maintain neutrality, not support Austria-Hungary In 
the event of the latter Power being engaged In war, that 
Austria-Hungary would support King Milan In the event of any 
Internal troubles, and that Austria-Hungary would probably 
exercise some Influence on the relations of Servla with other 
Powers. No Information was received such as to lead It to 
expect that Austria-Hungary would assist Servla In the event 
of her being engaged In war or that she would encourage 
Servian aggression at the expense of Turkey or other Balkan 
States.
In regard to Rumania, Information was such as to lead 
to the expectation that In the event of war Rumania would side 
with Austria-Hungary and Germany, that the latter Powers 
would support King Charles In the event of internal diffi­
culties, and that they would probably exercise some Influence 
over Rumanian relations with other Powers.
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Tills Information was not, however, always so decisive 
nor always received from such a source that the Foreign Office 
could have full confidence In Its accuracy or completeness. 
Thus In regard to the Drelkalserbund, the Information In 1881 
respecting the signature of a Protocol was not received from 
a source wnlch enabled the Foreign Office to consider It 
accurate. The Foreign Office had no decisive Information 
that any one of the three Empires would maintain an attitude 
of benevolent neutrality If the other two were engaged In war, 
nor that a promise of assistance had not been given for 
certain eventualities. It had only Malet's Information from 
an unspecified source, tnough one for whose reliability he 
was prepared to vouch, that as a result of the agreement 
established at Sklernerwlrce the question of the Straits was 
to be raised by Russia, Moreover, the fact that the report 
was never confirmed or substantiated, probably led to Its 
being considered unfounded.
In regard to the Triple Alliance: Information which 
led to the expectation that neutrality would be maintained 
by the others In the event of one of the Signatories engaging 
In a "preventive" war against a fourth Power was such as to 
lead only to an Impression that that was probable, and was 
not decisive. The Information that the alliance was to 
terminate In 1887 was also not decisive. For It was not 
known when It had been concluded and It was only considered
421
likely that it had been concluded some time during 1832.
Finally in regard to the Austro-Servlan Alliance, and 
the Austro-Grerraan-Rumanian Alliance, British information 
again was such as to lead them to consider In given clrcum- 
i stances, certain developments probable rather than to feel 
convinced that they would actually come about.
In the case of the agreements where British Information 
was generally decisive and such as to lead the Foreign Office 
to feel confidence In Its accuracy and completeness, an 
Interval elapsed either before It received Information of 
that nature or before It received any Information at all.
Thus In regard to the Austro-G-erman Alliance while only a 
short Interval elapsed before the Foreign Office was 
informed of the main Implications of the Treaty, It was only 
by 1884 that It had received decisive Information respecting 
the effect of the Treaty on the relations of the two Powers 
to Russia and upon Its exclusive character. It was not until 
three years after Its conclusion that the Foreign Office had 
received Information respecting the Drelkalserbund which led 
It to appreciate the main effects of that agreement. It was 
almost a year after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance 
before the Foreign Office knew of Its existence.
Only In regard to the Austro-German Alliance was the 
Foreign Office Informed of the date of conclusion. Only In 
regard to the Triple Alliance v/as It Informed of the date
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of Its expiration. Lastly the Foreign Office on no occasion 
received Information respecting the negotiations of the 
agreements.
The diplomatic machine Is not designed primarily for 
the purpose of securing Information. An Ambassador or 
Minister Is appointed to represent the Interests of his 
country and to act as Its agent in any transactions It may 
have with the country to which he Is accredited. It there­
fore suffers under certain practical disadvantages In this 
respect. The public standing of an Ambassador necessarily 
restricts his freedom of movement. No British Ambassador 
therefore witnessed any of the Imperial meetings, even when 
as In the case of the Danzig meetings or the meetings between 
the Emperors of Austria-Hungary and Germany, they took place 
partly In public. The same applies to the meetings between 
Bismarck and Andrassy at Gaskeln, or between Bismarck and 
Kalnoky at Salzburg.
Again, only In exceptional circumstances can an Ambassador 
ask a direct question without running the risk of a rebuff or 
at best of an evasive reply. On no occasion, as far as has 
been shown by the documents that have been studied In connec­
tion with the present subject, did he do so without some 
opening being given, either, for Instance, by the circulation 
of exaggerated rumours which the Ambassador could suggest 
the Foreign Minister might wish to deny, or by some
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remark of the Foreign Minister himself. When Salisbury 
enquired of Karolyl whether the Austro-German Alliance 
Involved a written agreement Bismarck considered he had 
been highly Indiscreet. Later he complained to Ampthill 
that Waddlngton who was then In Berlin, had passed the limits 
Imposed by ordinary diplomatic courtesy In questioning him 
In regard to the Triple Alliance. Paget questioned ManeIn1 
directly on the subject. It Is doubtful, however, whether he 
would have secured any Information as the result of his 
enquiries If ManeIn1 had not considered It In his Interest 
to give It. Paget questioned Kalnoky as to whether any 
agreement existed between the three powers respecting the 
Straits and Kalnoky replied that none existed.
Again, the diplomatic machine being designed primarily 
for the purpose of negotiation, the moment when there was a 
lull In diplomatic negotiations was chosen for the regular 
leave of the head of the Embassy or Mission. The fact that 
an Important development In European relations was taking 
place or might be about to take place was never considered 
sufficient to prevent an Ambassador from taking his leave. 
Thus It happened that In the autumn of 1879, at the time of 
the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance, Britain was 
represented by charges d’affaires In all the principal 
European capitals. Walsham did not see Bismarck when he 
returned to Berlin Immediately after the Vienna meeting.
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Russell would probably have procured an interview. Bismarck 
when in Vienna called upon the Ambassadors who were there 
and spoke to them of the object of his journey, Egerton as 
charge d’affaires did not receive a visit. Again at the time 
of the signature of the Drelkalserbund agreement In Berlin, 
the British Ambassador was on leave. In the same way a 
change of Ambassadors was not determined by the demands of 
the Foreign Office as far- as the obtaining of information 
was concerned. During the year In whlch Important develop­
ments In RussIan relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany 
took place. DufferIn was recalled from St. Petersburg and 
for six months the Embassy was without a permanent head.
Moreover, while Instructions from the Foreign Office
could Influence to some extent the energy and success of 
the Ambassador as far as negotiations were concerned, the 
Foreign Office was entirely dependent upon the representa­
tives’ skill and activity when It came to securing Informa­
tion In regard to some new development. Paget’s activity 
drew from Vienna more Information than Elliot or Egerton 
as the charge d ’affaires had been able to procure.
As a result It has been seen that the Foreign Office
secured the greater part of Its Information as to the 
relations between the Powers from the course of diplomatic 
negotiations. They showed the development from the fluid 
state of relationships 3n the period Immediately following
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the Congress of a close Austro-German friendship. After 
1880 they were a less fruitful source but they served to 
indicate to some extent the basis upon which the relations 
between the three Empires were being drawn closer. They 
showed the relations existing between Germany and France, 
and served to confirm the Information received from other 
sources respecting the relations between Italy and the 
German Empires. After 1881 on the one hand, they encouraged 
the view that some formal agreement existed between the 
three Empires and revealed to some extent the results of 
the agreement that had In fact been concluded. On the 
other hand, they furnished the only Information which 
the Foreign Office possessed until 1883 respecting Italy’s 
relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Only when 
an Ambassador had been led as a result of the evidence 
afforded by diplomatic negotiations to expect that some 
agreement was In existence or was about to come Into 
existence, did he devote any serious attention to discovering 
what was the precise nature of the relations between any 
group of Powers.
There were other sources from which the necessary 
Impulse to the obtaining of Information came. There was 
generally some public evidence given sooner or later when any 
effort was made to put the relations between any Powers
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upon some particular footing. An Ambassador’s personal 
observation enabled him to detect any marked exchange of 
civilities between tlie representative of another Power and 
the Court to which he was accredited. Thus In 1879 the 
attention paid In Rome to the Russian Ambassador,and the 
exchange of civilities between the Russians and French In 
Paris, In 1880 the coolness of the Czar towards the French 
Ambassador, In 1881 the courtesy shown to the Turkish 
Ambassador In Berlin,played some part In causing the British 
representative to seek Information upon the relations of 
the powers In question. In the same way the Ambassador soon 
observed any particular friendship between the representatives 
of different powers accredited to the same Court as himself.
In St. Petersburg the close association between Schwelnltz 
and Kalnoky attracted Dufferln’s attention. The Imperial 
meetings and the visit of King Humbert to Vienna, the visits 
of different Ambassadors to Varzln and Frledrlchsruhe and 
meetings between Bismarck and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister again gave public evidence of the relations existing 
between the Powers In question. To the same category belong 
the various military missions that took place: the mission 
that was sent from Germany In 1878 to attend the French army 
manoeuvres, the mission of Austrian and German generals to 
St. Petersburg In 1880, the mission of Russian Generals to 
congratulate the Emperor William on the seventieth anniversary
of his receipt of the Russian order of St. George and the
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various Turkish missions. Lastly, in Austria-Hungary,
Russia and Germany, where the Governments exercised con­
siderable control over the Press of their country. It often 
afforded public evidence of the relations that existed.
The various "scares" that occurred during the period are 
examples In this connection. The necessary Impulse might 
come from other articles In the Press or from the rumours 
that were circulating In the capital where the Ambassador 
was stationed. Thus It was the Press and the talk of the 
Vienna public that was largely responsible for significance 
being attached to the Vienna meeting In 1879 as It had 
not been attached to the Gasteln meeting which preceded It. 
Again, It v/as the Press that was responsible by the publica­
tion of the Protocol that It was alleged had been signed by 
Glers and Kalnoky, for the attempt half-hearted though It 
was, that was made along lines that would have led to an 
eventual revelation of the Protocol that had actually been 
signed to obtain Information respecting the Drelkalserbund 
agreement. It was the Press In 1882 which eventually gave 
Paget the necessary material to enable him to frame Important 
questions for Manclnl and which was In part responsible for 
his successful attempt In 1883 to secure Information 
respecting the Triple Alliance. It was public opinion In 
Bucharest that led the British representative there to attach 
some significance to the visits of Prince Charles and Bratlano
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to Vienna and Gasteln In 1883 and to attempt to discover 
vfhat had taken place.
There was a certain circulation of Information among 
the representatives of different Powers accredited to the 
same court, among the different British representatives, and 
occasionally among the Foreign Ministers In person. This 
also provided the stimulus necessary before an attempt to 
secure Information was made. Tv/o notable occasions when 
the Information received from one of his colleagues set a 
representative at work to secure Information, were when 
Kendell Informed Macdonnell of Russian overtures to France and 
Italy, and v/hen one of his colleagues Informed Thornton of 
the Protocol signed by Glers and Kalnoky In December 1881.
There was always some exchange of opinions between Dufferln 
and Kalnoky while the latter was Austrian Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg and between Dufferln and General Chauzy, the French 
Ambassador there. Haddington’s communications to Salisbury 
In 1879 respecting Andrassy’s resignation furnished an 
example of an exchange of Information between Foreign Ministers 
The circulation of Information among the British representa­
tives was conducted by means of the Confidential Print, 
the sending of despatches under Flying Seal through certain 
capitals, the sending by the Foreign Office of copies of 
Important despatches to other representatives for their 
comments, and the personal correspondence of the representa­
tives themselves. A representative, especially at one of the
429
smaller capitals often secured Important Information that 
did not primarily concern him, although It might concern the 
Government to which he was accredited, as when the British 
Minister at Belgrade was Informed that the Austrian Government 
had remonstrated with Robllaut on account of the close 
relations between England and Italy. In the same way •
Stephens at Phlllppopolls learnt In 1831 of the alleged 
overtures of Russia to Austria-Hungary for an agreement 
respecting the Balkans. Again a military attache frequently 
secured information which did not concern him as when Stourdza 
spoke to Colonel Primrose respecting Rumania’s relation with 
Austha-liungary. Gould’s despatches from Belgrade passing 
through Vienna under plying Seal, drew further Information 
from Elliot. The St. Petersburg despatches which went under 
Plying Seal through Berlin, such as the despatch concerning 
Jomlnl’s overture for an alliance with England, drew Information 
from the representative there. Of Important despatches of 
which copies were forwarded to other capitals by the Foreign 
Office, the most Important were those concerning the Austro- 
German Alliance and Paget’s despatch concerning the Triple 
Alliance.
Less frequently statements of the Foreign Ministers In 
Parliament give the necessary Impulse to the securing of 
Information. Manclnl’s statements to the Italian Chambers 
and Senate respecting the Triple Alliance was the principal
occasion on which this occurred.
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All these sources from which the impulse to secure 
Information came showed the results of developments which had 
already taken place and caused the Ambassador to seek Informa­
tion after the event In question had occurred. The Foreign 
Office was dependent for Information contemporary with the 
event It concerned upon communications from the Powers In 
question, the Press, or upon some Independent and private 
source. Communications from the Powers concerned were always 
open to the suspicion that they were Incomplete and that they 
they were determined solely by what the particular Power desired 
the British Foreign Office to believe respecting Its relations 
with other powers, and were generally distrusted. Thus 
Maffel’s denials In 1879 that Italy was coquetting with Russia 
were disregarded. In spite of the friendship of Austria-Hungary 
to England In 1878, Andrassy never communicated the exact 
character of Austria-Hungary’s relations with Russia. From 
1878 until It was Impossible In the face of evidence given 
publicly to the contrary, Austria-Hungary whenever she 
coromunlcated anything respecting her relations with other Powers, 
was always careful to deny the existence of any chance of an 
Austro-RussIan rapprochement. The communication respecting 
the Austro-German Alliance, It was obvious to the Foreign 
Office which knew of the existence of a written agreement, 
was at best but a paraphrase of the actual Treaty. Kalnoky’s 
statements respecting the Triple Alliance were at once dis­
trusted after Manclnl’s conversation with Paget. Where
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the Press was in receipt of coriimunications from the Government 
of the country, it furnished a useful source of information.
As for instance when Maneini drew Paget’s attention to an 
article in the Popolo Romano instead of himself communicating 
what had occurred at the Belgirate Conference. Again it was 
always an index to public opinion and the state of public 
opinion was an indirect source of information either as In 
the case of the Triple Alliance because It heralded the 
course ultimately taken by the Government, or as In the case 
of the Drelkalserbund by giving an opportunity for the Foreign 
Office to appreciate the existence of considerable confidence 
between the three Governments. Independent and private 
sources, while they furnished Information concerning the 
actual committments undertaken and not only such Information 
as would lead to an Impression as to the probability of certain 
situations arising, were normally called Into play only 
after the event. Thus In 1878 Russell,sometime after It had 
been written, secured Information respecting the Confidential 
Memorandum concerning Germany’s relations with Russia that 
was drawn up for the Crown Prince, Malet obtained Information 
respecting the Drelkalserbund In 1884 from some private source, 
Paget obtained Information respecting the Triple Alliance from 
an Independent and private source but not until 1883. Only 
on the two occasions of the signature of the Austro-German 
Alliance and the negotiations In the summer of 1880 between
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Italy and Germany did such an independent source furnish 
information contemporary with the event.
The large body of Information respecting actual 
ccmmlttments furnished to the Foreign Office was then the 
result of the Interpretation In the light of the Ambassador’i 
personal knowledge and experience - his preconceived notions 
on the subject - of the Information derived from the sources 
which had originally caused him to make enquiries.
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